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bana her zaman güç verdi. Sizi çok seviyorum…
Table of contents
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xiii
1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Starting point 1
1.2 Existence of “legal constraints”: Nature of the EU legal order 3
1.2.1 Constitutional or not? 6
1.2.2 Evolution towards further entrenchment of rights 9
1.3 Nature of “legal constraints”: Theoretical definition 19
1.4 Identifying “legal constraints”: Operational definition 21
1.4.1 Methodology 23
1.4.2 The Permanent Safeguard Clause (PSC) 24
1.5 Structure of the thesis 27
1.5.1 Part I: Legal constraints flowing from EEC-Turkey
Association Law 27
1.5.2 Part II: Legal constraints flowing from the Accession
Process 29
1.5.3 Part III: Legal constraints flowing from the constitutional
foundations of the Union 29
1.6 Summary 30
PART I – Legal Constraints flowing from EEC-Turkey Association Law 33
2 ASSOCIATION AS A STEPPING-STONE TO MEMBERSHIP 35
2.1 Introduction 35
2.2 Defining ‘association’ 35
2.3 Principles of practice and association as a flexible and evolving tool 38
2.4 Different models of association 43
2.4.1 Associations based on a Customs Union 44
2.4.2 Associations based on a potential Customs Union 45
2.4.3 The EEA: The Internal Market Association 46
2.4.4 Associations based on a Free Trade Area 48
2.5 Conclusion 51
X Table of contents
3 THE ANKARA ASSOCIATION LAW 55
3.1 Introduction 55
3.2 Aims and structure of the Agreement 55
3.3 Ankara Association Law 59
3.3.1 The Customs Union 59
3.3.2 Free movement of persons 62
3.3.2.1 In the Ankara Agreement 63
3.3.2.2 In the Additional Protocol 65
3.3.2.3 In the Association Council Decisions 67
3.3.2.3.1 Decision 2/76 67
3.3.2.3.2 Decision 1/80 67
3.3.2.3.3 Decision 3/80 70
3.3.2.4 Case law of the Court of Justice 72
3.3.2.4.1 Establishing the Court’s jurisdiction 74
3.3.2.4.2 Aims and nature of the standstill clauses 77
3.4 Conclusion 107
PART II – Legal Constraints Flowing from the Accession Process 113
4 PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS 119
4.1 Introduction 119
4.2 Past and present Treaty provisions governing enlargement 119
4.3 Accession procedure in practice 126
4.3.1 Precedent set by the first enlargement 126
4.3.2 Evolution of the enlargement practice 130
4.3.2.1 Role of the Commission 133
4.3.2.2 Role of the Council 136
4.3.2.3 Role of the European Parliament 139
4.3.3 Practice governing future enlargements 141
4.4 Definition and consolidation of negotiation principles 143
4.4.1 The first enlargement as the source of all principles 144
4.4.2 Enlargement to the South: Main principles maintained 145
4.4.3 Enlargement to the North: Main principles confirmed 146
4.4.4 Enlargement to the East: Negotiation principles entrenched 147
4.4.5 Future Enlargements: Respect or deviation from entrenched
principles? 150
4.5 Conclusion 154
5 SUBSTANTIVE CONSTRAINTS 159
5.1 Introduction 159
5.2 The notion of “adjustments” to the Treaties 161
5.2.1 Meaning and scope of the term “adjustment” 163
5.2.2 “Adjustments to the Treaties” v. “Adaptations to Acts
Adopted by the Institutions” 166
Table of contents XI
5.2.3 “Adjustments” in previous Accession Treaties 169
5.2.4 Other measures facilitating the full integration of new
Member States 172
5.2.4.1 Transitional measures 173
5.2.4.2 Quasi-transitional measures 178
5.2.4.2.1 Economic and Monetary Union 180
5.2.4.2.2 Schengen 180
5.2.4.3 Safeguard clauses 182
5.2.4.3.1 “New” safeguard clauses 186
5.2.4.3.2 The proposed PSCs in the Negotiating Framework for
Turkey 192
5.3 Changes to the Treaties going beyond mere “adjustments” 194
5.3.1 Arrangement on fishing rights under the 1972 Act of
Accession 195
5.3.2 Other measures in past Acts of Accession going beyond
“adjustments” 199
5.4 Conclusion 206
PART III – Legal Constraints Flowing from the Constitutional Foundations 211
of the Union
6 CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNION AS A CONSTRAINT ON
PRIMARY LAW MAKING 213
6.1 Introduction 213
6.2 Existence of constitutional constraints: Judicial acknowledgment of the
“very foundations” of the Union 214
6.2.1 Opinions 1/91 and 1/92 216
6.2.2 Opinion 1/09 219
6.2.3 Kadi I 220
6.2.4 Implications 221
6.3 Substance of constitutional constraints 224
6.3.1 Fundamental freedoms 226
6.3.1.1 Fundamental freedoms in the Treaties 226
6.3.1.2 Development of free movement of persons in secondary law 228
6.3.1.2.1 Case law on the freedoms 229
6.3.1.3 Academic opinion 231
6.3.2 Union citizenship: The fundamental status 233
6.3.2.1 Union citizenship as defined in the Treaties 235
6.3.2.2 Citizenship Directive 236
6.3.2.3 Union citizenship in the case law of the Court 237
6.3.2.3.1 Union citizenship taking shape: First ‘ground breaking’
cases 237
6.3.2.3.2 Further developments: Beyond discrimination, beyond
material scope, beyond internal situations? 239
6.3.2.3.3 Core of Union citizenship 243
6.3.3 Fundamental rights 244
XII Table of contents
6.3.3.1 Snapshot of recent case law 245
6.3.3.2 Inception and rise of fundamental rights 249
6.3.3.3 Constitutionalisation of fundamental rights by inclusion in
primary law 251
6.3.3.4 Role of fundamental rights in the constitutionalisation of the
legal order 254
6.3.3.4.1 As general principles of Union law 254
6.3.3.4.2 As part of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 257
6.4 Application of constitutional constraints 258
6.4.1 Are the “very foundations” impossible to amend? 260
6.4.2 Are the “very foundations” able to constrain Member States
as primary law makers? 261
6.5 Conclusion 266
7 THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AS PART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNION: A CASE STUDY 271
7.1 Introduction 271
7.2 Internal market origin of the principle of non-discrimination 274
7.2.1 Its place in the Treaties 275
7.2.2 Its development in the case law of the Court 277
7.3 Embedding equality deeper into Union law 279
7.3.1 Equality as an established general principle of EU law 281
7.3.2 Equality as part of citizenship 284
7.3.3 Expanding scope of equality in the Treaties 287
7.3.4 Equality as enshrined in the Charter 289
7.4 Principle of equality of Member States 291
7.5 Conclusion 293
8 GENERAL CONCLUSION 295
SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 305




AA Ankara Agreement (EEC-Turkey Association Agreement)
AG Advocate General
AP Additional Protocol
BVerGE Bundesverfassungsgericht (German (Federal) Constitutional Court)
CCT Common Customs Tariff
CEECs Central and East European Countries
CFR Charter of Fundamental Rights
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
Coreper Committee of Permanent Representatives
EA Europe Agreement
EAEC European Atomic Energy Community
EC European Community
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
ECJ European Court of Justice (also referred to as CJEU)
ECR European Court Reports
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EEA European Economic Area
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EU European Union
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GG Grundgesetz (Basic Law, i.e. the German Constitution)
GCC German (Federal) Constitutional Court (BVerGE)
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OJ Official Journal
PSC Permanent Safeguard Clause
SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SAP Stabilisation and Association Process
TCN Third-Country National
TEU Treaty on the European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK The United Kingdom
UKTI The United Kingdom Trade and Investment




The European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey signed an Association
Agreement in Ankara on 12 September 1963 with the purpose to “facilitate
the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date”.1 Since 1963, Tur-
key’s quest for joining the EU has often been resembled to a long, rough,
winding road or to the story of Sisyphus,2 who was doomed to roll a large
rock up a hill, only to watch it roll back down and then try again. As difficult
as Sisyphus’ task seems to be, that of Turkey has been harder, as each time
the rock rolled down, Turkey found a larger rock to roll and a higher hill to
climb. The hill grew to become a mountain with a life of its own, which never
stopped growing (“widening and deepening” in EU terminology), almost as
if out of control of the Gods that had created it.
This story (thesis) is about the growing rock (acquis communautaire) and
the mountain (the EU) rather than Sisyphus (Turkey). Sisyphus is the starting
point, the excuse to tell the tale of the mountain, which managed to slowly
escape the rule of its creator Gods (the Member States) to acquire a life of its
own. The aim is to shed light on the process in which the once omnipotent
and omnipresent Gods of the mountain saw their hands and feet tied on certain
occasions. As will be demonstrated below, many elements in the mountain
joined forces to form the spirit of the mountain (EU constitutional law) which,
combined with tricks of faith and some magic, managed to constrain its creator
Gods (the Member States) to some extent so that the mountain could develop
to lead a relatively autonomous and independent life.
After setting the general plot of this thesis, what follows is the specific
research question it aims to answer, namely whether Member States of the
EU have a completely free hand in drafting Accession Treaties, or whether there
are some legal constraints on their primary law making function. It is worth
noting from the outset that the thesis focuses exclusively on Member States’
1 See the preamble of the Agreement, OJ C 113/2, Eng. Ed., 24.12.1973.
2 For two examples, see A. E. Çakır (ed.), Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story
(Routledge, 2011). T. Tayanç, A long and winding road: Turkey-EU relations through cartoons
(Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi, 2012).
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primary law making function under Article 49 TEU.3 It argues that such con-
straints exist, and accordingly, tries to identify them as well as the sources
they are flowing from, thereby hoping to provide some insight into the nature
of the EU legal order. The point of departure as well as the main focus of the
study is the proposed permanent safeguard clause (PSC) on free movement
of persons in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey. It is with reference to
the PSC that legal provisions, rules, principles and norms constraining Member
States as primary law makers in the context of drafting an Accession Agree-
ment are identified.
Before going into discussing how the issue is approached and structured,
the term “legal constraints” is defined and discussed so as to enlighten us as
to the types of constraints covered by this study. It should be noted that the
focus is exclusively on constraints flowing from EU law, even though occa-
sionally the most obvious constraints flowing from public international law
might be mentioned as well. Since the concept of constraint and the premise
on which this study is based, i.e. that the EU legal order is of constitutional
nature, are inextricably linked they will be briefly elaborated on below simul-
taneously. After discussing the salient characteristics of the EU legal order that
merit its categorisation as constitutional, analogies will be drawn from other
constitutional legal orders, which have developed implicit and explicit rules
(constraints) in order to protect their most basic and foundational character-
istics from arbitrary change.
There are many examples, but the German, and Indian legal orders protected
by their constitutions are particularly insightful for our purposes. Next, to
complete the endeavour of defining “legal constraints”, a working definition
of the term is developed in light of the preceding discussion on the nature
of the Union legal order. This working definition, as well as discussions
underlying the characteristics of the term, lies at the basis of the methodology
chosen for this thesis.
After explaining the methodological course adopted for this study and
the rationale underlying this choice, the final term that needs clarification in
the introduction is: the “permanent safeguard clause”. After briefly discussing
the vague wording provided in the Negotiating Framework, the term is defined
in light of the common features of other safeguard clauses used in past Treaties
and Accession Agreements. Last but not least, comes the description of the
structure of the thesis, which identifies constraints flowing from three levels
of analysis: the pre-accession level, the accession process itself, and the constitu-
3 It does not deal with issues or constraints on Member States in the context of Article 48
TEU. Primary law in the Union legal order is composed of the Treaties (Treaty on the
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)),
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), and various Acts of Accession, which contain
the terms of accession for new Member States. In other words, this thesis deals only with
the last aspect of primary law. For more information on primary law in the Union legal
order see, N. Foster, Foster on EU LAW, 3 ed. (OUP, 2011). 111.
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tional foundations of the Union. The approach taken in those parts and their
structure is explained below at the very end of this chapter.
1.2 EXISTENCE OF “LEGAL CONSTRAINTS”: NATURE OF THE EU LEGAL ORDER
“Law not only constrains government but also constitutes and enables it.”4
It enables action by legitimizing assertions of authority by those who fulfil
its requirements. Thus, it is argued that these enabling rules also act as con-
straints.5 In other words, “constitutional constraint and empowerment are
two sides of the same coin”.6 In the EU legal order the primary instruments
that perform the function of constituting and enabling have been the founding
Treaties, which have for long been regarded as “the constitutional charter”
of the EC by the Court of Justice.7 As early as in Van Gend en Loos, the Court
held that the subjects of the new legal order created by the EEC Treaty were
not only Member States but also their nationals. The new legal order conferred
on individuals both rights and obligations. According to the Court, “[t]hese
rights arise not only when they are expressly provided by the Treaty, but also
by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way
upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions
of the Community”.8 This illustrates clearly that the Treaties are the main
source of empowerment and constraint on Member States, as well as other
actors operating within the Union legal order. Another source of constraint
that is worth mentioning is the case law of the Court interpreting the Treaties.
Just like constitutions function in states, in the EU legal order the Treaties
establish the actors/institutions as well as the procedures through which the
legal order functions. One of these institutions, the Court of Justice of the EU
(CJEU, the Court, or the Court of Justice) is empowered to “ensure that in the
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed”.9 In their
functioning, both the institutions created by the Treaties, as well as the Member
States, which have laid down the rules in the Treaties, are equally bound and
constrained by them. The Treaties lay down both procedural and substantive
constraints on the Member States as well as on other actors/institutions that
function within their scope. For their actions to be legal and legitimate, all
4 C. A. Bradley and T. W. Morrison, “Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Con-
straint,“ Columbia Law Review 113(2013): 1124.
5 Ibid.
6 R. H. Fallon, “Constitutional Constraints,“ California Law Review 97, no. 4 (2009): 1035.
7 See, Case 294/83 Les Verts, [1986] ECR I-1339; and Opinion 1/91 EEA, [1991] ECR I-6084. Since
Article 1(3) TEU provides that “[t]he Union shall replace and succeed the European Com-
munity”, it could be argued that the Treaties are now “the constitutional charter” of the
EU as well.
8 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 1, 12.
9 See Article 19(1) TEU.
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actors functioning within the EU legal order need to comply with both types
of constraints.
It should be noted from the outset that it is not possible to find the word
“constraint” in legal dictionaries.10 One reason for its absence might be the
fact that the nature and form of “constraints” in law (“legal constraints”) are
different in different jurisdictions as well as in different areas of law depending
on whom they apply.11 This brings the necessity to coin our own definition
in light of existing literature on legal constraints and taking account of the
specificities of the EU legal order (as well as using dictionaries providing the
colloquial definition of the term).12
To begin with the nature of the EU legal order, as it serves as a stepping-
stone to move from the issue of “existence” of constraints to that of “identify-
ing” them, there is an overwhelming agreement among EU law scholars that
despite their international law origins, the founding Treaties on which the legal
order is founded, have gradually evolved over the decades and transformed
the order to one of constitutional nature.13 This process of constitutionalisation
has been driven by the Court of Justice and consolidated by subsequent Treaty
amendments. What causes some divergence of opinion as to the nature of the
legal order is the fact that it contains both constitutional and international
10 B. A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8 ed. (USA: Thomson-West, 2007); B. A. Garner, A
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, 2 ed. (OUP, 2001).
11 Different studies focus on the constraining power of different types of legal rules on different
actors. For an example of legal constraints on the powers of the president in the US legal
order, see Bradley and Morrison, “Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal
Constraint.“; for a conceptual study on the sources of constraints on judges as decision
makers, see E. Braman, “Searching for Constraint in Legal Decision Making,“ in The
Psychology of Judicial Decision Making, ed. D. E. Klein and G. Mitchell (OUP, 2010), 204-16;
for a study examining constitutional constraints on judicial as well as non-judicial actors
in the US legal order, see Fallon, “Constitutional Constraints,“ 975-1037.
12 (1). A constraint is something that limits or controls the way you behave or what you can
do in a situation. (2). Constraint is control over the way you behave which prevents you
from doing what you would prefer to do. See, J. M. Sinclair, Collins Cobuild English Language
Dictionary (London: HarperCollins, 1994). 302. Another dictionary provides the following
definition: “the act of constraining; restraint, compulsion, necessity; a compelling force;
a constrained manner; reserve, self-control. [OF constreign-, stem of constreindre, L con-
stringere (stringere, to draw tight)]”. See, B. Kirkpatrick, The Cassel Concise English Dictionary
(London: Cassel Publishers Limited, 1989). 279.
13 J. H. H. Weiler, “The transformation of Europe,“ Yale Law Journal 100 (1990-1991): 2410;
Dashwood qualified it as “constitutional order of states“, see A. Dashwood, “States in the
European Union,“ European Law Review 23(1998): 201-16; J.-C. Piris, “Does the European
Union have a Constitution? Does it need one?,“ European Law Review 24(1999): 559; P. Craig,
“Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union,“ European Law Journal 7, no.
2 (2001): 125; E. Tanchev, “The Lisbon Treaty within and without Constitutional Orthodoxy,“
in Ceci n’est pas une Constitution – Constitutionalisation without a Constitution?, ed. I. Pernice
and E. Tanchev (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 29; A. Cuyvers, “The Confederal Comeback:
Rediscovering the Confederal Form for a Transnational World,“ European Law Journal 19,
no. 6 (2013): 712-13.
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elements at the same time,14 which makes it difficult to identify what kind
of entity exactly it is; hence the use of the term sui generis to describe the nature
of the legal order. As ‘lame’ as that description might be,15 no new terminol-
ogy reflecting the true nature of the legal order that is widely acknowledged
has been coined yet.
The divergences of opinion on the role of Member States as primary law
makers under Article 48 TEU and of the end product under the Treaty revision
procedure is a good illustration for the latter point. While for some the Treaty
revision procedure is “more compatible with an international treaty than with
a constitution”,16 others see the procedure differently. While acknowledging
the prominent role of the intergovernmental conference, Besselink argues that
“this does not detract from its being embedded in the EU structures”,17 since
Article 48(3) TEU stipulates that “the European Council shall define the terms
of reference for a conference of representatives of the governments of Member
States”.
The controversial sui generis nature of the EU legal order necessitates a closer
look at the qualities it manifested at its various stages of development and
its current state. This discussion is important not only in its own right, but
also because it will demonstrate the existence of “legal constraints”. Without
this discussion or demonstration, the thesis could be criticised on the ground
that it is built on an assumption of the existence of constraints. In short, the
brief discussion on the nature of the legal order in the introduction will demon-
strate the existence of “legal constraints” and will enable us to move on to the
issue of identifying those constraints in the following parts. Moreover, this
discussion will also influence the definition of the term “legal constraints”,
which is central for the findings of this thesis.
Unfortunately, the difficulties are not only limited to the novel and unique
nature of the legal order under analysis, but also extend to our use of ancient
concepts, which have acquired different meanings over centuries, and were
developed in the framework of the nation-state.18 Hence, the need to define
14 A. M. G. Martins, “The Treaty of Lisbon – After all another Step towards a European
Constitution?,“ in Ceci n’est pas une Constitution – Constitutionalisation without a Constitution?,
ed. I. Pernice and E. Tanchev (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 74.
15 B. De Witte, “Treaty Revision Procedures after Lisbon,“ in EU Law After Lisbon, ed. A.
Biondi, P. Eeckhout, and S. Ripley (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 51.
16 Martins, “The Treaty of Lisbon – After all another Step towards a European Constitution?,“
74.
17 L. Besselink, “The Notion and Nature of the European Constitution After the Lisbon Treaty,“
in European Constitutionalism Beyond Lisbon, ed. J. Wouters, L. Verhey, and P. Kiiver (Inter-
sentia, 2009), 268.
18 The problems arising out of the use of concepts that emerged in the context of the nation-
state to describe the nature of the EU legal order has been called “the problem of trans-
lation“. See, N. Walker, “Postnational constitutionalism and the problem of translation,“
in European Constiutionalism Beyond the State, ed. J. H. H. Weiler and M. Wind (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 27-54.
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what is meant by those terms: the most central ones for this thesis being
constitution, constitutionalisation (of the EU legal order) and constitutionalism
(in the context of the latter order).
1.2.1 Constitutional or not?
As Grey eloquently puts it “[c]onstitutionalism is one of those concepts,
evocative and persuasive in its connotations yet cloudy in its analytic and
descriptive content, which at once enrich and confuse political discourse.”19
To illustrate his point he provides examples of mutually inconsistent definitions
of the term used by different scholars in different periods.20 For our purposes
the focus will be exclusively on the qualities of the term that fit the emergence
and development of the EU/EC/EEC legal order, which goes back only around
half a century. To begin with what is considered as the “one essential qual-
ity”21 or “the centre piece”22 of constitutionalism and constitutions respective-
ly, it is their role as “a legal limitation on government”23 or “the limitation
of power”24, in other words, their role as constraint on the exercise of public
power.
“A central way the Constitution [the Treaties] constrains is by constituting
or otherwise giving rise to institutions and legal practices [procedures] that
perform constraining function.”25 As mentioned above, constraint and
empowerment in this sense are inseparable. “Constraint inheres not just in
threats of sanctions”,26 as will be discussed in more detail below, “but also
in the incapacity to act with recognized authority beyond the sphere of tenable
claims of lawful power, and in norms that define official roles and obliga-
tions.”27
In the EU legal order, the founding Treaties laid down the institutional
structure as well as the rules and procedures for its lawful functioning. In this
“thin sense” of the term constitution, as the law establishing and regulating
19 T. C. Grey, “Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework,“ in Constitutionalism, ed. J. R.
Pennock and J. W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 189.
20 See, ibid. For more information on the features of ’ancient constiutionalism’ versus ’modern
constitutionalism’, see M. La Torre, Constitutionalism and Legal Reasoning: A New Paradigm
for the Concept of Law, Law and Philosophy Library 79 (The Netherlands: Springer, 2007).
1-12.
21 C. H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1947). 21; cited in Grey, “Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework,“ 189.
22 D. Castaglione, “The Political Theory of the Constitution,“ Political Studies XLIV(1996): 417.
23 McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern: 21; cited in Grey, “Constitutionalism: An
Analytic Framework,“ 189.
24 Castaglione, “The Political Theory of the Constitution,“ 417.




the main organs of government and their powers,28 the founding Treaties
were indisputably of constitutional nature. As far as the Treaties encompassed
the fundamental legal norms underlying the polity, in addition to establishing
the institutional framework, which was to create general legal norms, they
were also a constitution in a “material sense”.29 However, as Curtin explains,
the material constitution refers to “the totality of fundamental legal norms that
make up the legal order of the polity”,30 which is not limited to the Treaties,
but includes the contributions of the Court of Justice. By developing the
principles of supremacy, direct applicability and direct effect the Court insti-
gated the development of the empirical constitution, which refers to the way
in which the EU is organized and functions as a matter of fact.31 What the
Treaties have never been, however, is a democratic or political constitution,
as the emphasis in the latter conception of the term lies in the manner in which
the constitution is adopted, that is deliberated by the people directly or through
their representatives.32
The “thick sense” of the constitution is more controversial as different
scholars emphasize different features of the term.33 For instance, Griller bases
this “thicker” concept on the European Enlightenment, the gist of which is
illustrated in Article 16 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of the Citizen (1789): “Any society in which the guarantee of rights is not
secured, and in which the separation of powers is not determined, has no
constitution at all.”34 Hence, according to Griller, a constitution needs to
perform three important functions: firstly, to recognize the rights of citizens;
28 J. Raz, “On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,“ in
Constitutionalism, ed. L. Alexander (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 152-53; cited in Craig,
“Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union,“ 126.
29 S. Griller, “Is this a Constitution? Remarks on a Contested Concept,“ in The Lisbon Treaty:
EU Constitutionalism without a Constiutional Treaty?, ed. S. Griller and J. Ziller (Austria:
Springer, 2008), 30.
30 Emphasis added. D. Curtin, “The Sedimentary European Constitution – The Future of
’Constitutionalisation’ without a Constitution,“ in Ceci n’est pas une Constitution – Constitutio-




33 Craig cites seven features that Raz finds important for a constitution to be considered a
constitution in the thick sense: firstly, it needs to be constitutive, i.e. define the main institu-
tions of government and their powers; secondly, it needs to provide a stable framework
for the legal and political institutions; thirdly, it needs to be enshrined in one or few written
documents; fourthly, it needs to be superior law; fifthly, it needs to be justiciable; sixthly,
it needs to be entrenched, i.e. amendable only by special procedures; and lastly, it needs
to express a common ideology. Craig acknowledges that any constitution will contain these
elements to a lesser or greater degree. Not all constitutions will contain all the elements
listed. Yet, it is important to identify them in order to understand the nature of constitutions
in general. See, Raz, “On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Prelimin-
aries.“; cited in Craig, “Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union,“ 126-27.
34 Griller, “Is this a Constitution? Remarks on a Contested Concept,“ 29-30.
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secondly, to organize the relations between the government and those
governed; and lastly, to establish a system of checks and balances among the
various branches of government. In the EU, there are now rules in place that
fulfil all these criteria.35
To begin with the first of Griller’s criteria, the Court established at the very
beginning that individuals (Member State nationals) are granted rights by the
Treaty on which they can rely and have enforced in national courts.36 Yet,
that was just the beginning. Subsequently, taking the hints of some national
constitutional courts, the Court also established that individuals have funda-
mental rights, which Union institutions and Member States need to respect
when they act within the scope of EU law. Drawing inspiration from the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)
and the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, the Court
established that fundamental rights constitute general principles of EU law.
Those rights are now enshrined in a Charter (Charter of Fundamental Rights
(CFR)), which has the same status as the Treaties.37
Another monumental development in the history of European integration
was the move from economic to political integration with the signature of the
Maastricht Treaty and the inclusion of intergovernmental cooperation in the
two new pillars of the EU: Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice
and Home Affairs. To mark the importance of this shift, and create a concept
that would bring Member States’ nationals closer to the integration project,
the status of Union citizenship was introduced.38 While the concept of Union
citizenship was regarded as empty and superfluous at the beginning, the Court
managed to flesh it out. It proclaimed that it “is destined to be the fundamental
status of nationals of Member States”.39 In short, in terms of securing rights
of individuals, the EU legal order has moved a long way forward compared
to its early days.
As to the latter two criteria, separation of powers is foreseen both vertically
and horizontally in the EU.40 The Treaties lay down the division of com-
petences between the Union and its Member States, and provide for procedures
through which the Union institutions interact in order to be able to legislate.
The Court makes sure that those procedures and the balance between the
35 Curtin also identifies modern constitutionalism with three elements. Those are limited
government, adherence to the rule of law and protection of fundamental rights. See, Curtin,
“The Sedimentary European Constitution – The Future of ’Constitutionalisation’ without
a Constitution,“ 80.
36 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos.
37 See Article 6(1) TEU.
38 See Article 20 TFEU.
39 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 31.
40 See Articles 5 and 13 TEU.
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institutions is respected,41 which leads Griller to the conclusion that the
Treaties can be qualified as a constitution.42
1.2.2 Evolution towards further entrenchment of rights
Since the French revolution individual rights, together with representative
government, (which according to Bellamy was largely assimilated to the
principle of separation of powers), have defined constitutionalism for a long
time. However, rights have become predominant in recent years. “Rights,
upheld by judicial review, are said to comprise the prime component of
constitutionalism, providing a normative legal framework within which politics
operates.”43 While rights have risen to provide the substantive aspect of the
constitution, political mechanisms and procedures have been relegated to a
secondary role. Accordingly, argues Bellamy, “constitutionalism has come to
mean nothing more than a system of legally entrenched rights that can over-
ride, where necessary, the ordinary political process”.44 In the same vein,
Dworkin pointed out that constitutionalism is increasingly understood as being
no more than “a system that established legal rights that the dominant legis-
lature does not have the power to override or compromise”.45 The question
is whether that is the case in the EU legal order as well, and if so, to what
extent? The experiences of the German and Indian constitutional orders, which
are briefly discussed below, provide useful clues and guidance that enable
us to draw some conclusions for the EU legal order as well.
The latter definition of constitutionalism implies the entrenchment of certain
individual rights or a hierarchically superior position in comparison to other
provisions of a constitution. While many constitutions declare that it is “the
people” who are sovereign and exercise that power through the democratic
process, they also establish limits on what can and cannot be done within that
process. As far as individual rights constrain and limit the legislature, this
is viewed as the clash of democracy versus rights,46 or the clash of ancient
versus modern constitutionalism,47 also referred to as the counter-majoritarian
41 See Case 138/79 Roquette Fréres, [1980] ECR 3333; Case 139/79 Maizena, [1980] ECR I-3393;
Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council, [1990] ECR I-2041.
42 Griller, “Is this a Constitution? Remarks on a Contested Concept,“ 32.
43 R. Bellamy, “The Political Form of the Constitution: the Separation of Powers, Rights and
Representative Democracy,“ Political Studies XLIV(1996): 436.
44 Ibid.
45 R. Dworkin, “Constitutionalism and democracy,“ European Journal of Philosophy 3, no. 1
(1995): 2.
46 E. Katz, “On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional En-
trenchment,“ Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 29(1996): 252-53.
47 La Torre, Constitutionalism and Legal Reasoning: A New Paradigm for the Concept of Law: 1-12.
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difficulty.48 What led to the rise of constitutionalism in the latter sense were
events such as the atrocities committed during the Second World War, post-
colonialism, and military interventions in troubled democracies.49 They
resulted in the insertion of “immutable constitutional clauses” protecting the
rights of the individual in the constitutions of many states.50
While some of those rights were spelled out explicitly by the constituent
power (pouvoir constituant) that had drafted the constitution in some states,
such as Germany and Brazil,51 in others, the same result was achieved by
judicial activism. Constitutional courts in countries, such as India,52 South
Africa53 and Colombia,54 developed doctrines to protect individual rights
48 The counter-majoritarian difficulty is seen as the “intrinsic constitutional dilemma”, which
arises in legal systems in which the judiciary has the ultimate authority to interpret the
constitution and is able to overrule unconstitutional acts of the executive and legislative
branches through judicial review. See, Michael Freitas Mohallem, “Immutable clauses and
judicial review in India, Brazil and South Africa: expanding constitutional courts’ authority,“
The International Journal of Human Rights 15, no. 5 (June 2011): 765.
49 This logic can be seen in Klass Case of the GCC: “The purpose of Article 79, paragraph
3, as a check on the legislator’s amending the Constitution is to prevent the abolition of
the substance or basis of the existing constitutional order, by formal legal means of amend-
ment …. and abuse of the Constitution to legalize a totalitatrian regime.” See, Privacy of
Communications Case (Klass Case), BverfGE, 1 (1970).
50 Mohallem, “Immutable clauses and judicial review in India, Brazil and South Africa: ex-
panding constitutional courts’ authority,“ 765-67. Not all examples of immutable clauses
deal directly with the protection of individual rights. Often, it is the form of government
that is protected. For instance, Article 89 of the 1958 French Constitution, Article 139 of
the 1947 Italian Constitution, Article 288 of the 1975 Portuguese Constitution and Article
4 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution protect the republican form of government. An interesting
example to note is Article 112 of the 1814 Norwegian Constitution, which protects the
“spirit” of the constitution. It provides that constitutional amendments “must never […]
contradict the principles embodied in this Constitution, but solely relate to modifications
of particular provisions which do not alter the spirit of the Constitution”. See, K. Gözler,
Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments: A Comparative Study (Turkey: Ekin Press, 2008).
52-53 and 70.
51 See, H. Goerlich, “Concept of Special Protection for Certain Elements and Principles of
the Constitution Against Amendments and Article 79(3), Basic Law of Germany,“ NUJS
Law Review 1(2008); D. P. Kommers, “German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon,“ Emory
Law Journal 40(1991); Mohallem, “Immutable clauses and judicial review in India, Brazil
and South Africa: expanding constitutional courts’ authority.“; R. O’Connell, “Guardians
of the Constitution: Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms,“ Journal of Civil Liberties 4(1999);
R. Albert, “Nonconstitutional Amendments,“ Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence XXII,
no. 1 (January 2009).
52 S. Prateek, “Today’s Promise, Tomorrow’s Constitution: ’Basic Structure’, Constitutional
Transformations and the Future of Political Progress in India,“ NUJS Law Review 1(2008);
Mohallem, “Immutable clauses and judicial review in India, Brazil and South Africa:
expanding constitutional courts’ authority,“ 770-72; G. J. Jacobsohn, “An unconstitutional
constitution? A comparative perspective,“ International Journal of Constitutional Law 4, no.
3 (July 2006): 470-76.
53 Albert, “Nonconstitutional Amendments,“ 25-28; Mohallem, “Immutable clauses and judicial
review in India, Brazil and South Africa: expanding constitutional courts’ authority.“
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as well as certain aspects of their systems, which they viewed as defining or
essential for their constitutional identity.55 In the case of Germany and Brazil,
their constitutions laid down the so-called “eternity clauses” or “petrified
clauses” (cláusulas pétreas), which future legislatures acting as constituted
powers (pouvoir constitué or also called “derived constituent power”) would
not be able to amend.56 In Germany, it is Article 79(3) of the Basic Law
(Grundgesetz; henceforth GG) that prohibits the amendment of the constitution
“in such a way as to change or abrogate the principles laid down in Arts. 1
and 20 GG”.57 While Article 20 GG lays down the central qualities of the
German State such as democracy, republican State order, federal organization
etc., Article 1 GG enshrines one of the constitution’s “most fundamental, ‘supra-
positive’ principles”,58 which declares human dignity inviolable. Article 60
of the Brazilian constitution plays a similar function.59
The existence of the immutable clauses should not be taken to mean that
the German and Brazilian courts were less activist compared to their Indian
or Colombian counterparts.60 The German Constitutional Court (GCC) has
widened the scope of application of Article 79(3) GG by providing a broad
interpretation to the concept of human dignity.61 In the same vein, its
Brazilian counterpart has extended the immutability doctrine to almost all
54 C. Bernal, “Unconstitutional constitutional amendments in the case study of Colombia:
An analysis of the justification and meaning of the constitutional replacement doctrine,“
International Journal of Constitutional Law 11, no. 2 (2013).
55 For a comparative study including various traditions of judicial review of constitutional
amendments, see Gözler, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments: A Comparative Study.
56 The distinction between constituent and constituted powers is traced back to Emmanuel
Joseph Sieyès. While the former refers to the sovereign power of the people to create a
new constitutional regime without any restraints (also called “original constituent power”),
the latter refers to the power to reform the constitution in accordance with the procedural
and/or substantive limits set by the original constituent power (also called “derived
constituent power”). See, E. J. Sieyès, What is the Third Estate? (New York: Praeger, 1963);
cited in J. I. Colón-Ríos, “Carl Schmitt and Constituent Power in Latin American Courts:
The Cases of Venezuela and Colombia,“ Constellations 18, no. 3 (2011): 366.
57 R. Herzog, “The Hierarchy of Constitutional Norms and Its Functions in the Protection
of Basic Rights,“ Human Rights Law Journal 13, no. 3 (1992): 90.
58 Ibid.
59 It prohibits any proposition to abolish: “(a) federative form of the state; (b) the concealed,
direct, universal and periodic right to vote; (c) the separation of powers and (d) individual
rights and guarantees.” See, Mohallem, “Immutable clauses and judicial review in India,
Brazil and South Africa: expanding constitutional courts’ authority,“ 773.
60 O’Connel argues that the doctrine of “unconstitutional constitutional norms”, proclaimed
in the Southwest Case, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951), is controversial, since there is no explicit
authorization in the Basic Law for the review of legality of constitutional amendments.
That power was claimed by the GCC in order to “protect the objective order of values on
which the Constitution rests”. See, O’Connell, “Guardians of the Constitution: Unconstitu-
tional Constitutional Norms,“ 54.
61 Goerlich, “Concept of Special Protection for Certain Elements and Principles of the Constitu-
tion Against Amendments and Article 79(3), Basic Law of Germany,“ 408.
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constitutional provisions that confer rights on individuals.62 However, those
clauses are not the only means employed by constitutional courts to guarantee
the identity and continuity of the constitutions, whose guardians they are. It
is worth citing more extensively from the case law of the GCC, since it forms
part of the constitutional tradition on which the jurisprudence of the Court
of Justice is built and serves as a source of inspiration for the doctrines devel-
oped by other constitutional courts, such as “the basic structure doctrine” of
the Indian Constitutional Court.63
In German constitutional theory, the constitution is seen as a coherent and
unified structure of principles and values.64 Hence, the GCC provided that:
‘An individual constitutional provision cannot be considered as an isolated clause
and interpreted alone. A constitution has an inner unity, and the meaning of any part
is linked to that of other provisions. Taken as a unit, a constitution reflects certain
overarching principles and fundamental decisions to which individual provisions
are subordinate.
…
That a constitutional provision itself might be null and void, is not conceptually
impossible just because it is part of the constitution. There are constitutional prin-
ciples that are so fundamental and to such an extent an expression of a law that
precedes even the constitution that they also bind the framer of the constitution,
and other constitutional provisions that do not rank so high may be null and void,
because they contravene these principles.’65
The court clarifies that both harmonious interpretation as well as invalidation
are possible options. In a later case, it also explained that fundamental constitu-
tional change was possible, but only if it were in line with the overarching
principles and the logic/identity of the constitution, i.e. if it were carried out
“in a system-immanent manner”.66 Hence, a constitutional amendment could
62 Mohallem, “Immutable clauses and judicial review in India, Brazil and South Africa: ex-
panding constitutional courts’ authority,“ 773.
63 Prof. Dietrich Conrad, a German scholar of Indian politics and law, is seen as the instru-
mental name in acquainting Indian judges with the German experience. See, Jacobsohn,
“An unconstitutional constitution? A comparative perspective,“ 477; see also, Chapter I
titled “Sanctity of the Constitution: Dieter Conrad – the man behind the ‘basic structure’
doctrine”, in A. G. A. M. Noorani, Constitutional Questions and Citizens’ Rights: An Omnibus
Comprising Constitutional Questions in India and Citizens’ Rights, Judges and State Accountability
(New Delhi: OUP, 2006).
64 Kommers, “German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon,“ 851; Jacobsohn, “An unconstitu-
tional constitution? A comparative perspective,“ 478.
65 Emphasis added. The Southwest Case, 1 BVerGE 14 (1951), cited in W. F. Murphy, “Slaugh-
ter-House, Civil Rights, and Limits on Constitutional Change,“ The American Journal of
Jurisprudence 32(1987): 13-14.
66 Privacy of Communications Case (Klass Case), BverfGE, 1 (1970). The GCC declared as
follows: “Restrictions on the legislator’s amending the Constitution … must not, however,
prevent the legislator from modifying by constitutional amendment even basic constitutional
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be nullified to the extent that it transformed the constitution into something
“fundamentally incoherent”.67
Similarly, in one of the most important cases of Indian constitutional law,
Kesavananda Bharati v. the State of Kerala,68 the Supreme Court of India ruled
by a narrow majority (7-6) that the constitution could be amended following
the procedure stipulated in Article 368, however, no part could be amended
so as to change its “basic structure”. Six of the Justices argued that Article 368
did not empower the Parliament to abolish fundamental rights because it
contains “inherent or ‘implied limitations’”69 that protect the “basic structure”
of the constitution. The other six disputed the existence of such limitations.
The Justice tilting the balance (Justice Khanna) rejected the theory of implied
limitations but argued that the word “amendment” itself contained limitations.
He argued that “[t]he power of amendment under Article 368 does not include
the power to abrogate the Constitution nor does it include the power to alter
the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.”70 That is the same
argument that lies at the basis of “the constitutional replacement doctrine”
developed by the Colombian Constitutional Court.71
It is argued that the doctrine developed by the Indian Court constitutes
a version of the coherence requirement developed by the GCC. As far as it also
emphasized the need to preserve the identity of the Indian constitution, it is
viewed as a more demanding criterion,72 even though both are interlinked.
As Jacobsohn argues, “the incongruities and inconsistencies that could lead
to a finding of constitutional incoherence might only mean that the document’s
identity has been obscured in a manner that seemingly casts doubt on its
fundamental character and commitments”.73 As to the vexing issue of what
principles in a system-immanent manner”, cited in Jacobsohn, “An unconstitutional constitu-
tion? A comparative perspective,“ 477.
67 Ibid., 478.
68 AIR [1973] SC 1461.
69 Noorani, Constitutional Questions and Citizens’ Rights: An Omnibus Comprising Constitutional
Questions in India and Citizens’ Rights, Judges and State Accountability: xv.
70 Ibid.
71 Articles 241 and 379 of the Colombian Constitution empowers the Court to review constitu-
tional amendments, however, only with respect to the rules establishing the amendment
procedure. The Colombian Constitutional Court developed the “constitutional replacement
doctrine” to circumvent this constraint. Put succinctly, it argued that the power to amend
the constitution does not entail the power to replace it, but to only modify it. The Court
has the power to check whether the amending authority is only modifying, or replacing
the constitution. However, that requires an analysis of the content to be able to determine
whether the constitution is modified or replaced. In short, the Colombian Court concludes
that “the power to review whether the constitution has been replaced implies the compet-
ence to review the content of constitutional amendments”. Bernal, “Unconstitutional
constitutional amendments in the case study of Colombia: An analysis of the justification
and meaning of the constitutional replacement doctrine,“ 340.
72 Jacobsohn, “An unconstitutional constitution? A comparative perspective,“ 478.
73 Ibid.
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constitutes a state’s identity, and when it could be considered to have changed,
Aristotle provided the following answer: “a polis’s identity changed when
the constitution (referring to more than just a document) changes as the result
of a disruption in its essential commitments”.74 Hence, we can identify the EU’s
identity by looking at its main goals and commitments. When those goals clash
with the means to achieve them, according to Murphy, “it is the means that
must yield, unless a people rethink and redefine their goals”.75
What can be extrapolated from the German and Indian examples for the
EU legal order? There are no explicitly set immutable clauses in the Treaties.
However, it can be argued that there is an implied hierarchy within the
Treaties, which is also confirmed by the case law of the Court.76 Just as the
Indian Supreme Court established that some fundamental rights form part
of the “basic structure” of the Indian Constitution, which it protects, the CJEU
established the fundamental nature of some principles, which form part of
“the very foundations”77 of the Union legal order, whose guardian it is. The
Court did not hesitate to give negative opinions about signing agreements,
which it found incompatible with principles that form part of “the very founda-
tions of the Community”,78 or as it stated more recently, incompatible with
“the essential character of the powers which the Treaties confer on the institutions
of the European Union and on the Member States and which are indispensable
to the preservation of the very nature of European Union law”.79
Fundamental rights are now deeply entrenched in the EU legal order. They
are called “constitutional principles” by the Court.80 They are qualified as
“constitutional core values”.81 This can be inferred both from the Treaty text
itself, as well as from the case law of the Court. To begin with the latter, in
Kadi, the Court explicitly stated that other Treaty provisions “cannot be under-
stood …to authorize any derogation from the principles of liberty, democracy
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article
74 Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, trans. E. Barker (OUP, 1962). 99; cited in Jacobsohn, “An
unconstitutional constitution? A comparative perspective,“ 478.
75 Murphy further warns that “means – institutional arrangements – inconsistent with those
ends pose grave problems for the system’s survival”. See, Murphy, “Slaughter-House, Civil
Rights, and Limits on Constitutional Change,“ 18.
76 See Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, [2008] ECR I-6351, paras.
288-90.
77 Ibid., para. 303. See also, Opinion 1/91 EEA; and J. L. C. Vilaça and L. N. Piçarra, Are there
material limits to the revision of the Treaties on the European Union? , Zentrum für Europäisches
Wirtschaftsrecht, Vorträge und Berichte Nr 46 (Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-
Univesität Bonn, 1994).
78 Emphasis added. Opinion 1/91 EEA.
79 Emphasis added. Opinion 1/09 of the Court of Justice, [2011] ECR I-1137, para. 89.
80 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, para. 285.
81 See, J. Kokott and C. Sobotta, “The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and International
Law – Finding the Balance?,“ The European Journal of International Law 23, no. 4 (2012): 1015.
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6(1) EU [now Article 2 TEU] as a foundation of the Union”.82 The Court elabor-
ated further, that other provisions, in this case Article 307 EC, “may in no
circumstances permit any challenge to the principles that form part of the very
foundations of the Community legal order, one of which is the protection of
fundamental rights”.83
The foundational or overarching character of fundamental rights can also
be inferred from the clear wording of Article 2 TEU as well as their central
place in the Treaty. As soon as Article 1 TEU declares the establishment of the
European Union, Article 2 TEU lists the values (previously, principles listed
in ex Article 6(1) TEU) on which the Union is built. According to Article 2 TEU:
‘The Union is founded on the values of respect to human dignity, freedom, demo-
cracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights
of persons belonging to minorities.
These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism,
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and
men prevail.’
Moreover, first among the list of the Union’s objectives in Article 3(1) TEU is
the promotion of peace, Union’s values and the well being of its people.
Article 6 TEU is also entirely devoted to demonstrate the central place of
fundamental rights in the EU legal order. After declaring the rights and
freedoms in the CFR have the same legal value as the Treaties in its first para-
graph, Article 6(2) TEU mandates Union’s accession to the ECHR. Last but not
least, Article 6(3) TEU proclaims that fundamental rights as guaranteed by the
ECHR and common constitutional traditions of the Member States constitute
general principles of Union law.
The fact that the very first sentence of Article 49 TEU, which lays down
the procedure for accession of new Member States mentions respect for the
values in Article 2 TEU as well as commitment for their promotion as a precon-
dition for application of EU membership, also illustrates their importance.
However, arguably, the provision that implies their hierarchical superiority
is Article 7 TEU. While other fundamental rights provisions in the Treaty apply
on the proviso that Member States act within the scope of Union law, there
is no such limitation in Article 7 TEU. The values enumerated in Article 2 TEU
are considered to be so important, so vital for the EU legal order that a clear
risk of serious breach of those values eradicates the “acting within the scope
of Union law” requirement for Member States. Hence, the European Council
is empowered to take punitive measures against a Member State in serious
and persistent breach of these values, even when the latter breach falls under
82 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, para. 303.
83 Ibid., para. 304.
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the so-called “internal situation” rule.84 Article 7 TEU clearly illustrates the
degree to which protection of fundamental rights has been internalized in the
EU legal order. Even though the process whereby fundamental rights were
incorporated into the case law of the Court was instigated by the push of a
few national constitutional courts, the EU now acts as a guarantor of rights
both against the Member States (by virtue of Article 7 TEU) as well as against
international organizations.85 This clearly demonstrates the emergence of the
EU legal order as a new and autonomous legal level between national and
international law.86
The latter discussion leads us to a definition of constitutionalisation, which
signifies the process by which the Treaties assert their normative independence
vis-à-vis the Member States and become “the founding charter of a supra-
national system of government”.87 It is usually argued that the border between
an international treaty and a constitution will be transgressed if future amend-
ments are no longer a prerogative of the Member States.88 In other words,
the crucial question is to what extent the EU as the subject created by the
Treaties can become legally independent from the Member States, which are
the parties to the Treaties?89
While it is still the Member States that are “the Masters of the Treaty
text”,90 as illustrated above, once ratified they escape their exclusive control.91
84 In its Communication on Article 7 TEU, the Commission provided the following explanation
concerning its application: “[t]he scope of Article 7 is not confined to areas covered by Union
law. This means that the Union could act not only in the event of a breach of common
values in this limited field but also in the event of a breach in an area where the Member
States act autonomously.” See, Communication from the Commission to the Council and
European Parliament, on “Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. Respect for and
promotion of the values on which the Union is based”, COM(2003) 606 final, 15.10.2003,
p. 5. See also, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, “A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law”, COM(2014) 158 final/2,
19.3.2014, p. 5.
85 See, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi.
86 According to Möllers, in the context of EU law, constitutionalisation denotes the developing
autonomy of the legal order from intergovernmental action. It can also be defined as “a
phenomenon of the gradual formation of a new legal level”. See, C. Möllers, “Pouvoir
Constituant – Constitution – Constitutionalisation,“ in Principles of European Constitutional
Law, ed. A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (Hart Publishing and Verlag CH Beck: 2009), 195.
See also, Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos; and G. De Búrca, “The EU, the European Court of
Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi,“ Harvard International Law Journal 1,
no. 51 (2009).
87 T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2006). 5.
88 Möllers, “Pouvoir Constituant – Constitution – Constitutionalisation,“ 176; see also, Besse-
link, “The Notion and Nature of the European Constitution After the Lisbon Treaty,“ 268.
89 Griller, “Is this a Constitution? Remarks on a Contested Concept,“ 23.
90 De Witte, “Treaty Revision Procedures after Lisbon,“ 36. J. Shaw, “Process and Constitu-
tional Discourse in the European Union,“ Journal of Law and Society 27, no. 1 (March
2000): 29.
91 De Witte, “Treaty Revision Procedures after Lisbon,“ 36.
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The enormous contribution of the Court of Justice to the development of the
unwritten or empirical constitution was already mentioned. It is true that
Treaty amendments “provide for a framework but it takes tradition, conven-
tions and implementing law to make the system tick”.92 The process of devel-
opment of these legal and institutional practices is incremental and cumulative,
some of which lead to corresponding changes in the Treaties over time.93
If Member States act as Masters of the Treaties from one amendment to
another, while in between the system incrementally evolves and takes shape
in the light of the interactions of the EU institutions, what conclusion does this
lead us to?
As Walker explains eloquently:
‘… constitutionalism and constitutionalization should be conceived of not in black-
and-white, all-or-nothing terms but as questions of nuance and gradation. There
is no unitary template in terms of which constitutional status is either achieved
or not achieved …’94
Accordingly, if “constitutional” and “not-constitutional” are seen as the two
opposite ends of a spectrum, the constitutionalisation of the EU legal order
can be viewed as a gradual and evolutionary process that has slowly but surely
been moving towards the “constitutional” end of the spectrum spurred by
the case law of the Court and Treaty amendments. Since EU constitutional law
comprises both the Treaties as well as the case law of the Court, it is often
compared to the unwritten constitution of the UK, which is comprised of
charters, bills, declarations, Parliamentary statutes, constitutional conventions
etc.95 As argued above, Tanchev confirms that the concept of the unwritten
EU constitution, though more difficult to comprehend, “reflects a relatively
high level of independence of the Communities from the Member States and
has a highly developed level of legally regulated power, institutional frame-
work independently existent from the Member States”.96
92 Curtin, “The Sedimentary European Constitution – The Future of ’Constitutionalisation’
without a Constitution,“ 82.
93 Ibid., 85.
94 N. Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism,“ The Modern Law Review 65, no. 3 (2002):
339. Like other scholars cited above, Walker identifies a set of factors that enable one to
identify and measure the degrees of constitutionalisation. His “indices of constitutionalism”
can be summarized as follows: discursive self-awareness, authority, jurisdiction, interpretive
autonomy, institutional capacity, citizenship and voice. For a more detailed elaboration
of those indices, see pp. 343-354.
95 Tanchev, “The Lisbon Treaty within and without Constitutional Orthodoxy,“ 31; See also,
Besselink, “The Notion and Nature of the European Constitution After the Lisbon Treaty,“
262-67.
96 Tanchev, “The Lisbon Treaty within and without Constitutional Orthodoxy,“ 31-32.
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The role of the Court of Justice in the constitutionalisation of the EU legal
order can indeed not be overrated.97 Sólyom draws attention to the import-
ance of historical circumstances as well as the self-understanding of constitu-
tional courts, since they actively shape their own competences and power.98
In that regard, both the self-understanding of the Court of Justice,99 which
can be inferred from the Court’s reference to the Treaties as ‘constitution’,
‘constitutional’ or ‘the basic constitutional charter’,100 the historical circum-
stances under which it was established in the framework of the Communities
in the aftermath of the Second World War, as well as the constitutional tradi-
tions of the Member States’ constitutional courts from which it draws inspira-
tion and with which it interacts, have been instrumental in how the Court
shaped its own jurisdiction as well as the legal order within which it oper-
ates.101
In short, this overview serves to demonstrate how the process of entrench-
ment of fundamental rights in some of the European national legal orders was
followed by the Court of Justice as well as other constitutional courts around
the world. This process of emulation has, in addition to other factors and
developments, contributed to the further constitutionalisation of the Union
legal order. The more entrenched rights are in a legal order (that is the more
deeply rooted they are), the more constraining they get for actors operating
within it. For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to expose that a PSC
on free movement of persons would violate rights that are deeply rooted in
the Union legal order. In our case, such an exposition would imply that
Member States would not have the power to override those rights, i.e. those
rights would constrain them from including the PSC in a future Accession
Agreement. A preliminary examination of the compatibility of the PSC with
the legal order and some of its fundamental principles follows in 5.2.4.3.2.
97 There are many scholars, who in defining the process of constitutionalisation, lay emphasis
on the Court’s contribution to the process. For instance, Tanchev provides the following
definition: “[t]he constitutionalization is a mechanism through which the unwritten constitu-
tion is taking shape through the Court’s jurisprudence”. See, ibid.
98 L. Sólyom, “Comment,“ in European and US Constitutionalism, ed. G. Nolte (Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 249.
99 For a brief elaboration of the constitutional powers exercised by the Court of Justice, see
M. L. F. Esteban, The Rule of Law in the European Constitution (Kluwer Law International,
1999). 23-25.
100 See Opinion 1/76, [1977] ECR 741, para. 12; Case 294/83 Les Verts, para. 23; Joined Cases 46/87
and 227/88 Hoechst AG, [1989] ECR 2859, para. 62; Opinion 1/91 EEA, para. 20; Case C-314/91
Weber, [1993] ECR I-1093, para. 8; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah
Kadi, paras. 202, 81 and 316. For a deeper discussion of these cases, see Esteban, The Rule
of Law in the European Constitution: 26-37.
101 It is argued that many “European constitutional courts were created out of a deep mistrust
in the majoritarian institutions, which had been misused and corrupted during the Nazi,
fascist, and communist regimes”. It was this historical setting that led the judges to see
themselves as guarantors of their democratic legal orders and explained their “self-conscious
activism”. See, Sólyom, “Comment,“ 249-50.
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1.3 NATURE OF “LEGAL CONSTRAINTS”: THEORETICAL DEFINITION
The preceding discussion on the nature of the legal order is important, as it
provides important clues as to the types of legal constraints operating within
it. It is possible to make different categorizations of the concept of legal con-
straints. So far, procedural and substantive constraints were mentioned, as
well as those relating to the overall structure or identity of a constitution. While
procedural constraints were just mentioned in passing, the significance of some
substantive constraints, especially those flowing from the fundamental nature
of some principles and norms, was emphasized. It was also argued that just
like some national constitutional courts protect the “basic structure”, identity
or coherence of their constitutions, so does the Court of Justice protect “the
very foundations” of the Union legal order. In other words, those “very
foundations” place constraints on Member States and Union institutions, which
need to be taken account of.
To begin with the theoretical underpinning of the concept of legal con-
straints in the literature, the constraining effect of law is typically considered
to be based on internal and external considerations (internal (normative) versus
external constraints). The first and most obvious way that law constrains is
when relevant actors or institutions within a system have internalized legal
norms derived from “authoritative text, judicial decisions, or institutional
practice”,102 i.e. they have learnt what those texts or decisions say and act
accordingly, out of belief they “ought to” do so. As far as the protection of
fundamental rights in the EU legal order is concerned, it is not difficult to
demonstrate how deeply internalized they are as they are mentioned widely
in the Treaties, as well as in Member States’ constitutions. Moreover, they have
been incorporated into the case law of the Court as general principles of EU
law as mentioned above, and have always been actively promoted by the
political institutions.103 All actors believe in the value of and need to act in
accordance with established standards of fundamental rights. The last Chapter
of this thesis provides a specific example of the general principle of equality.
Normative (or internal) constitutional constraint is a matter of law: it does
not depend on what any particular actor or institution believes the law to be.
However, since different actors can perceive the law differently, Fallon dis-
tinguishes further between “direct normative constraints” and “mediated
constitutional constraints”.104 The former are about “the perceptions of consti-
tutional obligation”105 experienced by particular actors. Since different per-
102 Bradley and Morrison, “Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint,“ 1132;
in the literature, this is referred to as the “Hartian” perspective. See, H. L. A. Hart, The
Concept of Law, 2 ed. (1994).
103 See, Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, Council and the Commission concerning
the protection of fundamental rights and the ECHR (Luxembourg, 5 April 1977).
104 Fallon, “Constitutional Constraints,“ 995-97.
105 Ibid., 1036.
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ceptions might lead to a dispute about constitutional meaning, the importance
of the latter concept comes to the fore, as “mediated constitutional constraint”
is about the interpretation adopted by the judiciary, which further constrains
the non-judicial actors and institutions.106
In the EU legal order, it is the Court of Justice that provides authoritative
interpretation of provisions of both primary and secondary law.107 To provide
an example, it is not rare that different institutions have different understand-
ing of what the Treaties provide for. In Chernobyl,108 different understandings
of what Article 173 EC (now Article 263 TFEU) meant (direct normative con-
straint) led to a dispute between the European Parliament and the Council.
The Court held that the provision should be interpreted to allow Parliament
to bring an action for annulment to safeguard its prerogatives, despite the fact
that it was not listed as one of the institutions that could do so under Article
173 EC. The Court’s pronouncement constituted an example of a “mediated
constitutional constraint”, which was thereafter, binding on all actors and
institutions operating within the scope of Union law.
As to the second type of constraints, called external constraints, their power
arises from “[t]he prospect of inefficacy and the threat of sanctions”.109 Actors
within a legal order are aware of the boundaries of their competence and
authority. They know that transgressing those boundaries would make their
assertions of power inefficacious, and trigger sanctions in some cases. For
instance, if the Council fails to follow the procedure prescribed in the Treaties,
and tries to legislate without obtaining the consent of the Parliament as
required, the promulgated legal act could be invalidated by the Court, for not
fulfilling “an essential procedural requirement”.110 Similarly, there are pro-
cedures built in the system, for instance the infringement proceedings under
Article 258 TFEU, whereby Member States, which fail to fulfil their obligations
under the Treaty might end up incurring heavy financial sanctions.111
Despite the distinction between internal and external (sources of) constraints
in the literature, scholars point out that in many contexts the two do not
106 Ibid.
107 See, Article 19(1) TEU and Article 267 TFEU.
108 Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council.
109 Fallon, “Constitutional Constraints,“ 1036. For a more detailed discussion of “external
sanctions“, see ibid., 997-1000; and Bradley and Morrison, “Presidential Power, Historical
Practice, and Legal Constraint,“ 1137-40.
110 Case C-65/90 European Parliament v Council, [1992] ECR I-4593, para. 21.
111 Bradley and Morrison explain further that enforcement does not have to be formal. Even
formal modes of enforcement are considerably strengthened by informal mechanism, such
as criticism and public shaming. See, Bradley and Morrison, “Presidential Power, Historical
Practice, and Legal Constraint,“ 1127.
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operate independently.112 Bradley and Morrison underline that often practices
followed out of fear of external sanction become internalized as a result of
habit. This is called “the normative power of the actual” and denotes people’s
inclination “to give normative significance to that with which they are famil-
iar”.113 When applied to actions of States in the context of international law,
that type of behaviour or practice results in the formation of ‘custom’.114 In
political science, the latter logic is called “path dependency”.115 In the latter
context, it is not necessarily borne out of fear of external sanction, but rather
out of habit and the convenience of the familiar. Overall, given how the
internal and external constraints are intertwined, this thesis does not make
an effort to disentangle them or specify exactly what sort of legal constraints
we are dealing with.
1.4 IDENTIFYING “LEGAL CONSTRAINTS”: OPERATIONAL DEFINITION
In this thesis the focus is on constraints that limit Member States’ behaviour
as primary law makers in the particular context of drafting Accession Agree-
ments. The focus is on constraints that find their source in the EU legal order.
Even though our focus is on “legal” constraints, as it will become clear below,
a wide interpretation of the term “legal constraint” is employed. Hence, what
is covered is a wide range of rules, norms, principles and practices deriving
from the pre-accession and accession process of a new Member State as well
as from the constitutional foundations of the Union that constrain existing
Member States and compel them to follow a particular course of action.
To be more specific about what falls within the scope of our broad defini-
tion of “legal constraints” in EU law, it is composed of three categories: directly
effective law (justiciable law), or hard law; law that is not clear, precise and
unconditional enough to produce direct effect (non-justiciable law); and estab-
lished practices and procedures (written and unwritten). To begin with the
first category of constraints, “directly effective law” comprises provisions,
principles and norms that can be invoked in courts of law. Those could be
invoked in their own right, such as directly effective Treaty provisions, as well
112 Ibid., 1040. Fallon agrees with that, but points out that there could be few instances when
the two might diverge. For instance, in the American system voters could sanction a state
court judge for upholding an unpopular but legally valid constitutional claim. See, Fallon,
“Constitutional Constraints,“ 1036.
113 Bradley and Morrison, “Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint,“ 1140.
114 M. Koskenniemi, “The Normative Force of Habit: International Custom and Social Theory,“
in International Law, ed. M. Koskenniemi (New York University Press, 1992), 213-89.
115 P. Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,“
Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (1996): 145-46; J. Giandomenico, “Path Dependency
in EU Enlargement: Macedonia’a Candidate Status from a Historical Institutionalist Perspect-
ive,“ European Foreign Affairs Review 14(2009): 89-112.
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as to check the legality of other measures, such as the general principles of
law, to provide two examples.
Second, come legal provisions with no direct effect, i.e. the so-called “quasi-
legal” norms and principles, which can also be traced back to Treaty provisions
or other legal measures. These norms, even though not suitable for reliance
in courts of law, do affect Member States’ behaviour; hence they need to be
taken into account. The line between the political and legal is not always easy
to draw.116 What will distinguish the norms, principles and values identified
in this category from the purely political, in other words what will qualify
them as “quasi-legal” will be the fact that they are traceable to a given written
binding legal source. For instance, while principles can be invoked in courts,
we do not know whether the same is true for “values”,117 which are also
mentioned in the Treaties. If we were to stick to a very strict definition of what
“legal” is, we would be able to identify only some of the factors constraining
Member States as primary law makers, and would miss many other significant
ones.
Another reason for not being very strict with this category are the develop-
ments of the last twenty years. The EEC was initially a legal and technocratic
project, but the EU is now far beyond that, which is visible in the TEU and TFEU.
The Treaties are imbued with “fundamental rights and freedoms” language.
As will be demonstrated in Part III of this thesis, which is on the constitutional
foundations of the Union, the impetus for many legal developments was
political. The creation of the citizenship concept or the incorporation of the
CFR in the Treaties are all part of efforts to bring the Union closer to its citizens
and thereby increase the legitimacy of the integration project. In other words,
the political rationale underlying certain provisions can be seen as an addi-
tional force contributing to their power as legal constraints.
The third category of legal constraints consists of the established practices
and procedures, which Member States and the institutions of the EU follow
even if those are not to be found in strictly legally binding (or written) instru-
ments. Those established practices are customs similar to the “constitutional
conventions”118 in UK law, or “customs” under public international law.119
They also constrain Member States. In Part II, it will be illustrated how the
process of the accession of a new Member State is governed by practice set
116 As Bradley and Morrison argue, law and politics are frequently intertwined. See, Bradley
and Morrison, “Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint,“ 1124.
117 Compare the wording of ex Article 6(1) TEU with the current Article 2 TEU.
118 A constitutional convention is defined as an informal and uncodified procedural agreement
that is followed by the institutions of a state. For a more detailed elaboration see, P. Leyland,
The Constitution of the United Kingdom: A Contextual Analysis, 2 ed. (Hart Publishing, 2012).
32-41.
119 See Koskenniemi, “The Normative Force of Habit: International Custom and Social Theory.“;
D. Kennedy, “The Sources of International Law,“ in International Law, ed. Martti Kosken-
niemi (New York University Press, 1992), 362-79.
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by the first wave of accession (that of the UK, Ireland and Denmark). Even
though there were some changes to accommodate the particular needs of every
enlargement wave, the basics of this process were followed in all subsequent
enlargement waves.
To sum up, the reason for the employment of a broad definition of legal
constraints is to provide as accurate a picture as possible of the accession
process, which culminates in the drafting and ratifying of an Accession Agree-
ment. Focusing only on one or two of these dimensions would produce a
picture that is blurred, patchy and incomplete, hence the need for a broader
definition that provides a clearer and more accurate picture.
1.4.1 Methodology
This thesis is a case study, which aims to establish the existing legal constraints
on Member States as primary law makers in the context of accession. There
are many more types of constraints in operation in the Union legal order: of
a political, economic or psychological nature to name but a few. For the
purposes of this thesis, as discussed above, constraints of a “legal” nature are
of relevance. Yet, there are a myriad of constraints of a legal nature. This thesis
provides a case study of the PSC, which means that it aims to identify those
“legal constraints”, which would operate to preclude the inclusion of a PSC
that would seriously breach them.
The method of a study needs to be suitable for the analysis of the material
at hand. It should be able to help to extract a meaningful answer to the main
research question. The methodology chosen for this thesis is firstly, determined
by the operational definition coined for the concept of “legal constraints”; and
secondly, by the nature of the (legal) material available in the three levels of
analysis, i.e. constraints that flow from association law, enlargement law, and
EU constitutional law.
The second important consideration in choosing an appropriate method,
in addition to available material, is the nature of the area under analysis. While
in some areas, such as in EU constitutional law, which is the area examined
in Part III of this thesis, there are plenty of sources of a legally binding nature;
treaty provisions, secondary law, case law, Opinions of the Court, in other
areas, such as enlargement law examined in Part II of this thesis, there is one
relevant treaty provision and a few cases that shed light on the interpretation
of that provision. The rest of the picture is painted with the aid of non-binding
documents of Union institutions (and academic literature) evidencing past
practice in this area.
In short, analysis of every topic in each Chapter begins by examining hard
law, that is the Treaties and existing secondary law. That is often comple-
mented by the case law and Opinions of the Court, followed by academic
discussion on the matter. If information generated is not sufficient to provide
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a full or satisfactory picture or an explanation, established rules and procedures
and common practices are also examined. The examination is also comple-
mented by soft law: non-binding documents issued by Union institutions which
have explanatory value in terms of revealing existing practices or policy choices
of those institutions.
1.4.2 The Permanent Safeguard Clause (PSC)
The central role played by the PSC in this study requires a brief definition of
the term, a preliminary overview of where it comes from, what it might entail
and how it will be used for the purposes of this thesis. Last but not least,
existing scholarly comments on the proposed clause are examined, as they
provide a basis as to why it could be problematic and worth studying further.
Safeguard clauses are provisions that form the legal basis on which, after
an authorisation obtained from an institution specified in the clause (usually
the Commission), Member States are able to take protective measures to tackle
an unforeseen situation that arises during a transitional period. In principle,
they are tools available for a certain period of time: for instance, in the case
of the original Treaties, Article 226 EC was available to the original Member
States only until 31 December 1969,120 that is the end of the transitional
period.121 Similarly, all safeguard clauses employed in previous Accession
Agreements were available for a pre-determined period of time within which
a new Member State was expected to adapt to the working of the internal
market and eventually, assume full responsibility as an equal Member State
of the Union. Likewise, the safeguard clauses provided the old Member States
with time to adapt to the new circumstances of an enlarged internal market.
In other words, these clauses functioned as safety valves during transitional
periods dampening the effect of unexpected shocks by allowing protective
measures to be taken either on the part of the old or new Member States.
120 Article 226 EC provided as follows: “1. If, during the transitional period, difficulties arise
which are serious and liable to persist in any sector of the economy or which could bring
about serious deterioration in the economic situation of a given area, a Member State may
apply for authorisation to take protective measures in order to rectify the situation and
adjust the sector concerned to the economy of the common market. 2. On application by
the State concerned, the Commission shall, by emergency procedure, determine without
delay the protective measures which it considers necessary, specifying the circumstances
and the manner in which they are to be put into effect. 3. The measures authorised under
paragraph 2 may involve derogations from the rules of this Treaty, to such an extent and
for such periods as are strictly necessary in order to attain the objectives referred to in
paragraph 1. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning
of the common market.”
121 For examples of other safeguard clauses used in that period, see P. J. Slot, “Vrijwaringsclau-
sules en vrijwaringsmaatregelen in het recht van de Europese Economische Gemeenschap,“
SEW: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht 9(1976): 473-502.
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As mentioned above, the PSC analysed in this thesis appeared in Turkey’s
Negotiating Framework. Neither its precise form nor its mode of operation
has been specified. Its unprecedented nature makes those elements difficult
to foresee. All these factors raise doubts as to the possibility of including such
a clause in an Act of Accession as well as to its compatibility with the Treaties.
To have a closer look at the exact wording of the Negotiating Framework,
it refers to:
‘Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard
clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures,
may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its
proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or
agriculture. Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establish-
ment of freedom of movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual
Member States. Transitional arrangements or safeguards should be reviewed regard-
ing their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal market.’122
It is not possible to infer from this paragraph which type of measures will
be employed regarding the different policy areas mentioned. The focus in this
thesis is on the freedom of movement of persons, because of its paramount
importance in the system of the Treaty. As previously mentioned, the most
important novelty in the paragraph cited above is the reference to permanent
safeguard clauses, which will be always available as a basis for taking protect-
ive measures. Bringing the word “permanent” next to the “safeguard clause”
seems problematic in the context of EU law. As it will be illustrated in more
detail in Part II, safeguard clauses are flexible tools and can take various forms.
Even the institution authorizing the measure can change.123 However, what
has been constant over the decades was their “temporary” or “transitional”
nature.
Like any provision derogating from the main rules of the Treaties, safe-
guard clauses are also to be interpreted strictly.124 What the Court established
regarding the application of temporary derogation clauses in Accession Treaties
is insightful for our purposes. The Court ruled that “it was justified for the
original Member States provisionally to accept such inequalities, it would be
contrary to the principle of equality of the Member States before Community law to
accept that such inequalities could continue indefinitely”.125 Hence, the Act
122 Emphasis added. Point 12, paragraph 4 of the Negotiating Framework for Turkey. Available
online at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf
123 While it is usually the Commission, which plays the central role in the authorization of
the employment of safeguard clauses, it was the Council that was responsible (upon the
Commission’s recommendation) to take the postponement decision under the membership
postponement safeguard clause laid down in Article 39 of the 2005 Act of Accession for
Romania and Bulgaria.
124 Case 11/82 SA Piraiki-Patraiki and others v Commission, [1985] ECR 207, para. 26.
125 Emphasis added. Case 231/78 Commission v UK, [1979] ECR 1447, para. 11.
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of Accession had to be interpreted with due regard “to the foundations and the
system of the Community, as established by the Treaty”.126
The vague wording of the paragraph from Turkey’s Negotiating Framework
cited above lends itself to many interpretations. For instance, the statement
that “the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom
of movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual Member
States”, suggests that the clause adopted regarding free movement of persons
might be only temporary, if eventually freedom of movement is to be estab-
lished. However, if we were to put emphasis on the latter aspect of the state-
ment, that individual Member States would be given a maximum role, it is
not difficult to envision a scenario whereby such a clause might turn into a
permanent derogation clause in the hands of some Member States. Hence, the
possibility of various scenarios is taken into account throughout this thesis,
and a broad approach is adopted aiming to identify whether Member States
would be precluded from including such clauses effecting free movement of
persons in an Accession Agreement and if so, what kind of legal constraints
would play a role in that process? However, the primary focus is on the
proposed PSC, which has also drawn some scholarly attention.
The prevalent view in the literature is that there is a difference between
Articles 48 and 49 TEU. While the former provides for ‘amendment’ of the
Treaties, the latter allows only for ‘adjustments’ necessitated by accession. It
is argued that Accession Agreements have to respect the fundamental prin-
ciples underlying the Union legal order, and any changes going beyond mere
‘adjustments’ have to be introduced via Article 48 TEU.127 The proposed PSC
has been qualified as a “Trojan horse”128 threatening to undermine the funda-
mentals of the Union, first and foremost the principle of equality of its
citizens,129 as well as that of its Member States.130 Such a clause would
126 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 12.
127 C. Hillion, “Widen to Deepen? The Potential and Limits of Accession Treaties to Achieve
EU Constitutional Reform,“ in Reconciling the Deepening and Widening of the European Union,
ed. S. Blockmans and S. Prechal (T.M.C. Asser Institute, 2007), 163-64; A. Ott, “A Flexible
Future for the European Union: The Way Forward or a Way Out?,“ in Reconciling the
Deepening and Widening of the European Union, ed. S. Blockmans and S. Prechal (T.M.C. Asser
Instituut, 2007), 153-54; K. Inglis, Evolving Practice in EU Enlargement (Martin Nijhoff
Publishers, 2010). 48-55; U. Becker, “EU-Enlargements and Limits to Amendments of the
E.C. Treaty,“ in Jean Monnet Working Paper 15/01, ed. Professor J.H.H. Weiler European Union
Jean Monnet Chair (2001), 9. Contra, see B. De Witte, “The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision
Process,“ in Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, ed. P. Beaumont, C. Lyons,
and N. Walker (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), 51.
128 M. Emerson, “Vade Mecum for the Next Enlargements of the European Union,“ CEPS Policy
Brief 61 (Dec. 2004): 2.
129 See Article 9 TEU and Chapter III of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). See also,
C. Hillion, “Negotiating Turkey’s Membership to the European Union: Can the Member
States Do As They Please?,“ European Constitutional Law Review 3, no. 2 (2007): 275-78; S.
Baykal, “AB Hukukunun Temel İlkeleri Çerçevesinde AB’ye Katılım ve Türkiye’nin Müza-
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blatantly discriminate on the basis of nationality, as its targets would be only
future Union citizens of Turkish nationality.131 The fact that the internal
market, the historical crux of the integration project has been built on the
principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, which is still at
the heart of its functioning, places a big question mark on the compatibility
of the proposed PSC with the fundamentals of the Union legal order. Building
on what has already been said and studied, this thesis aims to move beyond
what has already been done by providing a holistic account of constraints in
play during accession negotiations by examining all levels of EU law from
which they might be flowing.
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
It is argued that in the context of drafting an accession agreement, there are
constraints on Member States flowing from three levels: the pre-accession level,
that is the existing legal framework around the EEC-Turkey Association Agree-
ment, known as the Ankara Agreement (Part I); the accession process level, which
is comprised of past practice and existing EU rules on enlargement (Part II);
and last but not least, the constitutional foundations of the Union (Part III), which
constrain Member States whenever they act within the scope of Union law
as both primary and secondary law makers. It includes a case study of the
specific role of the principle of equality as part of the very foundations of the
Union, as an essential component of Union citizenship, the CFR as well as a
general principle of EU law.
1.5.1 Part I: Legal constraints flowing from EEC-Turkey Association Law
To begin with Part I, the centrepiece of this Part is the Ankara Agreement and
Ankara Association Law built around it by the Contracting Parties, the Court
of Justice as well as the Association Council. However, before going into
discussing the constraints flowing from Association Law, Chapter 2 focuses
on the concept of association as an instrument of EU external relations, in order
to place the Ankara Agreement in context, as a genuine pre-accession agree-
ment, among different types of association agreements. After defining the main
kere Çerçeve Belgesinde Yer Alan Esaslar,“ Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi 12, no. 1 (2013):
21-22.
130 See Article 4(2) TEU. See also Inglis, Evolving Practice in EU Enlargement: 54; Emerson, “Vade
Mecum for the Next Enlargements of the European Union,“ 2; Ott, “A Flexible Future for
the European Union: The Way Forward or a Way Out?,“ 152-54; Baykal, “AB Hukukunun
Temel İlkeleri Çerçevesinde AB’ye Katılım ve Türkiye’nin Müzakere Çerçeve Belgesinde
Yer Alan Esaslar,“ 25.
131 See Articles 18-20 TFEU.
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characteristics of the relationship of association, which are laid down in Article
217 TFEU (ex Article 238(1) of the EEC Treaty), an overview of different types
of association agreements signed in the past between the EEC/EC/EU and third
European states is provided. While the range of association agreements signed
with third countries is much broader, the reason to restrict our analysis to
agreements with European states is the requirement enshrined in Article 49
TEU that only “European” states may accede to become Union members. The
analysis in Chapter 2 reveals how association agreements signed with European
states have mostly evolved into becoming stepping-stones for membership,
even when that was not the original intention. As to the Ankara Agreement,
just like the Athens Agreement, it is undoubtedly among the most ambitious
association agreements having the explicit aim to facilitate Turkey’s accession
to the Union once it is ready to take on obligations flowing from membership.
Chapter 3 starts by examining the aims, structure and content of the Ankara
Agreement, and is followed by a brief discussion of the most developed area
of the association that is the Customs Union. The rest of the Chapter is devoted
entirely to the analysis of rules on free movement of persons, as it is argued
that the rules applicable in this area could constrain Member States from
introducing a PSC on free movement of persons when they are drafting an
Accession Agreement. Those rules are expected to constitute, as a minimum,
a solid building block that will have to be complemented with other rules of
the acquis communautaire on free movement of persons at the time of Turkey’s
accession.
Hence, the Chapter tries to lay down the current state of affairs regarding
the free movement of workers, services and freedom of establishment. How-
ever, surprisingly, that is not an easy task, as the area is in a state of flux. The
Association Council failed to take all the necessary decisions for the imple-
mentation of the freedoms; however, it took the very first steps regarding free
movement of workers by adopting Decisions 2/76 and 1/80, which include
standstill clauses. Though, left unimplemented, the schedule for establishing
free movement of workers, and a standstill clause in the area of free movement
of services and freedom of establishment was also laid down in an Additional
Protocol. The case law of the Court of Justice instigating change to the rules
on free movement of persons recently, revolves around the standstill clauses,
which prohibit Member States from introducing “new restrictions” on those
freedoms. The analysis of the Court’s case law reveals the state of development
of the three freedoms, and the fact that introducing a PSC would in certain
cases contravene even the existing standstill clauses. Hence, it is argued that
the existing level of development of the freedoms as well as the commitments
entered into in the Ankara Agreement as well as subsequent rules of the
Association Law, would act as constraints on Member States in drafting the
future Turkish Accession Agreement.
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1.5.2 Part II: Legal constraints flowing from the Accession Process
The focus of Part II is on constraints that flow from the accession process. Since
Article 49 TEU is the provision regulating the process, it is placed under the
spotlight to identify both the procedural and substantive constraints flowing
from that provision. As important as this provision is, as illustrated in Chap-
ter 4, which focuses on the procedural constraints flowing from Article 49 TEU,
it merely provides the basic contours of the process and is far from reflecting
in full what happens in practice. Hence, to provide a clearer account of the
dynamics of the process in practice, starting from the precedent set by the first
enlargement and the principles governing the process set therein, an overview
of subsequent waves of enlargement is provided in tandem with the evolving
roles of the Union institutions involved thereby. This involvement is interpreted
as a strong indication of the supranational character of the process, in addition
to its well-known inter-governmental component. Last but not least, it is
argued that the established practice of past enlargements in combination with
the consistent application of the principles governing accession, have created
(and consolidated) a well-trodden path with a centripetal force that induces
Member States to follow it again and again, i.e. what political scientists call
“path dependence”.
Chapter 5 begins by analysing the main substantive constraint that flows
from the wording of Article 49 TEU, namely that of “adjustment”. While the
English language version uses the concept “adjustments” for changes in
primary law, it uses “adaptations” for changes in secondary law. Other
language versions use one and the same concept for both. Hence, different
language versions of the concept, the Court’s pronouncements on the term
“adaptations”, as well as past Accession Agreements and their content are
examined with a view to shedding light on the scope and meaning of the
concept “adjustment”. Subsequently, follow analyses of other measures, which
even though they do not fall, strictly speaking, under the category “adjust-
ments” or “adaptations”, are worth looking into as they share the same broad
purpose, namely: facilitating the full integration of new Member States into
the Union. Finally, measures that do not share that broad purpose, and as such
arguably go beyond being mere “adjustments”, by creating permanent ex-
ceptions in certain areas, are analysed to identify their nature, scope, and
effects on the internal market, so as to establish whether they could be con-
sidered as precedents paving the way for introducing the proposed PSC.
1.5.3 Part III: Legal constraints flowing from the constitutional foundations
of the Union
Part III analyses the constraints that flow from the constitutional foundations
of the Union. Chapter 5 begins by trying to identify the existence of those
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foundations based on the Treaties, Opinions and case law of the Court. The
latter illustrate the Court’s conviction that such an area, which constitutes the
“very foundations” of the Union, exists and provides examples of past cases
in which Member States were precluded from introducing agreements that
violate those very foundations. Next, it aims to identify the substance of those
“very foundations” with a view to establishing whether they contain elements
capable of precluding Member States from introducing a PSC on free movement
of persons in a future Accession Treaty. The fundamental freedoms, and more
specifically free movement of persons, Union citizenship, and fundamental
rights are identified as areas containing elements that form part of those “very
foundations”, which could preclude Member States from introducing a PSC
clause that could violate the core principles underlying all three areas/
concepts. Lastly, the Chapter looks into the application of the constitutional
constraints that flow from the “very foundations” of the Union by the Court
of Justice. It concludes by examining the recent Pringle case, which confirms
that prior to their ratification, i.e. prior to becoming primary law, measures
introduced in the primary law making process or procedures are also subject
to judicial review.
Chapter 7 provides a case study of the principle that would be most
seriously breached by the inclusion of a PSC on free movement of persons:
namely, the principle of equality or more specifically the principle of non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality. This Chapter demonstrates that
equality is one of the most important principles constituting part of the “very
foundations” of the Union legal order identified in Chapter 6, and as such
would be able to constrain Member States from including such a clause in
a future Accession Agreement. To illustrate its foundational role for the integra-
tion project, the evolution of the principle as well as its various roles and
functions are examined with the purpose to demonstrate its ever widening
scope and increasing importance in EU constitutional law. Chapter 7 demon-
strates the latter point by providing examples of the principle as a general
principle of Union law, as constituting an inalienable component of citizenship
as well as an important part of the CFR. Lastly, it argues that a PSC would also
be in breach of the principle of the equality of Member States, which has been
recently codified to become Article 4(2) TEU.
1.6 SUMMARY
The introduction laid down the scene for the following Chapters by introducing
the research question, identifying the essential characteristics of the Union
legal order, as well as introducing the most important concepts on which this
thesis is built, namely “legal constraints” and the PSC. It established that this
study aims to answer the question whether there are legal constraints on
Member States when they act as primary law makers during the accession
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process of a new Member State, and if so, to identify those constraints. The
research question is answered by providing a case study of the proposed PSC
on free movement of persons mentioned in Turkey’s Negotiating Framework.
Scholars have indicated their doubts as to the possibility of including such
a clause, which would trample on the fundamental principles on which the
Union is built. Hence, this thesis aims to establish whether these principles
or other legal measures are capable of constraining Member States in the
context of accession negotiations and what sources they are flowing from.
The first step in the introduction was to discuss the nature of the Union
legal order. The fact that there is an agreement that it evolved to become more
constitutionalised over the decades enabled us to make analogies with national
legal orders as well as to move from the issue of existence of legal constraints
to that of identifying them. It was argued that just like some constitutional
courts protect the “basic structure”, identity or coherence of their constitutions,
so does the Court of Justice protect “the very foundations” of the Union legal
order. The “very foundations” of the legal order were identified as the first
and most obvious constraint on Member States.
Next, both a theoretical and operational definition of the concept of “legal
constraints” was provided so as to understand its nature and the criteria
according to which it could be identified. It was emphasised that the aim
behind this exercise was not to establish all legal constraints on Member States
as primary law makers in the context of accession, but only those that relate
to the proposed PSC. In other words, the thesis is a case study based on the
proposed PSC, and its compatibility with the fundamental principles underlying
the Union legal order. Hence, the following step was to briefly define what
kind of measures safeguard clauses were, how they had been used in the past,
and last but not least, why scholars thought the proposed PSC would be
problematic.
Lastly, the overall structure of the thesis was introduced. Three levels, or
three sources, of constraints were identified: the pre-accession level, the
accession process itself and lastly the constitutional foundations of the Union.
These could also be considered as three temporal stages; starting from ‘aspiring
to be’ a Member State, to ‘becoming’ one, and extending to ‘being’ a Member
State. Put differently, the thesis tries to identify legal constraints on Member




Legal Constraints flowing from
EEC-Turkey Association Law
INTRODUCTION
The first part of this thesis tries to lay down the constraints that would flow
from the EEC-Turkey Association Law on Member States when negotiating
Turkey’s accession. Before going into the particularities of the Ankara Agree-
ment and the legal regime created around it, Chapter 2 focuses on the legal
basis, aims, scope, as well as past practice of establishing association agree-
ments with third European countries. The EU has signed association agreements
with many countries around the world. The reason for restricting our analysis
to agreements signed with European countries is the geographical constraint
under Article 49 TEU stipulating that only “European” States may apply to
become members of the Union. In other words, what is of interest for our
purposes are association agreements that have the potential to be used as
stepping-stones for EU membership. Chapter 2 examines association agreements
of different kind with a view to placing the Ankara Agreement in context,
and demonstrating that it is a genuine pre-accession agreement.
Chapter 3 examines the Ankara Agreement in detail, as it constitutes the
main legal framework within which EU-Turkey relations take place. As such,
it not only shapes and constrains existing relations, but also forms the (legal)
basis of future relations and constitutes an important building block towards
the negotiation of a possible future Accession Agreement, hence, the need for
its in-depth analysis. After introducing the general structure and objectives
of the Agreement, the focus shifts on the provisions on free movement of
persons, that is free movement workers, service providers and establishment,
since the objectives set and the legal rules established around those provisions
could arguably constrain Member States and preclude them from introducing
a PSC in Turkey’s future Accession Treaty.
To demonstrate the level of development of the Ankara acquis,132 the instru-
ments introduced as a first step for the implementation of free movement of
persons, that is the Additional Protocol of 1973, as well as Decisions of the
Association Council are briefly introduced. Ironically, today, what is more
132 The terms Ankara acquis and Ankara Association Law are used interchangeably throughout
this thesis to refer to all legal rules flowing from the Ankara Agreement, its Additional
Protocols, Association Council Decisions as well as the case law of the Court of Justice
interpreting those instruments.
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interesting and instrumental for the further development of free movement
are not any instruments taken to complete the final stage of association as
envisaged by the Ankara Agreement or its Additional Protocol, but the case
law of the Court of Justice which interprets the provisions of the instruments
just mentioned.
It should be noted that the case law of the Court delivered during the first
decades of the Association dealt mainly with the rights of Turkish workers
who were already established in a Member State and the rights of members
of their families. It is only in the last fifteen years that the Court has been
delivering judgments which have direct implications for free movement of
workers, freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment between
Turkey and Member States of the EU. Chapter 3 focuses on these more recent
cases, which deal with the long forgotten standstill clauses. Those clauses were
introduced in the instruments that were supposed to lay down the groundwork
for the future establishment of the freedoms, by prohibiting the introduction
of any new restrictions as a firs step. Since no second or third steps were taken,
those clauses were either forgotten or not taken seriously. The cases that
provide for the establishment of some freedom of movement in certain fields
nowadays is a result of the Court’s rulings identifying some of the Member
States’ measures obstructing free movement as new restrictions prohibited
by the standstill clauses.
The examination of the case law on the standstill clauses reveals not only
the extent to which free movement of persons is liberalised at the moment,
but also provides clues for the possibility of its further liberalisation prior to
Turkey’s entry into the Union. The case law has also exposed the limits of
those clauses, i.e. areas in which liberalisation of free movement is not possible
by judicial fiat, such as the free movement of service recipients. In short,
Chapter 3 shows that even with the existing limitations, the Ankara Association
Law contains one of the most advanced free movement regimes between the
EU and a third State, second only to the EEA. The more developed the free
movement of persons regime gets under the Association, the more credible
(both political and legal) constraint it would constitute on Member States when
negotiating Turkey’s accession.
2 Association as a stepping-stone to
membership
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Association has proved to be a versatile instrument for the EEC/EC/EU external
relations. Not only have associations with different countries had different
aims and content,133 but also association as a form of relationship with specific
countries proved flexible enough to evolve over time in line with the changing
needs and desires of its contracting parties.134 This flexibility was made possible
by the vague wording of Article 217 TFEU (ex Article 238 of the EEC Treaty,
and ex Article 310 EC), which constitutes the legal basis of those agreements.
Thus, for a better understanding of what an association entails, an analysis
of the wording of Article 217 TFEU and the Court’s interpretation of it will be
provided first. To complement the latter analysis, principles governing the
use of association agreements will be deduced from past practice as well as
relevant documents. Last but not least, a brief account of the evolutionary
trajectory of association will be provided so as to be able to place the Ankara
Agreement on it.
2.2 DEFINING ‘ASSOCIATION’
To begin with the wording of Article 238(1) of the EEC Treaty (now, Article
217 TFEU), it provided that the Community (now the Union) “may conclude
with a third State, a union of States or an international organisation agreements
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common
action and special procedures”. The second paragraph of the same provision
laid down the procedure according to which such agreements were to be
concluded,135 i.e. that they were to “be concluded by the Council, acting
133 D. Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership? (England:
Sheffield Academic Press, 1999). 17.
134 While initially not drafted with membership prospects in mind, the early association
agreements with the CEECs were later reoriented towards the attainment of that prospect.
See, ibid., 18-19. See also, K. Inglis, “The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of
Their Pre-accession Reorientation,“ Common Market Law Review 37(2000): 1175-90.
135 The procedure for the conclusion of association agreements is now laid down in Article
218 TFEU.
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unanimously after consulting the Assembly [European Parliament].”136 Lastly,
Article 238(3) provided that “[w]here such agreements call for amendments
to this Treaty, these amendments shall first be adopted in accordance with
the procedure laid down in Article 236 [now Article 48 TEU]”.
The brief definition of association as a relationship that involves “reciprocal
rights and obligations, common action and special procedures”, does not say
much. Arguably, the drafters of the Treaty wanted to provide the Community
with as much flexibility as possible in defining the aim, scope and content
of each association agreement. This is confirmed by the statement of the first
president of the Commission of the EEC Walter Hallstein, according to whom
“association can be anything between full membership minus 1% and a trade
and cooperation agreement plus 1%”.137 The fact that an association con-
stitutes a relationship that goes beyond a mere trade agreement can also be
inferred from the Court’s Demirel ruling, in which it established that an asso-
ciation agreement creates “special, privileged links with a non-member country
which must, at least to a certain extent, take part in the Community
system”.138
To look more closely at the different components defining association, the
first is “reciprocal rights and obligations”, which according to the Court, should
not be interpreted as “reciprocity” or “equality” in the obligations assumed
by the parties.139 In an association, depending on the level of development
of the associate country, rights and obligations may be taken on over time
and on an asymmetrical basis, as illustrated by the Ankara Agreement that
is discussed in more detail below. However, the parties do not have a com-
pletely free hand in this regard. They are, or at least the EC/EU is, constrained
by their commitments with regard to international trade. The EC/EU’s partici-
pation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995, means that it can only grant unilateral
trade preferences to an associate country under the Article XXIV (5) GATT
exemption, that is if the association leads to the “formation of a customs union
136 The role of the European Parliament in the conclusion of association agreements was
upgraded with the Single European Act, after the entry into force of which the procedure
required “the assent of the European Parliament which shall act by an absolute majority
of its component members”. See, M. Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the
European Community (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006). 315.
137 See, Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 23.
138 Emphasis added. Case 12/86 Demirel, [1987] ECR 3719, para. 9.
139 Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community: 316. See also, Phinne-
more, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 24; and S. Peers, “EC
Frameworks of International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership and Association,“ in The
General Law of E.C. External Relations, ed. A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (Sweet & Maxwell,
2000), 169.
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or a free trade area”.140 Since the agreement between the founding six was
that an association should go beyond a mere free trade area,141 in practice,
this was not a problem.
The second component of the definition of association is “common action”.
Although it has been interpreted by the Court to mean to “take part in the
Community system”,142 as Maresceau argues, the expression in the Treaty
“has perhaps a less ambitious significance than the Court seems to
suggest”,143 since associated countries have never taken part in the Commun-
ities’ decision-making system.144 Hence, “common action” seems to refer to
the implementation of the objectives of the association through the common
institutions created in the framework of the association, such as association
councils and/or association committees. Moreover, it is not difficult to deduce
that the objectives of the association and any common action will need to be
in line with, that is parallel to, those of the Treaty. According to this principle
of parallelism established in the AETR case:
The Community enjoys the capacity to establish contractual links with third
countries over the whole field of objectives defined by the Treaty. This author-
ity arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty, but may equally
flow from measures adopted, within the framework of provisions, by the
Community institutions.145
The Court elaborated on this principle in Kramer, by stating that the author-
ity of the EC to enter into international commitments may arise “not only from
express conferment by the Treaty, but may equally flow implicitly from other
provisions of the Treaty, from the Act of Accession and from measures adopted
within the framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions”.146
The implication of this principle for association agreements was that common
action could cover only areas where the EC had “an explicit or implicit internal
competence to act”.147 However, association agreements entailing matters
beyond the EC’s treaty-making powers were signed in the past,148 and today
agreements that include cooperation in the field of CFSP can be signed as well.
The method employed to overcome the competence constraint in signing an
140 Moreover, any customs union had to cover “substantially all the trade between the consti-
tuent territories of the union” (Article XXIV (8)(a)(i) GATT) and had to contain “a plan
and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within
a reasonable length of time” (Article XXIV (5)(c) GATT). See, the Text of the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Available online at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf
141 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 30.
142 Case 12/86 Demirel, para. 9.
143 Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community: 317.
144 Ibid.; and Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 31.
145 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR), [1971] ECR 263, para. 1 of the summary.
146 Emphasis added. Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Kramer and Others, [1976] ECR 1279, paras. 19-20.
147 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 25.
148 Ibid., 27.
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association agreement has been to have both the EC/EU and its Member States
individually sign and approve the envisaged association agreement, which
would then be classified as a “mixed agreement”.149 According to Phinne-
more, the use of this method has broadened the scope of association “well
beyond that already available under the flexible provisions of Article 238 (310)
[Art. 217 TFEU]”.150
As to the last component of association laid down in Article 217 TFEU, that
is “special procedures”, it refers to the establishment of an institutional frame-
work to ensure the proper functioning of the association. This institutional
framework created separately under each association agreement, which usually
consists of an association council, an association committee and a joint par-
liamentary committee,151 provides the forum in which, decisions and “common
action” are taken, so as to materialize the objectives of the association.152
2.3 PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE AND ASSOCIATION AS A FLEXIBLE AND EVOLVING
TOOL
Efforts to establish the EEC’s approach on association were put forth as soon
as it was created. What follows is a brief account of the Member States’ chang-
ing views on the nature and aims of association over time, as well as an
endeavour to identify some of the principles of practice that have not changed
since their inception.
The founding six Member States of the EEC considered the idea to create
a European free trade area with other OEEC (Organisation for European Eco-
nomic Co-operation) countries, which was referred to as the European Eco-
nomic Association at the time. To that effect an Interim Committee was estab-
lished already back in 1957 in order to coordinate the position of the six on
what such association should entail. It was agreed that an association should
go beyond a free trade area to include the coordination or harmonization of
149 Schermers defined mixed agreements as follows: “A mixed agreement is any treaty to which
an international organization, some or all of its Member States and one or more third States
are parties and for the execution of which neither the organization nor its Member States
have full competence”. H. G. Schermers, “A Typology of Mixed Agreements,“ in Mixed
Agreements, ed. D. O’Keeffe and H. G. Schermers (Kluwer, 1983), 25-26. For a comprehensive
and up-to date account of challenges posed by mixed agreements, see C. Hillion and P.
Koutrakos, Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2010).
150 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 28.
151 An association council is composed of representatives of the Council and of the government
of the associate state; an association committee is composed of Commission officials and
senior civil servants of the associate state; and a joint parliamentary committee contains
parliamentarians from both the European Parliament as well as the national parliament
of the associate state. See, ibid., 26-27.
152 Ibid.; Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community: 317.
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commercial policy, the conditions of production, as well as provision of
adequate safeguards.153 This list was extended in the ‘Ockrent Report’ of
October 1958 to include the coordination of trade policies, rules on competition,
the harmonization of social conditions and rapprochement of legislation, the
convergence of economic, and free movement of workers,154 which led to the
collapse of the talks with countries of the OEEC, as the list was considered to
be too ambitious. The Report emphasised the following principle, which was
to govern negotiations and their conclusion. It provided that “[the European
Economic Association] Agreement must not in any way prejudice either the
content or the implementation of the Treaty of Rome”.155 In other words,
the implementation and safeguarding of the Treaty of Rome had priority. The
fear the associations could slow down or compromise the EEC’s own develop-
ment led to the exclusion of associates from participation from the EEC institu-
tions.
As Phinnemore succinctly summarizes, the basic principles that emerged
during the first few years regarding the use and content of association agree-
ments were as follows: “first, no association should impede integration within
the EEC; secondly, association should not involve simply a free trade area, but
entail policy coordination if not harmonization; and thirdly, involvement of
the associate in the EEC’s internal decision-making processes was not on
offer”.156 These principles can be deduced not only from the early reports
of the European Parliament, but also from the content and structure of the
first two Association Agreements with Greece (1961) and Turkey (1963).157
Member States’ views on association in the 1960s and 1970s did not go beyond
these principles. Neither the Member States nor other community institutions
managed to formulate a consistent policy in this period.
One of the important differences of opinion was on the issue whether
association should be made available exclusively to those states aspiring to
become members in the future or whether it should also be employed as a
permanent, long-term alternative to membership. The divergence of opinion
is visible in the early reports of the European Parliament. While the Birkelbach
153 L. N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford and London:
Stanford University Press & OUP, 1963). 141-42.
154 What is referred to, as the “Ockrent Report” in the literature is a Memorandum of the
Council of Ministers of the EEC, of 17 October 1958, forwarded to the Intergovernmental





156 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 31.
157 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and
Greece (Athens Agreement), OJ 26/294, 18.2.1963; and Agreement establishing an Associ-
ation between the European Economic Community and Turkey (Ankara Agreement), OJ
113/1, 24.12.1973.
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Report (1961) outlined the association possibilities with the EEC,158 it emphas-
ized that “the norm for European states should be EEC membership and not
association”.159 However, two years later a second report by the European
Parliament, the Blaisse Report (1963) was published. While acknowledging
the view held by some that “an “association” agreement can be concluded
only with countries which later intend to become full members of the Com-
munity”,160 in its following page the Report states that association is also
possible “for countries which, though unable or disinclined to join the Com-
munity, are nevertheless prepared to play their part in the integration process
by harmonising their economy with that of the Community to a really appreci-
able extent”.161 In other words, countries, which did not wish to join the EEC,
could also become associates, provided they were ready to commit to a certain
degree of integration.
Despite the existence of supporters of both views, the prevailing, yet
unofficial view in 1960s, was that association had to be limited to less devel-
oped countries, such as Greece and Turkey, which could use the relationship
to develop their economies and become members in the future. That can be
deduced even from the first two concluding paragraphs of the Blaisse Report.
While acknowledging there is no reason why the applications of the neutral
countries (Austria, Sweden and Switzerland) should not be considered, it stated
that:
‘The Treaty of Rome provides for the association of non-member countries, although
what its authors had in mind was perhaps more a temporary association of countries still
not sufficiently developed economically to become full members. Thus the association
with Greece is undoubtedly the purest form of application of Article 238.’162
The principles mentioned above became formal principles in 1987 when the
Commission laid down its position on the future of EC-EFTA relations.163 These
principles, which were referred to as the Interlaken Principles, envisaged
158 The first possibility was that of an association based on a customs union leading to possible
future membership; the second possibility was an association based on a free trade area;
and lastly, a relationship based on a special economic cooperation agreement. See, M. Willi
Birkelbach (Rapporteur), “Rapport fait au nom de la commission politique de l’Assemblée
parlementaire européenne sur les aspects politiques et institutionnels de l’adhésion ou de
l’association à la Communauté“ (Birkelbach Report), 19 December 1961, pp. 25-28. Available
online at: http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/6/1/2d53201e-09db-43ee-9f80-
552812d39c03/publishable_fr.pdf
159 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 31.
160 P. A. Blaisse, “Report prepared on behalf of the Committee on External Trade on the
common trade policy of the EEC towards third countries and on the applications by
European countries for membership or association”, European Parliament Working Papers,
No 134, 26 January 1963, p. 31.
161 Ibid, p. 32.
162 Emphasis added. Ibid, pp. 35-36.
163 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 38-39.
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“priority for internal integration, preservation of the Community’s autonomous
powers of decisions and the need to achieve balanced results (a fair balance
between benefits and obligations)”.164 A second set of principles came out
from the Commission proposals for Europe Agreements (EAs) with the Central
and East European Countries (CEECs). The conclusion of such agreements was
to take place on the condition that prospective associates gave “practical
evidence of their commitment to the rule of law, respect for human rights,
the establishment of multi-party systems, free and fair elections and economic
liberalization with a view to introducing market economies”.165 The commit-
ment to democracy and the latter principles, (which later in 1993 were pro-
claimed officially as the “Copenhagen criteria”), have always been one of the
unwritten prerequisites for establishing an association, however, this was made
explicit only in 1990.166
The Commission’s proposals on the EAs undoubtedly reaffirmed earlier
principles. However, according to Phinnemore, they deviated in one important
respect from the earlier requirement that an associate be a democracy. He
argues that Spain was seen as ineligible for association in 1960s not only
because it was not a democracy, but also because association at the time was
seen as stepping-stone to membership. Whereas in the case of the CEECs, the
EAs were “proposed as sui generis agreements and not as pre-accession agree-
ments”.167 Even though future membership was not entirely ruled out, at
least in the earlier EAs (those with Hungary, Poland, the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic), the link between association and membership was not
explicitly acknowledged. It was only after the 1993 Copenhagen European
Council that the EAs were reoriented as pre-accession tools.168
One of the most creative uses of “association” as a tool has been within
the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) initiated in 1999,169 with the
164 Bulletin of the European Communities, Vol. 5 – 1987, p. 65.
165 European Commission, “Association Agreements with the Countries of Central and Eastern
Europe: A General Outline”, COM(90) 398 final, Brussels, 27 August 1990, p. 20.
166 C. Hillion, “The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny,“ in EU Enlargement: A Legal
Approach, ed. C. Hillion (Oxford, Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing, 2004); Phinnemore, Associ-
ation: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 39.
167 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 39. See also, M.
Maresceau, “A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements,“ in Mixed Agreements Revisited:
The EU and its Member States in the World, ed. Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 18.
168 See P.-C. Müller-Graff, “East Central Europe and the European Union: From Europe
Agreements to a Member State Status,“ in East Central Europe and the European Union: From
Europe Agreements to a Member State Status, ed. P.-C. Müller-Graff (Baden-Baden: Nomos,
1997), 16; Inglis, “The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of Their Pre-accession
Reorientation,“ 1173; Maresceau, “A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements,“ 18.
169 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, on
“The Stabilisation and Association Process of countries of South-Eastern Europe (Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Albania”, COM (1999) 235 final, Brussels, 26.05.1999.
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purpose to stabilize and democratize the Western Balkans by offering “a
perspective of EU membership”170 once the Copenhagen criteria are fulfilled.
Hence, conditionality is the cornerstone of SAP and its novelty was that it
applied even in the absence of any contractual links between the EU and the
countries of the region.171 Blockmans calls this “a graduated process”, as
increasing levels of conditionality apply from the start of negotiations to the
conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) and later
until eventual accession.172 As a result of this process SAAs were signed with
Croatia (2001), Macedonia (2001), Albania (2006), Montenegro (2007), Bosnia
and Herzegovina (2008), and Serbia (2008). Negotiations for a SAA with Kosovo
started on the 28 October 2013.173 In its preamble, each of the agreements
confirms that the respective associate is “a potential candidate for EU member-
ship”,174 thereby creating officially an additional status for states aspiring
to join the EU.
In short, this overview illustrates the changing views and policies in the
EU on what association should entail. There were always diverse views on
the matter, as illustrated by the early Parliamentary reports mentioned above.
While the prevailing view in that early period was of developing association
as a relationship to assist less developed countries, such as Greece and Turkey,
to build their economies so as to prepare them for full membership in the
future, the EAs of the early 1990s were far less ambitious. However, no matter
what the initial intention was, as far as association agreements signed with
European countries were concerned, they could (and often would) be
reoriented towards attaining membership as soon as consensus to that effect
appeared. Not only the EAs, but also the 1995 enlargement to the EFTA countries
is a good illustration of the fact that, more often than not associations with
European countries serve as a road that sooner or later seems to lead to EU
membership.
170 See, Common Position concerning a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 1999/345/CFSP,
OJ L 133, 28.05.1999, pp. 1-2.
171 Another novelty was the paramount importance given to regional cooperation. While
cooperation between the CEECs was encouraged, it was considered crucial for the stabilisa-
tion of the Western Balkans. Hence, it constituted an explicit condition that reappeared
in the SAAs again and again. See, S. Blockmans, “Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herze-
govina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo),“ in The European
Union and Its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and
Integration, ed. S. Blockmans and A. Lazowski (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), 338.
172 S. Blockmans, “Consolidating the Enlargement Agenda for South Eastern Europe,“ in
Reconciling the Deepening and Widening of the European Union, ed. S. Blockmans and S. Prechal
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007), 67-68.
173 See European Commission, MEMO/13/938, 28.10.2013. Available online at: http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-938_en.htm
174 Emphasis added.
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2.4 DIFFERENT MODELS OF ASSOCIATION
As briefly discussed above, the nature of association agreements signed over
the decades between the EEC/EC/EU and third countries have changed. Before
going into categorizing them on the basis of the trade regime they entail, it
should be noted that “[t]he Community’s [now the Union’s] classification of
agreements is governed by politics, not law”.175 That is especially the case
with mixed agreements. Hence, scholars warn against approaching them from
a purely legal perspective, as they occupy the “complex grey zone where law
and politics meet”.176 That partially helps explain, why the Ankara Agree-
ment, which is considered as “a genuine pre-accession agreement”,177 has
not led to accession, while the Agreements with Malta and Cyprus, which
were considered to be “nothing more than advanced trade agreements”,178
have done so.
While the place of an association agreement in the classification below does
not automatically determine the fate of an associate state in terms of its
eventual accession to the Union, it is still very important, as the scope, content,
aim and degree of integration envisaged by each type of agreement is taken
into account by the Court of Justice when interpreting those agreements. It
will not be wrong to say that the deeper integration an agreement envisages,
the more the Court is inclined to give it an interpretation in line with EU law.
Thus, the first cluster of agreements, which envisaged the establishment of
a Customs Union and the eventual accession of Greece and Turkey to the
Community/Union, are among the agreements that have been given the widest
interpretation by the Court.179
The following classification of association agreements has been borrowed
from Phinnemore and has been updated.180 It is chronological, as clusters of
agreements signed in different periods reflect the Community’s/Union’s
evolving association policy in those respective periods of time. The first cluster
of agreements are the ambitious association agreements signed with Greece
and Turkey in the 1960s, immediately followed by the more modest agreements
signed with Malta and Cyprus in the 1970s. Thirdly, comes the EEA: the most
175 Peers, “EC Frameworks of International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership and Associ-
ation,“ 175.
176 Maresceau, “A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements,“ 16.
177 M. Maresceau, “Turkey: A Candidate State Destined to Join the European Union,“ in From
Single Market to Economic Union: Essays in Memory of John A Usher, ed. N. Nic Shuibhne and
L. W. Gormley (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 318. See also, A. Rizzo, “L’Accord d’Ankara: Accord
d’Association ou de Véritable “Pré-adhésion”?,“ in Turquie et Union européenne: État des
lieux, ed. B. Bonnet (Buxelles: Bruylant, 2012), 105-32.
178 Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community: 319.
179 As to the EEA Agreement, which does not envisage eventual accession, but deep integration
into the internal market, it should be noted that it is the EFTA Court that rules on issues
of interpretation.
180 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 45-49.
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advanced association regime created between the Union and a group of third
countries. Though officially it is a relationship that does not envisage member-
ship, in practice, as illustrated by the 1995 enlargement, membership is not
entirely ruled out. Last but not least, come the EAs of 1990s and SAAs of the
2000s signed with the CEECs and those of the Western-Balkans.
2.4.1 Associations based on a Customs Union
The first two association agreements were the so-called Athens Agreement
signed with Greece (1961), and Ankara Agreement signed with Turkey (1963).
These were ambitious association agreements that aimed at the gradual estab-
lishment of a Customs Union and the harmonization of the economic policies
of these two countries with that of the EEC in the medium-term, and preparing
them for full membership in the long-term.181
The emphasis in these agreements was on establishing a Customs Union
because that was also the EEC’s priority at the time. The very first sentence
of Article 9 of the EEC Treaty, which is situated in Part Two: Foundations of
the Community, under title I: Free Movement of Goods, stipulates that “[t]he
Community shall be based on a customs union …”. Both Agreements, even
though the Ankara Agreement was less detailed,182 can be called mini-Treaties
of Rome, as they covered the EEC Treaty’s entire subject matter.183 Both agree-
ments provided for future free movement of goods, workers, services, capital,
freedom of establishment, and the extension of the rules on agriculture, trans-
port, and competition. The comprehensiveness of those agreements, particularly
their economic provisions providing for the harmonization of policies between
the associates, according to Feld,184 strongly suggest that they provide for
“more than the creation of a mere customs union”.185
The conclusion that a relationship based on a Customs Union was suitable
for associates, which aspired to become members in the future, but were
181 W. Feld, “The Association Agreements of the European Communities: A Comparative
Analysis “ International Organization 19, no. 2 (1965): 230-34.
182 The Athens Agreement is more detailed and is composed of 77 provisions, whereas, the
Ankara Agreement is composed of only 33 provisions. Thus, the latter agreement had to
be complemented by an Additional Protocol providing for the details of its implementation
in 1971. See, J. N. Kinnas, The Politics of Association in Europe (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag
GmbH, 1979). 61.
183 See, Peers, “EC Frameworks of International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership and
Association,“ 161.
184 He notes however, “that the provisions containing the elements of an economic union [in
the Ankara Agreement] are not detailed regulations but only commitments for future action
during the transition and final periods which will be spelled out in detail by the Supple-
mentary Protocol”. Feld, “The Association Agreements of the European Communities: A
Comparative Analysis “ 233-34.
185 Ibid., 233.
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economically not ready to do so at the relevant time, such as Greece and
Turkey, can also be deduced from the report of the Political Commission of
the Parliamentary Assembly, which provided as follows:
‘Les avantages d’une association sous forme d’union douanière consistent
notamment dans un rapprochement progressif du pays associé au marché commun,
posant ainsi les jalons de son adhésion future. C’est pourquoi cette forme se recom-
mande tout particulièrement pour les pays désireux d’adhérer, mais qui ne remplissent
pas les conditions économiques nécessaires à l’adhésion. Si ces pays sont prêts à tirer
les conséquences d’ordre politique qui résultent des liens étroits de l’association,
à respecter les principes établis, à se soumettre au système de contrôle institutionnel
de l’association, l’union douanière leur offrira de plus grands avantages que les
autres formes d’association.’186
Even though both countries were considered as “developing” countries at the
time, Greece was better off than Turkey. That is why the Ankara Agreement
provided first, for an extra “preparatory stage”, in which Turkey was to
strengthen its economy with the aid from the Community. While a detailed
schedule for establishing a Customs Union was spelled out clearly in the
Athens Agreement,187 the Ankara Agreement provided for the drafting of such
a schedule in an Additional Protocol that was to be adopted once Turkey was
deemed ready to enter the next “transitional stage” of the association,188
which was to precede the “final stage” that was to be based on the Customs
Union.189 Last but not least, both Agreements contained provisions referring
to the examination of the possibility of their accession to the Community once
they were ready to accept the obligations their memberships would entail.190
2.4.2 Associations based on a potential Customs Union
In the following decade, “the apparent centrality of a customs union to an
association was challenged”,191 mainly because of the problems experienced
with Greece and Turkey.192 Thus, the association agreements signed with Malta
186 Emphasis added. Birkelbach Report, note 158 above, para. 103, p. 26.
187 For details see, Feld, “The Association Agreements of the European Communities: A
Comparative Analysis “ 230-34; and Kinnas, The Politics of Association in Europe: 56-61.
188 See, Articles 3 and 4 of the Ankara Agreement.
189 See Article 5 of the Ankara Agreement.
190 See Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement and Article 72 of the Athens Agreement.
191 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 46. See also, Peers,
“EC Frameworks of International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership and Association,“
161-62.
192 There were both economic and political problems. The economies of both countries did
not develop as quickly as expected to match those of their western counterparts. Moreover,
the 1960s were marked by military coups and political turmoil in both.
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(1970) and Cyprus (1972) were “a very limited form of free trade agree-
ment[s]”193 that envisaged the possibility to establish a Customs Union.194 These
agreements were not pre-accession agreements. They were not even mixed
agreements, as they did not envision cooperation in any other area than free
movement of goods.195
Neither the substantively limited scope of these agreements, nor the absence
of any reference to accession in them, constituted a problem or an obstacle
for the Maltese and Cypriot membership applications. Once they joined the
Union in 2004, these limited agreements were replaced by the Accession
Treaty,196 demonstrating clearly that when there is (political) will there is a
way.
2.4.3 The EEA: The Internal Market Association
This section provides only a brief overview of the EEA Agreement. Even though
it is the most advanced economic regime created as a basis of relations with
developed countries, the fact remains that it emerged as an alternative to EU
membership, and currently none of the states parties to it seems to have any
active membership aspirations.197
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland are the only remaining
parties to the EFTA Convention.198 While all of these states participated in the
negotiations of the EEA Agreement, as a result of a negative referendum in
December 1992, Switzerland failed to actually join the EEA. Subsequently, it
193 Peers, “EC Frameworks of International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership and Associ-
ation,“ 161. See also, Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community:
319.
194 The preamble of both agreements provide that “eighteen months before the expiry of the
first stage, negotiations may be opened with a view to determine the conditions under which
a customs union between the Community and [Malta/Cyprus] could be established”.
195 Maresceau, “A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements,“ 19.
196 Ibid.
197 There were two negative referenda on the issue of EU membership in Norway (in 1972
and 1994). A third referendum is not very likely in the near future. As to Iceland, it lodged
a membership application in 2009, which was followed by the opening of accession negotia-
tions in 2010. However, those negotiations were short-lived as the government of Iceland
dissolved its accession team, and put the negotiations on hold. See, http://eu.mfa.is/
documents/
198 The EFTA Convention was signed in Stockholm in 1960, and was updated on 21 June 2001
by the Vaduz Convention. The Vaduz Convention incorporated important rules and
principles established in the EEA Agreement as well as in the Bilateral Agreements between
the EU and Switzerland. As a result, all EFTA states now enjoy the same privileged relation-
ship among themselves as they do with the EU. The EFTA Council regularly updates the
Convention so as to reflect the developments under the EEA Agreement and the Bilateral
Agreements with Switzerland. For more details, see EFTA, Communiqué of Ministerial
Meeting of the European Free Trade Association, Vaduz, 21 June 2001, PR-E 3/2001. See
also, www.efta.int.
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established its own complex web of more than hundred bilateral agreements
with the EU, which now govern their relations.199 Since only a few of these
agreements are formally based on Article 217 TFEU (or its predecessor pro-
vision),200 from a legal point of view it is difficult to maintain that those con-
stitute an association regime, even though there are academics arguing to the
contrary.201
The EEA Agreement constitutes the most advanced economic regime created
as a basis of relations with developed countries. In terms of free movement
of goods, it does not go as far as establishing a Customs Union,202 yet, in terms
of free movement of persons, services and capital it entails the adoption of
the entire internal market acquis by the associates, i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein
and Norway (the so-called EEA/EFTA states).203 The EFTA Court, which deals
199 For a detailed analysis, see C. Tobler and J. Beglinger, Grundzüge des bilateralen (Wirtschafts-)
Rechts. Systematische Darstellung in Text und Tafeln, 2 vols. (Zurich: Dike, 2013); T. Cottier
et al., eds., Die Rechtsbeziehungen der Schweiz und der Europäischen Union (Berne: Stämpfli,
2014).
200 See, Agreement between the EC and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss
Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons, signed on 21.06.1999 in
Luxembourg, OJ L 114, 30.04.2002, p. 6; Agreement between the EC and the Swiss
Confederation on Air Transport, OJ L 114, 30.04.2002, p. 73; Agreement between the EC
and the Swiss Confederation on the Carriage of Goods and Passengers by Rail and Road,
OJ L 114, 30.04.2002, p. 91; Agreement between the EC and the Swiss Confederation on
trade in agricultural products, OJ L 114, 30.04.2002, p. 132; Agreement between the EC and
the Swiss Confederation on mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment, OJ
L 114, 30.04.2002, p. 369; Agreement between the EC and the Swiss Confederation on certain
aspects of government procurement, OJ L 114, 30.04.2002, p. 430; Agreement on Scientific
and Technological Cooperation between the EC and the Swiss Confederation, OJ L 114,
30.04.2002, p. 468; and Protocol to the Agreement between the EC and its Member States,
of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons
regarding the participation, as contracting parties, of the Czech Republic, the Republic of
Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia
and the Slovak Republic pursuant to their Accession to the European Union, signed on
26.10.2004 in Luxembourg, OJ L 89, 28.03.2006, p. 28. See also, G. Bauer and C. Tobler, “«Der
Binnenmarkt ist (k)ein Schweizer Käse». Zum Assoziationsstatus der Türkei, der EWR/
EFTA-Staaten und der Schweiz in ausgewählten EU-Politikbereichen, insbes. dem EU-
Binnenmarkt,“ in Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2014/2015 (Berne: Stämpfli, 2015
(forthcoming)).
201 For an example, see R. Streinz, “Die Türkei als Partner – Formen der Zugehörigkeit zur
EU,“ in Jahrbuch Bitburger Gespräche 2005/II, Zur Frage einer Mitgliedschaft der Türkei in der
Europäischen Union (München: C.H. Beck 2006), 121.
202 The free movement of goods remains limited to a free trade area. See, P. J. Kuijper, “External
Relations,“ in Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat: The Law of the European Union and the European
Communities, ed. P. J. G. Kapteyn, et al. (Kluwer Law International, 2008), 1339.
203 Ibid., 1339-41. See also, A. Lazowski, “EEA Countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway),“
in The European Union and its Neighbours, ed. S. Blockmans and A. Lazowski (The Hague:
TMC Asser Press, 2006); EFTA-Court, The EEA and the EFTA Court: Decentred Integration
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014); C. Baudenbacher and in cooperation with the University
of Liechtenstein, eds., Handbook of EEA Law (Heidelberg: Springer, 2015 (forthcoming)).
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with EEA law for matters arising on the side of the EEA/EFTA states, qualifies
the existing framework of relations as constituting “a fundamentally improved
free trade area”.204
While the existing system seems to function well, the first draft for an EEA
Agreement is recalled by scholars as an example of a planned association that
involved “too much integration”.205 The Court delivered a negative opinion
on the first draft agreement as it considered it provided for a system of courts
with competences that would damage the autonomy of the Community legal
order; hence the agreement was found to be incompatible with “the very
foundations of the Community”,206 and was accordingly revised.
2.4.4 Associations based on a Free Trade Area
In terms of the trade regime they create, the EAs together with the SAAs appear
to be the least ambitious of the agreements covered so far. They envisage(d)
the incremental establishment of a free trade area in industrial goods over
a period of time that could extend up to ten years, determined in line with
the level of development of each associate.207 Including rules on competition
and state aids was seen as a necessary corollary to introducing the rules on
free movement of goods.208
Free movement of workers, services, capital, freedom of establishment,
approximation of laws are referred to and included only “embryonically” in
the EAs.209 However, the substantive scope of cooperation was extended con-
siderably after those agreements were reoriented towards full membership
and were complemented by the introduction of the pre-accession strategy in
1994.210 Even though there is no explicit mention of membership or accession
204 Case E-2/97 Mag Instrument Inc v California Trading Company Norway, Ulsteen (Maglite decision),
[1997] EFTA Court Report 127, para. 27.
205 Peers, “EC Frameworks of International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership and Associ-
ation,“ 170.
206 Opinion 1/91 EEA. Cf. Opinion 1/92 EEA, [1992] ECR I-2821.
207 The periods envisaged in the EAs and SAAs varied among themselves. While the norm
was a ten-year period for the EAs, Estonia was deemed ready to pursue free trade imme-
diately. Latvia and Slovenia negotiated a four-year transition period, and Lithuania a six-
year period. The SAAs also envisage different periods. For instance, while the Agreement
with Croatia envisaged a six-year year transition period, the one with FYROM envisaged
a ten-year period. See, Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Member-
ship?: 48; D. Phinnemore, “Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements
for the Western Balkans?,“ European Foreign Affairs Review 8(2003): 89.
208 Müller-Graff, “East Central Europe and the European Union: From Europe Agreements
to a Member State Status,“ 17.
209 Ibid.
210 Phinnemore, “Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western
Balkans?,“ 94. See also, Inglis, “The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of Their
Pre-accession Reorientation,“ 1175-90.
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in the early EAs,211 the Court of Justice explicitly acknowledged that objective
in the interpretation of those agreements.212
Scholars agree that the structure and content of the SAAs were inspired
by the EAs.213 Thus, the emphasis here will be on the most important differences
rather than similarities between the two types of agreements.214 There are few
important differences worth mentioning here. The first is the reference con-
tained in the preambles of the SAAs to the associated countries as “potential
candidates” for EU membership. While Phinnemore thinks that this reference
“suggests that the SAAs enjoy a lesser status compared with the Europe Agree-
ments”,215 Maresceau takes the contrary view and argues that by virtue of
this reference, SAAs “at least conceptually, are more clearly pre-accession
agreements than the Europe Agreements”.216 The author agrees with the latter
view.217 As mentioned above, the first EAs do not contain anything explicit
211 The references that can be interpreted to that effect in the EAs are under the title “Political
Dialogue”. See, Article 2 of one of the earliest EAs (signed in 1991), which provides that
political dialogue and cooperation “will facilitate Poland’s full integration into the commun-
ity of democratic nations and progressive rapprochement with the Community”. See also,
the latest EA (signed in 1996), Article 4 of which provides for “Slovenia’s full integration
into the Community of democratic nations and its progressive rapprochement with the
European Union”.
212 While acknowledging the aim of the EA as “the progressive integration of the Republic
of Poland into the Community” in Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, the Court extended its case law
on workers to the EA provisions. However, the same statement with the further addition
of “with a view to its [Poland’s] possible accession” in G³oszczuk, was not enough for the
extension of the case law on freedom of establishment to the corresponding provisions
of the EA. In short, acknowledging the aim of the EAs as accession did not mean the
extension of corresponding EU Treaty rules and case law to the provisions of the EAs. For
the respective citations, see, Case C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, [2002] ECR I-1049, para.
42; and Case C-63/99 G³oszczuk, [2001] ECR I-6369, para. 50. For an in-depth analysis of the
Court’s case law on the interpretation of provisions of various EAs concerning free move-
ment of persons, see C. Hillion, “Cases C-63/99 Secretary of State for the Home Department
ex parte Wies³aw G³oszczuk and Elzbieta G³oszczuk; C-235/99 Secretary of State for the
Home Department ex parte Eleanora Ivanova Kondova; C-257/99 Secretary of State for
the Home Department ex parte Julius Barkoci and Marcel Malik; judgments of the Full
Court of 27 September 2001; Case C-268/99 Aldona Ma³gorzata Jany e.a v. Staatssecretaris
van Justitie, judgment of the Full Court of 20 November 2001; Case C-162/00 Land Nord-
rhein-Westfalen v. Beata Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, judgment of the Full Court of 29 January
2002.,“ Common Market Law Review 40, no. 2 (2003): 465-91.
213 See, Phinnemore, “Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the
Western Balkans?,“ 96; and Maresceau, “A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements,“ 18.
214 For an extensive and in-depth comparison see, Phinnemore, “Stabilisation and Association
Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western Balkans?,“ 77-103. See also, Maresceau,
“A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements,“ 18-19.
215 Phinnemore, “Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western
Balkans?,“ 84.
216 Maresceau, “A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements,“ 18.
217 Phinnemore might have reached that conclusion because he compares only the reference
in the EA with Slovenia with those in the SAAs. As can be seen in more detail in note 211
above, the standard reference in the earlier EA agreements (“full integration into the
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referring to accession or membership to the EU. The prospect of membership
was introduced not by the first EAs, but by the Copenhagen European Council
in 1993, following which special Accession Partnerships had to be developed
to assist each country in its transition to democracy and establishing a function-
ing market economy in preparation for accession.
The second important difference between the SAAs and EAs is the emphasis
placed on regional cooperation in the former. Regional cooperation was encour-
aged in the EAs as well, however, their focus was rather on economic and
political reform. It is not surprising that there is a special title (Title III) devoted
entirely to regional cooperation in the SAAs, as the underlying rationale of SAP
is, first and foremost, to bring peace and “stability” to the Western Balkans.218
Last but not least, the SAAs impose a four or five-year waiting period before
the respective Stabilisation and Association Councils are able to adopt measures
regarding the implementation of the freedom of establishment for the self-
employed.219 There was no such waiting period in the EAs, only the application
of the non-discrimination provision regarding the freedom of establishment
was postponed until the end of the respective transitional period defined in
each agreement,220 or exceptionally in certain sectors, excluded all together.221
As argued above, there are more similarities than differences between the
two types of agreements. Another important element borrowed from the
experience of the accession process of the CEECs is the so-called “European
Partnerships”, modelled on the Accession Partnerships designed to complement
community of democratic nations”) has become “full integration into the Community of
democratic nations” in the EA with Slovenia. Obviously, capitalizing the word “community”
has changed its meaning. In other words, if one judges only on the basis of the existence
of an explicit reference to accession to the EU, being “a potential candidate for EU member-
ship” seems more promising and concrete than “full integration into the community of
democratic nations”. However, on the whole, as Phinnemore’s comparative analysis of
the two types of agreements reveals, under many of the headings, the proposed scope of
cooperation is bigger in the EAs. He also adds that the language employed in the two types
of agreements proves the claim that the SAAs envisage a less intense form of association
than the EAs. See, Phinnemore, “Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agree-
ments for the Western Balkans?.“
218 Ibid., 84-85.
219 See for example, Article 50(4) of the SAA with Albania and Article 48(4) of the SAA with
Macedonia, which impose a five-year waiting period after the entry into force of their
respective agreements, while Article 49(4) of the SAA with Croatia and Article 53(4) of
the SAA with Serbia impose a four-year waiting period. See also, S. Peers, “EU Migration
Law and Association Agreements,“ in Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges for EU External
Relations, ed. B. Martenczuk and S. Van Thiel (Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2008),
56.
220 For an example see, each indent of Article 44(1) of the EA with Poland.
221 For an example see, Article 44(6) of the EA with Poland, which reads as follows: “The
provisions concerning establishment and operation of Community and Polish companies
and nationals contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall not apply to the areas or matters
listed in Annex XIIe.”
Association as a stepping-stone to membership 51
the EAs.222 As to the change in the qualifying adjective of the partnership, the
Croatian experience illustrated that once the necessary conditions for opening
accession negotiations are fulfilled, it is not difficult to re-name and re-qualify
the relationship.223 Yet, as illustrated by the Turkish experience so far, neither
the existence of Accession Partnership instruments,224 nor the official opening
of accession negotiations are a guarantee for a country’s eventual accession
to the EU.225
2.5 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this introductory part on various forms of association between
the Community/Union and third European states was to illustrate that the
latter relationship could take various forms and that it could evolve over time
in line with the development of the Community/Union and the changing needs
or wishes of the associates. However, as soon as the associates expressed their
wish to join the club, and provided they were ready to do so, they were always
welcome to join.
Association can be any kind of relationship, which goes beyond being a
mere trade agreement but falls short of full membership.226 As is illustrated
in more detail in Part II, the rationale underlying the EU’s latest enlargement
policy, its creative design, use of various strategies and partnerships was to
assist the associate states aspiring to join the EU in their preparation to become
full members of the EU, so that they are able to take on fully their respective
obligations flowing from the Treaties without disrupting the proper inner
functioning of the Union.
Whether and to what extent the Union succeeded in preparing the candi-
dates for their membership is another matter. However, as will also be demon-
222 Blockmans, “Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia
and Montenegro, including Kosovo),“ 346.
223 It should be noted that the re-naming took place following the opening of accession negoti-
ations with Croatia on 3 October 2005. See, Council Decision 2006/145/EC on the principles,
priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Croatia, OJ L 55/30,
25.02.2006, and repealing Council Decision 2004/648/EC on the principles, priorities and
conditions contained in the European Partnership with Croatia, OJ L 297/19, 22.09.2004.
Emphasis added.
224 For the first Accession Partnership developed for Turkey see, Council Decision 2001/235/EC
on the principles, priorities and intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the
Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, OJ L 85/13, 24.03.2001; for the latest
one see, Council Decision 2008/157/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained
in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/
EC, OJ L 51/4, 26.02.2008.
225 Accession negotiations with Turkey were opened on 3 October 2005.
226 Feld, “The Association Agreements of the European Communities: A Comparative Analysis“
227.
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strated in the following Part, the Community/Union kept on developing and
fine-tuning its instruments to that effect based on its previous experiences.
This was essential, not only because the EU is a moving target, which kept
“deepening” by acquiring new powers and competences, but also because the
challenge of integrating new Member States increased tremendously, as there
were not many “developed” countries left wishing to join the Union. Hence,
if the Union wished to sustain its enlargement policy, it had to develop the
appropriate instruments that would assist membership aspirants in their
transformation in the quest to join the Union. In this context, association
proved to be an invaluable framework within which those instruments could
be employed in line with the corresponding needs of each associate.
As demonstrated above, different associations were developed on the basis
of different (trading) models; hence, each relationship developed to a different
extent. If an associate wished to join the Union, it had to live up to the chal-
lenge of taking on fully the obligations that flew from its accession to the
Community/Union at the relevant time, which seemed to grow exponentially
with each subsequent enlargement. At that point, the legal regime created by
the association, with the rights and obligations it entails for the Contracting
Parties as well as their nationals, has always served as the basis, which had
to be complemented with the necessary policies and measures that would
transform the associate into a full Member State. The more developed the legal
regime under the association, the less complementary work was needed at
the time of accession. This is clearly exemplified by the short period of time
it took for the EEA States Austria, Finland, and Sweden to join the Union in
comparison to other former associates.227
The purpose of this introductory part on different association regimes was
to put the Ankara Agreement in the context of other association agreements
so as to reveal its true nature. It was established that it is indisputably a
genuine pre-accession agreement. Since the aim of this thesis is to establish
the constraints on Member States in drafting Turkey’s Accession Agreement,
it is essential to lay down the existing legal regime created by the Ankara
Agreement in more detail, as it serves as the basis for Turkey’s accession
process. The amount of work to be done is determined by the level of coopera-
tion and approximation reached by the association regime along various policy
lines. This basis is the minimum, the starting point, which is to be topped up
in the process of accession and preparation for membership with the missing
pieces of the jigsaw puzzle that will complete the picture and raise Turkey
227 Austria, Finland and Sweden signed the EEA Agreement on 2 May 1992. The EEA Agree-
ment entered into force on 1 January 1994. See, Information concerning the date of entry
into force of the Agreement on the European Economic Area and of the Protocol adjusting
the Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ L 1/606, 3.1.1994. Half a year later,
on 24 June 1994, they signed their Accession Treaties, which entered into force on 1 January
1995, OJ L 1, 1.1.1995.
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to the status of a full Member State. It is argued further that this minimum
or this already acquired basis of rights and obligations will serve as a con-
straint on Member States in the accession process. In other words, the existing
association regime can be characterized as a stepping-stone or a basis that
needs to be further complemented; it is not something to be further reduced.
If the latter is at stake, then we are no longer talking about an accession
process, but simply about changing the existing nature of the association.228
As Hallstein put it, membership minus %1 is an association.229 Hence, even
if Turkey’s full integration in other policy areas is ensured, it is argued that
given the importance of free movement of persons to the European integration
project, crippled free movement rights for Turkish nationals will mean nothing
more than the changing of form of the existing association. Since the case study
in this thesis is based on the possibility of including a PSC on free movement
of persons in the future Turkish Accession Agreement, the analysis of the
existing association regime that follows below focuses specifically on the acquis
on free movement of persons.
228 For more detailed arguments to that effect, see Hillion, “Negotiating Turkey’s Membership
to the European Union: Can the Member States Do As They Please?,“ 273 and 80-81.
229 According to Hallstein, “association can be anything between full membership minus 1%
and a trade and cooperation agreement plus 1%”. He is cited in Phinnemore, Association:
Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 23.

3 The Ankara Association Law
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of providing a brief account of the Community/Union’s association
policy over the decades was to understand the nature of association as a legal
relationship and to be able to put the Ankara Agreement in context. As briefly
discussed above, it was one of the two most ambitious agreements signed in
the 1960s, aiming to prepare Turkey for future accession to the Union. The
following part firstly, lays down the aim and structure of the agreement, as
well as the means that it puts at the Parties’ disposal to achieve its objectives.
Secondly, it briefly introduces the plan laid down in the agreement for the
establishment of a Customs Union, after which, the focus shifts on the pro-
visions of the agreement that envisage the gradual establishment of free
movement of workers, services and freedom of establishment. Lastly, the rest
of this Chapter examines the case law of the Court interpreting these provi-
sions, since most developments in the acquis in this area are products of the
case law of the Court rather than the institutions of the association.
The aim of this Chapter is to demonstrate that the free movement of
persons regime established by the agreement is already quite developed, and
that a PSC would not only be a step back from the Union acquis on free move-
ment of persons but also a step back from the existing association acquis in
some cases. It is argued that standstill clauses in the association agreement
as well as similar clauses included in Accession Agreements constitute con-
straints on Member States, in addition to other constraints flowing from the
accession process, which are examined in detail in Part II of this thesis.
3.2 AIMS AND STRUCTURE OF THE AGREEMENT
The Ankara Agreement was the second association agreement ever signed
by the EEC and had ambitious objectives. It aimed at “establish[ing] ever closer
bonds between the Turkish people and the peoples brought together in the
[EEC]” and “to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty by joint pursuit of
ideals underlying the Treaty establishing the [EEC]”.230 Its Article 2 provided
230 Emphasis added. See the preamble of the agreement, OJ L 361/1-2, 31.12.77.
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further that the agreement was “to promote the continuous and balanced
strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while taking
full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish
economy and to improve the level of employment and the living conditions
of the Turkish people”. That objective was to be achieved by the support given
by the EEC, which would in turn “facilitate the accession of Turkey to the Com-
munity at a later date”.231
The very first step in the attainment of that objective was the progressive
establishment of a Customs Union, which was to be established over a pre-
paratory, a transitional, and a final stage.232 Those were also the three stages
the association was going to be comprised of.233 The purpose of the five-year
preparatory stage was to give Turkey the time and opportunity to strengthen
its economy. In this stage, Turkey would get aid from the Community, and
prepare itself for undertaking the obligations that would be delegated on it
in the following two stages.234 The twelve-year transitional stage was to be
composed of mutual and balanced obligations, during which the Customs
Union was to be progressively established and the economic policies between
Turkey and the Community were to be aligned.235 The final stage was to be
based on the Customs Union and would entail closer coordination of economic
policies.236
Like the EEC Treaty, which it was modelled after, the Ankara Agreement
was of programmatic nature and most of its provisions were drafted in general
terms. Just like some of the Treaty provisions requiring the promulgation of
more detailed secondary law for their implementation, some of the provisions
of the Association Agreement required more detailed rules, which were to
be issued by the Association Council, the main-decision making body of the
Association.237 It was to be composed of members of the governments of the
Member States, members of the Council, the Commission, and members of
the Turkish government, and would act unanimously. It could establish further
committees to assist it in the fulfilment of its tasks.238
The preparatory stage ended when the Additional Protocol (AP), containing
detailed rules and the timetable for the implementation of the transitional stage
entered into force in 1973.239 It should be noted that all the stages of the associ-
231 Emphasis added. See ibid.
232 See Article 2(2) of the Ankara Agreement (AA).
233 See Article 2(3) AA.
234 See Article 3 AA.
235 See Article 4 AA.
236 See Article 5 AA.
237 See Article 6 AA and Articles 22-25 AA.
238 See Article 23 AA.
239 This was provided for in Article 8 AA.
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ation lasted longer than initially planned.240 With hindsight, the initial planning
was not very realistic. Under ideal conditions, (there were provisions providing
for the extension of those stages if need be), the Customs Union (the final stage)
could be in force as early as 1981. In terms of the economic development model
adopted by Turkey in those years,241 being part of a Customs Union with the
industrialized countries of the West did not make much sense. However, as
acknowledged by scholars, it was not economic considerations, but politics
and the geostrategic considerations of the cold war that triggered economic
cooperation in that period.242
The Customs Union was to cover all trade in goods,243 including agri-
cultural products.244 The Agreement provided further for the progressive
establishment of free movement of workers, and for the abolition of restrictions
regarding freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. Article
12, 13 and 14 AA lay down that in securing those freedoms the Contracting
Parties agreed to be guided by the relevant articles of the EEC Treaty.245 It is
by virtue of these references to the EEC Treaty that some of the developments
in Community/Union law were subsequently reflected to the case law on the
Ankara acquis.
Other two indispensable principles for the functioning of the EEC/EC/EU
legal order that found their place in the Ankara Agreement are the principle
of loyal cooperation, embodied in Article 7 AA, and the prohibition of non-
discrimination based on nationality, enshrined in Article 9 AA. Following
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, Article 7 requires the Contracting Parties to “take
all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment
of the obligations arising from this Agreement”, and to “refrain from any
240 The preparatory stage, which was to last five years, lasted nine years. The transitional stage,
which was planned as 12 years in the Ankara Agreement, took 22 years, in line with the
plan laid down in the Additional Protocol (AP).
241 As it was the trend with other developing countries at the time, Turkey’s growth strategy
was based on import substitution. See, K. Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2002 [Turkish
Economic History], 8 ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2004).
242 J. Pinder, “Positive integration and negative integration: Some problems of economic union
in the EEC,“ The World Today (March 1968): 92-93. For a detailed account, see A. Eralp,
“Soğuk Savaştan Günümüze Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri,“ in Türkiye ve Avrupa, ed.
A. Eralp (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997), 86-119; İ. Tekeli and S. İlkin, Türkiye ve Avrupa
Topluluğu I [Turkey and the European Community I], vol. I (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993);
Ç. Erhan and T. Arat, “AET’yle İlişkiler,“ in Türk Dış Politikası I, ed. B. Oran (İletişim, 2002);
M. A. Birand, Türkiye’nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası 1959-2004 [Turkey’s Big European Struggle
1959-2004], 11 ed. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005); T. Saraçoğlu, Türkiye Avrupa Ekonomik
Topluluğu Ortaklığı (Anlaşmalar) [Turkey EEC Association (Agreements)] (Akbank Ekonomi
Yayınları, 1992).
243 See Article 10(1) AA.
244 See Article 11 AA.
245 For free movement of workers, Articles 48-50 of the EEC Treaty; for freedom of establish-
ment, Articles 52-56 and Article 58 of the EEC Treaty; and finally for free movement of
services, Articles 55-56 and Articles 58-65 of the EEC Treaty.
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measures liable to jeopardize the[ir] attainment”. Similarly, Article 9 AA pro-
vides that, without prejudice to any special provisions, “any discrimination
on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited in accordance with the principle
laid down in Article 7 of the Treaty establishing the Community”.
Other economic provisions worth mentioning are quite broad. Article 15
AA provides for the extension to Turkey of the transport provisions contained
in the Treaty taking into account its geographical situation. Article 16 “recog-
nize[s] that the principles laid down in the provisions on competition, taxation
and the approximation of laws contained in Title I of Part III of the Treaty
establishing the Community must be made applicable” in the relations within
the Association. In addition, there are provisions on economic policy, securing
overall balance of payments, exchange rates, and payments or transfers relating
to movement of goods, services, or capital.246 The provision on free movement
of capital is more modest compared to the provisions on other freedoms,247
yet it reflects the pace of development of that freedom within the internal
market.
Last but not least, comes Article 28 AA, which lays down explicitly the long-
term objective of the Agreement. It reads as follows: “As soon as the operation
of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full accept-
ance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the
Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the
accession of Turkey to the Community.”248 Obviously, Article 28 AA does not
guarantee Turkey’s future accession to the Community/Union,249 it provides
for the examination of that possibility once Turkey is ready to accept the
obligations flowing from the Treaties. As argued by Lichtenberg, it provides
for a fair procedure regarding Turkey’s application, and “specifically excludes
the possibility that, in making a decision on Turkey’s membership, criteria
other than those found in the acquis communautaire and the economic and legal
functioning of the Association Agreement could be used”.250 However, more
importantly, it makes the arduous discussion on Turkey’s geographic location,
i.e. the issue whether it is a ‘European State’, irrelevant for the purpose of
accession.251
246 See respectively Articles 17, 18, and 19 AA.
247 Article 20(1) AA provides that “The Contracting Parties shall consult each other with a
view to facilitating movements of capital between Member States of the Community and
Turkey which will further the objectives of this Agreement.”
248 Emphasis added.
249 According to Lasok, “it was an express intention of the contracting parties to use the
Accession Agreement as a stepping stone to accession”, and Article 28 AA expressed that
intention, but gave “no guarantee but merely a prospect of admission”. See, D. Lasok, “The
Ankara Agreement: Principles and Interpretation,“ Marmara Journal of European Studies 1,
no. 1-2 (1991): 36.
250 H. Lichtenberg, “Turkey and the European Union,“ Marmara Journal of European Studies
6, no. 1 (1998): 145.
251 Ibid.
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3.3 ANKARA ASSOCIATION LAW
Having laid down the main objectives envisaged by the Association Agreement
in the previous section, this one tries to briefly outline how far those objectives
have been achieved. After providing a brief account of the development of
the Customs Union, the focus will be on the rules laid down regarding free
movement of workers, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide
services. The emphasis will be on showing how far the latter rules on free
movement of persons have developed, as the safeguard clause will affect them
directly. The main argument that follows is that membership entails more
extensive rights and obligations for nationals of a Member State than the
nationals of an associate country, or at least equivalent. This is not only in
line with common sense, but there is also a provision in the Additional
Protocol to ensure that “Turkey shall not receive more favourable treatment
than that which Member States grant to one another pursuant to the Treaty
establishing the Community”.252 Hence, memberships should entail increase
and not decrease in the rights enjoyed by Turkish nationals.
3.3.1 The Customs Union
“Believing that the conditions have been established for passing from the
preparatory stage to the transitional stage”, the Additional Protocol laying
down the conditions, arrangements, and timetables for this intermediate stage
entered into force on 1 January 1973.253 It provided for the progressive abolition
of customs duties and charges having an equivalent effect over a period of
twenty-two years, at the end of which the Turkish Customs Tariff had to be
aligned with the Common Customs Tariff.254 Quantitative restriction on imports
and exports and measures having equivalent effect had to be abolished at the
latest by the end of the transitional stage.255 Last but not least, if there were
to be free movement of agricultural products between the Community and
Turkey, over a period of twenty-two years Turkey would have to adjust its
252 Article 59 AP.
253 See the Preamble to the Additional Protocol signed at Brussels, 23 November 1973. The
Additional Protocol was a mixed agreement that formed an integral part of the Ankara
Agreement. See, OJ 1973 C 113/17.
254 See, Section I: Elimination of customs duties between the Community and Turkey (Articles
7-16 AP) and Section II: Adoption by Turkey of the Common Customs Tariff (Articles 17-20
AP) of the Additional Protocol. For a more detailed account of the establishment of the
Customs Union, see H. Kabaalioğlu, “The Customs Union: A Final Step before Turkey’s
Accession to the European Union?,“ Marmara Journal of European Studies 6, no. 1 (1998):
113-40.
255 See Chapter II: Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions (Articles 21-29 AP) of the Additional
Protocol.
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agricultural policy to that of the Community by adopting the necessary
measures.256
At the end of the envisaged period, the Association Council decided the
final stage of the Association could begin on 1 January 1996. To that effect,
the Association Council adopted Decision 1/95 on the implementation of the
final phase of the Customs Union.257 The Customs Union would cover
“products other than agricultural products”,258 in other words industrial
products. The Council reaffirmed the objective to move towards the free
movement of agricultural products, but noted that an additional period is
required to achieve that aim.259
As argued by Kabaalioğlu, Decision 1/95 imposes on Turkey many addi-
tional requirements, which do not fall strictly within the basic Customs Union
structure. These sweeping requirements together with the Customs Union make
sense only when considered as being parts of a temporary or transitional
regime that is designed to prepare Turkey for full membership.260 To provide
few examples in order to give an idea as to the scope of these requirements,
Turkey is required to provide equivalent levels of effective protection of
intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights.261 “With a view to
achieving the economic integration sought by the Customs Union”, Turkey
had to ensure not only that its legislation in the field of competition law was
compatible with that of the Community, but also that it was applied effective-
ly.262 Hence, it had to establish a competition authority to enforce those rules
before the entry into force of Decision 1/95.263
When the content of the “Competition rules of the Customs Union”
included in Decision 1/95 is examined more closely (Articles 32 to 38), it is
surprising to see that most articles are identical copies of the competition
provisions of the EEC Treaty, in which the phrase “common market” has been
replaced by the “Customs Union”.264 Hence, Article 35 provides that those
256 See, Chapter III: Products Subject to Specific Rules on Importation into the Community
as a Result of the Implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy (Article 31 AP); and
Chapter IV: Agriculture (Articles 32-35 AP) of the Additional Protocol.
257 Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council on implementing the final phase of
the Customs Union, 96/142/EC, OJ L 35/1, 13.02.1996.
258 See Article 2 of Decision 1/95. Special rules on agricultural products were set in Chapter
II of the Decision.
259 Article 24 of Decision 1/95. Also note that “Processed agricultural products not covered
by Annex II to the Treaty establishing the European Community“ are dealt under Section
V of Chapter I on “Free Movement of Goods and Commercial Policy“ (Articles 17 to 23
of Decision 1/95).
260 Kabaalioğlu, “The Customs Union: A Final Step before Turkey’s Accession to the European
Union?,“ 123.
261 See Article 31 of Decision 1/95.
262 See Article 39(1) of Decision 1/95.
263 See Article 39(2)(b) of Decision 1/95.
264 Article 32 of Decision 1/95 is a copy of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty; Article 33 is a copy
of Article 86 EEC; and Article 34 of Article 92 EEC.
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provisions “shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from the applica-
tion of the rules of Articles 85, 86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community and its secondary legislation”.
The Decision further required Turkey to adapt all the aid it granted to the
textile and clothing sector to the EC rules before the entry into force of this
Decision.265 All other aid schemes had to be adapted within two years after
the entry into force of Decision 1/95.266 It is notable that Turkey is treated
almost like a Member State of the Union regarding the adoption of new aid
schemes. It needs to notify the Community of any individual aid to be granted
to an enterprise that would be notifiable under Community rules.267 Similarly,
Turkey needs to be informed on the same basis as the Member States “[r]egard-
ing individual aids granted by Member States and subject to the analysis of
the Commission”.268 Both parties are entitled to raise objections against an
aid granted by the other party, which would be deemed incompatible with
EC law. If there is dispute regarding an aid granted by Turkey, which is not
resolved within 30 days, either party has the right to refer the case to arbitra-
tion.269 If the dispute concerns an aid granted by a Member State, and the
Association Council is not able to resolve it within three months, it may refer
it to the Court of Justice.270
Other far-reaching provisions are Articles 41 and 42 of Decision 1/95. The
former provided that by the end of 1996, Turkey had to ensure that regarding
public undertakings and undertakings enjoying special or exclusive rights,
the principles of the EEC Treaty, “notably Article 90, as well as the principles
contained in secondary legislation and the case-law developed on this basis,
are upheld”. Article 42 required Turkey to progressively adjust any State
monopolies of a commercial character by the end of 1997, so that there is no
discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and
marketed. Moreover, Article 43 of the Decision stipulated that the Party believ-
ing its interests are negatively effected by the anti-competitive conduct carried
out on the territory of the other, “may notify the other Party and may request
the other Party’s competition authority initiate appropriate enforcement
action”.271
The Decision also includes provisions providing for negotiations aimed
at opening the Contracting Parties’ respective government procurement
markets,272 provisions on direct and indirect taxation,273 as well as provisions
265 See Article 39(2)(c) of Decision 1/95.
266 See Article 39(2)(d) of Decision 1/95.
267 See Article 39(2)(e) & (f) of Decsision 1/95.
268 See Article 39(2)(f) of Decsision 1/95.
269 See Article 39(4) of Decsision 1/95.
270 See Article 39(5) of Decsision 1/95.
271 Article 43(1) of Decision 1/95.
272 See Article 48 of Decision 1/95.
273 See repectively Articles 49 and 50 of Decision 1/95.
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on settlement of disputes by resorting to arbitration.274 Lastly, it establishes
“an EC-Turkey Customs Union Joint Committee” to oversee the proper
functioning of the Customs Union.275 The Customs Union Joint Committee
is composed of representatives of the Contracting Parties, and as a rule meets
at least once a month. It is entitled to establish subcommittees or working
parties to assist it, if need be.276
Even a brief look at the provisions of Decision 1/95 suffices to conclude
that it is not only about the Customs Union and Turkey’s adoption of the
Common Customs Tariff (CCT).277 It goes way beyond that into aligning Tur-
key’s commercial policy, competition policy, taxation and economic policy
with that of the Union. Economically, it does not make sense for a state like
Turkey, which is less developed, to adopt all these far-reaching policies in
the absence of the prospect of EU accession. As advanced as the EEA regime
might be, it should be noted that it does not go as far as adopting the CCT.278
In the absence of the membership perspective, it does not make sense either
politically or economically for any state to be a part of the Customs Union,
since under the existing arrangements, it has officially no say in the decision-
making regarding the adoption or changes in the CCT. That can be acceptable
only temporarily, as part of a long-term plan that is expected to pay off in
other ways in the future, such as EU membership. Association without the
membership perspective in the long run, places the associate in “the position
of de facto satellite to the [EU]”,279 which, at least for Turkey as a medium-
size state, is not that attractive. In short, as Lichtenberg put it: “Association
and accession are not alternative options for the relationship between Turkey
and the EC [now EU], both are progressive steps towards full membership”.280
3.3.2 Free movement of persons
Since the test case in identifying the existence of constraints on Member States
as primary law makers in the accession context is the PSC on free movement
of persons mentioned in Turkey’s Negotiating Framework, the free movement
of persons aspect of the association regime is central to this study. It is argued
that EU membership for Turkey is supposed to lift the remaining obstacles
274 See Articles 61 and 62 of Decision 1/95.
275 See Article 52 of Decision 1/95.
276 See Article 53 of Decision 1/95.
277 M. S. Akman, “Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği Gümrük Birliği İlişkisi ve Ortak Dış Ticaret
Politikası,“ in Yarım Asrın Ardından Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri, ed. Belgin Akçay and
Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2013), 226-35.
278 As noted by Kuijper, in the EEA “free movement of goods remains limited to a free trade
area as opposed to a customs union“. See, Kuijper, “External Relations,“ 1339.
279 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 119.
280 Lichtenberg, “Turkey and the European Union,“ 145.
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in front of the free movement of persons, and not introduce new ones. As is
illustrated below, the introduction of new obstacles to free movement of
workers, services and establishment is prohibited under the existing association
regime. Thus, it can be argued that this should be a fortiori the case after
accession.
To be able to establish how much the existing legal framework would
constrain Member States as primary law makers in drafting the Turkish
Accession Agreement, one needs to establish the aims set and commitments
undertaken regarding the development of free movement of persons under
the Ankara Agreement, as well as the actual level of development of those
freedoms under the existing association regime. Hence, what follows firstly,
is an examination of the objectives of the provisions of the Ankara Agreement
with relevance for free movement of persons; secondly, an examination of legal
instruments adopted in order to implement those provisions; and lastly, the
case law of the Court of Justice, which by interpreting these provisions, con-
tributed greatly to their effective enforcement as well as their further develop-
ment.
3.3.2.1 In the Ankara Agreement
It is important to begin by acknowledging the importance and enormous
contribution of the free movement of persons to the establishment of the
internal market and the integration project as a whole. Even though initially
people were seen more as factors of production like goods and capital, whose
circulation was expected to deliver economic benefits to the economies of both
their host and home Member States, that view started changing as early as
the first amendment to the Treaties were made with the Single European Act,
which added the social provisions. While initially free movement was possible
only for economically active nationals of Member States, soon free movement
for other nationals who were self-sufficient became also possible. Lastly, as
discussed in Chapter 6, free movement of persons was revolutionized and
became even more central to the integration project with the introduction of
the concept of Union citizenship into the Treaties and its interpretation by
the Court of Justice, which inextricably linked Union citizenship and free
movement.
In short, free movement of persons has always been part of the very crux
of the integration project, and its importance has only increased in time. Its
enormous contribution to achieving the ideals underlying the project is self-
evident. Some of these ideals mentioned in the preamble of the EEC Treaty
were the creation of “an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe” by
ensuring “economic and social progress of their countries” through the elimina-
tion of barriers dividing them and by striving for “the constant improvement
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of the living and working conditions of their peoples”. These lofty ideals were
also reflected in the preamble to the Ankara Agreement.281
Title I of the Ankara Agreement begins with introducing the main “Prin-
ciples” of the association, after which Title II of the Agreement on the “Imple-
mentation of the Transitional Stage” lays down some of its most important
provisions for the purposes of this study. To begin with Article 8, it provides
the procedure for the adoption of the Additional Protocol, which was supposed
to “determine the conditions, rules and timetables for the implementation of
provisions relating to the fields covered by the Treaty establishing the Com-
munity”. The provisions worth citing for our purposes are the provision
providing for the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality and the
provisions on free movement of persons.
To begin with the non-discrimination provision, it reads ad follows:
Article 9
‘The Contracting Parties recognize that within the scope of this Agreement and
without prejudice to any special provisions which may be laid down pursuant to
Article 8, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited in accordance
with the principle laid down in Article 7 of the Treaty establishing the Community.’282
The provisions providing for the free movement of workers, freedom of
establishment and freedom to provide services read respectively as follows:
Article 12
‘The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty
establishing the Community for the purpose of progressively securing freedom
of movement for workers between them.’
Article 13
‘The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 52 to 56 and Article 58 of
the Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions
on freedom of establishment between them.’
Article 14
‘The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 55, 56 and 58 to 65 of the
Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on
freedom to provide services between them.’
Before proceeding to the examination of the provisions preparing the ground
for the future implementation of these freedoms in the Additional Protocol,
it is worth making a brief comment on the general wording of those provisions.
The broad and general formulation of these provisions with reference to the
281 See the first paragraph under title “3.2 Aims and structure of the Agreement”.
282 Emphasis added.
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corresponding Treaty provisions, proved to be a blessing and a curse at the
same time. It proved to be a curse; because Turkish nationals were not able
to rely directly on these provisions in order to invoke the freedoms they aimed
to establish. As will be analysed in more detail below, the Court ruled that
these provisions were of programmatic nature, and were “not sufficiently
precise and unconditional”283 to be capable of conferring directly effective
rights on individuals. According to the Court, it was up to the Association
Council to take decisions of specific and unconditional nature that would
materialize the objectives of those provisions.284
The broad formulation of these provisions with reference to corresponding
Treaty articles was a blessing as it served as the justification/ground for the
Court to give a dynamic interpretation to these provisions. By virtue of these
references, the Court interpreted the terms in these provisions, as well as the
terms in other measures adopted to implement these provisions, “as far as
possible” in line with the meaning given to those terms under Union law.285
As the meaning and scope given to some concepts was broadened under EU
law, so was the case for those concepts under the Ankara Agreement. As
generous as the Court seemed to be in that exercise, there are few recent
examples in which the Court drew the boundaries between Association Law
and EU law by declaring what it deemed not possible.286
3.3.2.2 In the Additional Protocol
While the provisions on “Free Movement of Goods” under Title I are many
and quite detailed (Articles 2 to 35 AP), there are only seven general provisions
under Title II of the Additional Protocol dealing with “Movement of Persons
and Services” (Articles 36 to 42 AP). The Protocol set a timetable for establish-
ing free movement of workers and prohibited the introduction of any new
restrictions regarding free movement of establishment and freedom to provide
283 Case 12/86 Demirel, para. 23.
284 Ibid., paras. 20-21.
285 Van der Mei calls this “the Bozkurt-interpretation rule“. See, A. P. Van der Mei, “The
Bozkurt-Interpretation Rule and the Legal Status of Family Members of Turkish Workers
under Decision 1/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council,“ European Journal of Migration
and Law 11(2009). See also, N. Tezcan/Idriz, “Free Movement of Persons Between Turkey
and the EU: To Move or Not to Move? The response of the judiciary,“ Common Market Law
Review 46(2009); F. G. Jacobs, “Direct effect and interpretation of international agreements
in the recent case law of the European Court of Justice,“ in Law and Practice of EU External
Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape, ed. A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 29-31.
286 For instance, it was not possible to extend the personal scope of the freedom to provide
services under the Ankara Agreement so as to encompass service recipients, as is the case
under EU law. See, Case C-221/11 Demirkan, judgment of 24 September 2012, n.y.r. See also,
Case C-371/08 Ziebell, [2011] ECR I-12735. Compare the ECJ’s approach with that of the EFTA
Court in Case E-15/12 Jan Anfinn Wahl, judgment of 22 July 2013, n.y.r.
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services, however, the specific measures that were to turn these freedoms into
reality were to be taken by the Association Council.
To begin with the timetable set for the establishment of free movement
of workers, Article 36 AP provided that it was to be achieved by progressive
stages in line with the principles set out in Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement
“between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-second year after the entry
into force of that Agreement”. Article 37 AP prohibited discrimination on the
grounds of nationality between Turkish workers and workers who are
nationals of Member States of the Community regarding conditions of work
and remuneration. Article 39 AP directed the Association Council to adopt
social security measures for Turkish workers and their families residing in
the Community. Those measures had to enable Turkish workers “to aggregate
periods of insurance or employment completed in individual Member States
in respect of old-age pensions, death benefits and invalidity pensions, and
also as regards the provision of health services”.287 Those measures had to
ensure that Member States take into account periods completed in Turkey.
These measures had to be adopted by the end of the first year after the entry
into force of this Protocol. The proposal for the implementation of this pro-
vision, as well as Decision 3/80, most provisions of which are too general to
be directly effective, has still not been adopted.288
As to establishing the timetable and rules on the abolition of restrictions
on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, Article 41(2)
AP designated the Association Council as the competent body. Until the adop-
tion of those rules, Article 41(1) AP introduced a standstill instructing the
Contracting Parties to “refrain from introducing between themselves any new
restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide
services”. Since Member States did not refrain from introducing new
restrictions, disregarding the standstill clause, the Court of Justice has recently
delivered interesting cases concerning the scope and application of the latter
clause.289 Most of the recent developments regarding free movement of persons
between Turkey and some of the Member States, which will be dealt with in
detail below, are the result of the Court’s judgments declaring some of these
measures incompatible with Association Law.290
287 Article 39(2) AP.
288 See, Proposal for a Council Decision “on the position to be taken on behalf of the European
Union within the Association Council set by the Agreement establishing an association
between the European Economic Community and Turkey with regard to the provisions
on the coordination of social security systems”, COM(2012) 152 final, Brussels, 30.03.2012.
289 For an example, see Case C-221/11 Demirkan.
290 For an example, see Case C-228/06 Soysal, [2009] ECR I-1031.
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3.3.2.3 In the Association Council Decisions
The Association Council took few decisions that lay down in concrete terms
the rights to be enjoyed by Turkish workers that were already legally employed
in a Member State; however, it failed to adopt any decisions that would
facilitate the free movement of workers, services or freedom of establishment.
The case law of the Court concerning the interpretation of provisions of those
decisions with relevance for the free movement of persons between Turkey
and the Member States of the EU is examined in detail in the following part.
For our purposes, it suffices to mention the most important decisions adopted
by the Association Council and the most important provisions contained
therein.
3.3.2.3.1 Decision 2/76
The first decision adopted on the implementation of Article 12 of the Ankara
Agreement, i.e. the provision providing for the establishment of free movement
of workers, was Decision 2/76 of the Association Council.291 It laid down the
rules for the implementation of the first stage of free movement of workers,
which was to last four years. It was replaced in time by Decision 1/80 on the
Development of the Association.292 Its only relevant and important provision
for free movement of workers for our purposes today is the standstill clause
contained in its Article 7, which read as follows: “The Member States of the
Community and Turkey may not introduce new restrictions on the conditions
of access to employment applicable to workers legally resident and employed
in their territory.” In other words, the standstill obligation as far as the
workers’ rights are concerned goes back to 20 December 1976, when Decision
2/76 was adopted and is deemed to have entered into force.
3.3.2.3.2 Decision 1/80
Decision 1/80, which was adopted on 1 December 1980, aimed “to improve
the treatment accorded to Turkish workers and members of their families in
relation to the arrangements introduced by Decision 2/76 of the Association
Council”.293 In what became Article 13 of Decision 1/80, the scope of the
standstill clause, which was embodied in Article 7 of Decisions 2/76, was
broadened to include the family members of Turkish workers. All other
provisions contained in the Decision, concern the rights of Turkish workers
who are already legally resident and employed in a Member State. Even
though they have no implications for the free movement of workers between
Turkey and the Member States of the EU, a brief account of the content of those
provisions might be useful to provide an overall view of the extent of rights
291 It was adopted on 20 December 1976.
292 This decision was not published in the Official Journal.
293 See the preamble to Decision 1/80.
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enjoyed by the Turkish workers and their families, once they are legally
resident and employed in a Member State of the EU.
It is also important to underline that some of the provisions of the Decision
were modelled after the first measures that applied regarding free movement
of Community workers during the transitional period. Most of Article 6 of
Decision 1/80, copies Article 6 of Regulation No. 15 of 1961,294 which illustrates
the intention that the progressive establishment of free movement of workers
between Turkey and the EEC at the time, is to follow the steps of development
of this freedom within the Community. Just like Council Regulation No. 15
did for Community workers, Article 6 of the Association Council provides
for the gradual integration of Turkish workers into the labour force of a
Member State. Article 6 reads as follows:295
‘1. … a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a
Member State:
- shall be entitled in that Member State, after one year’s legal employment, to
the renewal of his permit to work for the same employer, if a job is available;
- shall be entitled in that Member State, after three years of legal employment
and subject to the priority to be given to workers of Member States of the
Community, to respond to another offer of employment, with an employer
of his choice, made under normal conditions and registered with the employ-
ment service of that State, for the same occupation;
- shall enjoy free access in that Member State to any paid employment of his
choice, after four years of legal employment.’
The importance of Article 6 became apparent when the Court interpreted the
right of access to the labour market in line with the Court’s jurisprudence in
this area, i.e. as necessarily implying a right to legal residence. The Court
reasoned that a different interpretation would deprive the right of access to
294 The Regulation is not available in English. For the Dutch version, see Verordening No.
15 met betrekking tot de eerste maatregelen ter verwezenlijking van het vrije verkeer van
werknemers binnen de Gemeenschap, Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen,
1073/61, 26.08.1961.
295 Compare with the wording of Article 6 of Regulation No. 15, which provides as follows:
“1. Na één jaar regelmatige arbeid op het grondgebied van een Lid-Staat heft de onderdaan
van een andere Lid-Staat die een betrekking heft, recht op verlenging van zijn arbeidsver-
gunning voor hetzelfde beroep.
2. Na drie jaar regelmatige arbeid verkrijgt deze onderdaan vergunning om een ander
beroep in loondienst uit te oefenen waarvoor hij de nodige vakbekwaamheid bezit.
3. Na vier jaar regelmatige arbeid verkrijgt de betrokken onderdaan vergunning om ieder
beroep in loondienst te oefenen, onder dezelfde voorwaarden als die welke gelden voor
nationale werknemers.”
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the labour market and the right to work of all effect.296 In addition, Article
6(2) set out certain legitimate causes of interruption to employment.297
Article 7 of Decision 1/80 regulates the rights enjoyed by family members
of a Turkish worker in the territory of a Member State.298 Family members
duly authorised to join the worker have to wait for a period of three years
to be able to respond to an offer of employment, and then, only subject to the
priority to be given to Community workers. Family members enjoy free access
to employment of their choice only after five years of legal residence in the
Member State concerned.299 In addition, Article 9 provides for equal access
to general education for children of Turkish workers.300
Another important provision interpreted generously by the Court is Article
10(1) of Decision 1/80,301 which is the special provision providing for non-
discrimination based on nationality regarding Turkish workers. It provides
as follows: “The Member States of the Community shall as regards remuner-
ation and other conditions of work grant Turkish workers duly registered as
belonging to their labour forces treatment involving no discrimination on the
basis of nationality between them and Community workers.”
Last but not least, Article 14(1) of Decision 1/80 is worth mentioning as
it provides that “[t]he provisions of this section shall be applied subject to
296 See, Case C-192/89 Sevince, [1990] ECR I-3461, para. 29; Case C-36/96 Günaydin, [1997] ECR
I-5143, para. 26; Case C-1/97 Birden, [1998] ECR I-7747, para. 20.
297 Article 6(2) makes distinction on the basis of the type and length of periods in which a
Turkish worker was not working. Accordingly, the first sentence of that provision concerns
periods of inactivity involving only a brief cessation to work, such as absences for annual
holidays, maternity leave, short period of sickness, etc. Such absences are treated wholly
as periods of legal employment within the meaning of Article 6(1). The second sentence
concerns periods of inactivity due to long term sickness or involuntary employment. While
it is not possible to treat the latter periods of inactivity as legal employment, they may not
always result in the Turkish worker losing the rights which he had already acquired. See,
Case C-230/03 Sedef [2006] ECR I-157, paras. 49-51.
298 As to the definition of a “member of the family” of a Turkish worker, the Court interpreted
the concept in line with the interpretation given to the concept in the area of free movement
of Union workers. See, Case C-275/02 Ayaz [2004] ECR I-8765.
299 First and second indents of Article 7(1) of Decision 1/80. The Court established further
that once a family member fulfills the condition of legal residence for three years stipulated
in the first indent of Article 7(1), Member States are no longer entitled to attach conditions
to his/her residence. This applies a fortiori to a family member who has legally resided
in a Member State for at least five years. See, Case C-329/97 Ergat, [2000] ECR I-1487, paras.
38-39.
300 Article 9 of Decision No 1/80 provides as follows: “Turkish children residing legally in
a Member State of the Community with their parents who are or have been legally employ-
ed in that Member State, shall be admitted to courses of general education, apprenticeship
and vocational training under the same educational entry qualifications as the children
of nationals of that Member State. They may in that Member State be eligible to benefit
from the advantages provided for under the national legislation in this area.”
301 For an evaluation of the precise scope of Article 10(1) by the Court, see Case C-171/01
Wählergruppe Gemeinsam, [2003] ECR I-4301.
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limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security and public
health”. Before the introduction of Directive 2004/38/EC (the Citizenship
Directive), these concepts were interpreted in line with EU law, and the pro-
cedural guarantees and protection accorded to Community nationals regarding
expulsion under Directive 64/221/EEC were also accorded to Turkish nationals
falling within the scope of Association Law.302 However, after the introduction
of the Citizenship Directive, the Court in Ziebell ruled that it was no longer
possible to extend the scheme of protection offered to Union citizens to Turkish
nationals, as the status of Union citizenship “is intended to be the fundamental
status of nationals of Member States, [… which] justifies the recognition, for
Union citizens alone, of guarantees which are considerably strengthened in
respect of expulsion”.303 Ziebell came as a surprise, since the Court had
acknowledged only a year ago that it “follows from Article 2(1) of the
Association Agreement, that [it] has the objective of bringing the situation of
Turkish nationals and citizens of the Union closer together through the progressive
securing of free movement for workers and the abolition of restrictions on
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services”.304
3.3.2.3.3 Decision 3/80
Lastly, Decision 3/80 concerned the application of social security schemes of
the Member States of the EC to Turkish workers and members of their
families.305 This proved to be the most problematic area concerning the rights
of Turkish nationals. There was no specific provision on social security in the
Ankara Agreement. As mentioned above, it was Article 39(1) AP that provided
that “[b]efore the end of the first year after the entry into force of this Protocol,
the Council of Association shall adopt social security measures for workers
of Turkish nationality moving within the Community and their families
residing in the Community”.
It took the Association Council almost a decade to adopt Decision 3/80.
Its aim was to coordinate Member States’ social security schemes so as to
enable Turkish workers employed or formerly employed in the Community,
members of their families and their survivors to qualify for benefits in the
traditional branches of social security. The Decision either copied the provisions
of Regulation 1408/71/EC306 or made direct references to them. However, the
adoption of this decision was only a first step in granting full and equal social
security rights to Turkish workers and their families. For the aim stipulated
302 See, Case C-136/03 Dörr and Ünal, [2005] ECR I-4759.
303 Emphasis added. Case C-371/08 Ziebell, para. 73. See, K. Hamenstädt, “The Protection of
Turkish Citizens Against Expulsion—This Far and No Further? The Impact of the Ziebell
Case,“ German Law Journal 41, no. 1 (2013): 239-67.
304 Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands, [2010] ECR I-03683.
305 OJ 1983 C 110/60.
306 Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes
to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, OJ L 194/2, 5.7.1971.
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in Article 39 AP to be fully achieved, further measures implementing Decision
3/80 were required. Unfortunately, the initial interpretation provided by the
Court in Taflan-Met, did not add much clarity to the field.307
On 8 February 1983 the Commission submitted to the Council a proposal
for a Regulation to bring this Decision 3/80 into force within the Community
and to lay down supplementary detailed rules for its implementation.308
However that proposal, which concerned the social security rights of the largest
group of third country nationals (TCNs) in Europe, was never adopted. A
recently updated Commission proposal has been adopted by the Council as
the position of the EU within the Association Council; however, the latter
proposal has still not been adopted by the Association Council.309
In conclusion, Association Council decisions were important first steps
towards achieving free movement of workers between Turkey and the Member
States of the EU. Even though some of these steps, i.e. provisions of Decisions,
needed to be complemented with further more specific steps to entitle indivi-
duals to directly effective rights,310 Turkish nationals were able to rely on those
which were sufficiently specific and precise. In that sense, the latter provisions
could be qualified as an embodiment of already existing “legal constraints”
on Member States, which could be placed in the first category of constraints
consisting of directly effective, i.e. justiciable law. Since these rights were raised
in more than sixty cases in front of the Court, by now most of them are well
established and entrenched. They demonstrate the concrete minimum achieved
on the way to establish full free movement rights.
While these specific provisions falling within the first category of “legal
constraints” defined in the introduction constitute the current minimum, the
broader programmatic provisions that do not have direct effect and fall within
the second category, such as Article 12, 13 or 14 AA, embody the final objective
pursued by those provisions. The specific provisions are just first steps taken
307 Compare Case C-277/94 Taflan-Met and Others, [1996] ECR I-4085; to Case C-262/96 Sürül,
[1999] ECR-I 2685. See also, S. Peers, “Equality, Free Movement and Social Security,“
European Law Review 22(1997): 342-51; Tezcan/Idriz, “Free Movement of Persons Between
Turkey and the EU: To Move or Not to Move? The response of the judiciary,“ 1652-53.
308 OJ 1983 C 110, p.1. Case C-277/94 Taflan-Met and Others, paras. 34-35.To a large extent,
Commission’s proposal was based on Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of March 21,
1972 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) 1408/71, OJ L 74/1,
27.3.1972.
309 See, Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File: 2012/0076 (NLE), Subject:
Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the
Association Council set up by the Agreement establishing an association between the
European Economic Community, and Turkey with regard to the adoption of provisions
on the coordination of social security systems, Brussels, 20 November 2012, 14798/12, SOC
820 NT 29.
310 For an example, see Case C-277/94 Taflan-Met and Others. For a brief discussion of the case,
see Tezcan/Idriz, “Free Movement of Persons Between Turkey and the EU: To Move or
Not to Move? The response of the judiciary,“ 1652-53.
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to gradually fulfil the broader objectives contained in the Treaties. As demon-
strated by the Court’s case law below, that is the reason why if unclear, these
specific provisions are interpreted in the light of the broader objectives they
serve. It should be noted that the fact that general provisions are not directly
effective does not mean that they are not binding. It simply means that indiv-
iduals are not able to rely on those provisions in national courts. The Contract-
ing Parties of the Agreement are under the obligation to give them effect. In
short, since both types of provisions are legally binding, arguably both would
equally constitute constraints on Member States when negotiating a future
Accession Agreement.
It should be emphasised however, that as a first step, these decisions aimed
to ensure the rights of workers and their families who were already legally
resident on the territory of a Member State of the EU. The next step, which
was to institute free movement of workers between Turkey and the Member
States, was to follow later. Those next steps were never taken. However, as
far as free movement existed at the time the Additional Protocol or the first
Decisions were adopted, it was protected by the standstill clauses contained
in those instruments,311 which seemed to have been forgotten for a while.
Nowadays, it is those clauses that are the source of any change, since the
migration policies of Member States were much more liberal in the 1970s and
early 1980s.
Since it is the Court’s recent case law on the standstill clauses that provides
for the partial establishment or re-institution of free movement of workers,
services and establishment between Turkey and some of the Member States
of the EU, the focus in the following section is on those cases. They are im-
portant for our purposes as they demonstrate that if standstill clauses had been
respected, there would already be substantial amount of free movement
between Turkey and the EU, which would make the discussion on a PSC
untenable as it could imply a step back even from the existing free movement
regime. Even if the level of freedom of movement of the 1970s and early 1980s
is not likely to be achieved under the existing Association regime, the case
law of Court results in the removal of some of these “new restrictions”.
3.3.2.4 Case law of the Court of Justice
So far the Court has delivered more than sixty judgments on EU-Turkey
Association Law.312 While some recent cases concern free movement of workers,
311 Article 7 of Decision 2/76, which was replaced by Article 13 of Decision 1/80; and Article
41(1) AP.
312 For an overview of EU-Turkey Association Law, see K. Groenendijk and M. Luiten, Rechten
van Turkse burgers op grond van de Associatie EEG-Turkije [Rights of Turkish Nationals on
the Grounds of the EEC-Turkey Association] (The Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2010);
N. Rogers, A Practitioners’ Guide to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2000); K. Groenendijk, “The Court of Justice and the Development of
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service providers and freedom of establishment between Turkey and Member
States of the EU,313 which will be examined in more detail below, most of the
cases in the area of Association Law concern the rights of Turkish workers
and their families who are already legally resident and employed in a Member
State, in other words cases concerning various provisions of Decision 1/80.314
While it is important to take note of these rights, and the fact that they have
been further complemented and strengthened with other measures aiming
to improve the rights of TCNs,315 the focus in the following part is on the rules
of admission to Member States and free movement of persons between Turkey
and the Member States of the EU.
Before proceeding to the part on free movement, what follows below is
a brief historical account of the Court’s case law establishing that it has inter-
pretative jurisdiction over Association instruments, that they form integral
part of EU law, and that individuals deriving rights from these instruments
are able to rely on them. That case law is of paramount importance as it has
emphasized again and again the objective of the Association regime as well
as the central role played by the free movement of workers, services and
EEC-Turkey Association Law,“ in Grenzüberschreitendes Recht – Crossing Frontiers: Festschrift
für Kay Hailbronner, ed. G. Jochum, W. Fritzmeyer, and M. Kau (C.F.Müller, 2013), 413-28;
D. Martin, “The Privileged Treatment of Turkish Nationals,“ in The First Decade of EU
Migration and Asylum Law, ed. E. Guild and P. Minderhoud (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2012), 75-91.
313 A. Wiesbrock, “Political Reluctance and Judicial Activism in the Area of Free Movement
of Persons: The Court as the Motor of EU-Turkey Relations?,“ European Law Journal 19, no.
3 (2013); M. T. Karayigit, “Vive la Clause de Standstill: The Issue of First Admission of
Turkish Nationals into the Territory of a Member State within the Context of Economic
Freedoms,“ European Journal of Migration and Law 13(2011); Tezcan/Idriz, “Free Movement
of Persons Between Turkey and the EU: To Move or Not to Move? The response of the
judiciary.“
314 T. Theele, “Rights of Turkish Workers on the Basis of the EEC/Turkey Association Agree-
ment,“ in Migration, Integration and Citizenship, Volume II: The Position of Third Country
Nationals in Europe, ed. H. Schneider (Forum Maastricht, 2005); K. Groenendijk, “Citizens
and Third Country Nationals: Differential Treatment or Discrimination,“ in The Future of
Free Movement of Persons in the EU, Volume 2, ed. J. Y. Carlier and E. Guild (Brussels:
Bruylant, 2006); T. Takács, “Legal status of migrants under the association, pertnership
and cooperation agreements of the EU: How far from EU citizenship?,“ in Globalisation,
Migration, and the Future of Europe: Insiders and Outsiders, ed. L. S. Talani (Routledge, 2012),
82-88.
315 The most relevant instruments in this area are Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family
reunification, OJ L 251/12, 3.10.2003, applicable as of 3 October 2005; and Directive 2003/
109/EC on the rights of long-term residents, OJ L 16/44, 23.01.2004, applicable as of 23
January 2006. For an extensive elaboration on how these instruments complement the rights
of Turkish nationals under Association Law, see Peers, “EU Migration Law and Association
Agreements,“ 53-87. See also, Groenendijk, “Citizens and Third Country Nationals: Differ-
ential Treatment or Discrimination.“
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establishment. By now it constitutes a solid body of case law that is followed
and given effect by the national courts of some of the Member States.316
3.3.2.4.1 Establishing the Court’s jurisdiction
The first case to reach the Court of Justice concerning the Ankara Agreement
and its Additional Protocol was that of Mrs. Demirel. She came to rejoin her
husband in Germany on a visitor’s visa.317 She overstayed her visa and was
faced with an order to leave the country. She challenged the order relying
on Articles 7 and 12 AA together with Article 36 AP. In addition to the pre-
liminary references sent by the national court on the interpretation and applica-
tion of those provisions, the Court also had to deal with the issue of admissibil-
ity raised by the German and the UK governments. They contested the Court’s
jurisdiction to interpret the Ankara Agreement and its Protocol, on the ground
that the latter were “mixed” agreements and argued that as far as free move-
ment of workers was concerned, Member States’ commitments in this field
concerned the exercise of their own powers.318
The Court disagreed. First, it reminded Member States of its earlier case
law,319 in which it had established that an agreement signed by the Council
under Article 228 and 238 EEC is considered an act of one of the Community’s
institutions, and that “as from its entry into force, the provisions of such an
agreement form an integral part of the Community legal system”.320 Hence, it
followed that it had jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the
interpretation of such an agreement. It further explained that:
‘…[s]ince the agreement in question is an association agreement creating special,
privileged links with a non-member country which must, at least to a certain extent,
316 It is especially the national courts of Germany and the Netherlands, both of which host
sizable Turkish communities, that follow and apply the Court’s Association case law. In
many instances they resolve arising issues in line with the case law of the Court, without
making preliminary references. For an example, see N. Tezcan/Idriz, “Dutch Courts
Safeguarding Rights under the EEC-Turkey Association Law. Case Note on District Court
Rotterdam Judgments of 12 August 2010, and District Court Roermond Judgment of 15
October 2010,“ European Journal of Migration and Law 13(2011): 219-39. It should be noted
however, that despite hosting large Turkish communities too, there has been no single
reference from the Belgian, Danish or French national courts until 2014. See (forthcoming),
K. Groenendijk, “The Court of Justice and the Development of EEC-Turkey Association
Law,“ in Degrees of Free Movement and Citizenship, ed. D. Thym and M.H. Zoetewij Turhan
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2015).
317 She was not able to obtain a family reunification visa, because of the stricter family reunifica-
tion rules introduced in 1982 and 1984. Those rules increased the continuous and lawful
residence requirement for Mr. Demirel from three to eight years. As he was working there
since 1979, he was not able to meet the stricter requirement. See, Case 12/86 Demirel, paras.
2-3.
318 Ibid., para. 8.
319 The Court referred to Case 181/73 Haegeman, [1974] ECR 449.
320 Emphasis added. Case 12/86 Demirel, para. 7.
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take part in the Community system, Article 238 must necessarily empower the Commun-
ity to guarantee commitments towards non-member countries in all the fields covered by
the Treaty. Since freedom of movement for workers is, by virtue of Article 48 et
seq. of the EEC Treaty, one of the fields covered by that Treaty, it follows that
commitments regarding freedom of movement fall within the powers conferred
on the Community by Article 238.’321
Before establishing its jurisdiction to interpret the Ankara Agreement and its
Protocol, the Court lastly recalled its Kupferberg judgment,322 in which it ruled
that “in ensuring respect for commitments arising from an agreement con-
cluded by the Community institutions the Member States fulfil … an obligation
in relation to the Community, which has assumed responsibility for the due
performance of the agreement”.323
The rest of the judgment was disappointing for Mrs. Demirel. She was not
entitled to rely on Article 12 and Article 36 AP, even if the deadline to establish
free movement of workers between Turkey and the Member States of the EC
at the time had expired. Since those provisions were of programmatic nature,
they were not “sufficiently precise and unconditional to be capable of govern-
ing directly movement of workers”.324 This implied that Turkish nationals
could rely on other provisions of the Agreement, which fulfilled the conditions
of direct effect.
As important as Demirel was, it did not resolve all questions concerning
Association Law. The issues that came up in the following case, Sevince, were:
firstly, whether the Court had jurisdiction to interpret decisions of the Associ-
ation Council; and secondly, whether the provisions of those decisions which
were sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional, were capable of having direct
effect.325 The Court answered both questions in the affirmative.
In its reply to the first question, the Court referred to a judgment it had
delivered in the framework of the Association Agreement with Greece,326 in
which it had already ruled that decisions of the Association Council were
directly linked to the Agreement to which they give effect, and that as such
they also “form an integral part, as from their entry into force, of the Commun-
ity legal system”.327 Hence, the Court ruled that it also had jurisdiction to
rule on the interpretation of Association Council decisions. In addition, accord-
ing to the Court, its finding was reinforced by the function of Article 267 TFEU
321 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 9.
322 Case C-104/81 Kupferberg, [1982] ECR 3641.
323 Case 12/86 Demirel, para. 11.
324 Ibid., para. 23.
325 See, Case C-192/89 Sevince. Mr. Sevince was a Turkish national, who tried to rely on the
provisions of Decision 1/80 to challenge the refusal of Dutch authorities to extend his
residence permit.
326 See, Case 30/88 Greece v Commission, [1989] ECR 3711, para. 13.
327 Case C-192/89 Sevince, para. 9.
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“to ensure the uniform application throughout the Community of all provisions
forming part of the Community legal system”.328
As to the second question, the Court established that the provisions of an
Association Council decision had to satisfy the same conditions as those
applicable to the provisions of an Association Agreement mentioned in
Demirel.329 According to the Court, the fact that in Demirel it established that
some provisions of the Ankara Agreement “set out a programme does not
prevent the decisions of the Council of Association which give effect in specific
respects to the programmes envisaged in the Agreement from having direct
effect”.330
Sevince and the following judgments, revealed how instrumental Association
Council decisions were in implementing the general objectives set by the
Ankara Agreement and its Protocols. Thanks to their specific and unconditional
nature, Turkish workers and their family members were able to invoke most
of the provisions of Association Council decisions in national courts. However,
except for the standstill clause contained in those decisions, which the Court
interpreted to cover “substantive and/or procedural conditions governing the
first admission” into the territory of a Member State,331 all other provisions
concern the rights of Turkish workers who are already legally resident on the
territory of a Member State.
In recent years it is possible to witness a limited movement of persons
between Turkey and some Member States of the EU. This limited movement,
did not result from instruments adopted by the Association Council to give
effect to the freedoms, but from the case law of the Court of Justice interpreting
the standstill clauses that are contained in the Additional Protocol and in the
above-mentioned Association Council Decisions. This case law established
that some measures introduced by some Member States, such as the visa
requirement introduced by Germany on service providers, constituted “new
restrictions” prohibited by the standstill clauses,332 and by virtue of being
incompatible with Association Law, they had to be removed. The removal
of some of these barriers resulted in a complicated and fragmented regime,
the effects of which are analysed in more detail below. However, before
proceeding to the analysis of specific case law in different areas of free move-
ment, first a general introduction as to the aims and nature of standstill clauses
is provided, as all the cases that follow concern those clauses.
328 Ibid., para. 11.
329 Ibid., para. 14.
330 Ibid., para. 21.
331 Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands, para. 49.
332 See Case C-228/06 Soysal.
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3.3.2.4.2 Aims and nature of the standstill clauses
To begin with the main aim of these two clauses, since it plays an important
role in how the Court interprets them, they aim “to create conditions conducive
to the gradual establishment of freedom of movement for workers, of the right
of establishment and of freedom to provide services by prohibiting national
authorities from creating new obstacles to those freedoms…”.333 Even if those
provisions allow the retention of existing obstacles, the Court notes that “it
is important to ensure that no new obstacle is introduced in order not to
further obstruct the gradual implementation”334 of those freedoms.
Standstill clauses performed an important function in the Community
context as well. They were used during the transitional period and similarly
aimed to prevent Member States from introducing new obstacles or aggravate
existing ones, so as to prepare the ground for future harmonization measures.
One of the first and most seminal judgments of EU law, Van Gend en Loos,335
was a case concerning a standstill provision: Article 12 of the EEC Treaty, which
had a similar nature and purpose to that of Article 41(1) AP.336
As to the nature of the standstill clauses, they have direct effect,337 however,
they do not confer any substantive rights on individuals. They rather serve
as quasi-procedural rules which determine, ratione temporis, the laws of a
Member State that must be referred to for the purposes of assessing the
position of a Turkish national who wishes to exercise one of the freedoms in
a Member State.338 To put it differently, after the entry into force of the instru-
ments containing the respective standstill clauses, that is 1 January 1973 for
the Additional Protocol and 1 December 1980 for Decision 1/80, Member States
are allowed either not to act, that is to keep the existing obstacles in place,339
or take steps to lift those obstacles. However, it should be noted that once a
Member State lifts an obstacle, it is not allowed to re-introduce it.340 In other
words, the standstill clauses freeze the most favourable conditions for the
333 Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, [2003] ECR I-12301, para. 72.
334 Case C-16/05 Tum and Dari, [2007] ECR I-07415, para. 61.
335 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos.
336 Article 12 of the EEC Treaty provided as follows: “Member States shall refrain from
introducing between themselves any new customs duties or imports or exports or any
charge having equivalent effect and from increasing those which they already apply in
their trade with each other.”
337 Case C-192/89 Sevince, paras. 18 and 26; Case C-37/98 Savas, [2000] ECR I-2927, para. 49; Case
C-317/01 Abatay and Others, paras. 58-59; Case C-16/05 Tum and Dari, para. 46; Case C-228/06
Soysal, para. 45.
338 Case C-16/05 Tum and Dari, para. 55.
339 Case 77/82 Peskeloglou, [1983] ECR 1085, para. 13; Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, para.
81; Case C-16/05 Tum and Dari, para. 61.
340 Joined Cases C-300/09 and C-301/09 Toprak and Oguz, [2010] ECR I-12845.
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exercise of a freedom and prohibit the Member States from taking backward
steps. This has been dubbed as the “accumulative rights approach”.341
To give a few examples as to what has been found to qualify as “a new
obstacle” in the EU-Turkey Association context: introducing a work permit
requirement for service providers,342 making stricter immigration rules with
regard to those seeking entry to establish themselves in a Member State,343
introducing a visa requirement for service providers,344 increasing the fees
charged for issuing or extending residence permits,345 and introducing a
requirement for family members to prove a basic level of German language
proficiency prior to their entry into Germany,346 were all considered to consti-
tute new obstacles prohibited by the two standstill-clauses.
Lastly, it should be noted that the standstill clauses used in Association
Law are not absolute. There are some limitations to the application of those
clauses. Firstly, these clauses do not apply to Turkish nationals whose position
in a Member State is not lawful, that is Turkish nationals who have not com-
plied with the rules of the Member State as to entry, residence, employment
or establishment.347 Secondly, by virtue of Article 59 AP, which stipulates that
Turkish nationals shall not be treated more favourably than EU nationals, new
restrictions on the freedoms are allowed as far as they also apply to EU
citizens.348 Finally, as proclaimed by the Court recently, derogations from these
clauses are possible both on the grounds of public policy, public security, and
public health, and on the ground of an overriding reason in the public
interest.349
341 A. Hogenboom, “Moving Forward by Standing Still? First Admission of Turkish Workers:
Comment on Commission v Netherlands (Administrative Fees),“ European Law Review
35(2010): 713.
342 Case C-37/98 Savas. See, A. Ott, “The Savas Case – Anologies between Turkish Self-Employed
and Workers?,“ European Journal of Migration and Law 2(2000): 445-58.
343 Case C-16/05 Tum and Dari.
344 Case C-228/06 Soysal.
345 Case C-242/06 Sahin, [2009] ECR I-8465; and Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands. See,
Hogenboom, “Moving Forward by Standing Still? First Admission of Turkish Workers:
Comment on Commission v Netherlands (Administrative Fees),“ 707-19.
346 Case C-138/13 Dogan, judgment of 10 July 2014, n.y.r.
347 Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 53; Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, para. 85.
348 For a more detailed elaboration, see Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands. See also, Hogen-
boom, “Moving Forward by Standing Still? First Admission of Turkish Workers: Comment
on Commission v Netherlands (Administrative Fees),“ 716-18. For another example of a
compatibility check with Article 59 AP, see Case C-325/05 Derin, [2007] ECR I-6495; for details
see, Tezcan/Idriz, “Free Movement of Persons Between Turkey and the EU: To Move or
Not to Move? The response of the judiciary,“ 1662-64.
349 Case C-225/12 Demir, judgment of 7 November 2013, n.y.r., para. 40. Even though the Court
mentioned the possibility of introducing these restrictions/derogations only regarding
Article 13 of Decision 1/80, it is not difficult to foresee that these will apply by analogy
to Article 41 AP. As the Court noted in an earlier judgment, the Court is of the opinion
that the two standstill clauses are of the same kind and must be acknowledged to have
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a) Case law on free movement of workers
Just like in the area of free movement of services and freedom of establishment,
the case law carrying the potential to remove the barriers in front of free
movement of workers is generated by the standstill clause contained in De-
cisions 2/76 and 1/80. Article 7 of Decision 2/76 provided that “[t]he Member
States of the Community and Turkey may not introduce new restrictions on
the conditions of access to employment applicable to workers legally resident
and employed in their respective territories”. Article 13 of Decision 1/80 added
the phrase “and members of their families” in order to broaden or clarify the
scope of the provision. The most important case in this area is the recent Demir
judgment delivered on 7 November 2013.350 The judgment is cryptic and
concise, however, it confirms the Court’s dictum in Commission v Netherlands
to the effect that issues relating to first entry fall within the scope of the
standstill clause contained in Decision 1/80.351 Hence, it is worth having a
closer look at Demir.
However, for a better understanding of Demir, a brief overview of the
Court’s previous judgments interpreting the standstill clause would be useful,
so as to show how the Court gradually changed its approach to the interpreta-
tion of that clause. Thus, the analysis below begins by the first case, in which
this clause was ever mentioned, and proceeds to the more recent cases in which
the Court broadened its interpretation of the clause, by drawing analogies from
its case law on the standstill clause on the freedom of establishment and the
freedom to provide services contained in Article 41 AP. Last but not least,
follows the analysis of the Demir case.
– First mention of the standstill clause
When the wording of Article 7 of Decision 2/76 and Article 13 of Decision
1/80 are examined, one is left with the impression that both the material and
personal scope of those provisions are limited. The material scope is limited
to “the conditions of access to employment”, whereas the personal scope is
limited to “[Turkish] workers (and their families) legally resident and
employed in [Member States’] respective territories”. However, as the analysis
below reveals, except for the first case in which the clause was implicitly
mentioned (Demirel), the Court interpreted the scope of the standstill much
more broadly than it appears to be at first sight.
In Demirel, which was discussed above, the Court implied that standstill
had a limited scope. After underlining that Article 36 AP grants the Association
Council “exclusive powers to lay down detailed rules for the progressive
attainment of freedom of movement for workers in accordance with political
the same meaning. See, Case C-37/98 Savas, para. 50; and Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others,
70-71.
350 Case C-225/12 Demir.
351 Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands, para. 49; referred to in Case C-225/12 Demir, para. 34.
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and economic considerations arising in particular out of the progressive
establishment of the customs union and the alignment of economic pol-
icies”,352 the ECJ acknowledged that the only decision adopted on the matter,
Decision 1/80, concerned “Turkish workers who are already duly integrated
into labour force of a Member State”.353 It added that, without explicitly
mentioning Article 13, regarding those workers, Decision 1/80 prohibited “any
further restrictions on the conditions governing access to employment”.354
However, emphasised the Court, there was no such decision taken in the area
of family reunification.
Moreover, according to the Court, it was not possible to infer from Article 7
AA, the provision laying down the principle of loyal cooperation, “a prohibition
on the introduction of further restrictions on family reunification”.355 What
the latter provision did was to merely “impose on the contracting parties a
general obligation to cooperate in order to achieve the aims of the Agree-
ment”.356 It could not confer direct rights on individuals, which had not been
conferred on them by other provisions of the Agreement.
In Sevince, the second case concerning Association Law, the Court estab-
lished that “Article 7 of Decisions 2/76 and Article 13 of Decision 1/80 contain
an unequivocal ‘standstill’ clause regarding the introduction of new restrictions
on access to the employment of workers legally resident and employed in the
territory of the contracting States”.357 This meant the clauses had direct effect.
– Broadening the scope of the standstill clause by interpretation
In Savas, which was the third case mentioning a standstill clause, it established
that Article 41(1) AP is a provision of the same kind as Articles 7 of Decision
2/76 and Article 13 of Decision 1/80.358 Even if the Court occasionally men-
tioned the different wording of Article 13,359 it used its case law on the two
clauses interchangeably to shed light on one another. In subsequent case law,
it confirmed that the two standstill clauses are of the same kind and added
that they must be acknowledged to have the same meaning and objective.360
As far as the substantive scope of Article 13 is concerned, the Court does
not seem to limit it in any way. While a strict interpretation of Article 13 would
mean that it applies only with regard to new restrictions on the conditions of
access to employment, as the wording of the article suggests, in practice the Court
352 Case 12/86 Demirel, para. 21.
353 Ibid., para. 22.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid., para. 24.
356 Ibid.
357 Case C-192/89 Sevince, para. 18.
358 Case C-37/98 Savas, para. 50.
359 Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, para. 69.
360 Ibid., paras. 70-71; Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 65.
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seems to interpret the provision much more broadly. This is clearly illustrated
in paragraph 63 of the Sahin judgment. It reads as follows:
‘It is also settled case-law that the standstill clause enacted in Article 13 prohibits
generally the introduction of any new measure having the object or effect of making
the exercise by a Turkish national in its territory of the freedom of movement for
workers subject to more restrictive conditions than those which applied at the time
Decision 1/80 entered into force with regard to that Member State concerned.’361
This is quite a sweeping prohibition covering every new obstacle, which
according to the Court affects the exercise of free movement of workers, i.e. not
just access to employment in the territory of the host Member State. While
the Court has been consistent regarding the broad substantive scope of Article
13,362 it raised some doubts as to its personal scope recently in Demir.
In Abatay, the Court explained clearly why the substantive and personal
scope of Article 13 should not be interpreted restrictively. It emphasized that
the purpose of the clause could not be the protection of the rights of Turkish
nationals as regards employment, “since those rights are already fully covered
by Article 6 of that decision”.363 The German government argued that the
standstill clause did not prevent it from introducing new restrictions, but
merely from making them applicable to Turkish workers and their families
who are already lawfully resident on its territory.364 The Court found the latter
argument:
‘… paradoxical and liable to deprive Article 13 of any meaning, since a Turkish national
who is already lawfully employed in a Member State no longer needs the protection
of a ’standstill’ clause as regards access to employment, as such access has already
been allowed and the person concerned subsequently enjoys, for the rest of his
career in the host Member State, the rights which Article 6 of that decision expressly
confers on him. On the other hand, the ’standstill’ requirement as regards conditions
of access to employment is intended to ensure that the national authorities refrain
361 Emphasis added. The Court refers to Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, paras. 66 and second
indent of 117; and by analogy, as regards Article 41(1) AP to Case C-228/06 Soysal, para. 47.
362 See Case C-225/12 Demir, para. 33.
363 Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, para. 79.
364 The German government argued as follows in paragraph 75 of the Abatay judgment: “the
Court cannot uphold the argument, relied on by the German Government inter alia, that
Article 13 does not affect the right of the Member States to adopt, even after 1 December
1980, new restrictions on access to employment for Turkish nationals, but merely entails
that they are not applicable to those Turkish nationals who are already lawfully employed
and thereby have a right of residence in the host Member State when those restrictions
are introduced. The German Government infers that interpretation from the wording
’workers and members of their families legally resident and employed in their respective
territories’ which appears in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80.“ In the following paragraph,
the Court explains that the latter interpretation “disregards the system set up by Decision
1/80 and would deprive Article 13 thereof of its effect“.
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from taking measures likely to compromise the achievement of the objective of
Decision No 1/80, which is to allow freedom of movement for workers, even if,
initially, with a view to the gradual introduction of that freedom, existing national
restrictions as regards access to employment may be retained.’365
The fact that the standstill clause applies not only to workers, but also to their
family members, whose reunion with the worker is not conditional on their
exercise of paid employment (or in general to the performance of an economic
activity), is another proof that the clause aims to protect ratione materiae, more
than “access to employment”, and ratione personae, more than only “Turkish
nationals already integrated into the employment market of a Member
State”.366 Thus, concludes the Court, the scope of the standstill clause is “not
limited to Turkish nationals already integrated into the employment market
of a Member State, that provision none the less refers to workers and members
of their families ‘legally resident and employed in their respective territ-
ories’”.367
Given the arguments mentioned above, it can be convincingly argued that
the confusion arises from the formulation of Article 13, which would reflect
the overall aims of the decision better had it been formulated as ‘workers and
members of their families legally resident or [rather than ‘and’] employed in
their respective territories’. The following explanation provided by the Court,
clarifies and confirms the latter point. It provides that the terms used in the
standstill clause make it clear that the “clause can benefit a Turkish national
only if he has complied with the rules of the host Member State as to entry,
residence and, where appropriate, employment and if, therefore, he is legally
resident in the territory of that State”.368 This formulation is much more
accurate as it also includes family members, who in accordance with Article 7
of Decision 1/80, do have the right t reside, but not the right to work, during
their first three years of presence on the territory of the host Member State.
– Further broadening: Article 13 covers rules of entry into a Member State
In Sahin, which was the first case in which the Court ruled on the excessive
administrative fees imposed by Dutch authorities on Turkish nationals in their
applications for residence permits and for the extension of their periods of
validity, the Court recalled its analysis of Article 13 of Decision 1/80, men-
tioned above, in paragraphs 75 to 84 of its Abatay judgment and confirmed
that Article 13 was “not subject to the condition that the Turkish national
concerned satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1) of that decision and that
365 Emphasis added. Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, para. 81; for comparison, the Court refers
to Case 77/82 Peskeloglou, para. 13.
366 Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, para. 83.
367 Ibid., para. 84.
368 Emphasis added. Ibid.
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the scope of that Article 13 is not restricted to Turkish migrants who are in paid
employment”.369
The Court repeated its conclusion regarding the personal scope of Article 13
in Abatay to the effect that it “is not intended to protect Turkish nationals
already integrated into a Member State’s labour force”.370 It clarified further
that it “is intended to apply precisely to Turkish nationals who do not yet qualify
for the rights in relation to employment and, accordingly, residence under Article
6(1) of Decision 1/80”.371 Hence, the fact that Mr. Sahin, who entered the
Netherlands legally to be able to live with his Dutch wife, and did not satisfy
the requirements under Article 6, did not mean he could not rely on Article 13.
It was established that he complied with all relevant rules as to entry and
employment, from 12 September 2000 until 2 October 2002, when the validity
of his residence permit expired. He applied for the extension of his permit
on 23 April 2003, but his application was refused on the ground that he did
not pay the relevant administrative fee (EUR 169). Mr. Sahin contested the fee
and the refusal of extension after paying for the fee. As stated by the referring
court, his residence had to be deemed legal under domestic law after his
application for extension. Moreover, it was not disputed that he would have
obtained an extension had he paid the fee in time.372
Hence, the Court referred to its established case law according to which
residence permits have “only declaratory and probative value”.373 Even
though Member States are entitled to require from foreigners resident on their
territory to be in possession of such permits and apply for their extension in
time, and even if they are empowered to impose penalties for the breach of
such obligations, “nevertheless Member States are not entitled to adopt in that
regard measures which are disproportionate as compared with comparable
domestic cases”.374
As to the substantive scope of Article 13, the Court first repeated its mantra
that it “prohibits generally the introduction of any new measures having the
object or effect of making the exercise … of the freedom of movement for
workers subject to more restrictive conditions that those which applied at the
time when Decision 1/80 entered into force with regard to the Member State
concerned”.375 Then, with reference to its parallel mantra regarding Article
369 Emphasis added. Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 50.
370 See, Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, para. 83-84; Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 51.
371 Emphasis added. Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 51.
372 Ibid., para. 55-58.
373 Ibid., para. 59.
374 Ibid.; see also the Court’s reference to Case C-329/97 Ergat, paras. 52, 55, 56, 61, and 62.
375 Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 63; the Court refers to Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, para. 66
and second indent of para. 117; and by analogy to Article 41(1) AP, Case C-228/06 Soysal,
para. 47.
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41(1) AP,376 it reminded its finding that it prohibits any new restrictions “in-
cluding those relating to the substantive and/or procedural conditions governing
the first admission to the territory of [the] Member State [concerned]”.377 Since
those two standstill clauses were of the same kind and pursued identical
objectives,378 the Court reasoned that the interpretation of Article 41(1) AP
regarding conditions of first entry into the territory of a Member State “must
be equally valid as regards the standstill obligation which is the basis of Article
13 in relation to freedom of movement for workers”.379
The Court repeated its latter finding even more explicitly in Commission
v. the Netherlands, which dealt with the same issue raised in Sahin, the compat-
ibility of the increase in the prices of administrative fees paid by Turkish
nationals for their residence permits with the existing standstill and non-
discrimination clauses in the Association Law. While the Court found the
increase in the fees disproportionate and hence incompatible with both types
of clauses, what is important for our purposes is that based on the same
reasoning just mentioned above in Sahin,380 the Court reached the following
conclusion:
‘It follows that Article 13 of Decision 1/80 precludes the introduction into Nether-
lands legislation, as from the date on which Decision 1/80 entered into force in
the Netherlands, of any new restrictions on the exercise of free movement of
workers, including those relating to the substantive and/or procedural conditions governing
the first admission to the territory of that Member State of Turkish nationals intending
to exercise that freedom.’381
As clear as the Court’s reasoning and finding was, Member States were not
convinced. A standstill clause on free movement of workers interpreted as
broadly as the standstill clause on freedom of establishment and freedom to
provide services could have important implications on the immigration policies
of Member States when considered in combination with the broadly formulated
376 The Court’s parallel mantra provides that Article 41(1) AP prohibits the introduction of
any new measures having the object or effect of making the exercise by a Turkish national
of freedom of establishment or freedom to provide services on the territory of a Member
State, subject to stricter conditions than those that applied at the time when the Additional
Protocol entered into force with regard to that State. See, Case C-37/98 Savas, para. 69; Case
C-317/01 Abatay and Others, para. 66; Case C-16/05 Tum and Dari, para. 49; Case C-228/06
Soysal, para. 47; Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 64.
377 Emphasis added. Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 64. See also, Case C-16/05 Tum and Dari, para.
69; Case C-228/06 Soysal, para. 49.
378 Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 65; the Court refers to Case C-37/98 Savas, para. 50; Case C-317/01
Abatay and Others, paras. 70-74.
379 Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 65.
380 See ibid., paras. 64-65; and Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands, paras. 47-48.
381 Emphasis added. Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands, para. 49.
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Articles 12 to 14 AA. Thus, the issue was bound to reach the Court again, and
it did in Demir.
– Demir: Partial tightening of the scope of Article 13 by allowing for justifications
Few years later in Demir, the Court was asked to rule on the same issue,
namely: firstly, on whether Article 13 covers rules of entry into the territory
of a Member States, and secondly on the meaning and relevance of the “legally
resident” requirement mentioned in Article 13, i.e. its personal scope. Even
though the Court confirms its previous finding that Article 13 should be
interpreted as covering the rules applicable to a substantive and/or formal
condition governing first admission of Turkish workers into a Member State,
its answer in Demir seems to be more elaborate and nuanced, providing for
the possibility of derogation on parallel justification grounds to those existing
under EU free movement law. As important as this latest judgment is, it is
difficult to interpret, as the Court’s answers to the second question is not only
difficult to reconcile with the first, but also with previous case law. In its
response to the second question, the Court seems to be taking a step back from
its previous findings on the personal scope of Article 13. However, since the
national Court did the most logical thing to do, i.e. it ignored the answer given
to the second question,382 the focus in this section is on the first question as
it has important implications for the immigration policies of Member States,
which failed to respect the standstill clause.
To begin with the facts of the case, Mr Demir obtained a residence permit
in 1993 to reside with his Dutch wife. His residence permit also allowed him
to work without a work permit. The issue, giving rise to the current case, arose
after his divorce in 1995, when his application for a permit of continued
residence, as well as his subsequent appeals were all refused.383 After conclud-
ing an employment contract for three years with a Dutch undertaking in 2007,
for the first year of which he was also able to obtain a work permit, he applied
for an ordinary fixed-term residence permit in view of employment. However,
the latter application, which led to this preliminary reference, was refused
on the ground that that he did not have a valid temporary residence permit
issued for the same purpose as that of the application for a fixed-term residence
permit. Since the law imposing the ground on which Mr. Demir’s permit was
refused, had been introduced only in 2001, he challenged the refusal on the
ground that it violated the standstill clause embedded in Article 13 of Decision
1/80.
382 Raad van State, 2008054871/1/V3, judgment of 30 April 2014. For a detailed analysis of
the case, see (forthcoming) N. Tezcan, “The puzzle posed by Demir for the free movement
of Turkish workers: a step forward, a step back, or standstill?,“ in Degrees of Free Movement
and Citizenship, ed. D. Thym and M.H. Zoetewij Turhan (Martinus Nijhoff, 2015).
383 Case C-225/12 Demir, paras. 23-25.
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As to the national law that gave rise to the current case, on 1 December
1980, when the standstill clause entered into force, it was the Vreemdelingen-
wet 1965 (Law on Foreign Nationals, henceforth; Vw 1965) and the Vreemdelin-
genbesluit 1966 (Decree on Foreign Nationals, henceforth; Vb 1966) that gov-
erned the admission and residence of foreign nationals in the Netherlands.
Even though, the version in force on 1 December 1980, required foreign
nationals to have a valid passport and a valid temporary residence permit
if they wished to reside for more than three months in the Netherlands, lack
of such a permit on its own was not considered a sufficient ground for refusing
admission.
On 1 April 2001, the Law of 23 November 2000 comprehensively revising
the previous Law on Foreign Nationals (henceforth; Vw 2000) entered into
force, as well as a new decree adopted pursuant to that law (henceforth; Vb
2000). Under Article 1(h) of the Vw 2000, ‘temporary residence permit’ is
defined as “a visa for a stay of more than three months which is applied for
by the foreign national in person at a diplomatic mission or consulate of the
Netherlands in the country of origin and issued by that mission or consulate
after prior authorisation has been obtained from the Netherlands Minister for
Foreign Affairs”.384
Under Article 8(a), a foreign national is entitled to reside in the Netherlands
if he has a fixed-term residence permit. Under Article 8(f), a foreign national
that has applied for such a permit is entitled to stay in the Netherlands pend-
ing a decision on the application. However, under Article 16(1)(a) application
for such a permit may be refused if the applicant does not posses a valid
temporary residence permit issued for the same purpose as that for which
the fixed-term resident permit is sought. Lastly, under Article 3.71(1) of the
Vb 2000, an application for a fixed-term residence permit is to be refused if
the foreign national does not have a valid temporary residence permit.
It was impossible for Mr Demir to fulfil the requirements of the new law
after his divorce, as his initial purpose of entry and residence, which was to
live with his wife, had disappeared. In other words, while he entered and
resided legally in the Netherlands, by changing the conditions for obtaining
a fixed-term residence permit with the new law, which he was not able to
satisfy, his residence on Dutch territory became illegal. Hence, the first question
referred to the Court was whether the standstill clause covered rules, such
as those in Vw 2000, relating to substantive and/or procedural conditions on
first admission into the territory of a Member State, where those conditions
had the objective to prevent unlawful entry and residence.
After repeating its previous findings on the substantive scope of Article
13,385 the Court confirmed that the standstill clause was of no assistance to
those whose position was not lawful. Hence, the measures taken against
384 Opinion of AG Wahl in Case C-225/12 Demir, delivered on 11 July 2013, n.y.r., para. 12.
385 See Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 63; and Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands, para. 49.
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unlawful Turkish nationals could be made more stringent.386 However, the
Court added that while such measures might apply to the effects of such
unlawfulness, “they must not seek to define the unlawfulness itself”.387 It
further explained that:
‘[w]here a measure taken by a host Member State … seeks to define the criteria
for the lawfulness of the Turkish nationals’ situation, by adopting or amending
the substantive and/or procedural conditions relating to entry, residence and, where
applicable, employment, of those nationals in its territory, and where those con-
ditions constitute a new restriction of the exercise of the freedom of movement
of Turkish workers, within the meaning of the ‘standstill’ clause referred to in
Article 13, the mere fact that the purpose of the measure is to prevent, before an application
for a residence permit is made, unlawful entry and residence, does not preclude the applica-
tion of that clause.’388
Such a restrictive measure was prohibited according to the Court, unless it
could be justified on the grounds mentioned in Article 14 of Decisions 1/80,
i.e. public policy, public security or public health, or in so far as it was justified
by an overriding reason in the public interest, and fulfilled the conditions of
proportionality.389 The Court added that “the objective of preventing unlawful
entry and residence constituted an overriding reason in the public interest”,390
however, it concluded by repeating that the latter objective did not preclude
the application of the standstill clause where the measure taken defined the
criteria of lawfulness of the Turkish national’s situation.391
In short, Vw 2000 constituted a new restriction as it defined the criteria
based on which the lawfulness of Mr. Demir’s residence was determined. The
example of Mr. Demir is a clear illustration of how Member States can change
the status of individuals from legal to illegal, by changing how they define
legality in their laws. Therefore, even if the ‘legality requirement’ looks perfect-
ly logical and legitimate at first sight, a closer look reveals the pitfalls attached.
Thus, Turkish nationals whose status appears to be illegal should be able to
rely on the standstill clause, as it might be the new tighter rules that pushed
them to the status of illegality. As argued by Wiesbrock, after examining the
merits of the case under the relevant national law, if the status of individual
relying on the standstill clauses still does not change, or if there is an issue
386 See Case C-242/06 Sahin, para. 53; and Case C-317/01 Abatay and Others, para. 85.
387 Case C-225/12 Demir, para. 38.
388 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 39.
389 To be proportionate, a measure needs to be “suitable to achieve the legitimate objective
pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it”. See, ibid., para. 40.
390 Ibid., para. 41.
391 Ibid., para. 42.
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of abuse of rights, Member States are free to take any measures applicable
under their laws to illegal migrants.392
It is worth noting that Demir is the first case in which the Court introduces
the possibility to justify derogations to a standstill clause on the grounds of
overriding reasons in the public interest. This is the transplantation of the “rule
of reason” Association Law, which was foreseen by Göçmen.393 Given the
longevity of the “transitional period” within which the standstill clauses were
to apply, it may be argued that it proved inevitable for the Court to introduce
further legitimate grounds of derogation, (in addition to those existing under
Article 14), akin to those introduced to free movement law in the Court’s
seminal Cassis ruling.394 It will be interesting to see, whether this development
(the possibility to justify derogations to a standstill clause on the grounds of
overriding reasons in the public interest) will remain as something unique
to Ankara Association Law, or the Court will introduce the latter possibility
in other areas where EU law has made use of standstill clauses.
– Current state of affairs
The Court’s answer to the first question in Demir has serious implications for
the immigration policies of Member States. It should be noted that the standstill
regarding workers’ rights applies as of 20 December 1976.395 While one would
think that the standstill regarding the rights of their family members applies
as of 19 September 1980 (since they were explicitly added to the standstill of
Article 13 of Decision 1/80),396 the Court’s interpretation in Dogan suggests
that if the right to family reunification were considered to be the right of the
worker, without which he would be dissuaded from using that right,397 then,
arguably the reference date for the reunification of family members could still
be considered to be 20 December 1976.
Turkey signed bilateral recruitment agreements with many West European
countries in the 1960s.398 Even though it is known that most of them stopped
392 Case C-186/10 Oguz, [2011] ECR I-6957, para. 31-33. See also, Wiesbrock, “Political Reluctance
and Judicial Activism in the Area of Free Movement of Persons: The Court as the Motor
of EU-Turkey Relations?,“ 434.
393 İ. Göçmen, “To Visa, or Not to Visa: That is the (only) Question, or is it? Case C-228/06
Mehmet Soysal and Ibrahim Savatli v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2009] ECR I-1031,“
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 37, no. 2 (2010): 158-61.
394 See Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, [1979] ECR 649.
395 The date when Decision 2/76, and the standstill clause contained in its Article 7, were
adopted and were deemed to have entered into force.
396 The date of adoption of Decision 1/80.
397 Case C-138/13 Dogan, paras. 34-36.
398 Bilateral recruitment agreements were signed between Turkey and the Federal Republic
of Germany – 30 Sept. 1961 (extended on 30 Sept. 1964); Austria – 15 May 1964; Belgium
– 15 July 1964; The Netherlands – 19 Aug. 1964; France – 8 Apr. 1965; Sweden – 10 March
1967. See A. Y. Gökdere, Yabancı Ülkelere İşgücü Akımı ve Türk Ekonomisi Üzerine Etkileri
[The movement of workforce to foreign countries and its effects on the Turkish economy]
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the intake of Turkish workers after the first oil crisis of 1973, an investigation
is needed, similar to that conducted by the Commission in the aftermath of
Soysal case, to establish which of those agreements were still in force at the
time Decision 2/76 entered into force. Moreover, as a follow up to Dogan, the
rules on family reunification existing at the time need to be identified and
revised accordingly, if they had been made more restrictive over time.
Hence, Member States, which had no restrictive measure hindering the
access of Turkish workers and their family members to their national territory
or employment markets in 1976, or when they acceded to the Union, would
have to apply the liberal rules of the past. Once Turkish workers have access
to the market of a given Member State and are legally employed and resident,
they (and in some cases their family members as well) will be able to rely on
the system established by Article 6(1) of Decision 1/80 for their gradual
integration into the labour force of the host Member State. In the meantime,
both workers and their family members would be able to rely on the wide
prohibition of non-discrimination under Article 10(1) of Decision 1/80, and
the standstill clause to fight any “new” obstacles making the exercise of their
rights more difficult.
Demir shows how the standstill clause in combination with the liberal
immigration rules Member States had few decades ago, might in practice
amount to a market access right for Turkish workers regarding some of the
Member States’ territories. Obviously, it would be untenable for the nationals
of a Member State as citizens of the Union, to be subject to a free movement
regime that could in certain instances be more restrictive than the free move-
ment regime of an associate country. For the purposes of our analysis, Demir
demonstrates the possibility of how step by step prohibited restrictions could
be identified and eventually removed, gradually leading to a more liberal
regime on free movement. The rights and freedoms accumulated as a result
of the Court’s case law could undoubtedly be regarded as acquired rights,
a minimum, and such compel Member States to go beyond that minimum
during accession negotiations.
b) Freedom of establishment
As mentioned above, the Association Council did not prepare any schedule
neither did it take any decisions for the implementation of freedom of estab-
lishment and the freedom to provide services. Thus, the legal framework
regarding these freedoms is comprised of the generally formulated Articles
13 and 14 AA, the standstill clause contained in Article 41(1) AP, and the Court’s
case law interpreting these provisions.
(Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1978). 275 cited in; N. Abadan-Unat, Bitmeyen Göç:
Konuk İşçilikten Ulus-ötesi Yurttaşlığa [The unending migration: From being a guest-worker
to trans-national citizenship], 2 ed. (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006). 58.
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The most important cases regarding the freedom of establishment with
implications on the free movement of persons between Turkey and the Member
States of the EU are the Tum and Dari and the Dogan cases. While the former
case concerns whether the right to first admission of Turkish nationals seeking
to exercise the economic freedom falls within the scope of Article 41 (1) AP,
the latter case concerns whether they have the right to be joined by their family
members and whether that right also falls under the scope of the standstill
clause.
– Tum and Dari: The right to first admission for the self-employed
Tum and Dari was not the first case in which the Court was asked to interpret
Article 41(1) AP,399 but it was the first case in which the Court was explicitly
asked to rule on whether rules of entry (first admission) into a Member State
fall within its scope. Put more precisely, the question referred was whether
the conditions of and procedure for entry of Turkish nationals seeking to
establish themselves in business in a Member State fell within the scope Article
41(1) AP.
The applicants in the case were two Turkish nationals who sought ad-
mission on the basis of the Ankara Agreement and more specifically Article
41(1) AP, and requested that their applications be considered with reference
to the 1973 Immigration Rules rather than the more restrictive rules of 1994,
which were in force at the time.400 Their applications were, however, considered
under the latter immigration rules, which were much more difficult to fulfil.
They were not granted leave to enter the UK, upon which they made claims
for judicial review. The reviewing court found in their favour, and the Court
of Appeal also upheld that decision.401 The Secretary of State appealed those
decisions to the House of Lords, which referred the matter to the Court of
Justice for a preliminary ruling.
The Court ruled that Article 41(1) AP did not confer on Turkish nationals
a right of entry into the territory of a Member State, since no such right could
be derived from Community law. That right was still governed by national
law. However, the Court explained that Article 41(1) was supposed to operate
as a quasi-procedural rule which stipulated, ratione temporis, to which pro-
visions of a Member State’s legislation one had to refer to for assessing the
399 The first case on Article 41(1) was Case C-37/98 Savas. For a detailed analysis, see Ott, “The
Savas Case – Anologies between Turkish Self-Employed and Workers?.“
400 Mr Tum and Dari were granted temporary admission to the UK pending their asylum
applications. Their applications were eventually refused. However, in the meantime both
of the applicants had established their businesses and they applied to the immigration
authorities for leave to enter the UK so that they could continue operating their businesses.
They based their applications on the Ankara Agreement and Article 41(1) AP.
401 For details see, Case C-16/05 Tum and Dari, para. 32.
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position of a Turkish national who wished to exercise freedom of establishment
in a Member State.402
The Court examined the wording and the aim of Article 41(1) AP, and found
there was nothing to limit its sphere of application. It was clear that the
intention was to create conditions conducive to the progressive establishment
of freedom of establishment by way of an absolute prohibition on Member
States against introducing any new obstacles to the exercise of that freedom.
Thus, the Court concluded that the standstill clause had to be regarded as
applicable to rules relating to the first admission of Turkish nationals into a
Member State in the territory of which they intend to exercise their freedom
of establishment.403
In other words, even if in principle the first entry of Turkish nationals to
a territory of a Member State is governed by the national law of that State,
Member States do not have complete freedom in applying their immigration
rules to Turkish nationals intending to establish a business or provide a service.
Each Member State needs to determine for itself whether its current immigra-
tion rules are more onerous or restrictive compared to the rules that were
applicable when the Additional Protocol entered into force with respect to
that Member State. If its current rules are more onerous, it is under an obliga-
tion to apply the less restrictive rules.
The Court’s judgment in Tum and Dari is particularly important. It had
implications not only for the individual national immigration policies and
measures of Member States, but also for measures introduced at Community
level that might be considered to constitute new obstacles or new restrictions
for Turkish nationals wishing to exercise their freedom of establishment or
freedom to provide services in a Member State. In this respect, the logical
question was whether Council Regulation No. 539/2001,404 which lists Turkey
as one of the countries whose nationals need to obtain a visa when crossing
the EU’s external borders, was one of these ‘new restrictions’, which were
prohibited by Article 41(1) AP. Since the Schengen acquis in general and this
Regulation in particular were introduced after 1 January 1973, when the
Additional Protocol entered into force vis-à-vis the EEC, it seemed like these
measures would also fall under the prohibition of the standstill clause. The
Soysal judgment, which is dealt under the following sub-section, provided some
clarity.
402 Ibid., para. 55.
403 Ibid., paras. 60-63.
404 Council Regulation No. 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose
nationals are exempt from that requirement, OJ L 81/1, 21.03.2001.
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– Dogan: The right of the self-employed to be accompanied by their family members
Dogan is another recent case with important implications for free movement
of persons between Turkey and the EU as it established that economically active
people, such as workers and the self-employed, have the right to be joined
by their family members, if that had been the case when the respective instru-
ments containing the standstill clauses entered into force regarding certain
Member States. In other words, it established that rules on family reunification
also fall under the scope of standstill clause, which puts all the Member States
under the obligation to freeze their most favourable conditions regarding
family reunification in the period after the entry into force of those clauses.
Any rules that have been tightened could be qualified as a “new restriction”
by the Court, unless objectively justified and proportionate.
As to the facts of the case Mr. Dogan was the managing director of a
limited liability company of which he was also the majority shareholder. He
lived in Germany since 1998 and had a residence permit of unlimited duration
since 2002. In 2011, his wife Mrs. Dogan applied to the German embassy in
Ankara for a family reunification visa for herself and two of their children
(they had four). In addition to other documents required, she submitted a
language certificate issued by the Goethe Institute verifying she had passed
a level A1 test with a ‘satisfactory’ grade (62 points out of 100). Her application
was dismissed on the ground that she was illiterate and had obtained the grade
by randomly answering multiple choice questions and learning three standard
sentences by heart for the writing part of the test. After her application for
reconsideration was also refused, Mrs. Dogan brought an action before Ver-
waltungsgericht Berlin arguing that the language requirement infringed the
prohibition to introduce new restrictions under Article 41(1) AP. The national
court referred the issue to the ECJ inquiring whether the requirement for family
members to prove a basic level of German language proficiency prior to their
entry into Germany fell within the scope of the standstill clause.
The Court started its analysis by establishing firstly, that the language
requirement, which was introduced after the AP entered into force (1 January
1973), had tightened the conditions for family reunification; secondly, that Mr.
Dogan was earning his income from a self-employed activity; and lastly, that
his situation fell within the scope of the freedom of establishment. Hence, Mr
Dogan’s situation had to be analysed in the light of Article 41(1) AP. Then,
the Court referred to a previous ruling, in which it had established that family
reunification was essential to enable Turkish workers to lead a family life,
which would contribute “both to improving the quality of their stay and to
their integration in [the host] Member States”.405 Hence, reminding one of
its rulings concerning the family rights of Union citizens, it provided that: “The
decision of a Turkish national to establish himself in a Member State in order
405 Case C-138/13 Dogan, para. 34; the Court refers to Case C-451/11 Dülger, judgment of 19 July
2012, n.y.r., para. 42.
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to exercise there a stable economic activity could be negatively affected where
the legislation of that Member State makes family reunification difficult or
impossible, so that that national could, as the case may be, find himself obliged
to choose between his activity in the Member State concerned and his family
life in Turkey”.406
Accordingly, the Court ruled that the language requirement concerned
constituted a ‘new restriction’ under Article 41(1) AP. Following its reasoning
in Demir, the Court added that such a restriction is prohibited, unless justified
by an overriding reason in the public interest, which is also proportionate,
i.e. suitable to achieve the objective pursued and not going beyond what is
necessary to attain it.407 The Court established further that the prevention of
forced marriages and the promotion of integration, the derogation grounds
on which Germany relied, could constitute overriding reasons in the public
interest. However, added the Court, the disputed language requirement went
beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives in so far as the absence
of proof to that effect automatically led to the dismissal of the application for
family unification. The Court noted that in their evaluation, the authorities
had to take into account the specific circumstances of each case. Hence, Article
41(1) AP precluded the disputed measure.408
Dogan is significant, not only for confirming the application of the rule
of reason to the Ankara acquis, but also for overturning the Court’s finding
in Demirel, which seemed to require the Association Council to adopt a specific
decision to materialize family reunification.409 Hence, what the Court estab-
lished for self-employed under Article 41(1) AP, with reference to case law
in the area of free movement of workers,410 should also be valid for workers
themselves under Articles 7 and 13 of Decisions 2/76 and 1/80 respectively.
This means that Member States which introduced new restriction in the area
of family reunification after the entry into force of Decision 2/76 (20 December
1976) and the Additional Protocol (1 January 1973) will have to remove those
restrictions, unless they are able to meet the objective justification and
proportionality requirements laid down by the Court.
406 Case C-138/13 Dogan, para. 35.
407 Ibid., para. 37; with reference to Case C-225/12 Demir, para. 40.
408 Case C-138/13 Dogan, paras. 38-39.
409 The entire paragraph reads as follows: “The only decision which the Council of Association
adopted on the matter was Decision No 1/80 of 19 September 1980, with regard to Turkish
workers which are already duly integrated in the labour force of a Member State, prohibits
any further restrictions on the conditions governing access to employment. In the sphere
of family reunification, on the other hand, no decision of that kind was adopted”. See, Case
12/86 Demirel, para. 22.
410 See Case C-138/13 Dogan, para. 34.
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– Current state of affairs
The UK took steps to implement Tum and Dari and created a new procedure
whereby Turkish citizens who wish to establish themselves in business in the
UK are granted entry clearance in line with the judgment. Applications are
considered under the business provisions that were in place in 1973.411 How-
ever, applicants who have participated in fraud in relation to their applications
will not be accepted. Fraudulent activity has been defined broadly. Having
made an asylum claim that has been discredited, for instance, is considered
as a fraudulent conduct. This means that were Mr Tum and Mr Dari to apply
under the current procedure, their applications would not have succeeded.412
As to the rules of other Member States regarding freedom of establishment,
the Commission did not take any steps for the implementation of this judg-
ment. There has been no action regarding Dogan either, as it is quite recent.
In short, the rules on free movement of workers, freedom of establishment
as well as the rules on family reunification in force in the Member States when
Decision 2/76 and the Additional Protocol entered into force (the first nine
Member States), or when the Member States acceded to the Union and took
on the acquis (Member States that joined in and after the 1980s), is still to be
established. Dogan is an additional step towards achieving free movement and
contributing to the body of case law capable of constituting a constraint on
Member States when negotiating Turkey’s accession.
c) Freedom to provide services
Even though there are not many provisions that apply to this freedom, only
Article 14 AA and Article 41(1) AA, this freedom is more complicated, than
the freedom of establishment to which similar provisions apply, due to the
Court’s case law in this area. As is explained in more detail below, the Court
ruled that the freedom to provide services could not be interpreted in line with
the corresponding rules existing in EU law. To be more precise, this freedom
can be interpreted in line with EU law only in so far as it covers the freedom
to provide services. It does not cover the freedom to receive services, which
according to the Court is too closely intertwined with the concept of Union
citizenship and as such cannot be transposed to the Association Law with
Turkey.
This part will analyse the case law of the Court starting with the Soysal
judgment, which was delivered immediately after Tum and Dari. The issue
referred to the Court in Soysal was whether the visa requirement introduced
by a Member State after the entry into force of the Additional Protocol consti-
411 For details, see the the website of the UK’s Border Agency: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.
gov.uk/visas-immigration/working/turkish/business/.
412 N. Tezcan/Idriz and P. J. Slot, “Free movement of persons between Turkey and the EU:
The Hidden potential of Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol,“ in CLEER Working Papers
2010/2 (The Hague: TMC Asser Institute, 2010), 15-16.
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tuted ‘a new restriction’ to the freedom to provide services that fell within
the scope of Article 41(1) AP. After the Court’s affirmative reply, the issue in
the following case (Demirkan) was whether the freedom to provide services
under the Ankara acquis also covered the freedom to receive services, and if
so, whether visa requirements introduced after the entry into force of the
Additional Protocol vis-à-vis Turkish recipients of services could also be con-
sidered as new restrictions. Hence, what follows is an analysis of Soysal and
Demirkan, as well as the measures taken to bring national and EU law in line
with those judgments with the aim to establish the currently applicable free
movement rules between Turkey and the Member States concerning this
freedom.
– Soysal: Establishing visa requirement is ‘a new restriction’ under Article 41(1) AP
The main question referred to the Court in Soysal was whether the introduction
of a visa requirement constituted a new restriction on freedom to provide
services under Article 41(1) AP. Mr. Soysal and Mr. Savatli, the appellants in
this case, were Turkish nationals who worked in international transport for
a Turkish undertaking as drivers of lorries owned by a German company
registered in Germany. They had to obtain Schengen visas to enter Ger-
many413 even though on the date on which the Additional Protocol entered
into force they were permitted to enter the Federal Republic without a visa.
The issue arose when Germany’s consulate-general in Istanbul rejected their
visa applications.
Firstly, the Court verified that, as claimed by the appellants, when the
Additional Protocol entered into force with regard to Germany, namely 1
January 1973, Turkish nationals engaged in the provision of services had the
right to enter German territory without having to obtain a visa. That require-
ment was only introduced as from 1 July 1980 with the German legislation
on aliens. That legislation was later replaced by the Aufenthaltsgesetz, which
implements Regulation No 539/2001 at the Member State level.
The Court ruled that national legislation that makes the exercise of the
right to freedom to provide services conditional on issuing of a visa was “liable
to interfere with the actual exercise of that freedom, in particular because of
the additional and recurrent administrative and financial burdens involved in
obtaining such a permit which is valid for a limited time”.414 Moreover, the
denial of a visa, as in the main proceedings, entirely prevented the exercise
of that freedom. Thus, the legislation at issue in the main proceedings consti-
413 That requirement arose under paragraphs 4(1) and 6 of the Aufenthaltsgesetz (German
Law on Residence) of 30 July 2004 and Article 1(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001,
note 404 above . The regulation has been amended several times.
414 Emphasis added. Case C-228/06 Soysal, para. 55.
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tuted a “new restriction” of the right of Turkish nationals resident in Turkey
to freely provide services in Germany within the meaning of Article 41(1) AP.415
The Court added that its finding could not be called into question by the
fact that the German legislation in force at the time merely implemented a
provision of secondary Community legislation (Regulation No 539/2001). In
that respect, the Court referred to an earlier judgment416 in which it had already
ruled that international agreements concluded by the Community have primacy
over provisions of secondary Community legislation, which in practice means
that the provisions of the latter must be interpreted, so far as is possible, in
a manner consistent with the former.417 The Court provided no guidance as
to what should happen when it is not possible to interpret the piece of second-
ary law concerned in line with the provision of the international agreement.
The primacy of international agreements would imply an obligation on the
part of the EU to adjust the secondary legislation so as to make it compatible
with its international obligations.418
After the Court declared that the procedure and conditions of first ad-
mission fall within the scope of Article 41(1) AP in Tum and Dari, it was much
easier and straightforward for the Court to take the second step and pronounce
that a visa requirement introduced after the entry of the Additional Protocol
constituted “a new restriction” prohibited by Article 41(1) AP. Whether there
would be a third step or not, was to be decided in Demirkan. Even though
the Court expressly stated that Article 41(1) AP referred “in a general way, to
new restrictions inter alia ‘on the freedom of establishment’ and that it does not
limit its sphere of application by excluding, as does Article 13 of Decision No
1/80, certain specific aspects from the sphere of protection afforded on the
basis of the first of those two provisions”,419 neither the Member States nor
the Commission were willing to draw conclusions from existing case law. As
it is shown below, the Court proved them right in their reluctance to take any
steps.
– Demirkan: Emerging limits of Association Law?
In terms of its repercussions for free movement of Turkish nationals between
Turkey and the Member States of the EU, Demirkan was the most promising
judgment in terms of its potential to lift obstacles regarding free movement
415 Ibid., paras. 55-57.
416 Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany, [1996] ECR I-3989, para. 52.
417 Case C-228/06 Soysal, paras. 58-59.
418 Tezcan/Idriz, “Free Movement of Persons Between Turkey and the EU: To Move or Not
to Move? The response of the judiciary,“ p. 1629-30.
419 Case C-16/05 Tum and Dari, para. 60.
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of persons,420 since none of the Member States of the EEC on 1 January 1973
required a visa from Turkish visitors and tourists. The first and most important
question raised in the case was whether the scope of the freedom to provide
services in Article 41(1) AP encompassed also the passive freedom to provide
services.421 In other words the referring court sought to ascertain whether or
not freedom to provide services under Article 41(1) AP had to be interpreted
in line with EU law to cover also service recipients. If so, the second question
asked whether Article 41(1) AP could be extended to Turkish nationals, like
the applicant, Ms. Leyla Ecem Demirkan, who planned to enter Germany not
to receive a specific service, but to visit relatives relying on the possibility of
receiving services.
The applicant, Ms. Demirkan was fourteen years old and lived with her
mother in Turkey, while her stepfather lived in Germany. In 2007, she and
her mother applied for a visa to visit her stepfather. Both applications were
refused, upon which they appealed. During the appeal process, Ms. Demirkan’s
mother was issued a visa on the basis of family reunification. However, Ms.
Demirkan’s claim to a visa free entry, or in the alternative to a visitor’s visa,
was refused by a judgment of 26 October 2009. The judge found that the
standstill clause did not apply to the applicant, even when she invoked receiv-
ing services, since that was not the primary aim of her visit but just an in-
cidental result.
As to the legal regime of free movement of persons applicable between
Germany and Turkey, when the visa requirement for visitors and tourists was
introduced (1980), they were both parties to the European Agreement on
Regulations Governing the Movement of Persons between the Member States
of the Council of Europe since 1958 and 1961 respectively. The Agreement
provided for visa free visits of up to three months for the nationals of other
parties to the agreement holding one of the documents listed in its Appendix.
Article 7 of the Agreement allowed the temporary suspension of the Agreement
on grounds relating to ordre public, security or public health. Such a measure
had to be notified to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Relying
on Article 7, Germany introduced a general visa requirement for Turkish
nationals as from 5 October 1980.422
420 For an in-depth analysis of the case, see V. Hatzopoulos, “Turkish service recipients under
the EU-Turkey Association Agreement: Demirkan,“ Common Market Law Review 51, no. 2
(2014): 647-64; and T. Vandamme, “’Le temps détruit tout’? Het dienstverkeer binnen EU-
Turkije Associatie na de uitspraak van het Hof van Justitie in Demirkan,“ Nederlands
Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 20, no. 2/3 (2014): 61-67.
421 Case C-221/11 Demirkan.
422 See the Declaration contained in a Note Verbale of the Permanent Representation of
Germany, dated 9 July 1980, and registered at the Secretariat General on 10 July 1980.
Available online at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=
025&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG&VL=1 See also the relevant national law: The Elfte Verordnung
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Previously, Turkish nationals were required to obtain a visa prior to their
entry to Germany only if they wanted to work there. There was no visa
requirement for tourists or visitors. In addition to German law, the obligation
to obtain a visa for Turkish nationals for stays not exceeding three months
also flew from Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006,423 which referred
to Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing third countries whose nationals had
be in possession of visas when crossing external borders in its Annex I.424
Turkey was listed in Annex I.
In its answer to the fist question the Court firstly explained that the free-
dom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU, conferred on Member State
nationals, who were also Union citizens, the “‘passive’ freedom to provide
services, namely the freedom for recipients of services to go to another Member
State in order to receive a service there, without being hindered by restric-
tions”.425 The Court emphasized that Article 56 TFEU “covers all European
Union citizens who, independently of other freedoms guaranteed by the FEU
Treaty, visit another Member State where they intend or are likely to receive
services”.426 According to its established case law, (the Court refers to Luisi
and Carbone), tourists, people receiving medical treatment and those travelling
for educational purposes or business are to be regarded as recipients of ser-
vices.427 While the Court’s emphasis here seems to be on the fact that it is the
Union citizens, who are entitled to visit another Member State with the intention
to receive services, its established case law dating back to the 1980s, that is
prior to the introduction of the concept of Union citizenship, reveals that
individuals were entitled to this right (to receive services) under Article 56
TFEU as nationals of Member States of the EEC/EC.
After citing its previous findings on Article 41(1) AP,428 the Court acknowl-
edged that under established case law “the principles enshrined in the pro-
visions of the Treaty relating to freedom to provide services must be extended,
so far as possible, to Turkish nationals to eliminate restrictions on the freedom
to provide services between the Contracting Parties”.429 For a second time
zur Änderung der Verordnung zur Durchführung des Ausländergesetzes (Eleventh regula-
tion amending the DVAuslG), BGBl. I, p. 782.
423 Council Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of
persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 105/1, 13.4.2006.
424 For details, see note 404 above.
425 Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 35. The Court refers to Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone,
[1984] ECR 377, para. 16; Case 186/87 Cowan, [1989] ECR 195, para. 15; Case C-274/96 Bickel
and Franz, [1998] ECR I-7637, para. 15; Case C-348/96 Donatella Calfa, [1999] ECR I-11, para.
16; N. Foster, EU Law: Directions, 2 ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2010). para. 37.
426 Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 36.
427 Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone, para. 16.
428 See Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 37-42.
429 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 43. To that effect, the Court refers to Case C-317/01 Abatay
and Others, para. 112 and the case law cited therein.
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in the history of the Ankara Association Law,430 the Court refers to the principle
established in Polydor,431 in which it ruled that the interpretation given to
provisions of EU law relating to the internal market could not be automatically
extended by analogy to the interpretation of an agreement concluded by a
non-Member State unless there were explicit provisions to that effect in the
agreement itself.432
According to the Court, the fact that the freedom to provide services
embedded in Article 14 AA was “to be guided by” the corresponding Treaty
provisions indicated that the latter provisions were to be considered merely
as a source of guidance. There was no obligation to apply the provisions of
the Treaty.433 The Court added that the possibility to extend the interpretation
of Treaty provision to a comparable, similar or identically worded provisions
of an agreement concluded by a third State depended, inter alia, on the object-
ives pursued by each provision in its specific context. Hence, a comparison
between the aims and contexts of the Ankara Agreement and those of the
Treaty was needed.434
The Court argued that there were fundamental differences between the
aims and context of Article 41(1) AP and Article 56 TFEU. To begin with compar-
ing the aims of the agreements, regarding the Ankara Agreement, the Court
cited its only former case, the Ziebell case, in which it established that the
agreement “pursues a solely economic purpose”.435 In all other previous cases
in which the Court had to identify the objective of the Ankara Agreement,
it had consistently held that its objective was Turkey’s accession to the Union.
Mostly, those references were part of the “Legal context” under which “The
EEC-Turkey Association” was described,436 and sometimes part of the reason-
ing of the relevant judgment.437
Ironically, the reference to the ultimate objective of the Ankara Agreement,
i.e. “facilitating the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date” is
present in the description of the legal context of the association in both Ziebell
430 The first time was in Case C-371/08 Ziebell, para. 61.
431 Case 270/80 Polydor, [1982] ECR 329.
432 Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 44. The Court refers to Case 270/80 Polydor, paras. 14-16; Case
C-351/08 Grimme, [2009] ECR I-10777, para. 29; and Case C-70/09 Hengartner and Gasser, [2010]
ECR I-7233, para. 42.
433 Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 45.
434 Ibid., para. 47. The Court further refers to Case C-312/91 Metalsa, [1993] ECR I-3751, para.
11; Case C-63/99 G³oszczuk, para. 49; and Case C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, para. 33.
435 Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 50. The Court referes to Case C-371/08 Ziebell, para. 64.
436 Case C-37/98 Savas, para. 3; Case C-171/01 Wählergruppe Gemeinsam, para. 3; Case C-317/01
Abatay and Others, para. 3; Case C-136/03 Dörr and Ünal, para. 7; Case C-16/05 Tum and Dari,
para. 3; Case C-325/05 Derin, para. 3; Case C-228/06 Soysal, para. 3; Case C-242/06 Sahin, para.
3; Case C-371/08 Ziebell, para. 3; Joined Cases C-300/09 and C-301/09 Toprak and Oguz, para.
3; Case C-451/11 Dülger, para. 3; Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 4.
437 Case C-262/96 Sürül, para. 70; Case C-37/98 Savas, para. 52. See also, Case C-416/96 El-Yassini
[1999] ECR I-1209, para. 49.
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and Demirkan.438 That reference is in stark contrast to the Court’s conclusion
that “the EEC-Turkey Association pursues solely a purely economic objective”.439
One cannot help but remind judges not to take the existing legal framework
for granted and refresh their memories once in a while, which is admittedly
not very appealing given how tedious and repetitive the latter framework has
been for the last four-five decades.
According to the Court, the fact that the aim of the Association Agreement
is purely economic was reflected not only in the wording of the agreement
but also in the titles of its various Chapters,440 which the Court failed to men-
tion, reflect entirely the titles and structure of the EEC Treaty. As explained
above, the structure and content of the Athens and Ankara Agreements fol-
lowed that of the EEC Treaty and were indeed purely economic, and so was
the European Economic Community. The aim at the time was accession to the
EEC. However, as will be discussed in the next Chapter, it was obvious that
States wishing to join the Community/Union had to accept the latter as an
evolving entity and had to adopt the entire acquis communautaire as it stood
at the time of their accession. Hence, when the Community became the Union,
the objective of accession to an economic Community was replaced with that
of accession to a complex Union with many dimensions going beyond eco-
nomy. This was verified at the 1999 Helsinki European Summit, in which
Turkey’s status as a candidate for membership to the Union was officially
confirmed.441
The Court went on to explain that “[t]he development of economic freed-
oms for the purpose of bringing about freedom of movement of a general
nature which may be compared to that afforded to European Union citizens
under Article 21 is not the object of the Association”.442 The Court em-
phasized that there was no general principle of freedom of movement of
persons between Turkey and the Union, but as explained above, that is simply
because there was no such objective in the original EEC Treaty itself. Only
economically active individuals were entitled to free movement initially, i.e.
workers, self-employed, service providers and service recipients. As is briefly
explained in Chapter 6, the right to free movement of persons with sufficient
financial means emerged only in the 1990s.
The Court concluded that Article 41(1) AP could be invoked “only where
the activity in question is the corollary of the exercise of an economic activity that
the ‘standstill’ clause may relate to conditions of entry and residence of Turkish
438 Emphasis added. Case C-371/08 Ziebell, para. 3; Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 4.
439 Emphasis added. Case C-371/08 Ziebell, para. 72.
440 See Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 51.
441 See the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999,
para. 12, in which it was established that “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the
Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States”. Available
online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm
442 Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 53.
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nationals within the territory of the Member States”,443 implying that receiv-
ing services does not qualify as such. The Court contradicts itself immediately
in the following paragraph, which explains the role of the passive freedom
to provide services in establishing the internal market, which was the crux
of the EEC project, as well as of the project to integrate Turkey gradually into
that market by means of the association. To provide the Court’s reasoning
in full with the aim to avoid any misunderstanding, it read as follows:
‘By contrast, under European Union law, protection of passive freedom to provide
services is based on the objective of establishing an internal market, conceived as an
area without internal borders, by removing all obstacles to the establishment of
such a market. It is precisely that objective which distinguishes the Treaty from
the Association Agreement, which pursues an essentially economic purpose, as
stated at paragraph 50 above.’444
The Court seems to be attaching a meaning to the internal market that goes
beyond being merely economic.445 And since it had established that the Ankara
Agreement was merely economic, the objectives of those had to be different.
As illustrated above, the Court’s reasoning is at times contradictory and
difficult to follow. It tries to justify it with unconventional and novel argu-
ments, such the importance of “the temporal context” of provisions.446 In
principle, the Court’s interpretation of a particular provision is retroactive,
which means, it is considered to have always meant so, unless exceptionally
the Court explicitly limits the temporal effect of a judgment due to previously
unforeseen drastic economic consequences.447
Hence, the Court’s argument that there was nothing to indicate that the
Contracting Parties intended to include service recipients into the scope of
the freedom to provide services, since Luisi and Carbone was delivered only
in 1984, i.e. after the entry into force of the Additional Protocol in 1973,448 is
unconvincing.449 The Court blatantly ignored the fact that there was secondary
443 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 55.
444 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 56.
445 Hatzopolous successfully summarizes the Court’s reasoning in one of the titles of his case
note as the “regressive interpretation of the Ankara Agreement” and “idealistic projection
of the EU Treaty”. The author agrees with his opinion that “it is difficult to see the differ-
ence between “an internal market” on the one hand and “an agreement which pursues
an essentially economic purpose” on the other”. See, Hatzopoulos, “Turkish service re-
cipients under the EU-Turkey Association Agreement: Demirkan,“ 657.
446 Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 57.
447 See Case 43/75 Defrenne II, [1976] ECR 455; Case C-262/88 Barber, [1990] ECR I-1889. See also,
Foster, EU Law: Directions: 162.
448 Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 59-60.
449 With that type of logic one could argue against the extension of almost any principle or
legal doctrine of EU law to the Ankara Agreement, since the latter was signed the year
Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62, [1963] ECR 1) was delivered. Then, one could even argue
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law in place defining clearly the scope of the freedom to provide services
dating back to 1964.450 In other words, the Court did not come up with the
interpretation of the concept of services in Luisi and Carbone, as it seems to
suggest, but simply applied the definition of the concept, as it existed under
secondary law.451
At the end, the Court ruled that “because of differences of both purpose
and context between the Treaties on the one hand, and the Association Agree-
ment and its Additional Protocol on the other, the Court’s interpretation of
Article 59 of the EEC Treaty in Luisi and Carbone cannot be extended to the
‘standstill’ clause in Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol”.452 One cannot
help but agree with Hatzopolous’ that the latter finding in Demirkan was
“[o]verall: Politically unavoidable yet legally embarrassing”.453
After Demirkan, it is now possible to identify a clearly delineated area
concerning the free movement of persons in the Association Law that will have
to be brought to the level of the Union acquis at the time of accession. While
there is some scope for the actual development of the other freedoms over
time depending on how liberal the rules on free movement were in the past
(when the relevant standstill clauses entered into force), free movement of
recipients of services seems to emerge as an area in which the Union rules
will have to be adopted in their entirety, in line with existing acquis and well-
established accession practice that are identified in the next Chapter.
– Implementation of Soysal and current state of affairs
Ziebell confirmed that it was possible to interpret concepts used under the
Ankara acquis in line with corresponding concepts of EU free movement (eco-
nomic) law; however, it established that the latter interpretation could not go
as far as encompassing rights and duties connected to the concept of “Union
against the extension of the principle of direct effect, as it was still controversial back in
1963.
450 Directive 64/220/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within
the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the
provision of services, OJ 845/64, 4.4.1964, p. 115, was quite clear, as its Article 1(1)(b)
stipulated explicitly that it applied to “nationals of Member States wishing to go to another
Member State as recipients of services”. Emphasis added. Moreover, Directive 64/221/EEC
on the coordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign
nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health,
OJ Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-1964, p. 117, in its Article 1(1) also provided that its provisions “shall
apply to any national of a Member State who resides in or travels to another Member State
of the Community, either in order to pursue an activity as an employed or self-employed
person, or as a recipient of services.” Emphasis added.
451 See the Court’s reference to the relevant Directives, Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone,
para. 12.
452 Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 62.
453 Hatzopoulos, “Turkish service recipients under the EU-Turkey Association Agreement:
Demirkan,“ 653.
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citizenship”.454 Demirkan established that interpreting some of the economic
provisions of the Ankara acquis in line with EU law, such as the provision of
the freedom to provide services, was not possible either. Although not
explained clearly by the Court, the underlying reason for the Court’s ruling
in Demirkan seems to be its view of the passive freedom to provide services
as the harbinger to the free movement right linked inextricably to the concept
of Union citizenship.455 What the Court seems to be saying is that receipt of
services as an economic activity is ‘not economic enough’ to justify its trans-
position to Association Law. Hatzopoulos argues that the Court’s interpretation
is legally untenable, as it “does not correspond to either EU and/or inter-
national legal practice or to economic theory”.456
Since service recipients fall outside the scope of Article 41(1) AP, Member
States are allowed to keep the new restrictions they introduced after the entry
into force of the Additional Protocol in this area. In other words, unlike after
Soysal, Member States do not have to take any steps for the implementation
of Demirkan. After Soysal, visa restrictions introduced both at EU and Member
State level after 1973, and for Member States joining the Union after their
accession dates, had to be eliminated. What follows is an analysis of how Soysal
was implemented, first at EU and then, at Member State levels, with a view
to showing the current picture regarding the free movement of service pro-
viders between Turkey and the EU.
To begin with Soysal’s implementation at EU level, the most important
measure was Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001, which listed Turkey as
one of the countries whose nationals had to obtain a visa when crossing EU’s
external borders. Since the Schengen acquis in general and this Regulation in
particular were introduced after 1 January 1973, when the Additional Protocol
entered into force vis-à-vis the EEC, these measures also fall under the pro-
hibition of the stand-still clause. The preliminary reference in Soysal confirmed
precisely that point.
The first step taken by the Commission as a follow up to Soysal was to
conduct an inquiry into the applicable laws of Member States concerning
service providers at the time the Additional Protocol entered into force regard-
ing their territories. The replies to the inquiry revealed that only four Member
States allowed visa-free access to their territories at the relevant time: Germany,
the UK, Denmark and Ireland. It should be noted that, for instance in Germany,
visa-free provision of services was possible only with respect to certain services.
Whether there were such restrictions on the types of services that could be
454 Case C-371/08 Ziebell. See, Hamenstädt, “The Protection of Turkish Citizens Against Expul-
sion – This Far and No Further? The Impact of the Ziebell Case.“
455 See the Court’s reasoning in Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 53. For the inconsistency compare
with the Court’s reasoning in para. 56.
456 Hatzopoulos, “Turkish service recipients under the EU-Turkey Association Agreement:
Demirkan,“ 663.
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provided on the territories of the UK and Ireland is not known. Since the UK
and Ireland are not part of the Schengen area, they were also not included
in the Commission’s follow up documents issued to clarify the implementation
of Soysal. Obviously, the fact that they are not part of Schengen does not
absolve the UK or Ireland from taking the necessary measures to bring their
current immigration rules regarding Turkish service providers in line with
their rules applicable on 1 January 1973.
The first document adopted by the Commission was its Recommendation
on amending the “Practical Handbook for Border Guards (Schengen Hand-
book)” adopted at the end of 2009.457 In the Annex to the Commission Re-
commendation one finds the “Guidelines on the Movement of Turkish
Nationals Crossing the External Borders of EU Member States in order to
Provide Services Within the EU” (the Guidelines). According to the Guidelines
entry without a visa for service providers is possible only to Germany and
Denmark.458 Three years later, the Commission had to add the Netherlands
next to Germany and Denmark in its new Recommendation on amending the
“Schengen Handbook”,459 as a result of a judgment of the Raad van State
(highest general administrative court) of the Netherlands.460 Raad van State
established that the Netherlands did not require visa for service providers of
Turkish nationality when the Additional Protocol entered into force. In their
study, Groenendijk and Guild found out that just like the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, France and Italy, also did not have visa requirement in place regarding
for Turkish service providers on 1 January 1973.461 Given how sensitive immi-
gration issues are in most of the Member States, recourse to findings of
academics or independent experts would have been more reliable.
The case of the Netherlands is a good example of ‘internalization’ of rules
and case law of Court by the judiciary, which acted as constraint in this
context. As far as Belgium, France and Italy are concerned, they are in no way
constrained by theirs. It would be interesting to know whether the complete
457 Commission Recommendation of 29.9.2009, C(2009) 7376 final, on amending the Recom-
mendation establishing a common “Practical Handbook for Border Guards (Schengen
Handbook)” to be used by Member States’ competent authorities when carrying out the
border control of persons, C(2006) 5186 final.
458 For a more detailed account of the Guidelines see, N. Tezcan/Idriz and P. J. Slot, “Free
movement of persons between Turkey and the EU: The hidden potential of Article 41(1)
of the Additional Protocol,“ in EU and Turkey: Bridging the differences in a complex relationship,
ed. H. Kabaalioglu, A. Ott, and A. Tatham (Istanbul: IKV, 2011), 82-86.
459 Commission Recommendation of 14.12.2012, C(2012) 9330 final, amending the Recommenda-
tion establishing a common “Practical Handbook for Border Guards (Schengen Handbook)”
to be used by Member States’ competent authorities when carrying out the border control
of persons (C(2006) 5186 final).
460 Raad van State, 201T02803/1/V3, judgment of 14 March 2012.
461 K. Groenendijk and E. Guild, Visa Policy of Member States and the EU Towards Turkish
Nationals after Soysal, 3 ed. (Istanbul: Economic Development Foundation Publications No
257, 2012). 37.
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silence or inactivity of the judiciary in these states in the area of Association
Law is due to absence of conflicts, which does not seem very likely; the ignor-
ance of national judges on the topic; or their conscious choice to ignore that
area of law.
It should be noted that neither the Commission nor the Member States
have passively waited for Demirkan. A visa liberalization process was under
way between Turkey and the EU in line with the precedent of the Western
Balkans. The Council invited the Commission “in parallel to the signature of
the readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU, to take steps towards
visa liberalisation”.462 Under the readmission agreement, Turkey commits
to take back not only its own nationals that are illegally on EU territory, but
also all third-country nationals who have reached the EU illegally via Turkish
territory.463 Turkey signed the agreement on 16 December 2013, which was
also the date on which the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue was launched.464 It
ratified the agreement on 26 June 2014.465
The Commission prepared a “Roadmap towards a Visa-Free Regime with
Turkey”,466 which has already been adopted by the Council. It is part of “A
Broader Dialogue and Cooperation Framework on Justice and Home Affairs
between the EU and its Member States and Turkey”,467 though it is clear that
there is not much to talk about or negotiate. The list of requirements in the
Roadmap needs to be unilaterally fulfilled by Turkey. Given the Court’s ruling
in Demirkan, the Roadmap seems to be the only viable solution to visa-free
travel for Turkish citizens prior to (or in the absence of) Turkey’s accession
to the EU.
To have a brief look at the implementation of Soysal at Member State level,
the country to implement visa-free travel for service providers most swiftly
was Denmark. It implemented visa-free travel in line with the Guidelines
462 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on developing cooperation with Turkey
in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 21 June 2012, p. 2.
463 For Turkey’s role in illegal migration to the EU see, “Facts and figures related to visa-free
travel for Turkey,“ (Brussels: European Stability Initiative, 15 June 2012), 19-20.
464 European Commission – IP/13/1259, 16.12.2013,“Cecilia Malmström signs the Readmission
Agreement and launches the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue with Turkey”. Available online
at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1259_en.htm
465 European Commission, “Statement by Cecilia Malmström on the ratification of the EU-
Turkey readmission agreement by the Turkish Parliament”, 26 June 2014, STATEMENT
14/210. Available online at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-
210_en.htm
466 See Annex II to the ANNEX, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 30 November 2012,
16929/12, LIMITE, ELARG 123, JAI 849, pp. 13-28. The Roadmap consists of a long list
of requirements that Turkey needs to fulfill in areas related to the readmission of illegal
immigrants, document security, migration management, public order and security and
fundamental rights. These general titles are then broken into specific titles and then further
into specific requirements to be fulfilled, which add up to a 16-page list of requirements.
467 See Annex I to the ANNEX, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 30 November 2012,
16929/12, LIMITE, ELARG 123, JAI 849, pp. 7-12.
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issued by the Commission. The country that reported to the Commission that
it had no visa requirement in place for service providers at the time the AP
entered into force, but did not take any steps to remedy the situation (as far
as the author is aware) is Ireland. Conversely, the Netherlands reported that
it had no visa requirement in place. However, its national courts disagreed.
After a series of appeals, its highest court on the matter (Raad van State) ruled
that there was no visa requirement in place, upon which the Commission took
steps to include the Netherlands in the Guidelines next to Denmark.
Germany, announced initially that Turkish nationals providing the services
mentioned above would be able to enter Germany only after obtaining “visa
exemption” from the German embassy in Istanbul, providing for a somewhat
eased procedure which arguably still involved “additional and recurrent admin-
istrative and financial burdens”.468 Though obtaining the “visa exemption” is
no longer mandatory, service providers who wish to do so are informed that
they are able to obtain that document from the visa section of Germany’s
consulates and embassy in Turkey.469
The UK has taken some half-hearted steps to implement Soysal. On 1 May
2012, it introduced a visa facilitation package to improve economic relations
between the two countries. In line with this package, Turkish companies were
invited to register with the UK Trade & Investment (UKTI) by presenting a list
of required documents. Once registration is completed, employees and partners
of these companies are able to apply for visa only with a letter from their
companies, fingerprints and photos. Moreover, while previously visas were
issued for six months only, this period is extended to a year, 5 years or
longer.470 It was announced that visa facilitation would cover students and
academics too.471 As welcome as those steps are, they are a far cry from imple-
menting Soysal. The UK had no visa restrictions in place concerning the pro-
vision of services in 1973 when the Additional Protocol entered into force,
which means that its current visa regime is still incompatible with its obliga-
tions under the Ankara acquis.
Overall, Denmark and Germany seem to be the most-compliant Member
States with the judgment, while Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and the UK
468 Emphasis added. Case C-228/06 Soysal, para. 55.
469 Almanya Büyükelçiliği’nin 21 No’lu ve 05.06.2009 tarihli Basın Bildirisi (German Embassy’s
Press Release No 21 of 05.06.2009). Available online at: http://www.ankara.diplo.de/
Vertretung/ankara/tr/03__Presse/Archiv__Pressemitteilungen/2009__21__pressemitteilung.
html.
470 “Şirket çalışanları tek bir mektup ile İngiltere vizesi alabilecek“, Hürriyet, 19 May 2012.
Available online at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/20585135.asp. See also the
electronic weekly bulletin of the Economic Development Foundation, İktisadi Kalkınma
Vakfı E-Bülteni, 16-22 May 2012, “İngiltere Türk Vatandaşlarına Vize Kolaylıĝı Uygulamas-
ına Ba?ladı”. Available online at: http://www.ikv.org.tr/images/upload/data/files/ikv_e-
bulten_16-22_mayis_2012.pdf.
471 “İngiltere’den vize kolaylığı“, TRT Haber, 2 April 2012. Available online at: http://www.
trthaber.com/haber/dunya/ingiltereden-vize-kolayligi-35046.html.
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are labelled as “ostriches”.472 Like the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and France
seem to have provided incorrect information,473 the difference being the absence
of cases on the matter in their national courts. This provides a mixed picture
for our conclusion. In the absence of ‘internalization’, the constraining effect
of law is rather limited as demonstrated here. The Commission is reluctant
to take any steps or start enforcement proceedings as far as non-compliance
with Association law is concerned.474 Hence, the need to analyse areas contain-
ing rules and procedures with stronger constraining power in the following
two Parts of this thesis.
3.4 CONCLUSION
The aim of the first Chapter of Part I was to examine what kind of relationship
“association” is and identify exactly what it entails so as to be able to establish
the extent to which association agreements could be capable of constraining
Member States when drafting an Accession Treaty. More specifically, the aim
was to map out the legal regime on free movement of persons that developed
under the Association law so as to see if it could preclude Member States from
introducing a PSC on free movement of persons in the Turkish Accession
Agreement.
Association proved to be a very flexible relationship capable of changing
over time. The focus of this Chapter was on different types of Association
Agreements signed between the EEC/EC/EU and third European countries.
Chapter 2 revealed that even though some of those agreements had more
modest objectives initially, as soon as the associates were willing and ready
to join the Union, the agreements could be reoriented with the aid of additional
instruments to achieve the objective of full membership. That was the fate of
almost all association agreements signed with European countries,475 which
served as efficient springboards for EU membership.
Association comprises a wide range of agreements: it has been defined
as “anything between full membership minus 1% and a trade and cooperation
agreement plus 1%”.476 While the latter part of the definition is not so difficult
472 Groenendijk and Guild, Visa Policy of Member States and the EU Towards Turkish Nationals
after Soysal: 39.
473 Ibid., 37.
474 Over the half-century in which the Association Law exists, the Commission has taken
enforcement action only twice. See, Case C-465/01 Commission v Austria, [2004] ECR I-8291;
Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands.
475 The main exceptions are the EEA Agreement (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) and the
regime of Bilateral Agreements with Switzerland. However, it should be noted that if these
countries were to change their minds, their membership to the Union could be easily
arranged, as they are already applying big chunk of the acquis.
476 Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?: 23.
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to establish, the definition of “full membership” is more complicated today
than forty years ago due to increased differentiation and opt-outs. However,
as it will be illustrated in Part II, permanent differentiation and opt-outs have
generally been ruled out for new comers. Only transitional measures carrying
the purpose of gradual but full integration of the acceding states to various
policy areas are allowed. Hence, it will be assumed that full membership
requires the adoption or at least the commitment to adopt the acquis communau-
taire in its entirety (as soon as the transitional period expires).
As discussed above, the Association Agreements with Greece and Turkey
were the oldest and most comprehensive association agreements, which had
the objective of preparing these countries for their future accession to the EEC/
EC/EU. The priority of both agreements, which was also the priority of the EEC
at the time, was to establish a Customs Union. Establishing an internal market
by ensuring free movement of persons, services and capital was the next step.
While Greece joined the EEC back in 1981, Turkey is still a candidate for EU
membership. It achieved the objective of establishing a Customs Union back
in 1996; however, its achievements in the area of free movement of persons
are rather mixed.
Even though the Additional Protocol laid down a timetable according to
which free movement of workers should have been completed by 1986, after
the economic crises of the 1970s, as well as the political crises that Turkey went
through in the early 1980s, Member States were not willing to take any steps
on this front. The maximum they were prepared to do was to grant rights to
Turkish workers who had already settled in the Member States of the EU.
Hence, the Association Council adopted decisions providing for the gradual
integration of Turkish workers into the labour force of the Member States in
line with measures adopted for the integration of Community workers in their
host Member States during the transitional period.477
While the case law of the 1990s focused on the consolidation of the rights
of Turkish workers legally resident and employed on the territories of the
Member States of the EU, in the new millennium, there were some cases dealing
with the standstill clauses in the Ankara acquis that managed to lift some
obstacles and provide impetus for the development of free movement of
persons between Turkey and some Member States of the EU. Hopes were raised
by the Court’s wide interpretation of the two standstill clauses, which estab-
lished that Member States had introduced new restrictions, such as visa re-
quirements for the entry of service providers into their territories,478 which
were incompatible with Association Law.
Despite the different formulation of the standstill clauses, the Court estab-
lished that both clauses were of the same kind and pursued the same objective.
Hence, what was established for Article 41(1) AP was reflected to the case law
477 See footnotes 294-295 above.
478 Case C-228/06 Soysal.
The Ankara Association Law 109
on Article 13 of Decision 1/80, which meant that the entry (first admission)
of Turkish workers into the territories of Member States was also found to
fall within the scope of Article 13.479 Some of these restrictions were removed
and free movement resumed. However, as illustrated above, both the Commis-
sion and some Member States are dragging their feet in the implementation
of the Court’s judgments. This could be interpreted as a sign that Member
States take Association Law less seriously than other areas of Union law, which
would in turn imply that the constraining power of the former is weaker than
the latter.
As courageous as the Court was in its first judgments on the standstill
clauses, it was perhaps unrealistic to expect it to maintain that line in Demirkan
regarding the interpretation of the personal scope of the freedom to provide
services, especially given the fact that this would have repercussions for the
free movement rules of all the first twelve Member States. Hence, the Court
had to be cautious. As observed by Hatzopoulos, the political climate seems
to have “compelled the Court to legal acrobatics, since the opposite solution
seemed forthcoming from a legal point of view”.480
Another case that could be considered as retreating from the Court’s
previous approach was the Ziebell case. In Ziebell, the Court established that
the concept of public policy, which was previously interpreted in line with
Directive 64/221/EEC,481 could no longer be interpreted in line with Directive
2004/38/EC, which replaced the former Directive, and provided for a system
of strengthened protection of Union citizens against expulsion. According to
the Court, it was justified in recognizing for Union citizens alone this
strengthened system of protection.482 The Court’s seems to have changed its
view on the matter within a year, since in Commission v Netherlands, it had
ruled that the objective of the Ankara Agreement was to bring “the situation
of Turkish nationals and citizens of the Union closer together through the
progressive securing of free movement for workers and the abolition of re-
strictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services”.483
The Court’s steps back in Ziebell and Demirkan are in stark contrast to Demir
and Dogan, which are the most recent additions to the list of cases with import-
ant repercussions for the free movement of persons between Turkey and the
Member States of the EU. The latter two cases are important firstly, because
the Court ruled that the first admission of Turkish workers fell within the
scope of the standstill clause concerning workers (Article 13 of Decision 1/80
in Demir); and similarly, that national rules on family reunification also fell
479 Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands; Case C-242/06 Sahin.
480 Hatzopoulos, “Turkish service recipients under the EU-Turkey Association Agreement:
Demirkan,“ 654-55.
481 See Case C-136/03 Dörr and Ünal.
482 Case C-371/08 Ziebell, para. 73.
483 Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands, para. 67.
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within the scope of the standstill on freedom of establishment (Article 41(1)
AP in Dogan). Secondly, these two cases do not only open the horizons for the
free movement of new category of Turkish nationals, i.e. workers and the
family members of economically active Turkish nationals, but they also seem
to illustrate a return to the Court’s previous approach in which it did not shy
away from transplanting some of the free movement rules it developed in the
framework of the internal market to that of association law. The transplantation
of the rule of reason to the Ankara acquis in Demir and Dogan is the most
important example to that effect.
Overall, despite the Court’s occasional half-heartedness and retreat regard-
ing its approach to Association Law, this does not change the fact that that
law constitutes the most developed pre-accession legal regime. Even under
the current restrictive interpretation of the standstill clauses, there is much
room for the development of free movement of persons.484 Association Law
is crucial not only because it provides the legal context and the past of EU-
Turkey relations, but also because it lays down the objectives and commitments
as to their future. The case law of the Court, which generally interprets various
provisions in the light of those general objectives, contributes further to their
internalization and entrenchment. Thus, it could be argued that Association
Law constitutes the minimum, the basis that will be complemented and topped
up by other rules and policies at the time of accession. The more developed
the basis, the less work there will be to do at the time of accession.
It is important to establish again that that the analysis above does not only
serve to demonstrate the framework of pre-existing relations between EU and
Turkey, but to demonstrate that these relations have been grounded in a solid
legal framework with a clear objective that has been spelled out at the very
start, i.e. EU membership. Downgrading the commitments established in the
Ankara Agreement and subsequent legal instruments would clearly violate
Article 7 AA, in which Member States as Contracting Parties to the Ankara
Agreement committed to “take all appropriate measures … to ensure the
fulfilment of the obligations arising [therefrom]”, and to “refrain from any
measures liable to jeopardize the attainment of [those] objectives”. Another
important principle worth emphasising here, though not autochthonous to
EU law, is the building block of international law: pacta sunt servanda.
To sum up, after placing the Ankara acquis in the specific context of associ-
ation as defined in time by Union law and practice, this Part demonstrated
the extent to which free movement rights have already developed under the
Association regime as well as the existing potential for their further develop-
ment. By now Ankara acquis constitutes a complex area of EU Association Law
484 As noted by Wiesbrock, the rulings on the standstill clauses require substantial changes
in the immigration policies of Member States. See, Wiesbrock, “Political Reluctance and
Judicial Activism in the Area of Free Movement of Persons: The Court as the Motor of EU-
Turkey Relations?,“ 438.
The Ankara Association Law 111
with its own sui generis rules and character. While there is a solid body of case
law accumulated over the years on the rights of Turkish nationals legally
resident and/ or employed on the territory of the Member States, the focus
in Chapter 3 was on the case law on the standstill clauses which developed
in the last fifteen years, since the latter case law has the potential to further
remove some of the obstacles in front of free movement. The current state of
affairs revealed that the implementation of those judgments was far from being
perfect, exhibiting arguably the weaker constraining power of Association Law
in comparison to what Member States consider as being hard core EU Law.
Identifying the constraints flowing from Association Law was important,
however it is not sufficient to draw a complete picture of legal constraints that
would be at work during the process of accession negotiations. The constraints
identified here will join forces with constraints flowing from well-established
practice and law of enlargement, the topic of Part II, as well as with constraints
flowing from the constitutional foundations of the Union, the topic of Part
III. Arguably, the combination of legal constraints flowing from all three levels
will provide us with the most accurate appraisal as to the possibility of the
eventual inclusion of a PSC in Turkey’s future Accession Agreement.

PART II
Legal Constraints Flowing from the
Accession Process
INTRODUCTION
This thesis tries to identify legal constraints on Member States qua primary
law makers in the specific context of accession negotiations flowing from EU
association law, enlargement law, as well as constitutional law. The first part
examined the first “pre-accession” or “association” level, in which the main
legal framework of relations between Turkey and the EEC was the Association
Agreement signed back in 1963. It was argued that in terms of rights enjoyed
by Turkish nationals, the existing legal framework constitutes the legal
stepping-stone (a minimum basis, and as such a constraint), which would need
to be complemented with further rights at the time of accession in order to
be fully aligned with EU law in the area of free movement of persons. This
argument leads us to the second level of analysis, i.e. that of “accession”, which
lays down the procedural and substantive constraints flowing from the past
and present Treaty provisions specifying the main contours of the enlargement
process, as well as past practice that sheds light on its true nature.
The main purpose of this part is to reveal the complex nature of the acces-
sion (enlargement) process, which has become more supranational over the
years, (despite its erroneous reduction to being intergovernmental by those
who cast only a first glance). Chapter 4 begins by setting the ground for the
whole part, by providing an analysis of the past and present forms of the
Treaty provisions governing the accession procedure. These provisions are
of utmost significance, as they enable us to identify the most salient procedural
and substantive constraints on Member States when acting within the scope
of the enlargement procedure, as well as enable us to track their evolution.
Chapter 4 deals with procedural constraints on Member States that flow
firstly, from the stipulations of Article 49 TEU itself; secondly, established
practice; and thirdly, from principles of negotiation that were consistently
applied in every subsequent accession wave. Since the Court established long
ago that Article 237 EEC (now Article 49 TEU) is “a precise procedure
encompassed within well-defined limits for the admission of new Member
States”,485 it is not difficult to foresee that a Council Decision entailing the
admission of a new Member State, which has not complied with those precise
485 Emphasis added. Case 93/78 Mattheus v Doego, [1978] ECR 2203, para. 7.
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procedural requirements, would be susceptible to annulment for “the infringe-
ment of an essential procedural requirement”.486 In other words the constrain-
ing effect of the procedural aspect of Article 49 TEU flows from the threat of
an external sanction, i.e. from the annulment of the above-mentioned Council
Decision by the Court of Justice.
A closer analysis of the enlargement procedure and past practice reveals
that the procedure laid down in the Treaty is perhaps not as precise as the
Court claims it to be. Article 49 TEU is undoubtedly very important, as it
establishes the main framework to be followed by the institutions operating
within its scope. However, as important as it is, it merely lays down the basic
contours of the process, i.e. it provides a bare skeleton. Therefore to provide
a fuller and clearer account of how the process works in practice, starting from
the precedent set by the first enlargement, an overview of the evolution of
past enlargement practice is provided. The role of the Union institutions in
this process is highlighted. It should be noted beforehand, that the role of the
institutions in this context is not limited to their roles specified under Article
49 TEU, but extends further to their additional roles under the pre-accession
strategy designed for the successful realization of the Eastern enlargement.
In short, this part will add flesh to the bones provided under Article 49 TEU.
Last but not least, by identifying the main principles that governed past
processes of accession and negotiations taking place therein, the flesh and
bones of the enlargement process will also acquire their spirit. Identifying these
principles and verifying their consistent application over past enlargement
waves, will demonstrate the existence of further constraints on Member State
action flowing from past enlargement practice.
It should be noted that past practice and principles of negotiation are legal
constraints of different kind compared to the procedural constraints flowing
from Article 49 TEU. While the latter are formal constitutional constraints
written in the Treaties, the former are informal and are to be found in non-
binding documents, Commission reports and European Council conclusions.
The constraining effect of past practice is a good illustration of “an informal
constitutional convention”487 creating “path dependence”,488 while the con-
486 Case 138/79 Roquette Fréres.
487 The ‘new institutionalist’ literature in political science, and more specifically its ’historical
institutionalist branch’, serves here as a useful tool, a magnifying glass that provides a
clearer picture, and hence, a better understanding of the dynamics of the enlargement
process. The ‘new institutionalist’ approach views institutions “as extending beyond the
formal organs of government to include standard operating procedures, so-called soft law,
norms and conventions of behaviour”. See, S. J. Bulmer, “The Governance of the European
Union: A New Institutionalist Approach,“ Journal of Public Policy 13, no. 4 (1993): 355-56.
See also, J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors
in Political Life,“ The American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 734-47; and J. G. March
and J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The
Free Press, 1989).
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straining effect of principles is an illustration of their internalization by various
institutional actors. Arguably, “path dependence” also takes place as a result
of learning and internalization of values, norms, and principles that have led
to the establishment of these patterns of action,489 i.e. past practice and prin-
ciples have reinforced each other in the process of their development.
An overview of past and present of enlargement policy demonstrates
clearly, how Member States despite their frustration with certain of its aspects
“all find themselves locked into a system which narrows down the areas for
possible change and obliges them to think of incremental revision of existing
arrangements”.490 The following overview of past practice and the principles
governing past enlargement processes provides a clear illustration of how the
“the basics” or “the fundamentals” of enlargement policy have remained
unchanged over the years while there has been some fine-tuning to meet the
specific challenges posed by every subsequent enlargement wave.
The ‘historical institutionalist’ approach sheds light on how institutions,
in the widest sense of the term (here, read values, norms, principles and
conventions/ consistent past practice) shape not only actors’ strategies (as
explained by ‘rational choice institutionalists’) but also their goals. “[B]y
mediating [actors’] relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions structure
political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes”.491
In other words, norms, values, principles and past practice in the context of
enlargement, govern the relations between the actors involved in the enlarge-
ment process (that is Union institutions, Member States, and the candidate
State). They shape the process and constrain its actors from taking action that
violates them. That is how they affect the outcome of the enlargement process.
The overriding significance of these values and principles has been constitu-
488 Path dependence is a common feature of institutional evolution. In addition to social
processes, it “may occur in policy development as well, because policies can constitute
crucial systems of rules, incentives and constraints”. As is illustrated by the precedent set
by the first enlargement, examined below, the initial action of institutions lays down a path
that is difficult to change or reverse. As argued by Pierson, “[o]ver time, as social actors
make commitments based on existing institutions and policies, the cost of exit from existing
arrangements rises”. For both citations see, Pierson, “The Path to European Integration:
A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,“ 145-46.
489 Kochenov calls this “customary enlargement law“. See, D. Kochenov, “EU Enlargement
Law: History and Recent Developments: Treaty-Custom Concubinage?,“ European Integration
online Papers 9, no. 6 (2005).
490 M. Shackleton, “The Delors II Budget Package,“ in The European Community 1992: Annual
Review of Activities, ed. N. Nugent (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 20; cited in Pierson,
“The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,“ 147. See also,
Giandomenico, “Path Dependency in EU Enlargement: Macedonia’a Candidate Status from
a Historical Institutionalist Perspective.“
491 K. Thelen and S. Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,“ in Structu-
rung Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, ed. S. Steinmo, K. Thelen,
and F. Longstreth (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 9; cited in Bulmer, “The Governance
of the European Union: A New Institutionalist Approach,“ 356.
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tionalized by the inclusion of a reference to the provision listing those values
(ex Article 6(1) TEU, now Article 2 TEU) with the Amsterdam Treaty revision.
As to the substantive constraints imposed on Member States by Article
49 TEU, they are dealt with in Chapter 5. The most important substantive
constraint laid down in Article 49(2) TEU is the stipulation that admission of
a new Member States necessitates only “adjustments to the Treaties…which
such admission entails”.492 Hence, the focus in Chapter 5 is firstly, on the
definition of the concept of “adjustment”, and then, on the various forms in
which adjustments may appear in Accession Agreements, namely as transi-
tional and/or ‘quasi-transitional’ measures, as well as in the form of safeguard
clauses of different kind. Next, the Chapter examines past examples of changes
brought by Accession Treaties, which arguably go beyond being mere “adjust-
ments”. The rationale, and if available the “justification” for inclusion of such
measures is analysed with a view to establishing how compatible they are
with the system established by the Treaties. Last but not least, follows a similar
evaluation of the compatibility of the proposed PSC with the letter and spirit
of the Treaties.
As it will appear from our examination of the evolution of the accession
procedure that follows below, it is possible to identify further substantive
constraints flowing from Article 49(1) TEU that have been added relatively
recently. However, since those constraints, requiring respect for the values
referred to in Article 2 TEU and commitment to promoting them, are imposed
on the acceding State in this provision, they will not be dealt with in detail
here. However, these substantive constraints will be dealt with in Part III, since
these values form part of the constitutional foundations of the Union, which
Member States are bound to respect, especially when acting within the scope
of EU law and procedures, including Article 49 TEU.
Overall, identifying the complex nature of the accession process is extremely
important for the purposes of our analysis. A superficial reading of article
49 TEU leaves one with the impression that the process is intergovernmental
since it culminates in “ratification by all contracting States in accordance with
their respective constitutional requirements”. A follow up assumption based
on that impression is that, if the process were to be considered intergovern-
mental, Member States have unfettered freedom in their conduct within the
procedure, including the drafting of the Accession Agreement. However, as
mentioned above, and as will be demonstrated below, these assumptions are
misconceived. As important as the intergovernmental component in Article
49 TEU might be, it is to be found only at the end of the process, or put differ-
ently ratification is the culmination, finalization of the process. While the final
component or the conclusion of the procedure is intergovernmental, it will
be demonstrated that the previous stages of the procedure have a strong Union
492 Emphasis added.
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component, which constrains Member States’ action, since they are acting




This Chapter begins by analysing the evolution Article 49 TEU has undergone
over more than half a century. It is of utmost importance, because it is the
one and only provision governing the enlargement of the Union. As such it
contains the most important procedural and substantive requirements of the
enlargement process, even though it has never fully or accurately reflected
how the process worked in practice, hence, the need to examine actual practice.
Since the precedent set by the first enlargement determined the path to be
trodden in subsequent waves of enlargement, this Chapter casts a closer look
at the way the accession procedure worked during the first enlargement. Then,
it proceeds to examine the evolution of that practice during the most challeng-
ing of all the waves of enlargement so far, which is the enlargement to the
Central and East European States. The various roles assumed by the Union
institutions in this process are also analysed, since that has clearly strengthened
the Union nature of the process.
Lastly, follows an overview of the practice future enlargements are expected
to follow based on the Negotiating Framework documents drafted for current
candidate sates. That overview reveals that to counterbalance the increasingly
important roles assumed by the Union institutions throughout the process,
Member States have increased their control over the negotiation process with
the introduction of the ‘benchmarking’ system, which has multiplied their veto
opportunities. At the end, by adding flesh to the bones, we will get a fuller
picture of the process. Unfortunately, the fuller picture will reveal the complex
nature of the process and not necessarily make it easier to reach a sweeping
conclusion as to whether the process is intergovernmental or supranational.
It will be only after establishing the main principles of negotiation and analys-
ing the limitations imposed by the notion of “adjustment” that the Commun-
ity/Union nature of the process will become more evident.
4.2 PAST AND PRESENT TREATY PROVISIONS GOVERNING ENLARGEMENT
The enlargement process has extended the borders of the Union geographically
to an unimaginable extent as compared to the times of its inception. What is
now a Union of twenty-eight Member States started as a Union of six. There
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is a huge literature on the topic,493 straddling many disciplines, trying to
explain the rationale underlying the process and the reasons for its success.
In addition to primary sources of EU law, that literature will be used to reveal
the nature and dynamics of the process as well as its evolution over the
decades, the focus being on establishing the extent to which Member States
are constrained within the context of the enlargement procedure.
493 J.-P. Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities – A Commentary on the Treaty
and the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (Leiden:
A. W. Sijthoff 1975). 142; G. Avery and F. Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union
(Sheffield Academic Press, 1998). 188-91; EU Enlargement: A legal approach, ed. C. Hillion
(Oxford; Portland, Or.: Hart, 2004); N. Nugent, European Union Enlargement (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004); Reconciling the Deepening and Widening of the European Union, ed. S.
Blockmans and S. Prechal (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007); J. O’Brennan, The eastern
enlargement of the European Union (New York; London: Routledge, 2006); V. Curzon Price,
A. Landau, and R. Whitman, The enlargement of the European Union: Issues and strategies
(Routledge, 1999); F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The politics of European Union
enlargement: theoretical approaches (London; New York: Routledge, 2005); C. Hillion, “EU
Enlargement,“ in The Evolution of EU Law, ed. P. Craig and G. De Burca (Oxford: OUP, 2011);
Inglis, Evolving Practice in EU Enlargement; The Enlargement of the European Union, ed. M.
Cremona (Oxford: OUP, 2003); M. J. Baun, A wider Europe: the process and politics of European
Union enlargement, Governance in Europe (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000);
H. Motamen-Scobie, Enlargement of the EU and the Treaty of Nice, Executive briefings (London;
New York: Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 2002); D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure
of Conditionality (Kluwer Law International, 2008); W. Kaiser and J. Elvert, European Union
enlargement: A comparative history (London; New York: Routledge, 2004); W. Nicoll and R.
Schoenberg, Europe beyond 2000: the enlargement of the European Union towards the East
(London: Whurr Publishers, 1998); C. Preston, Enlargement and integration in the European
Union (London; New York: Routledge, 1997); A. Tatham, Enlargement of the European Union
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); J. Redmond, The 1995 enlargement of the
European Union (Ashgate, 1997); C. Ross, Perspectives on the enlargement of the European Union
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002); H. Sjursen, Questioning EU enlargement: Europe in search of
identity (London; New York: Routledge, 2006); C. A. Stephanou, Adjusting to EU enlargement:
recurring issues in a new setting (Edward Elgar, 2006); M. Sajdik and M. Schwarzinger,
European Union enlargement: Background, developments, facts (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction
Publishers, 2008); C. J. Schneider, Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); A. Ott and K. Inglis, Handbook on European
Union Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process, ed. Andrea Ott & Kirstyn Inglis
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002); M. Maresceau and E. Lannon, The EU’s Enlargement
and Mediterranean Strategies, ed. M. Maresceau and E. Lannon (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001);
M. Maresceau, Enlarging the European Union: Relations between the EU and Central and Eastern
Europe, ed. M. Maresceau (London/New York: Longman, 1997); A. Skuhra, The Eastern
enlargement of the European Union: efforts and obstacles on the way to membership (Innsbruck:
StudienVerlag, 2005); W. Armstrong and J. Anderson, Geopolitics of European Union Enlarge-
ment: The fortress empire (Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 2007); P. Nicolaides and S. R. Boean,
A Guide to the Enlargement of the European Union: Determinants, Process, Timing, Negotiations
(Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 1997); A. Moravcsik and M. A.
Vachudová, “Preferences, power and equilibrium: the causes and consequences of EU
enlargement,“ in The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, ed. F.
Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (Routledge, 2005); H. Wallace, “Enlarging the European
Union: reflections on the challenge of analysis,“ in The Politics of European Union Enlargement:
Theoretical Approaches, ed. F. Scimmelfenning and U. Sedelmeier (Routledge, 2005).
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Despite the criticism that the Treaty article regulating enlargement is
“vague and open”494 or it is an “imperfect guide to enlargement”,495 it lays
down the legal basis on which the whole process rests. Therefore, as imperfect
or incomplete the picture provided by that article might be,496 the analysis
of the enlargement process in this part requires a brief overview of its origins
and evolution. As mentioned above, the latter analysis will reveal the skeleton
of the process. As vague and imperfect the skeleton might be, it should be
kept in mind that it plays the important function of shaping as well as holding
the whole construct together. The flesh and the spirit of the process can devel-
op only to the extent allowed by the framework provided by the skeleton.
To begin with the first of the Communities, Article 98 of the ECSC was
worded as follows:
‘Any European State may apply to accede to this Treaty. It shall address its applica-
tion to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of
the high Authority; the Council shall also determine the terms of accession, likewise
acting unanimously. Accession shall take effect on the day when the instrument
of accession is received by the Government acting as depository of this Treaty.’
What is notable in this provision is that all the control of the accession process
is given to the Council, and Member States are not mentioned even once. It
also makes no provision for negotiations. According to Puissochet, this makes
the ‘supranational’ character of Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty more highly
developed than in the other Community Treaties.497
As soon as the other Communities were created, aspiring candidates had
to accede to the three Communities at the same time. The issue of accession
was complicated by the fact that enlargement in the EEC and the Euratom
Treaties was designed quite differently. Member States were given more
powers to regulate the process, which gave it an ‘intergovernmental’
flavour.498 Articles 237 EEC and Article 205 EAEC read as follows:
‘Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall
address its application to the Council which, after obtaining the opinion of the
Commission, shall act by means of a unanimous vote.
494 C. Hillion, “Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis,“ in Accountability and
Legitimacy in the European Union, ed. A. Arnull and D. Wincott (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 402.
495 Avery and Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union: 23.
496 Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: 13-14; O’Brennan, The eastern
enlargement of the European Union: 56.
497 Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities – A Commentary on the Treaty and
the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom: 13-14.
498 Hillion, “EU Enlargement,“ 188-91; Kochenov, “EU Enlargement Law: History and Recent
Developments: Treaty-Custom Concubinage?.“
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The conditions of admission and the amendments to this Treaty necessitated thereby
shall be the subject of agreement between the Member States and the applicant
State. Such agreement shall be submitted to all the contracting States for ratification
in accordance with their respective constitutional rules.’
Even if the Treaties prescribed different procedures for acceding to the ECSC,
the EEC and Euratom, one procedure was followed for acceding to all three
Communities. The practice of the first enlargement set the precedent for the
principles and procedure to be followed in future enlargements. The result
was that neither of the procedures prescribed in the Treaties was followed
strictly.499 As stipulated by Article 237 EEC, the Member States play an im-
portant role in the procedure; however, they have chosen to play that role
meeting qua Council, as stipulated by Article 98 ECSC. Moreover, the Commis-
sion, whose role according to Articles 237 EEC and 205 EAEC seems to be limited
to delivering an opinion, has played an increasingly important role in each
and every succeeding accession wave.500 However, eventually the fact that
each Member State needs to ratify the end-product, that is the Accession
Treaty, in line with its own constitutional rules leaves one with the impression
that the procedure is of an inter-state character.
The only novelty introduced by the Single European Act in the accession
procedure was the role to be played by the European Parliament. Article 8
of the Single European Act provided that before acting unanimously on the
matter, the Council needs to obtain “the assent of the European Parliament
which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members”. This can
be characterized as a development strengthening the legitimacy and Union
nature of the process. Ratification by Member States’ Parliaments was not
enough, the organ representing the European people at Community level also
had to give its approval to the process.
Another important development that followed was the introduction of a
single enlargement article, Article O of the Treaty on the European Union,
which abrogated all the previous articles. Moreover, as far as the wording is
concerned, the first important change was the replacement, in the first sentence
of the second paragraph of Article O TEU, of the word “amendment” with the
499 Kochenov argues that the enlargement procedure lies somewhere in between the models
adopted by the ECSC and the EEC/Euratom Treaties. See Kochenov, “EU Enlargement
Law: History and Recent Developments: Treaty-Custom Concubinage?.“; Hillion is of the
opinion that the eventual procedure adopted is “imbued with state centrism“, whereby
the Member States are the gate keepers. See Hillion, “EU Enlargement,“ 191.
500 Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities – A Commentary on the Treaty and
the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom: 8-12. O’Brennan,
The eastern enlargement of the European Union: 74-76; P. S. Christoffersen, “Organization of
the Process and Beginning of the Negotiations,“ in The Accession Story: The EU from 15 to
25 Countries, ed. G. Vassiliou (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 35-36.
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word “adjustment”.501 The implications of this change will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter 5 below. It suffices to say here that rather than pro-
viding a substantive change in that provision, the latter change in wording
simply aims to clarify the already limited nature of the existing meaning and
scope of the word “amendment” used in that provision, i.e. its limitation to
amendments to the Treaty that are only required or necessitated by the candi-
date State’s admission. The second change was the replacement of the word
‘Community’ with that of the ‘Union’.
Article O was renumbered to Article 49 TEU by the Amsterdam Treaty
revision, and a reference to Article 6(1) TEU (ex Article F1) was introduced.
Only the first sentence of the first paragraph of the article, a substantive
requirement for candidate States to respect the principles laid down in Article
6(1) TEU was added.502 This implies a corresponding obligation/constraint
on the Member States to ensure that new comers abide by these principles.
The principles mentioned in Article 6(1) TEU were those of “liberty, democracy,
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law,
principles which are common to the Member States.” Even though this refer-
ence might look like a novelty, it was not. This was simply the codification
of a long existing practice that only functioning democracies could join the
club.503
It is difficult to judge whether the most recent changes brought by the
Lisbon revision, again only in the first paragraph of Article 49 TEU, will trans-
late into any practical changes in the enlargement procedure. Article 49 TEU
provides that “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Ar-
ticle 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of
the Union”.504 The principles that needed to be respected in the previous
Treaty have been renamed as “values”, and it seems that in addition to
respecting those values a second condition that has been added is that the
applicant state needs to be committed to promoting those values. It is also
worth noting that the list of values listed in Article 2 TEU is longer than the
principles listed in the ex Article 6(1) TEU. It reads as follows:
501 Cf: Article 237 EEC provided as follows: “The conditions of admission and the amendments
to this Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of agreement between the Member
States and the applicant State.” Article O TEU provided: “The conditions of admission and
the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded which such admission entails
shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State.”
Emphasis added.
502 The first sentence of Article 49 TEU provided that: “Any European State which respects
the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union.”
503 European Council of Copenhagen, “Declaration on Democracy“, Bull. EC 3/1978, p. 6.
Hillion, “The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny,“ 1-22; B. De Witte, “The Impact of
Enlargement on the Constitution of the European Union,“ in The Enlargement of the European
Union, ed. M. Cremona (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 229.
504 Emphasis added.
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‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidar-
ity, and equality between women and men prevail.’
Other novelties in the current Article 49(1) TEU are that in addition to the
European Parliament, the national Parliaments need to be notified of the
application for membership, and finally, that “[t]he conditions of eligibility
agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account.” The former
is indeed a novelty that requires simply informing i.e. notifying the national
Parliaments of the new application and does not go further than that. While
the latter addition of the European Council’s power to add new conditions
to the existing ones is also new as a written element, substantively, it is simply
another codification of existing practice.505
Based on this overview of past and present Treaty articles governing the
enlargement process, it is possible to make a few observations. Firstly, the only
condition stipulated for membership in the EEC Treaty was that the applicant
country needed to be ‘European’.506 With the Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaty
revisions, in addition to being European, the candidate states were required
to respect as well as promote the above-mentioned lists of principles and
values. The next section shows the latter requirement is codification of existing
practice of requiring candidate states’ compliance with those principles and
values as pre-accession criteria. Moreover, although not stipulated as con-
straints on Member States in Article 49 TEU (since its focus is on the compliance
of the acceding State with these principles and values), the reference to Ar-
ticle 2 TEU is a reminder of the constraining force of these values on Member
States as well. Thus, the final part of this thesis demonstrates not only the
emergence of these values (as general principles of law), but also their
505 Hillion, “EU Enlargement,“ 212.
506 The term ’European’ remains undefined. According to the Commission, “[i]t combines
geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity.
The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot be
condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding generation.
The Commission believes that it is neither possible nor opportune to establish now the
frontiers of the European Union whose contours will be shaped over many years to come”.
See Commission Communication, “Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement“, Bull. EU
Supp. 3/92, p. 11. K. Inglis, “EU Enlargement – Membership Conditions Applied to Future
and Potential Member States,“ in The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging Union: Unity
in Diversity?, ed. K. Inglis and A. Ott (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2005), 234-35.
F. Hoffmeister, “Changing Requirements for Membership,“ in Handbook on European Enlarge-
ment, ed. Kirstyn Inglis and Andrea Ott (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002), 91-92. M.
Fisne, Political Conditions for “Being a European State“ – The Copenhagen Political Criteria and
Turkey (Afyon: Afyon Kocatepe University, 2003).
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development to constitute part of the “very foundations” of the Union that
constrain Member States at all times.507
Secondly, we are able to identify the institutions involved in the process.
While initially the only two institutions engaged in the process were the
Council and the High Authority/ Commission, subsequently the European
Parliament and the European Council have also been included in the provision
on enlargement. As to the roles they play in the actual process of accession,
the following part demonstrates how succinct the Treaty is regarding their
respective roles. However, it needs to be kept in mind that as succinct as the
procedure might be, any deviation from it, for instance failure to obtain the
assent of the European Parliament, is capable of triggering the annulment of
the Council Decision concluding the process.508
Last but not least, if we are to draw a general conclusion as to the nature
of the process based on the evolution and current wording of Article 49 TEU,
that conclusion would be that the enlargement procedure is of hybrid character,
embodying both supranational and inter-governmental components. When
we examine the first paragraph of Article 49 TEU, it is all about procedural
aspects of the process that is the role played by the EU institutions therein.509
In the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 49 TEU, the applicant
State and Member States need to agree on the conditions of admission and
the adjustments to the Treaties, which such admission entails. It is only in the
second and final sentence where all States become ‘contracting States’ that
need to ratify the accession agreement in line with their respective constitu-
tional requirements. This means that throughout the procedure Member States
need to act as Member States of the Union, conscious of the fact that they are
acting within the scope of EU law, thus respecting its values and general
principles.
The fact that the procedure ends with ratification of the accession agreement
in line with respective constitutional requirements could be deceptive and leave
a misleading impression as to the nature of the whole process. The Commun-
ity/Union/supranational component of this process is at least as heavy as the
inter-governmental one. As is demonstrated in the following Chapter, the fact
that the Union institutions are involved in the process in a similar manner
to their respective roles in other areas of EU law, clearly confirms the ‘supra-
national’/ Union nature of the process.
507 A risk of serious breach of values triggers Article 7 TEU, which does not restrict its applica-
tion to Member States acting within the scope of Union law. In other words, Member States
need to respect these values and principles at all times. For details see, note 84 above.
508 See, Case 138/79 Roquette Fréres; and Case C-370/12 Pringle, judgement of 27 November 2012,
n.y.r.
509 The only exception is the reference to the national Parliaments that need to be notified of
the membership application. On a closer look, that is not even an exception, because it
grants the national Parliaments the passive right to be informed, while it is the Union
institutions that need to fulfil that duty.
126 Chapter 4
4.3 ACCESSION PROCEDURE IN PRACTICE
4.3.1 Precedent set by the first enlargement
Article 237 of the EEC Treaty was not very clear as to when the Commission
or the Council were to deliver their opinions, nor was it clear as to whether
the Commission was to play any role in the negotiations. In the case of the
UK’s first application in 1961, when the Council requested the Commission’s
opinion on the matter, the President of the Commission Walter Hallstein
replied that the negotiations would deal with many problems of interest to
the Community, “the Commission will express itself on these insofar and to
the extent of the progress of the negotiations. It is on the basis of their results
that the Commission will express its opinion as provided by Article 237 of
the Treaty”.510 It has been argued that giving an immediate opinion “might
have made the Commission functus officio with no further right to take part
in the procedure provided by Article 237”.511
The way practice developed with the UK’s second application was as
follows: the Commission delivered a first opinion pursuant to Article 237(1),
but stated that this opinion was only preliminary. It delivered its second and
final opinion after the conclusion of the negotiations.512 That practice has
not changed until today. The Commission first delivers an opinion on an
application by a candidate state at the very beginning, and then it gives its
final opinion after the end of the negotiations.513
In its communiqué of the meeting of Heads of State and Government of
the Member States in The Hague on 1-2 December 1969, Member States re-
affirmed their agreement on the principle of the enlargement of the Commun-
ity.514 At its session on 8-9 June 1970, the Council of the European Commun-
ities established the procedure for negotiations with the applicant States515
that is Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the UK. The first paragraph of their
decision stated that the negotiations were to be conducted in accordance with
a standard procedure by the European Communities [emphasis added]. It fol-
lowed that in respect of any problems arising from the negotiations for mem-
bership the Council was the institution to decide on the common standpoint
of the Communities. However, in the adoption of that standpoint the Commis-
510 H. Smit and P. Herzog, “Article 237,“ in The Law of the European Community: A Commentary
on the EC Treaty ed. D. Campbell (Vol. 6: Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2005), 6-373.
511 Ibid., 373-74.
512 Ibid., 375.
513 For the sequence of institutions’ roles and contributions to the sixth enlargement round
see, Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: 61.
514 Communiqué of the meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Member States at
the Hague, 1-2 December 1969, (1969 Communiqué), para. 13.
515 Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities – A Commentary on the Treaty and
the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom: 8.
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sion was invited to make proposals for the resolution of the problems that
arise. The relevant discussions in the Council were to be prepared by the
Committee of Permanent Representatives, and the country presiding over the
Council was to preside over the meetings for negotiations at all levels. During
the negotiations, the common standpoint of the Communities was to be set
and defended by the Commission when already agreed upon Community
policies were concerned, and by the President-in-office of the Council or by
decision of the Council in general. Moreover, the Council stated:
‘… its readiness to call on the Commission to seek, in liaison with the candidate
countries, possible solutions to specific problems arising in the course of the nego-
tiations and to report thereon to the Council, which will give the Commission any
directives required to pursue the matter further with a view to working out the
basis for an agreement to be submitted to the Council. This provision will apply
in particular where common policies already agreed are concerned.’
It is remarkable that Member States are not mentioned even once throughout
the decision, whereas Article 237 EEC and Article 205 EAEC envisaged that “[t]he
conditions of admission and the amendments to this Treaty necessitated
thereby shall be the subject of agreement between the Member States and the
applicant State” [emphasis added]. The Community character of the procedure
is demonstrated by the fact that it is the Community institutions carrying out
the negotiations; that is the Commission in the area of pre-agreed policies and
the Council in general. According to Puissochet, the Community character
of the negotiations was already decided by the summit in The Hague where
Heads of State and Government agreed to “the opening of the negotiations
between the Community on the one hand and applicant States on the other.”516
He argued that the desire behind this decision was to demonstrate the single-
ness of purpose of the Member States. Moreover, by choosing a joint spokes-
man, the voicing of any divergent opinions among the six was also
avoided.517
In practice negotiations were conducted at two levels. During the first and
informal phase Member States were supposed to agree among themselves on
any given issue. This was followed by the official phase in which the President
of the Council met with the candidate country conducting the negotiations.
Negotiations had quite a rigid character since the President was not able to
depart from the pre-established position. Formal monthly meetings took place
at ministerial level and weekly meetings at deputy level, that is at the level
516 1969 Communiqué, note 514 above, para. 13 cited in ibid., 9. See also, Smit and Herzog,
“Article 237,“ 6-374.
517 Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities – A Commentary on the Treaty and
the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom: 9. Smit and
Herzog, “Article 237,“ 6-374.
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of permanent representatives of the six Member States.518 As it will be dis-
cussed below, the structure of the meetings and negotiations remained the
same in following enlargements, depending on the level of preparedness of
the candidate State, it was the frequency of these meetings that changed. The
more time a candidate needed for preparation, the less frequent the meetings
were.
The first session of the “Conference between the European Communities
and the States Applying for Membership” took place on 30 June 1970 in
Luxembourg. The title of the conference was meant to indicate the Community
nature of the process. The main issues with the UK were tackled between the
fall of 1970 and the summer of 1971. What remained were the negotiations
with Norway concerning fisheries and its agricultural supports. The Act of
Accession was signed on 22 January 1972,519 and entered into force on 1
January 1973 for the UK, Ireland and Denmark.
An interesting point to be noted is that the Communities were actually
prepared for an instance whereby one of the applicants would not eventually
accede. Article 2(3) of the 1972 Treaty of Accession provided for the entry into
force of the Treaty in such a case for those States that had deposited their
instruments of ratification. In the case of such a scenario, it was the Council
acting unanimously which needed to “decide immediately upon such resulting
adjustments as have become indispensable” to the Act of Accession. According
to Puissochet, the reason why that power was given to the Council rather than
a conference of representatives of States which had ratified it was a practical
one, that is to obviate the need for recourse to another round of parliamentary
ratifications or referendums. However, that choice had serious theoretical
implications. A Community institution was given the power to amend the
Treaties that is primary law, even if that power was circumscribed by the term
indispensable “adjustments”. Puissochet claims that “[t]he procedure followed
underlines the real individuality of the Community and its autonomy vis-á-vis
the States which had set it up”.520
In conclusion, an overview of the procedure for negotiations set by the
Council on 8-9 June 1970, and later followed in practice, illustrates clearly the
Community nature of the process. It was established that it was the European
Communities conducting the negotiations, more specifically the Council. The
Council was the main player in the process empowered to decide on the
common standpoint of the Communities. The Commission had a very active
supporting role. Where areas in which Community policies already agreed
were concerned, it would set and defend the common standpoint during the
negotiations. The Commission was also supposed to seek solutions to the
518 Smit and Herzog, “Article 237,“ 376.
519 Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities – A Commentary on the Treaty and
the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom: 10-13.
520 Ibid., 125.
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problems that arose during the negotiations together with the candidate states,
and make proposals concerning the adoption of a standpoint. In short, the
Commission was actively engaged in the process under the guidance of the
Council. Its actual role in the process was a far cry from the role assigned to
it under Articles 98 ECSC, 237 EEC and 205 EAEC, which was that of delivering
an opinion on a membership application. As to the Member States, it is worth
repeating that they had no individual roles to play in the process, the only
role they played was qua Council of the European Communities.521
The experience of the first enlargement laid down the ground rules to be
adhered to in future enlargements.522 As illustrated by the review of the
changes in the Treaty articles, other institutions, such as the European Parlia-
ment, were also given a role to play in the procedure at a later stage. However,
the main dynamic of the process, which is the central roles played by the
Council and Commission, remained unchanged.
It is worth noting that there is another Union institution, which is not
mentioned in Article 49 TEU and therefore not covered in detail in this Chapter,
however, whose authority is felt by other Union institutions as the sword of
Damocles swaying upon them through every step of the procedure. It is the
possible source of “external sanction” if the game were not played in line with
the rules stipulated in Article 49 TEU. That is the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union. The jurisdiction of the Court over the enlargement procedure
was already acknowledged in the founding treaties of the Communities “with-
out any particular explicit restriction.”523 That remained unchanged and now
under the Lisbon Treaty, Article 49 TEU is subject to the Court’s jurisdiction
as enshrined in Article 19 TEU and Article 275-276 TFEU. Treaties of Accession
also explicitly stipulate that “[t]he provisions concerning the rights and obliga-
tions of the Member States and the powers and jurisdiction of the institutions
of the Union as set out in the Treaties … shall apply in respect of this Treaty
[of Accession].”524
Last but not least, it is not the intention of this Chapter to trivialize the
important role played by the Member States. They are the gatekeepers that
trigger the opening and closing the door of the accession procedure, i.e. they
521 Smit and Herzog, “Article 237,“ 375-76. That is also clearly illustrated by Article 4 of
Protocol 10 of the 2003 Act of Accession, which provides as follows: “In the event of a
settlement, the Council, acting unanimously on the basis of a proposal from the Commission,
shall decide on the adaptations to the terms concerning the accession of Cyprus to the
European Union with regard to the Turkish Cypriot Community”.
522 Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: 62. C. Preston, “Obstacles to
EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the Propsects for a Wider Europe,“
Journal of Common Market Studies 33, no. 3 (September 1995): 452. Smit and Herzog, “Article
237,“ 377-78.
523 Hillion, “EU Enlargement,“ 213.
524 For an example, see Article 1(3) of the Treaty concerning the accession of the Kingdom
of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden
to the European Union, OJ C 241, 29.8.1994.
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are at the peak of their influence at the very beginning (by taking the decision
that a State qualifies as a “candidate” for EU membership) and the very end
(during the ratification of the Act of Accession).525 However in between, once
the procedure of Article 49 TEU is triggered, as illustrated by the first enlarge-
ment, the Union institutions come into play and Member States have to exert
their influence through the institutional structures of the Union. How that
works is analysed in more detail below.526
4.3.2 Evolution of the enlargement practice
There were no major changes in the way in which the accession of a new
Member State took place until the eastern enlargement. It was the responsibility
of each candidate State to prepare itself in the light of the acquis applicable
at the time of its accession.527 However, the sheer challenge presented by
the prospect of the CEECs joining the Union,528 prompted the EU institutions
to revise the existing practice so as to be more actively involved in preparing
the candidate States for their future accession. The enormity of the challenge
invited a proportionate amount of attention from academics, who wrote about
every possible aspect of what was called “the big bang enlargement”.529
525 The fact that France vetoed twice the UK membership application is a good illustration
to Member States’ influence at the very beginning of the process.
526 See the sub-sections under section 4.3.2.
527 Hoffmeister, “Changing Requirements for Membership,“ 103.
528 O’Brennan, The eastern enlargement of the European Union: 172.
529 A. Albi, EU enlargement and the constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Armstrong and Anderson, Geopolitics of European Union
Enlargement: The fortress empire; A. L. Dimitrova, Driven to change: the European Union’s
enlargement viewed from the East (Manchester University Press, 2004); M. A. Landesmann
and D. K. Rosati, Shaping the new Europe: economic policy challenges of European Union enlarge-
ment (Basingstoke, New York Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); P. Ludlow, The Making of the New
Europe: The European Councils in Brussels and Copenhagen, 1 vols., vol. 2, European Council
Commentary (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004); Maresceau, Enlarging the European Union:
Relations between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe; Nicoll and Schoenberg, Europe beyond
2000: the enlargement of the European Union towards the East; Sajdik and Schwarzinger,
European Union enlargement: Background, developments, facts; M. Schmidt and L. Knopp, Reform
in CEE-countries with regard to European enlargement: institution building and public administra-
tion reform in the environmental sector, Environmental protection in the European Union
(Berlin: Springer, 2004); S. Senior Nello and K. E. Smith, The European Union and Central
and Eastern Europe: the implications of enlargement in stages (Ashgate, 1998); Skuhra, The Eastern
enlargement of the European Union: efforts and obstacles on the way to membership; M. A. Vachu-
dová, Europe undivided: democracy, leverage, and integration after communism (Oxford OUP,
2005); A. Verdun and O. Croci, The European Union in the wake of Eastern enlargement:
institutional and policy-making challenges (Manchester University Press, 2005); A. E. Kellerman,
J. W. de Zwaan, and J. Czuczai, EU Enlargement: The Constitutional Impact at EU and National
Level (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001); A. Inotai, “The ’Eastern Enlargements’ of the
European Union,“ in The Enlargement of the European Union, ed. M. Cremona (Oxford: OUP,
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The event that constituted a milestone not only for the eastern enlargement
but for all subsequent enlargements was the June 1993 Copenhagen European
Council, where the CEECs were given the prospect of joining the Union. The
Presidency conclusions explicitly declared that “[a]ccession will take place
as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of member-
ship by satisfying the economic and political conditions.”530 The conditions
that had to be satisfied for accession, which became known as the Copenhagen
criteria, were as follows:
‘Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institu-
tions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the
Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations
of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary
union.
The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum
of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest
of both the Union and the candidate countries.’531
The Copenhagen criteria became the cornerstone of EU conditionality for both
the eastern and future enlargements. Accession negotiations could only be
opened after the political Copenhagen criteria were fulfilled by a candidate
State.532 In addition to the political and economic reforms that CEECs needed
to undergo as preparation for membership that is for the adoption of the
community acquis, the Copenhagen criteria stipulate that the Union itself also
needs to undergo reforms to be able to “absorb” the new Member States and
2003); K. Engelbrekt, “Multiple Asymmetries: The European Union’s Neo-Byzantine
Approach to Eastern Enlargement,“ International Politics 39(March 2002); U. Sedelmeier,
“Eastern enlargement: Risk, rationality and role-compliance,“ in The Politics of European
Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, ed. U. Sedelmeier and F. Schimmelfennig (Florence,
KY, USA: Routledge, 2005); F. Schimmelfennig, “The community trap: liberal norms,
rhetorical action and the eastern enlargement of the Euroepan Union,“ in The Politics of
European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, ed. F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier
(Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 2005); G. Vassiliou, The Accession Story: The EU from 15 to
25 Countries, ed. George Vassiliou (Oxford: OUP, 2007); E. Landaburu, “The Need for
Enlargement and Differences from Previous Accessions,“ in The Accession Story: The EU
from 15 to 25 Countries, ed. G. Vassiliou (Oxford: OUP, 2007). R. Goebel, “Joining the
European Union: The Accession Procedure for the Central European and Mediterranean
States,“ International Law Review 1, no. 1 (2003-2004). C. Chiva and D. Phinnemore (eds.),
The European Union’s 2007 Enlargement (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).
530 Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93
REV 1, p. 13.
531 Ibid.
532 Inglis, “EU Enlargement – Membership Conditions Applied to Future and Potential Member
States,“ 238.
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ensure that it still functions effectively. The so-called “absorption capacity”
of the Union,533 a novelty introduced in Copenhagen, became an additional
criterion to which enlargement-sceptic Member States could pay lip service
to in the future.
It should be noted that the political conditions formulated at Copenhagen
are not entirely new.534 In the mid-1970s when Greece, Portugal and Spain
were making a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, it was im-
portant to send a clear signal to these countries that “respect for and mainten-
ance of representative democracy and human rights in each Member State
are essential elements of membership in the European Communities”.535 Some
trace back the roots of political conditionality to the 1960s when the Political
Committee of the Parliament issued a report on the necessary political and
institutional conditions to become a Member State of the Communities.536
Unlike the political conditions, the economic conditions can be considered
relatively new. Since the states aspiring to join the Communities during the
Cold War years were capitalist states, the emphasis was placed on the political
conditions those states needed to fulfil. The collapse of communism and the
need for a total overhaul in the systems of the CEECs made both political and
economic conditionality a central feature of enlargement policy.537
The heavy emphasis on the Copenhagen criteria, resulted in their partial
codification in Article 6(1) TEU as the principles (later becoming “values” under
Article 2 TEU after Lisbon) on which the Union is founded and principles that
require respect from candidate States. In other words, those principles were
upgraded from being unwritten constitutional principles to being formal
constitutional principles and hence, formal constraints on Member States. Their
increased visibility in the Treaties was bound to increase their constraining
533 M. Emerson, S. Aydin, J. De Clerck-Sachsse, G. Noutcheva, “Just what is this ’absorption
capacity’ of the European Union?,“ CEPS Policy brief 113 (September 2006). F. Vibert,
““Absorption capacity“: the wrong European debate,“ http://www.opendemocracy.net/
content/articles/PDF/3666.pdf. G. Durand and A. Missiroli, “Absorption capacity: old wine
in new bottles?,“ in European Policy Center Policy Brief (September 2006). S. Gidisoglu,
“Defining and Understanding the Absorption Capacity of the European Union: from
absorption to integration capacity,“ Insight Turkey 9, no. 4 (2007); F. Amtenbrink, “On the
European Union’s institutional capacity to cope with further enlargement,“ in Reconciling
the Deepening and Widening of the European Union, ed. S. Blockmans and S. Prechal
(T.M.C.Asser Press, 2007), 111-16.
534 Hillion, “The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny.“; K. E. Smith, “The Evolution and
Application of EU Membership Conditionality,“ in The Enlargement of the European Union,
ed. M. Cremona (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 109-10.
535 European Council of Copenhagen, “Declaration on Democracy“, Bull. EC 3/1978, p. 6.
536 B. Kliewer and Y. Stivachtis, “Democratizing and Socializing Candidate States: The Case
of EU Conditionality,“ in The State of European Integration, ed. Yannis A. Stivachtis (Abing-
don, Oxon: Ashgate Publsihing Group, 2008), 146; G. Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU
Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (New York: Palgrave, 2005). 30.
537 Kliewer and Stivachtis, “Democratizing and Socializing Candidate States: The Case of EU
Conditionality,“ 146.
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power. The recurrent appeal to these principles requires corresponding commit-
ment and compliance with them, if the Union’s credibility were to be kept
in place. This consistency requirement as to the compatibility between what
one practices and what one preaches has been called “the civilizing force of
hypocrisy”,538 and can be identified as an important political as well as legal
constraint in the context of enlargement.
The significance of the Copenhagen European Council for the EU’s enlarge-
ment cannot be overstated. If there is a distinction to be made in terms of the
evolution of the enlargement practice, i.e. distinction between different periods,
Copenhagen will definitely be the borderline event. Thus, one can speak about
enlargement pre and post Copenhagen. Hillion is also of the opinion that since
Copenhagen, enlargement has become a policy governed by a set of elaborated
substantive rules as opposed to being merely a procedure.539 That policy
was given shape by the following European Councils as well as by the myriad
of pre-accession instruments developed by the Commission along the way.
The more involved Union institutions were in the process, the less chance
Member States got to hijack or abuse the process in line with their national
agendas. For a better understanding of how enlargement practice changed
with the eastern enlargement, a closer look at the role of the institutions in
this particular enlargement wave is warranted.
4.3.2.1 Role of the Commission
There were many factors that made the eastern enlargement a huge challenge.
To name a few, the number of candidate States, their political, economic,
administrative, judicial structures that had to be reformed in line with Western
standards, and the level of integration already achieved by the EU, that is the
enormous acquis communautaire which they had to adopt. Perhaps it is the scale
of the challenge that required a greater role for the institution that was to
orchestrate the process that is the Commission. Therefore, it is worth noting
that what follows is not an exhaustive description of the Commission’s role
in the process, but just an overview of its most important functions that will
enable us to understand and appreciate that role.
With the incoming membership applications after the Copenhagen Summit,
the pressure on the Union to develop a coherent strategy to prepare the CEECs
for membership increased. The Commission was given a very important role
in the process, as it was the institution that needed to prepare proposals for
the so-called pre-accession strategy,540 which was the route plan for the CEECs
538 J. Elster, “Introduction,“ in Deliberative Democracy, ed. J. Elster (Cambridge University Press,
1998), 12.
539 C. Hillion, “The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy,“ (Swedish Institute
for European Policy Studies, 2010), 14.
540 Presidency Conclusions, Corfu European Council, 24-25 June 1994.
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in their preparation for accession. The pre-accession strategy541 was approved
by the December 1994 Essen European Council.542 The political and economic
conditionality laid down in Copenhagen was used as the basis of the pre-
accession strategy and the instruments it was composed of further refined and
clarified that conditionality.543 According to Inglis, the fact that the Commis-
sion was so heavily involved in the formulation and implementation of the
instruments of the pre-accession strategy as well as its duty to monitor and
evaluate candidates’ performance in meeting their respective targets under
those instruments is an evidence of its unprecedented role in the eastern
enlargement.544
One of the most important ideas of the Commission came up from its
Agenda 2000 Report, in which it presented its opinions on the ten CEECs.545
Unlike previous opinions, Agenda 2000 provided a mid-term perspective on
the candidate’s preparedness rather than evaluating their current situation.
This concept, which set targets for fulfilling different objectives in different
time frames for different candidate states, established the basis of the most
important legal instrument guiding the candidate states through their process
of preparation for accession: the Accession Partnership.546
As soon as the Commission would draw an Accession Partnership for a
particular candidate State, that State had to adopt a National Plan for the
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) that reflected the principles, objectives and
priorities outlined in its Accession Partnership document. It also included the
policies and financial instruments to be adopted by the Union to support the
candidates’ reforms towards accession. However, setting goals was not enough.
541 European Commission, “The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession”, COM(94) 320 final; and European
Commission, “Follow up to Commission Communication ‘The Europe Agreements and
Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession’”,
COM(94) 361 final.
542 Presidency Conclusions, Essen European Council, 9-10 December 1994.
543 K. Inglis, “The Pre-Accession Strategy and the Accession Partnerships,“ in Handbook on
European Union Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process, ed. A. Ott and K.
Inglis (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002), 104. For more information on the pre-accession
strategies and different forms of conditionality applied by the EU, see; Smith, “The Evolution
and Application of EU Membership Conditionality.“ M. Maresceau, “The EU Pre-Accession
Strategies: A Political and Legal Analysis,“ in The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean
Strategies. A Comparative Analysis ed. M. Maresceau and E. Lannon (Palgrave, 2001). Kliewer
and Stivachtis, “Democratizing and Socializing Candidate States: The Case of EU Condition-
ality.“; L. Tunkrová, “Democratization and EU conditionality: A barking dog that does
(not) bite?,“ in The Politics of EU Accession: Turkish challenges and Central European experiences,
ed. L. Tunkrová and P. Šaradín (Routledge, 2010); M. Maresceau, “Pre-accession,“ in The
Enlargement of the European Union, ed. M. Cremona (Oxford: OUP, 2003).
544 Inglis, “The Pre-Accession Strategy and the Accession Partnerships,“ 104.
545 European Commission, “Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union”, Bull. EU Supp.
5-1997.
546 Inglis, “The Pre-Accession Strategy and the Accession Partnerships,“ 103-11.
Procedural Constraints 135
Therefore, starting from the end of 1998, the Commission was also asked to
prepare yearly reports, which made an overview of the progress made by each
applicant State towards accession.547
It was obvious that the tasks entrusted to the Commission could no longer
be dealt with by the task force (TFNA – Task-force Négociations d’Adhésion)
established in 1998. Thus, to represent the political importance as well as the
scale of the challenge of enlargement to the east, a Commissioner for Enlarge-
ment was appointed and a Directorate General for Enlargement was created
to assist him. According to Chrystoffersen, the creation of DG Enlargement
reflected “a shift in the focus of the accession process from diplomatic nego-
tiations to a much broader-based preparation process”.548
To make the negotiations easier and more systematic, the acquis was
divided into thirty-one chapters, each covering a specific policy area, upon
which the negotiations were carried out. The negotiations always started with
the analytical examination of the acquis by the Commission for each chapter,
the so-called “screening” process, which was presented to all candidate States
in joint meetings. Subsequently, the Commission held bilateral meetings with
each candidate State so as to identify the changes required to conform to the
Union’s acquis in all thirty-one chapters. At the end of the screening process,
the Commission presented its findings to the Council in a report, which
described the state of affairs and identified problematic areas.549
After the screening process was over, both the EU and the candidate states
prepared their negotiating positions on each individual chapter. Candidate
States explained how they intended to adopt the acquis, what changes were
needed, and how they planned to implement those changes. On the EU side,
it was the Commission that proposed the draft negotiating position for each
chapter and country. The only exceptions were the CFSP and JHA. For the latter
chapters, it was the Council Presidency that was officially responsible for
submitting proposals in “in liaison with the Member States and the Com-
mission.”550 However, in practice according to Chrystoffersen, in the JHA
area it was the Commission that did the work, which the individual EU Home
and Justice Ministers followed closely.551
The Commission played an important role in the process, even though
the negotiations formally took place in an IGC: in the case of the fifth enlarge-
ment called “Conference for accession to the European Union” between the
fifteen Member States and the specific candidate country.552 It was not only
547 Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg European Council, 12-13 December 1997, para. 29.




552 L. Maurer, “Negotiations in Progress,“ in Handbook on European Union Enlargement: A
Commentary on the Enlargement Process, ed. Andrea Ott and Kirstyn Inglis (The Hague: T.M.C.
Asser Press, 2002), 117-18.
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the institution monitoring the progress of the candidates, but also the one
developing and fine-tuning the myriad of strategies and instruments that
sought to manage the process. It acted as the main interlocutor with the
candidate States.553 Hence, Chrystoffersen concludes that the Commission’s
de facto role in the enlargement process “is more typical of the ‘Community
method’: the Commission proposes, the Council decides, and the Commission
implements, controls and evaluates”.554 That is again a far cry from the role
envisaged for the Commission under Article 49 TEU.
4.3.2.2 Role of the Council
Defining the role of the Council in the enlargement process is a bigger
challenge than defining the Commission’s role, since we talk about the role
of multiple entities under the rubric “the Council”. We talk about the European
Council,555 the Presidency of the EU, the Council of Ministers, Coreper (Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives), the expert working groups reporting
to Coreper. In the case of the eastern enlargement, these different parts of the
machinery combined to form the complex and multifaceted Council, which
had responsibility over a wide range of policy domains. According to O’Bren-
nan, this differentiated sharing of responsibility within the Council machinery
contributed to the fragmentation of enlargement policy, undermining the
coherence of the EU position and alienating the candidate states.556
To mention a few of the reasons for fragmentation within the Council;
firstly, officials working in the Council were Member State representatives
with relatively clearly defined and fixed national objectives which made it
difficult for the Council to develop its distinct ‘enlargement perspective’.557
Secondly, the Council would meet in one of its many configurations, composed
of ministers in a given sectorial area such as finance, the environment or
agriculture, which at the end would result in not only national but also
sectorial cleavages.558 Finally, cooperation and coordination was needed
among the sectorial Councils, the General Affairs Council, and Coreper as well
as between all these and the Presidency. All that fragmentation, according
553 O’Brennan, The eastern enlargement of the European Union: 56.
554 Christoffersen, “Organization of the Process and Beginning of the Negotiations,“ 36.
555 At the time of the eastern enlargement the European Council was not officially a fully-
fledged institution under the Treaties, but an inter-governmental forum. Therefore, it will
be dealt with as part of the Council machinery when describing its role in the eastern
enlargement.
556 O’Brennan, The eastern enlargement of the European Union: 58-59.
557 M. Conrad, “Persuasion, Communicative Action and Socialization after EU Enlargement,“
in Second ECPR Pan-European Conference (Bologna24-26 June 2004), 20; cited in O’Brennan,
The eastern enlargement of the European Union: 59.
558 U. Sedelmeier, “Sectoral Dynamics of EU Enlargement: Advocacy, Access and Alliances
in a Composite Polity,“ Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 (2002): 631.
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to O’Brennan, frequently undermined the Council’s ability to carve out a
consistent enlargement policy.559 Arguably, all these drawbacks experienced
by the Council might have contributed to the strengthened role of the Commis-
sion in the enlargement process.
As to the role of the Council machinery in the negotiation process itself,
every piece of work would start at the lowest level, and if not resolved, would
be transferred to a higher level until it reached the highest level of decision-
making. A draft common position would initially be examined by the Council’s
Enlargement Working Group, which would be composed of diplomats exper-
ienced in EU affairs. If there were difficulties in reaching an agreement on the
definition of the common position, the issue would be referred to Coreper,
a senior committee composed of EU ambassadors of Member States and the
Director General for Enlargement representing the Commission in this par-
ticular case. If it were still not possible to resolve the issue, it would be referred
to the General Affairs Council, composed of Foreign Ministers of Member
States and a member of the Commission. In exceptional cases, such as a
number of financial issues that needed to be agreed on at the end of the
negotiations of the fifth enlargement, the matter had to be raised to the level
of the European Council.560
Negotiations, which took place under the title “Conference for the Acces-
sion to the European Union”, usually, began at (deputy) ambassador level.
The President of Coreper, who was assisted by the Director General Enlarge-
ment, led the Union delegation. Negotiations also took place at ministerial
level with the EU being represented by the General Affairs Council and the
Enlargement Commissioner. A candidate State was represented by its chief
negotiator, who was a minister appointed to conduct the negotiations. Any
results reached in the negotiations at deputy level had to be approved at the
ministerial level. Usually each presidency held one meeting at deputy and
one at ministerial level. The negotiations, i.e. the conference could also be held
at the level of heads of state and government.561
According to Chrystoffersen, little real negotiation took place in the enlarge-
ment conferences. They were purely formal. Their main function was to register
the progress of the negotiations. Most of the real negotiations took place behind
the scenes, in meetings between the chief negotiator of the country and the
Commission and/or the Presidency.562 This suggests a limited role for Mem-
ber States representatives during the conference.
559 O’Brennan, The eastern enlargement of the European Union: 60.
560 Christoffersen, “Organization of the Process and Beginning of the Negotiations,“ 41-42.
561 Ibid.; Maurer, “Negotiations in Progress,“ 117-18. Schneider, Conflict, Negotiation and European
Union Enlargement: 18-19.
562 See also, Christoffersen, “Organization of the Process and Beginning of the Negotiations,“
42-43; G. Avery, “The Enlargement Negotiations,“ in The future of Europe: integration and
enlargement, ed. F. Cameron (London: Routledge, 2004), 40.
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The roles of the European Council and especially that of the Presidency
of the Council of Ministers also deserve special attention. To begin with the
role of the latter, it is one of the key institutional actors in the negotiating
process. It was expected to take a leadership role, and act as a mediator when
there were institutional or policy disputes. Activist Presidencies, such as the
Swedish and Danish presidencies, made a big difference in the acceleration
and conclusion of the accession process. Presidencies’ role in the process is
crucial since it is the Presidency that decides not only on the format of the
negotiation sessions, but also on their number and frequency. They are able
to structure and shape the negotiating agenda. Especially when the Commis-
sion and a Presidency enjoyed a good working relationship, they were able
to resolve problems since it would become more difficult for the Member States
to oppose proposed solutions backed by both institutions.563 According to
Ludlow, as far as the EU is concerned, the Commission and the Presidency
were the main actors in the enlargement story to the East.564
As to the role of the European Council, it provided the general political
direction to the enlargement process.565 Important decisions, such as the
opening of accession negotiations with a group of countries, or additional
criteria that had to be fulfilled by the candidates, would be specified in these
summits.566 Though there were few summits that provided momentum to
the enlargement process, O’Brennan argues that the structural dynamics of
intergovernmental bargaining was often inclined to produce non-decisions.
Where European Council meetings did produce EU agreement, “that was more
often than not because of the informal day-to-day supranational process which
increasingly characterized EU enlargement practice and provided the problem-
solving capacity in advance of intergovernmental gatherings”.567
To recap, the Council’s role in the process is complex and multifaceted.
Due to various forms of fragmentation mentioned above, it was not able to
act consistently throughout the process. Its role was still very important, since
it was the Council machinery through which Member States tried to maintain
their control over the process. This was important because the Commission
succeeded in establishing authority in key parts of the EU enlargement frame-
work from early on. Thus, the Council machinery enabled Member States to
563 O’Brennan, The eastern enlargement of the European Union: 62-65.
564 Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: The European Councils in Brussels and Copenhagen,
2: 64.
565 See Article 15(1) TEU.
566 The December 1999 Helsinki European Council for instance, invited Bulgaria, Romania,
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia to begin accession negotiations in February 2000. It was
emphasised that negotiating states had to comply not only with the Copenhagen criteria
but also with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN
Charter. See Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999,
paras. 10 and 4 for the respective examples.
567 O’Brennan, The eastern enlargement of the European Union: 72.
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scrutinize the Commission’s activities and ensure their interests were protected
throughout the process.568
The purpose of describing the role of each institution in the accession
process was to demonstrate its complex nature and the structures within which
Member States and Union institutions had to operate. All of these limit Mem-
ber States’ room for manoeuvre. Overall, the accession process of the CEECs
was far from being purely intergovernmental, and Member States were far
from having full control over it. They had to use existing structures, i.e. various
parts of the Council machinery, to be able to control the process. As in other
policy areas, there were and there still are inter-institutional turf battles where-
by each institution tries to maximize its power and influence over the process.
As a response to the increase in the Commission’s power over the process,
as argued in section 4.3.3 below, Member States have devised new ways to
increase their control over the process.
4.3.2.3 Role of the European Parliament
Upon a plain reading of Article 49 TEU, the role of the European Parliament
seems to be limited to saying “yes” or “no” at the end of the accession process.
However, scholars argue that with the eastern enlargement the EP became
a player in its own right in all the stages of the process within the Union and
within the candidate countries themselves. It managed to translate its formal
power of assent into various forms of informal influence over the process.569
The Parliament was pro-enlargement from the early stages of the process.
It was in favour of an inclusive strategy and insisted on the equality of treat-
ment of all the candidate states. Its Foreign Affairs Committee was largely
responsible for supervising and coordinating studies and debates on enlarge-
ment. Embedding democratic norms, human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the candidate states were the main themes of these studies and debates.
The EP also contributed to the early socialization of the members of the
national parliaments of the candidate states through their meetings in Joint
Parliamentary Committees.570 As negotiations progressed towards tackling
more challenging issues specialist committees were formed within the Parlia-
ment to tackle sector-specific enlargement issues. These specialist committees
568 Ibid.
569 Ibid., 95; Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: The European Councils in Brussels and
Copenhagen, 2: 64. See also, The European Parliament, “The European Parliament in the
Enlargment Process: An Overview“, June 2002.
570 O’Brennan, The eastern enlargement of the European Union: 99-104; Ludlow, The Making of
the New Europe: The European Councils in Brussels and Copenhagen, 2: 64-65.
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were involved in monitoring the negotiations in their areas of expertise, and
when needed conducted fact-finding missions in the candidate countries.571
Overall, the European Parliament played an important monitoring role
in the pre-accession process. In addition to holding annual debates on enlarge-
ment on the basis of reports prepared by its Foreign Affairs Committee and
its specialist committees in the process of negotiations of the Eastern enlarge-
ment, it also adopted resolutions on the Commission’s regular progress reports
for each candidate country.572 These resolutions were quite influential and
stirred fruitful debates within the Union as well as within the candidate
countries.
Though a minor player compared to the Commission and the Council,
Parliament’s pro-enlargement stance undoubtedly gave an extra momentum
to the process and contributed to its legitimacy. Parliament’s role is another
illustration of the Union nature of the enlargement process, as Parliament
usually has no say in purely intergovernmental settings. In other words, the
role of the EP in the enlargement process brings it closer to other areas of
Union law, which are shaped and implemented by the Community/Union
method, that is the interaction between the Commission, Council and the
European Parliament.
An overview of the roles of various institutions in the process was im-
portant to illustrate how active and involved they were in the process, way
beyond what had been envisaged in Article 49 TEU. That role now extends
to cover the pre-accession process. The main reason behind this extension was
the fact that the Union institutions had to be involved in “Member State
building”573 or “Member State creation”. Economic, administrative and
judicial structures compatible with the EU’s DNA, that is liberal democracy
based on the rule of law and on market economy principles, had to be created
before admitting the new comers. The transformation of the CEECs needed the
support and guidance of Union institutions, without which it might have lasted
way longer, and could have lost its momentum along the way. It needs to
be emphasised that this was indeed an evolution of the process and not only
an exception, as the majority of the candidate countries and potential candi-
dates are countries in need of a similar transformation process. Except for
571 See, “The European Parliament in the Enlargement Process – An Overview“, March 2003.
Available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/positionep/pdf/
ep_role_en.pdf
572 Ibid.
573 The term was first used by G. Knaus and M. Cox, “The “Helsinki Moment“ in Southeastern
Europe,“ Journal of Democracy 14(2005): 39-53. See also, S. Blockmans, “EU enlargement
as a peacebuilding tool,“ in The European Union and Peace Building: Policy and Legal Aspects,
ed. S. Blockmans, J. Wouters, and T. Ruys (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2010), 77-78.
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Iceland, there are no states like Austria, Finland or Sweden left outside the
EU anymore.574
Poul Skytte Chrystoffersen, who was the Danish ambassador to the EU from
1995 to 2003, and in this capacity was the President of Coreper and the EU
Chief negotiator, explained how formal enlargement conferences were and
how little real negotiation they entailed. He notes their main function was to
register the progress of the negotiations, which took place elsewhere, in
meetings between the chief negotiator of the country and the Commission and/
or the Presidency.575 This demonstrates how constrained Member States’
representatives were during the Conferences. They had limited room of
manoeuvre, especially when the Commission and Presidency worked well
together and came with common proposals.576
To sum up, the eastern enlargement showed how the active involvement
of Union institutions added an extra momentum to the enlargement process.
The institutions worked hard to make things move. The fact that so much
energy and effort was invested in the preparation of the candidates for full
membership, made it difficult for individual Member States to halt the process
or sabotage it. Both Member States and Union institutions jointly prepared
the ground for the unification of Europe. Once the process got underway,
blocking such a historical event was no longer plausible. Member States were
constrained (or ‘entrapped’ as Schimmelfennig calls it) both by their own
rhetoric,577 as well as by the momentum created by the scale of institutional
involvement in the process.
4.3.3 Practice governing future enlargements
Even though there has been some fine-tuning, the accession process of the
existing candidate states has been by and large working along the same lines
with that of the CEECs. The Commission prepared Accession Partnership
documents in which it outlined the short and medium-term priorities upon
which the candidates prepared their National Programmes for the Adoption
574 The author assumes that in the current political climate, and after negative referenda on
the issue of EU membership in both Switzerland and Norway, it is not very likely for either
of these countries to revive its membership aspirations in the near future. Moreover, it
should be noted that the Swiss also refused to join the EEA Agreement in December 1992,
following which the current association regime of bilateral agreements was established.
For more details, see the literature cited in footnote 199 above.
575 See also, Christoffersen, “Organization of the Process and Beginning of the Negotiations,“
42-43; Avery, “The Enlargement Negotiations,“ 40.
576 O’Brennan, The eastern enlargement of the European Union: 62-65.
577 Schimmelfennig, “The community trap: liberal norms, rhetorical action and the eastern
enlargement of the Euroepan Union.“
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of the Acquis.578 These documents are updated by the Commission on a reg-
ular basis.579
The Negotiating Frameworks for Turkey, Montenegro and Serbia also
contain a section on the “negotiating procedures” which briefly explain how
the negotiations are to proceed. The first step is breaking down the acquis into
chapters covering specific policy areas, to be followed by “screening”. After
the screening phase, building on the Commission’s regular reports and in
particular on the information obtained by the Commission during screening,
the Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by the Commission, lays down
“benchmarks” for the provisional closure and opening of every chapter. This
system of benchmarks is what differentiates the current accession process from
all the previous ones. It is an evaluation and assessment system that makes
use of pre-determined performance indicators. These indicators, i.e. the bench-
marks, can be updated as needed. The fact that unanimity in the Council is
required for identifying relevant benchmarks, (as proposed by the Commis-
sion), as well as for the opening and closing of individual chapters makes the
process much more political and difficult than before, as it gives Member States
plenty of opportunity to block decision-making at any stage they wish to do
so. This has arguably weakened the “Union nature” of the enlargement process.
Unlike initial practice, Member States’ increased control over the process has
given them the opportunity to hold up the negotiations also for reasons that
are not necessarily related to compliance with accession criteria, thereby
politicizing the process and making it unpredictable.580
Provisionally closed chapters might be opened at any stage and the definit-
ive ending of the negotiations takes place only at the very end, after everything
has been agreed upon. According to the Commission, there is such inter-
dependence between different chapters of the acquis that the principle that
governs the negotiations is that “nothing is agreed until everything is
agreed”.581 This is one of the relatively novel principles, which tells us that
no chapter is closed until all chapters are closed.
To be able to fully grasp the nature of the enlargement process we also
need to know about the well-established principles governing the negotiations.
These principles had to be respected by all actors involved in the process so
far. As such they can be considered as constraints on all actors including the
Member States. Having established some of the constraints flowing from the
578 For examples, see Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, available
online at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/npaa_full_en.pdf ; National
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis of the Republic of Macedonia, available online
at: http://www.mfa.gov.mk/Upload%5CContentManagement%5CFiles%5CMFA-National%
20programme%20for%20adoption%20of%20the%20acquis.pdf
579 For examples, see note 224 above.
580 Hillion, “The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy,“ 21.
581 “Closure of Negotiations and Accession Treaty”, available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/the-policy/process-of-enlargement/closure-and-accession_en.htm
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procedure laid down in Article 49 TEU and actual enlargement practice, that
is the bones and the flesh of our construct, it is time to identify the main
principles that have shaped the negotiation process thereby shedding light
on its spirit.
4.4 DEFINITION AND CONSOLIDATION OF NEGOTIATION PRINCIPLES
As with the actual practice of enlargement, the main principles of negotiation
established during the first enlargement have formed the very basis on top
of which some new principles have been added, however by and large, the
latter have been derived from the former. The focus in this part is on identify-
ing the main principles, which are by now entrenched in enlargement practice.
Principles that could be considered part of “customary EU law”,582 because
there has been a consistent actual practice over time as a result of a belief that
they are legally obligatory.583 Thus, the list provided here is shorter than
the lists of enlargement principles identified by scholars writing in this
field,584 since what is of interest for our purposes is identifying only the
principles that have been entrenched and internalized as a result of consistent
and repeated past practice. As part of “customary EU law”, these principles
constrain all the actors involved in the enlargement procedure, including the
Member States.
To show that these principles have been repeatedly and consistently applied
in each and every accession process out of a belief that such legal obligation
existed, i.e. to prove they have been internalized, it is appropriate to examine
the process in a chronological order. The fact that those principles were
respected is evidence of state practice, while statements of the Commission,
the Council, leaders of candidate states or Member States emphasizing the
importance of those principles or the requirement they be respected are evid-
ence of opinio juris, i.e. the belief that that following those principles is legally
obligatory.585 The emphasis in this part will be on the latter, while a more
in-depth analysis of the evidence of actual state practice, as manifested by the
Acts of Accessions follows in Chapter 4.
582 Kochenov, “EU Enlargement Law: History and Recent Developments: Treaty-Custom
Concubinage?.“
583 M. N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 68-80.
584 D. Booss and J. Forman, “Enlargement: Legal and Procedural Issues,“ Common Market Law
Review 32, no. 1 (1995): 100-03. K. Maniokas, “Methodology of Enlargement: A Critical
Appraisal,“ Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 1, no. 5 (2000); Preston, “Obstacles to EU
Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the Propsects for a Wider Europe,“
452-56. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: 38-45.
585 For more information on what constitutes ’opinio juris’ see, Shaw, International Law: 80-84.
H. Thirlway, “The Sources of International Law,“ in International Law, ed. M. D. Evans
(Oxford: OUP, 2010), 102-04.
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4.4.1 The first enlargement as the source of all principles
Once the main principles of negotiation were established, the main issues to
be discussed became also apparent. The founding Member States agreed that
there were two main principles that would govern the accession process. The
first principle had already been laid down in the Hague summit. It required
that “the applicant States accept the Treaties and their political finality, the
decisions taken since the entry into force of the Treaties and the options made
in the sphere of development…”.586 In today’s jargon, the applicant States
needed to adopt the entire body of acquis communautaire.
The second principle, which is a corollary to the first one, was established
by the Council at its session on 6th of March 1970 and provided as follows:
“The rule … is that the solution of any problems of adjustment which arise
must be sought in the establishment of transitional measures and not in changes
of existing rules.”587 In the first session of the “Conference between the Euro-
pean Communities and the States applying for membership of these Commun-
ities” on 30 June 1970, the President-in-office of the Council at the time, Mr.
Harmel, Foreign Minister of Belgium, emphasized these two principles. Regard-
ing the second principle, he reaffirmed that any transitional measures that
prove to be necessary need to be of limited duration, and that as a general
rule they must incorporate precise timetables.588
According to Puissochet, these two principles demonstrated the intention
of the founding Member States to apply the principle of continuity of the
Community. The legal and political personality of the Community as well as
existing economic arrangements were not to be distorted by accession in a
way that would constitute novation in the legal sense of the term. Also legally,
the Treaty articles on enlargement provided for “adjustments” and not amend-
ment to the Treaties.589
These principles were in no way new. The Commission had outlined them
long before the negotiations started. Back in the early 1960s, it made it clear
that membership required the full acceptance of the principles and content
of the Treaty of Rome. The entry of the new members was not to jeopardize
586 1969 Communiqué, note 514 above, para. 13.
587 Emphasis added. Cited in Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities – A
Commentary on the Treaty and the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom: 6.
588 Ibid., 10.
589 Puissochet must have reached that conclusion based on the original language versions of
the Treaty. Similarly, AG Lenz argued that “[s]ince accession treaties are, after all, agree-
ments admitting additional States to a group of members of an existing community, it may
be argued that such treaties should only contain the necessary technical adjustments of
existing Community law without substantially changing the character of the Community.”
Emphasis added. See, Opinion of AG Lenz delivered on 1 December 1987 in Joined Cases
31 and 35/86 LAISA and CPC España v Council of the European Communities, [1988] ECR 2285,
part B -I- (a) of the Opinion.
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the aims of the Community, and consequently the Treaty was not to be sub-
jected to any changes other than those required by the actual enlargement of
the Community to new Member States.590 Setting the limits within which
future negotiations were to proceed was important in order to ensure that the
interests of the Community were respected. Thus, already back in 1962 it was
underlined that “the Community could never agree to schemes that might,
by means of protocols or otherwise, introduce exceptions to the Treaty’s rules
which would be permanent or on so large a scale as to make the application
of these rules an exception in itself.”591
4.4.2 Enlargement to the South: Main principles maintained
To begin with the southern enlargement, the Commission acknowledged from
the very outset that the integration of Greece, Portugal and Spain would be
more problematic due to their lower level of development.592 It was obvious
to the Commission that the transitional period for these states should be longer
than the transitional period adopted in the previous enlargement. However,
there had to be a fixed deadline so as not to lose the incentive for reform. So
the Commission concluded that the transitional period should be between five
and ten years.593
The Commission also saw derogations or safeguard clauses of limited
duration as a possible response to problems that arise in the transitional period.
However it also emphasized that “[s]ubject to any strictly limited exceptions
or derogations specified in the accession treaty, the end of the transitional
period would represent the ultimate deadline for entry into force of all Com-
munity rules and application of all measures associated with enlargement.”594
In other words, at the end of the transitional period, the acceding States needed
to have adopted the acquis commnautaire in full. This general principle guiding
the negotiations was stated explicitly by the Commission, in addition to the
principle that the terms of negotiation should be clear and that Portugal and
590 EEC-Commission, The first stage of the Common Market: Report on the Execution of the
Treaty (January 1958 – January 1962), July 1962, pp. 95-96.
591 Ibid., p. 98.
592 For multi-disciplinary studies on the challanges of the ’enlargement to the South’ see, J.
B. Donges et al., The Second Enlargement of the European Community: Adjustment Requirements
and Challenges for Policy Reform, Kieler Studien: Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität
Kiel (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen, 1982). D. Seers and C. Vaitsos, The
Second Enlargement of the EEC: The Integration of Unequal Partners, Studies in the Integration
of Western Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982). L. Tsoukalis, The European Commun-
ity and its Mediterranean Enlargement (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981).
593 European Commission, Communication, “Enlargement of the Community – Transitional
period and institutional implications”, Supp. 2/78, pp. 6-7.
594 Ibid., p. 8.
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Spain should accede simultaneously.595 Put differently, the main principles
underlying the negotiations of the first enlargement did not change during
the second wave of enlargement.
4.4.3 Enlargement to the North: Main principles confirmed
An interesting point concerning the negotiations preceding the northern
enlargement was the fact that the Commission was preparing and carrying
out the negotiations based on the future acquis of what was to become the
European Union after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty.596 The
speech delivered by the Finnish President Koivisto in Bruges on 28 October
1992 reveals the spirit of the process, and is another illustration of the con-
firmation, or entrenchment if you will, of the principle established in the Hague
Communiqué: that “the applicant States accept the Treaties and their political
finality”.597 He provided as follows:
‘The European Community is playing a growing role in determining the course
of developments on our continent. We would like to play a part in this process.
We have studied the obligations of EC membership with care. In applying for
membership, we accept the acquis communautaire, the Maastricht Treaty and the
finalité politique of the European Union. We are ready to accept the obligations
conferred by membership and to help to meet them as agreed.’598
This does not mean that there were no difficulties at all. The northern states
also had their concerns, which they raised during the negotiations such as
their neutrality, their high environmental standards, taxation, their alcohol
monopolies etc. Norway was particularly concerned with the rules in the area
of energy and fisheries, which were considered as areas of vital national
importance.599 However, the President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers
made it clear at the ministerial meeting opening the Conferences on the acces-
sion of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the European Union that:
595 European Commission, Communication, “Problems of Enlargement – Taking stock and
proposals”, Supp. 8/82.
596 European Commission, “The Challenge of Enlargement. Commission opinion on Finland’s
application for membership”, Supp. 6/92, p. 6; and European Commission, “The Challenge
of Enlargement. Commission opinion on Sweden’s application for membership”, Supp.
5/92, p. 5.
597 1969 Communiqué, note 514 above.
598 European Commission, “The Challenge of Enlargement. Commission opinion on Finland’s
application for membership”, Supp. 6/92, p. 8.
599 For more detailed analysis see, T. Pedersen, European Union and the EFTA countries: enlarge-
ment and integration (London; New York: Pinter Publishers, 1994). F. Granell, “The European
Union’s Enlargement Negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden,“ Journal
of Common Market Studies 33, no. 1 (March 1995).
Procedural Constraints 147
‘The acceptance of the rights and obligations by a new member may give rise to
technical adjustments, and exceptionally to temporary (not permanent) derogations
and transitional arrangements to be defined during the accession negotiations, but
can in no way involve amendments to Community rules.’600
This was another way of formulating the main principles established during
the first enlargement. It is possible to recognize this formulation in a bit more
elaborated form in the following two sub-titles.
4.4.4 Enlargement to the East: Negotiation principles entrenched
Without doubt, the most challenging enlargement was the enlargement to the
east. As was discussed above, the Union and its institutions were much more
involved in shaping and preparing the applicant States for future membership.
However, as far as the main principles of negotiation are concerned, from the
very outset the Commission identified the same principles discussed above
as the basis on which the negotiations were to be conducted. The Commission
in its Agenda 2000 document601 confirmed that as in the past, the basis of
negotiations would be the acquis as it existed at the time of accession. It also
added that transitional periods of definite and reasonable duration might be
considered in duly justified cases, however, the objective should be the applica-
tion of the acquis on accession by the new Member States. In particular, the
measures concerning the extension of the single market should be applied
immediately. Moreover, “[t]he Union should not envisage any kind of second-
class membership or opt-outs.”602
The general position of the Union presented to the CEECs at the outset of
the negotiations was almost identical with its position in previous enlarge-
ments. It states that the acceptance of the CEECs of the acquis:
‘may give rise to technical adjustments, and exceptionally to transitional measures.
Such transitional measures should be limited in time and scope, and accompanied
by a plan with clearly defined stages for the application of the acquis. They must
not involve amendments to the rules or policies of the Union, disrupt their proper
functioning, or lead to significant distortions of competition. In this connection,
600 Emphasis added. European Commission, “The Challenge of Enlargement. Commission
opinion on Norway’s application for membership”, Supp. 2/93, pp. 5-6.
601 European Commission, “Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union”, Bull. EU Supp.
5-1997.
602 Ibid., p. 51-52.
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account must be taken of the interests of the Union, the applicant country and the
other applicant states.’603
The last sentence is novel and interesting. If it is taken to refer to the whole
paragraph, its meaning is easier to interpret in the light of well-established
principles. What is probably meant is that a balancing act of the interests of
the Union, the interests of an applicant state and interests of all other states
is required when deciding whether any exceptional transitional measure is
granted to a particular applicant state. Given the number of the applicants,
this statement is meaningful, since any ‘concession’ given to one is very likely
to be claimed by the others.604 However, if the last sentence is understood
to be qualifying the sentence it precedes, that it allows for such measures that
“involve amendments to the rules or policies of the Union” or “lead to signi-
ficant distortions of competition”, if those decisions are a result of a balancing
act of the interests of all, we reach a conclusion that is entirely incompatible
with already established rules. With hindsight, there is no evidence to support
the latter interpretation. This is just bad drafting that was corrected in sub-
sequent documents.605
In the Enlargement Strategy Paper,606 the Commission also provided
guidelines as to what types of transitional measures were “acceptable”, “nego-
tiable” or “unacceptable”. The transitional measures that were identified as
“acceptable” were those, which pose no significant problems and are of a
technical nature. Those measures were limited in time and scope and were
considered not to have a significant impact on competition or the functioning
of the internal market. The measures in the “negotiable” category were those
with a more significant impact on competition or the internal market, or in
terms of time and scope. The Commission might recommend the acceptance
of transitional measures in this category under certain conditions and within
a certain time horizon. In addition to the effects on competition and the single
market, requests for transitional measures in this category were also to be
evaluated in terms of their effects on the economy, health, safety and the
environment, consumers, citizens, other common policies and the Union
budget. The Commission further explains that classifying certain requests as
“negotiable” does not mean that they will be accepted, in whole or in part,
but that it means that a solution to those requests might be found under certain
603 European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy Paper – Report on progress towards accession
by each of the candidate countries, 2000“ (Enlargement Strategy Paper 2000). Available
online at: http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/ec-2000-
strategy-paper.pdf , p. 26.
604 Avery, “The Enlargement Negotiations,“ 39.
605 See section 4.4.5. or Negotiating Framework for Turkey, point 12; Negotiating Framework
for Montenegro, point 13; and Negotiating Framework for Serbia, point 33.
606 Enlargement Strategy Paper 2000, cited in note 603 above.
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conditions. Finally, according to the Commission, requests for transitional
measures that pose fundamental problems will not be accepted.607
Even though the principles established by the Commission in the conduct
of the negotiations with the CEECs were the same as in previous enlargements,
the result was a bit different. The use of temporary derogations, safeguard
clauses and transitional arrangements was far from being exceptional. Accord-
ing to Ott, the extent of these derogations in the 2003 and 2005 Accession
Treaties is without a precedent. She claims that half of the acquis chapters
include derogations for the new Member States in areas such as: free movement
of goods, free movement of persons, freedom to provide services, free move-
ment of capital, company law, competition policy, agriculture, fisheries, trans-
port policy, energy, telecommunications, environment etc.608
The whole pre-accession strategy was built around reducing the differences
between the candidates and the existing Member States and building the
administrative and legal capacity of candidates so that they are able to take
on the obligations of membership when the time of accession comes. Yet, this
was an ambitious objective despite all the legal and financial instruments
employed to make the candidates ready for membership. What’s more, the
structure of the Union was getting more and more complex, and there were
areas in which candidates could only join at a later stage, after becoming
Member States and after fulfilling the specific conditions necessary to join these
policy areas. That was the case for the EMU and the Schengen area. The new
Member States had to accept the EMU and the Schengen acquis from the date
of accession, yet they were not considered to be qualified to become full
members of these areas yet.609 They would be able to join in the future once
they fulfilled the relevant criteria applicable to these areas.
In addition to the wider use of transitional arrangements, another novelty
in the latest accession treaties was the inclusion of extra safeguard clauses.
In addition to the general economic safeguard clause that was also employed
in previous accession treaties,610 two specific safeguard clauses on the internal
607 Ibid., p. 27.
608 A. Ott, “EU Constitutional Boundaries to Differentiation: How to Reconcile Differentiation
with Integration,“ in Fifty Years of European Integration – Foundation and Perspectives, ed. A.
Ott and E. Vos (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Institute, 2009), 117.
609 From their accession date until their eventual entry into the eurozone, the new Member
States are considered as “Member States with a derogation” in the sense of Article 122 EC
(now Article 140 TFEU). They will need to fulfil the Maastricht convergence criteria to be
able to adopt the euro and join the eurozone. Similarly, they will be able to join the Schen-
gen area only after it has been verified that all the requirements of the Schengen acquis
have been met in full. See C. Hillion, “The European Union is dead. Long live the European
Union… A commentary on the Treaty of Accession 2003,“ European Law Review 29(2004):
593-96.
610 Article 37 of the 2003 Act of Accession. There were similar clauses in the Act of Accession
for Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (Article 135), and in the Act of Accession
for Austria, Finland, and Sweden (Article 152).
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market and on Justice and Home Affairs were included.611 This is a clear
indication of the mistrust of the old Member States concerning the new Mem-
ber States’ ability to take on the obligations flowing from the acquis. This
mistrust went as far as the inclusion of a mechanism to monitor Bulgaria and
Romania’s performance in their post-accession phase, the so-called “Co-opera-
tion and Verification Mechanism”.612
In short, even if the principles identified by the Commission before the
negotiations started with the CEECs were the same as the principles that applied
to the states that joined in previous enlargement waves, it turned out that these
principles were applied more liberally than before. It will not be an exaggera-
tion to say that transitional measures were the norm rather than the exception
in many policy areas. However, transitional measures are just instruments
that enable the extension of the acquis to the newcomers in a more flexible
way. What needs to be underlined is the fact that the idea behind all the new
creative mechanisms applied in the enlargement to the east was to enable the
effective participation of the new Member States in the policies of the EU in
the future where that was not possible at the time of accession. What is im-
portant is that the EU acquis was to apply to all the new Member States when
the relevant transitional periods expire and that this was done without any
opt-outs or amendments to the existing EU rules. In other words, despite all
the difficulties, the gist of the main principles of negotiation was respected
also during the most challenging enlargements of all, which is a clear illustra-
tion of how deeply entrenched those principles are.
4.4.5 Future Enlargements: Respect or deviation from entrenched principles?
The countries that are currently in the process of negotiating for accession are
Turkey, Montenegro and Serbia. The principles governing these negotiations
as well as their substance and procedure have been laid down in the “Negoti-
ating Framework” laid down for each individual applicant.613 The Negotiat-
ing Framework for Turkey was adopted on the 3 October 2005, that of Monte-
611 Article 38 of the 2003 Act of Accession is the internal market safeguard clause and Article
39 of the 2003 Act of Accession is the Justice and Home Affairs safeguard clause.
612 K. Inglis, “Accession Treaties: Differentiation versus Conditionality,“ in Fifty Years of
European Integration – Foundation and Perspectives, ed. A. Ott and E. Vos (2009), 154.
613 Negotiating Framework for Turkey, available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
pdf/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf.
Negotiating Framework for Iceland, available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
pdf/iceland/st1222810_en.pdf.
Negotiating Framework for Montenegro, available online at: http://glb.bos.rs/progovori-o-
pregovorima/uploaded/Montenegro-negotiating-framework.pdf.
Negotiating Framework for Serbia, available online at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=AD%201%202014%20INIT.
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negro on 29 March 2012, and that of Serbia on 21 January 2014. Apart from
one major difference, which is mentioned below, these documents are quite
similar both in terms of structure and content.614
The obligation to adopt and implement the acquis is the very first point
mentioned in both documents under the title “Substance of the negotiations”.
The following paragraphs constitute a good summary of the main principles,
which have constituted the basis of negotiations during previous as well as
on-going enlargement processes. They have been cited in almost identical terms
in the Negotiating Frameworks of Turkey, Montenegro and Serbia. They read
as follows:
‘Accession implies the acceptance of the rights and obligations attached to the Union
system and its institutional framework, known as the “acquis” of the Union. Turkey
will have to apply this as it stands at the time of accession. Furthermore, in addition
to legislative alignment, accession implies timely and effective implementation of
the acquis. The acquis is constantly evolving and includes …615
…
Turkey’s acceptance of the rights and obligations arising from the acquis may
necessitate specific adaptations to the acquis and may, exceptionally, give rise to
transitional measures which must be defined during the accession negotiations.
Where necessary, specific adaptations to the acquis will be agreed on the basis of
the principles, criteria and parameters inherent in that acquis as applied by the
Member States when adopting that acquis, and taking into consideration the specific-
ities of Turkey.
The Union may agree to requests from Turkey for transitional measures provided
they are limited in time and scope, and accompanied by a plan with clearly defined
stages for application of the acquis. For areas linked to the extension of the internal
market, regulatory measures should be implemented quickly and transition periods
should be short and few; where considerable adaptations are necessary requiring
substantial effort including large financial outlays, appropriate transitional arrange-
ments can be envisaged as part of an ongoing, detailed and budgeted plan for
alignment. In any case, transitional arrangements must not involve amendments to the
rules or policies of the Union, disrupt their proper functioning, or lead to significant
614 The Negotiating Frameworks for Montenegro and Serbia have an additional Annex on
“Procedure for and Organisation of the Negotiations”. What is more important and worth
noting however, is the emphasis laid down on the importance of reforms under chapters
“Judiciary and fundamental rights” and “Justice, freedom and security”. It is advised to
tackle these chapters early in the negotiations so as to provide the candidates with enough
time for the proper implementation of reforms. See, Negotiating Framework for Montenegro,
points 21-23; and Negotiating Framework for Serbia, points 42-44.
615 See Negotiating Framework for Turkey, point 10; and Negotiating Framework for Monte-
negro, point 11; Negotiating Framework for Serbia, point 31.
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distortions of competition. In this connection, account must be taken of the interests
of the Union and of Turkey.’616
In addition to few other differences,617 the main difference between Turkey’s
Negotiating Framework and those of Montenegro and Serbia is that the second
bullet point of paragraph 23 of the European Council conclusions of 16/17
December 2004 has been copy-pasted into the former document, while there
is only a reference to that point in the latter. The following paragraph of the
Negotiating Framework for Turkey reads as follows:
‘Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard
clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard
measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate,
in its proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies
or agriculture. Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual
establishment of freedom of movement of persons should allow for a maximum
role of individual Member States. Transitional arrangements or safeguards should
be reviewed regarding their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal
market.’618
In the Negotiating Framework of Montenegro and Serbia, what we find replac-
ing this paragraph is the following sentence: “Transitional measures and
specific arrangements, in particular safeguard clauses, may also be agreed in
the interest of the Union, in line with the second bullet point of paragraph
23 of the European Council conclusions of 16/17 December 2004.”619 This
leaves some room for speculation as to the meaning and significance of that
paragraph. On the one hand, one could argue that it has been explicitly
included in Turkey’s Negotiating Framework because of the expectation that
the accession of that country will involve greater difficulties and challenges.
On the other hand, that paragraph was taken from the European Council
conclusions and in principle it is supposed to refer to the accession of all
countries which were mentioned there, that is Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and
Turkey, and even if not mentioned in the conclusions, by virtue of the reference
included in its Negotiating Framework it applies to Montenegro and Serbia
as well. Thus, as far as substance is concerned, the four Negotiating Frame-
works are actually not much different from one another.
616 Emphasis added. Negotiating Framework for Turkey, point 12; and Negotiating Framework
for Montenegro, point 13; Negotiating Framework for Serbia, point 33.
617 These requirements are geared to the special expectations regarding each candidate state.
For instance under point 6 of Turkey’s Negotiating Framework, its continued support for
efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem is required; whereas
in the case of Serbia, improvement of relations with Kosovo is mentioned again and again.
618 Emphasis added. Negotiating Framework for Turkey, point 12, paragraph 4.
619 Negotiating Framework for Montenegro, point 13 (last sentence); Negotiating Framework
for Serbia, point 33 (last sentence).
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Yet, it is difficult to understand the reasoning behind the inclusion of that
paragraph and the reference to it in the Negotiating Frameworks, since a brief
glance at it and the paragraph preceding it is enough to reveal the stark
incompatibility between them. The Negotiating Frameworks lay down firstly,
the long established traditional position that transitional measures might be
included if “they are limited in time and scope”. Moreover, it is noted that
if they are linked to the extension of the internal market “transition periods
should be short and few”. It is emphasized that “transitional arrangements
must not involve amendments to the rules or policies of the Union, disrupt
their proper functioning, or lead to significant distortions of competition.”
Then, the Negotiating Framework contradicts itself and in the next paragraph
declares that “[l]ong transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements
or permanent safeguard clauses … may be considered.” The areas in which
these measures are to be included, areas such as freedom of movement of
persons, structural policies or agriculture, are areas which will have impact
on the functioning of the internal market, the importance of which was em-
phasized a few lines before. Moreover, allowing a maximum role for individual
Member States in the eventual establishment of free movement of persons,
means that the new Member State will not be equal to other Member States
even after their eventual accession. This will mean shift in power to the old
Member States, the continuation of inter-governmental bargaining after acces-
sion and possibly the falling prey of the new Member State to the vagaries
of the existing Member States. In short, it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to reconcile the messages of the newly introduced paragraph with the estab-
lished practice and principles of the past accessions. Inglis is also of the opinion
that “[p]ermanent flexibility or safeguard mechanisms, such as suggested for
Turkey, would go against the grain of any previous rationale underlying
transitional flexibility mechanisms in accession treaty practice.”620
Another important point is that the candidate States need to terminate all
existing bilateral agreements between them and the Communities, and all
international agreements which are not compatible with their obligations of
membership, which is not something new. In addition, the Negotiating Frame-
works provide that “[a]ny provisions of the [Association Agreement/
Stabilisation and Association Agreement] which depart from the acquis cannot
be considered as precedents in the accession negotiations.”621 What this
means in practice is that the acquis as it exists at the time of accession forms
the basis of accession negotiations, i.e. if there was an area where one of the
candidate States enjoyed a special regime, it will not be allowed to maintain
it. The candidate needs to adopt the acquis as it stands at the time of accession
in its entirety. While this requirement is not likely to pose any problems for
620 Inglis, “Accession Treaties: Differentiation versus Conditionality,“ 148.
621 Negotiating Framework for Turkey, point 11; Negotiating Framework for Montenegro, point
13; and Negotiating Framework for Serbia, point 33.
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the period when a new Member States is fully integrated, it might pose prob-
lems for the transitional period. It is not very likely that a candidate state
enjoys a more favourable regime with the EC/EU than the one between the
Member States themselves in a given area. However, it is likely that it would
enjoy a more favourable regime under previous agreements than the one that
will regulate a given area in the transitional period. Thus, to ensure that the
new transitional regime is not less favourable than the previous regime that
applied under an association agreement, standstill clauses have been included
in various fields of Accession Treaties. In other words, past practice demon-
strates that previous agreements served as precedent where those agreements
would be the basis on which more rights would be added and not sub-
tracted.622
4.5 CONCLUSION
To sum up, after providing an account of the evolution of the procedure
governing enlargement, now laid down in the Treaties as Article 49 TEU, this
Chapter demonstrated how the wording of that provision never provided an
accurate description of the process in practice. The procedural requirements
of the Treaty provision, such as the opinion provided by the Commission and
consent of the EP, are of paramount importance and were described as the
skeleton of the process. However, arguably it is past practice that provides
a clearer picture by adding flesh to the skeleton of enlargement procedure.
The analysis of past enlargements revealed that the precedent of the first
enlargement set the basics of the procedure, both in terms of institutional
interaction as well as establishing the main principles governing the negotiation
process. Subsequent enlargements followed those basics with some fine-tuning,
which did not challenge the basics. The most pronounced change to enlarge-
ment practice was experienced with the enlargement to the CEECs. The Chapter
demonstrated the increased involvement of Union institutions in the process.
The examination of the role of institutions as well as their interaction through-
622 Such a standstill clause was at issue in case C-546/07 Commission v. Germany [2010] ECR
I-439. It read as follows “The effect of the application of this paragraph shall not result
in conditions for the temporary movement of workers in the context of the transnational
provision of services between Germany or Austria and Poland which are more restrictive
than those prevailing on the date of signature of the Treaty of Accession.” See, Annex XII
to Act of Accession entitled ‘List referred to in Article 24 of the Act of Accession: Poland’.
Chapter 2 of that annex, entitled ‘Freedom of movement for persons’, paragraph 13. See,
Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia,
the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic
of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and
the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union
is founded, OJ L 236/33, 23.9.2003.
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out the process showed how Member States were left with less room for
manoeuvre and influence, highlighting the supranational/Union aspect of the
process.
Lastly, to complete the enlargement procedure with its spirit, the main
principles of negotiation established during the first enlargement and consist-
ently applied ever since, were put under the spotlight. The first principle
requires the full adoption of the acquis communautaire as it stands at the time
of accession, while the second principle requires the solution of any problems
via the establishment of transitional measures and not via change of existing
rules. The clear rationale underlying these principles is the preservation and
continuation of the existing legal order. The newcomers are expected to make
the necessary changes that will enable their integration into the existing system
without changing its defining characteristics.623 When that was too big a
challenge for the candidates to achieve by themselves, as in the eastern enlarge-
ment, the Union institutions were actively involved in the process to assist
them in achieving that important objective. As was demonstrated above, the
rules of the game, i.e. the main principles of negotiation, were clearly voiced
by the Community/ Union institutions and were accepted and respected by
candidates and Member States alike in every enlargement wave. As such these
principles constitute part of ‘customary EU law’ or ‘customary enlargement
law’ as illustrated by past practice coupled with a belief in the existence of
a legal obligation to respect and abide by those principles. In other words,
these principles set constraints on Member States for future accession processes.
The only sign that puts a question mark on that conclusion, and the reason
to conduct this research, is the statements in paragraph 4 of point 12 of the
Negotiating Framework of Turkey. The latter is very confusing and difficult
to interpret, as it stands in stark contrast to the reiteration and elaboration
of the main negotiating principles in the immediately preceding paragraphs.
It is quite possible that this paragraph was a result of a compromise and was
included in the Negotiating Framework simply to appease certain Member
States in return for opening the accession negotiations with Turkey. Whatever
the political rationale for including that paragraph, its repercussions for both
Turkey’s accession and Union law are significant enough to justify the conduct
of this study. At a time when Member States become more assertive and
willing to control (or even hijack) the enlargement process, identifying the
main procedures, rules and principles that constrain them is more important
than ever.
With the overview of the principles of negotiation used in past enlarge-
ments the analysis, which tried to shed light on the functioning of the accession
process, as enshrined in Article 49 TEU, has been completed. It was argued
623 The mirror image of that expectation (as well as an obligation) would be the legal constraint
or preclusion of Member States from imposing on new comers anything that could disrupt
the functioning of the system or its underlying principles.
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that Article 49 TEU drew the main contours of the enlargement process, but
did non manage to accurately reflect what happened in practice. We estab-
lished that in practice the Union institutions’ roles, especially that of the
Commission, was more important and varied than past and present articles
on enlargement suggest, especially during and after the eastern enlargement.
Moreover, even though past and present articles stipulated that “[t]he condi-
tions of admission…shall be subject of an agreement between the Member
States and the applicant State”, Member States have habitually acted via the
Community/ Union institutions such as the Council and/or its Presidency.
Even though with the introduction of the “benchmarking system” they seem
to have gained more control over the process,624 they still exercise that power
acting via the Council machinery and not qua Member States, which means
they need operate under different institutional constraints. This adds a Com-
munity/Union flavour to the process.
Having reviewed past and present Treaty provisions on enlargement, actual
practice and its evolution, as well as the main principles of negotiation that
shaped the process we have obtained a relatively clear picture of the nature
and functioning of the process. However, as clear as that picture might be,
it will not be complete without examining the final products of the processes
that were described so far, namely past Accession Treaties. There are still
important terms employed in Article 49 TEU and Accession Treaties that require
further elaboration and clarification. For instance, what does the term “adjust-
ments to the Treaties” mean? Can Member States go beyond “adjustments”
in Accession Treaties? What are adaptations? What is the function of other
instruments employed in Accession Treaties such as temporary derogations,
permanent derogations and safeguard clauses?
The formulation of paragraph 4 of point 12 of the Negotiation Framework
for Turkey is quite broad and vague. It is difficult to envisage what exactly
those “specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses” will be like since
they are unprecedented. Why would one need to “allow for a maximum role
of individual Member States” in “the decision-taking process regarding the
eventual establishment of freedom of movement of persons” in the existence
of a permanent safeguard clause? Could it be that the “specific arrangements”
in the area of freedom of movement of persons might de facto turn into a
permanent derogation as in the case of the fisheries regime established by the
first Act of Accession? The vague and ambiguous formulation of paragraph 4
of point 12 of the Negotiating framework opens it wide to speculation. Thus,
624 “Benchmarks” are conditions that need to be fulfilled by applicant countries in a given
field (chapter) so as to ensure their eventual alignment with Union acquis. While they were
designed with a view to assisting the applicants in their preparation process for accession,
the fact that they are established unanimously by the Council on a recommendation by
the Commission, gives any Member State plenty of opportunity to block the process, and
push through demands related to its own national agenda. See, Hillion, “The Creeping
Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy,“ 21.
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not knowing the precise nature of the regime envisaged in the area of free
movement of persons, the special mechanisms and terms used in past Acces-
sion Agreements are analysed with the expectation that past practice will
provide clues as to the future boundaries which Member States will need to




After having reviewed the procedural constraints on Member States that result
from the wording of Article 49 TEU as well as past practice, the focus of this
Chapter is on the substantive constraints that similarly flow from the wording
of Article 49 TEU, and its concomitant reflection in past practice. An overview
of past practice, in this case as evidenced by past Accession Agreements, is
provided with the aim to establish the existence of substantive constraints on
Member States as primary law makers in the context of an accession of a new
Member State.
This Chapter begins by discussing the change in the formulation of the
concept in the English language version, which establishes the most important
substantive constraint embedded in the wording of Article 49 TEU, from
“amendment” to “adjustment”. Given the absence of such a change, as well
as the distinction between the concepts of “adjustments” and “adaptations”
in other language versions of the latter provision, the relationship between
the terms “adjustment” and “adaptation” is examined, hoping that the inter-
pretation of the latter concept by the Court of Justice will shed light on the
interpretation of the former. What follows afterwards is an examination of
the most widely employed measures that provide for the “adjustment” or
“adaptation” (used in their broadest colloquial sense) of applicant States, as
they enable the gradual extension of the acquis to those States: that is transi-
tional measures, quasi-transitional measures, past and present forms of safe-
guard clauses. Last but not least, follows a chronological overview of past
measures, which arguably could qualify as going beyond being mere ‘adjust-
ments’ or ‘adaptations’. It will be demonstrated how difficult labelling or
categorizing these measures is so as to reveal the room of manoeuvre Member
States had during past negotiation processes.
Since the aim of this thesis is to identify the constraints on Member States
in drafting Accession Treaties, before going into identifying the existence of
substantive constraints, it is worth briefly examining what such Treaties
typically look like and what they contain. That overview provides a good
summary of the fundamentals of the process. The fact that the overall structure
of Acts of Accession has remained largely unchanged over the decades is
another indication of consistent practice in this area.
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To begin with the main document that is the Accession Treaty to which
the Act of Accession and other Annexes are attached, it is a document consist-
ing of three articles followed by the respective signatures of heads of state
or government empowered to sign the document. Article 1(1) of an Accession
Treaty proclaims that hereby the state concerned becomes a member to the
EEC/EC/EU. Article 1(2) points out that the conditions of admission and adjust-
ments to the Treaties necessitated by this accession are to be found in the Act
annexed to this Treaty, which forms an integral part of the latter. Article 1(3)
adds that powers and jurisdictions of EC/EU institutions apply in respect to
this Treaty as well. This article is of utmost importance, because firstly, it
describes what is happening, that is a State is acceding to the Union (Article
1(1)); secondly, it points to what this entails or how this is happening, by
agreement as to the conditions of admission and by making the corresponding
adjustments to the Treaties (Article 1(2)); and last but not least, it establishes
the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice with respect to Accession Treaties
(Article 1 (3)). In other words, the Court is to ensure (Article 1(3)) that what
happens, i.e. accession (Article 1(1)), happens in line with the requirements
of Article 1(2), without going beyond the constraints set thereby.
Put very briefly, Article 2 of an Accession Treaty stipulates that it needs
to be ratified with the respective constitutional requirements of the contracting
parties. It establishes a date when the Treaty enters into force. However, in
case not all acceding states submit their instruments of ratification in due time,
the Council is to decide immediately on such resulting adjustments as have
become indispensable. The latter provision is another proof of the Union/
supranational nature of the process as well as the technical nature of adjust-
ments necessitated by a candidate State’s accession. Finally, Article 3 lists all
the languages, adding the languages of the acceding states to the list of existing
official languages, in which the Accession Treaty is to be equally authentic.
On the whole, firstly, the Accession Treaty succinctly describes the
essentials of the process: what happens, how it happens, and impliedly, what
(sanction) could follow if the process were not to follow the requirements listed
in Article 1(2). Secondly, it reveals that the substantive issues, i.e. changes to
the Treaties and secondary law, are dealt with in the Act of Accession and
the Annexes attached to the Treaty of Accession. Lastly, it provides for the
procedure concluding the process with the entry into force of the Accession
Treaty, and just in case stipulates for an alternative procedure to enable the
completion of the process if an acceding State were to fail to comply with the
requirements of the former procedure, i.e. it fails to ratify the Treaty.
As to the content of the Act of Accession, part one lays down the “Prin-
ciples” governing the Act. Part two is titled “Adjustments to the Treaties” and
contains “Institutional Provisions” (Title I) and “Other Adjustments” (Title
II). It is followed by part three on “Adaptations to Acts Adopted by the Institu-
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tions”.625 Part four contains the “Transitional Measures” of the Act.626 Last
but not least, comes part five on the “Provisions Related to the Implementation
of this Act.” It should be noted that part three, on the adaptations to secondary
EU law, the most voluminous part of the document, merely makes a reference
to the relevant Annexes of the Act where those adaptations are to be found.
As mentioned above, in establishing the substantive constraints on Member
States in drafting Accession Treaties, the starting point is the terms used in
various versions of Article 49 TEU, the most important one being the term
“adjustments to the Treaties”. It is quite a challenge to accurately define the
scope of the latter term, since distinguishing between adjustments, adaptations
and other substantive changes is quite difficult and open to dispute.627 Infer-
ences are drawn as to the meaning and scope of the term from its past use
in Acts of Accession (see preceding paragraph), as well as from the Court’s
case law clarifying the term “adaptations”.
5.2 THE NOTION OF “ADJUSTMENTS” TO THE TREATIES
To begin by repeating the wording of Article 237 EEC and Article 205 EAEC,
it provided as follows:
‘Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall
address its application to the Council which, after obtaining the opinion of the
Commission, shall act by means of a unanimous vote.
The conditions of admission and the amendments to this Treaty necessitated thereby
shall be the subject of agreement between the Member States and the applicant
State. Such agreement shall be submitted to all the contracting States for ratification
in accordance with their respective constitutional rules. [Emphasis added]’
Each paragraph imposes a substantive requirement: the first paragraph requires
that the applicant state be European, while the second paragraph requires the
conditions of admission and the amendments to the Treaties necessitated by
the applicant State’s accession to be agreed upon by all the contracting States.
Implicit in the second paragraph is the condition that the changes to the Treaty
necessitated by the accession of the applicant State are limited to amendments/
625 Under the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession, part three was renamed as “Permanent Provi-
sions”. However, its content did not change. The titles of that part were as follows: “Adapta-
tions to acts adopted by the institutions (amendments to secondary law)” (Title I) and “Other
Provisions” (Title II). See respectively, OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, and OJ L 157, 21.6.2005.
626 Under the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession, part four was renamed as “Temporary Pro-
visions”. Again there was no change content-wise: its Title I contained “Transitional
Measures” and Title II contained “Other Provisions”.
627 Becker, “EU-Enlargements and Limits to Amendments of the E.C. Treaty,“ 9.
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changes necessitated by that accession. In other words, there needs to be a
direct causal link between the accession of the applicant State and the ensuing
changes to the Treaties.
These two provisions, together with Article 98 ECSC, were replaced by a
single provision in the Treaty of Maastricht, which reformulated the first
sentence of the second paragraph cited above, as follows: “The conditions of
admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded
which such admission entails shall be the subject of an agreement between
the Member States and the applicant State”.628 The implications of that change
are discussed in more detail below. For now suffice to say that examination
of other language versions reveals that there was no change in the substantive
scope of the constraint imposed by the term “adjustment” as opposed to
“amendment”. The aim was simply to clarify the constraint imposed by that
provision by using a more accurate term, which had already been the case
in other language versions.
Another important substantive requirement added by the Treaty of Amster-
dam was that only European States, which respected the principles set out
in Article 6(1) TEU, could apply to become members of the Union. Hence,
respect for the principles on which the Union was founded and which were
common to the Member States became another substantive requirement and
as such another constraint on the applicant as well as Member States. To name
those principles, they were “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law”.
These principles were renamed as “values” in Article 2 TEU with Lisbon
Treaty amendment and the list was further extended. Article 2 TEU now reads
as follows:
‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidar-
ity and equality between women and men prevail.’
With the Lisbon Treaty revision, it was no longer enough for the applicant
State to respect these values, it also had to illustrate that it was committed
to promoting them. Arguably, as a result of the experience gained from the
Eastern enlargement, it was important to emphasize that it was not enough
that the laws of a State were in line with these principles and Union acquis
on paper, their implementation and incorporation into daily practice was also
deemed equally important.
The mirror image of this substantive constraint on the applicant State to
comply with the foundational values of the Union is to be found in the pro-
628 Article O of the Treaty on the European Union.
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vision cited above (Article 2 TEU). It applies to Member States at all times, i.e.
not only when they act within the scope of EU law, as under Article 49 TEU,
but also when they act outside it. Hence, “a clear risk of a serious breach by
a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2”629 triggers the applica-
tion of Article 7 TEU. The threat of an external sanction under Article 7 TEU,
which can be taken by the Council by qualified majority, can go as far as
suspending “certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties
to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of the represent-
ative of the government of that Member State in the Council”.630 As important
as the latter substantive constraint is on Member States, it is dealt with in more
detail in the last part of the thesis, which identifies legal constraints flowing
from the constitutional foundations of the Union. As will be argued and
illustrated in Part III, the values listed in Article 2 TEU (principles listed in ex
Article 6(1) TEU) constitute an integral part of the Union’s constitutional
foundations, whereas this Chapter focuses exclusively on the substantive
constraints on Member States flowing from (the wording of) Article 49 TEU
and particularly from the term “adjustment to the Treaties”.
5.2.1 Meaning and scope of the term “adjustment”
To shed light on the true nature and scope of the term “adjustment” used in
Article 49 TEU, which replaced the word “amendment” used in the first English
version of the EEC Treaty, it is worth examining and comparing the original
language versions of the EEC Treaty, as English became an official language
only after the accession of the UK and Ireland in 1973. Hence, following the
method laid down by the Court for the interpretation of a particular term or
provision of EU law, such an interpretation entails first of all “a comparison
of the different language versions”, which are all equally authentic.631 Second-
ly, even when different language versions are in agreement, the Court warns
that EU law uses a terminology peculiar to it, which does not necessarily
correspond to the meaning it has acquired in national law. Last but not least,
the Court provides instructions explaining the fundamentals of its most widely
used “teleological” method of interpretation, which requires “every provision
of [EU] law [to] be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the
provisions of [EU] law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof
and to its evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be
applied”.632
629 Article 7(1) TEU.
630 Article 7(3) TEU.
631 Case 283/81 CILFIT, [1982] ECR 3415, para. 18.
632 Ibid., para. 20.
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For an accurate understanding of the substantive constraint imposed by
the wording of Article 237 EEC, the scope of the term “adjustment”/ “amend-
ment” used in the original Dutch, French, and German versions, alphabetically,
will be analyzed in comparison to the term providing for the procedure for
amending the Treaty in the preceding Article 236 EEC. It will be demonstrated
that in all the three language versions consistently, a concept with a more
restrictive scope compared to that used in Article 236 EEC has been employed,
which implies that Member States have less freedom/ discretion, i.e. they are
more constrained when acting as primary law makers under Article 237 EEC
as compared to Article 236 EEC.
To begin by comparing the terms used in the Dutch version of the EEC
Treaty, Article 236(1) employs the terms “herziening van dit Verdrag” (amend-
ment/revision of this Treaty), and “wijzigingen” (changes) in Article 236(3),
while Article 237(2) uses the more restrictive term “aanpassingen” (adaptations,
adjustments). Similarly, the terms used in the French version of Article 236(1)
and (3) are broader (respectively; “la révision du présent Traité” (revision/
amendment of the present Treaty) and “[l]es amendments” (amendments/
changes)) compared to the term “les adaptations” (adaptations/adjustments)
used in Article 237(2) EEC. The German version of the EEC Treaty follows the
same logic: Article 236(1) and (3) uses respectively the terms “Änderung dieses
Vertrags” (change/ amendment of this Treaty) and “[d]iese Änderungen”
(these changes/amendments), while Article 237(2) uses the term “Anpas-
sungen” (adjustments/adaptations). The following Treaty revisions have not
changed that logic, and the terms used in the current Articles 48 and 49 TEU
in the Dutch, French and German language versions, still reflect the more
restrictive scope of the term “adjustment” used in Article 49(2) TEU.
The use of different terms in Articles 236 and 237 EEC does not come as
a surprise. Those terms make perfect sense when considered in their context
and interpreted in the light of EU law as whole. To begin with the amendment
procedure laid down in Article 236 EEC (now Article 48 TEU), it has a much
broader purpose, which is to encompass and accommodate changes/ amend-
ments the nature of which, it is difficult to predict in advance. This is clearly
illustrated by the EC’s evolution into EU by the Treaty of Maastricht. Hence,
Member States had (and still have) more room for manoeuvre under Article
236 (an now 48 TEU), i.e. they are less constrained. While the purpose of Article
237 EEC is much more clear and circumscribed, it is to be used in the context
of accession of a new Member State to make the changes strictly necessary
for the latter State’s incorporation into the Union’s structures and policies.
Hence, Member States are more constrained when acting as primary law
makers under Article 237 EEC (now Article 49 TEU).
In other words, the change in the English wording of Article 49 TEU by
the Treaty of Maastricht from “amendments” to “adjustments”, made it more
clear and precise. It simply brought it in line with the other language versions
of the Treaty rather than making any substantive change to the scope of the
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term used in that provision. The English version of Articles 236 and 237
EEC,633 as far as it used the same term “amendment” in both provisions, was
an “aberration” rather than the rule: an aberration, which was duly corrected.
In conclusion, the analysis of different language versions of Article 237
EEC (now Article 49 TEU) clearly reveals that the scope of the term “adjustment”
is narrower than that of the term “amendment”. While the umbrella term
encompassing both is “Treaty change”, when interpreted in the their context,
the former Treaty change takes place under Article 49 TEU procedure and
provides only for the changes necessitated by the accession of new Member
States, such as the changing distribution of seats in the institutions as well
as other changes enabling the full participation of the new Member States in
policies and areas of Union action. The change envisioned by Article 236 TEU
has always been much broader so as to accommodate the need for any type
of change that might be needed in the long road to complete European integra-
tion. Despite the existing differentiation between the “ordinary revision pro-
cedure” and “simplified revision procedure” under Article 48 TEU, the terms
“revision” and “amendment” used in the framework of the latter provision
still have a broader scope.
Even though the scope of the term “amendment” is broader than that of
“adjustment”, as discussed in the introduction of this thesis, it should be
remembered that many constitutional courts are of the opinion that the concept
of “amendment” is not as broad as to encompass any change, but only changes
that respect the “basic structure”, the coherence, the spirit or the “very founda-
tions” of the Constitution, which they aim to amend.634 As important as it
is to establish that the concept “adjustment” has a narrower substantive scope
than the concept of “amendment”, which is also restrictively interpreted in
some jurisdictions, it does not provide a clear definition of the kind of changes
falling within the scope of the concept “adjustment”. The following part aims
to further clarify the definition of the latter concept.
633 Article 236 of the EEC Treaty read as follows: “[1.] The Government of any Member State
or the Commission may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of this Treaty.
[2.] If the Council, after consulting the Assembly [European Parliament] and, where appro-
priate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a conference of representat-
ives of the Governments of the Member States, the conference shall be convened by the
President of the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments
to be made to this Treaty. [3.] The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified
by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”
634 See the relevant literature cited in the introductory Chapter.
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5.2.2 “Adjustments to the Treaties” v. “Adaptations to Acts Adopted by the
Institutions”
So what does it mean exactly to make adjustments to the Treaties? How do
we know if the changes made go beyond mere adjustments as provided in
Article 49(2) TEU? One would think that adjustments are small technical
changes, i.e. adaptations that extend the existing acquis to the new Member
State and enable its participation in the Union’s institutional structures and
policies. Unfortunately, the Treaties themselves are silent about the precise
definition and scope of the term “adjustment”. So are English commentaries
on the EU Treaties. However, there is case law of the Court that could be of
some help. Although the case law is not strictly speaking on the definition
of the term “adjustment” in Article 49(2) TEU, it is on the definition of the term
“adaptation” that is contained in the provisions of various Accession Agree-
ments. Based upon an overview of the titles and contents of various Acts of
Accession, it is possible to make the observation that adjustments are the
technical changes made to the Treaties extending them to the newcomers, while
adaptations are the technical changes made to secondary EU law in order to
extend it to the acceding States.
Since there is no such distinction between the terms “adjustment” and
“adaptation”, in many other language versions, such as Dutch, French and
German, it could be argued that what the Court has established about the term
“adaptation” could also be used to explain the term “adjustment”. It is note-
worthy that in the just mentioned language versions, only one term is
employed to cover both terms. In Dutch, it is the term “aanpassing”, in French,
“adaptation”, and in German “Anpassung”. In other words, in these language
versions it seems more natural or intuitive to take the guidance of the Court
on adaptations and apply it cautiously to adjustments.
As described above, in every Accession Treaty there has been a part con-
taining provisions on the adaptation of secondary EU law. To look more closely
at one of those provisions to illustrate the point, Article 57(1) of the 2003 Act
of Accession states as follows:
‘Where acts of the institutions prior to accession require adaptation by reason of
accession, and the necessary adaptations have not been provided for in this Act
or its Annexes, those adaptations shall be made in accordance with the procedure
laid down by paragraph 2. Those adaptations shall enter into force as from acces-
sion.’
Both adjustments and adaptations aim to make the necessary changes for
accession, as mentioned above; the former is used in the context of changes
to the Treaties and the latter in the context of secondary law. Both types of
technical changes are necessary to be able to bring the acceding State within
the Union structures and to ensure the applicability of the Union acquis in that
State. Few points could be made about the added value of including a pro-
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vision such as Article 57 in an Accession Treaty. First, comes the vast challenge
of screening the entire acquis and making the necessary changes. It is not out
of question that the adaptation of certain secondary measures might have
simply been forgotten and therefore not included in an Accession Treaty. The
second and probably main reason is the fact that the EU is a moving target;
many legal acts are adopted every day. This means that the period between
the signature of an Accession Treaty and its actual entry into force might
become problematic if the interests of an acceding State have not been taken
into account.635 To be able to promptly resolve any problems that arise in
the interim period, provisions such as Article 57 have been included in Acces-
sion Treaties.636
It should be noted that provisions of the kind of Article 57 provide for
changes to “acts of the institutions”, not for the provisions of the Treaties. Even
though the aim of both types of changes (i.e. “adjustments” and “adaptations”)
is to enable the actual accession of the applicant State into the Union, they
involve changes to instruments in the different ranks of the constitutional
hierarchical order. Hence, the higher a norm is in the constitutional hierarchy,
the more restrictive will be the rules providing for the conditions of its change.
In other words, since the Treaties are higher in the hierarchy of constitutional
norms, it is to be expected that “adjustments” will be more difficult, and not
easier, to make in comparison to “adaptations” to secondary law.
In three relatively recent cases, the Court provided some clarification
regarding the meaning of the term “adaptation”.637 According to the Court,
the “adaptations” to which some provisions of Accession Agreements refer
“… correspond, in principle, to amendments necessary to ensure the full
applicability of acts of the institutions to the new Member States and which
are intended, with that in view, to supplement those acts in the long term”.638
The Court explains further that measures which can be adopted on the basis
of provisions such as Article 57 of the 2003 Act of Accession “… are limited,
in principle, to adaptations intended to render earlier Community measures
applicable in the new Member States to the exclusion of all other amendments…,
and, particularly, to the exclusion of temporary derogations”.639
635 See Cases Case C-413/04 Parliament v Council, [2006] ECR I-11221; and Case C-414/04 Parlia-
ment v Council, [2006] ECR I-11279.
636 See also Article 23 of the 2003 Act of Accession providing for a procedure to make adapta-
tions to acts related to the Common Agricultural Policy. See also Case C-273/04 Poland v
Council, [2007] ECR I-8925.
637 Case C-413/04 Parliament v Council; Case C-414/04 Parliament v Council; Case C-273/04 Poland
v Council.
638 Case C-413/04 Parliament v Council, para. 32.
639 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 37. See by way of analogy, in respect of the corresponding
provision in the 1994 Act of Accession (Article 169), Case C-259/95 Parliament v Council,
[1997] ECR I-5303, paras. 14 and 19.
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The Court’s interpretation of the term “adaptation” in Article 23 of the
2003 Act of Accession, which provides for a specific procedure for adaptations
to be made in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy, is also informative.
The Court provides that “… the concept of ‘adaptation’ must be restricted to
measures which cannot in any way affect the scope of one of the provisions
of the Act of Accession relating to the CAP nor substantially alter its content,
but which solely represent adjustments designed to ensure consistency between
the Act and new provisions adopted by the Community institutions between
the signature of the Act of Accession and actual accession.”640 By analogy
it can be argued that adjustments need to be restricted to changes which cannot
in any way affect the scope of one of the provisions of the Treaties nor sub-
stantially alter their content.641
Although the Commission seems to be in favour of a broader definition
of the term “adjustment” used in Article 49(2) TEU, it draws a limit as to how
far adjustments to the Treaties can go. Starting from the premise that enlarge-
ment will necessitate far-reaching change, the Commission thinks that “[f]rom
the legal angle there is no reason why the concept of adjustment of the Treaties
of Rome (Articles 237 of the EEC Treaty and 205 of the Euratom Treaty) should
not be interpreted more broadly than in the past, as long as there is a definite
causal link between the adjustments to the Treaties and the enlargement of the
Community and as long as it is borne in mind that any change in the fundamental
principles of the Treaties can be made only by the special procedure laid down for
that purpose.”642
In other words, according to the Commission, we can test whether an
adjustment falls within the legal boundary drawn by Article 49 TEU, by check-
ing whether two cumulative conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, the adjustments
to the Treaties should be necessitated by virtue of enlargement. Secondly, the
adjustments should be in law and in fact mere adaptations or amendments
enabling the accession of the applicant State, i.e. they should not bring about
any change in the fundamental principles of the Treaties and the way the
Union operates.643 Any amendment going beyond the above definition neces-
640 Emphasis added. Case C-273/04 Poland v Council, para. 48.
641 In similar vein, Becker argues that enlargements “need to leave the fundamental principles
of the Community unharmed. This means all principles which define the identity of the
Community”. According to Becker, among these are the institutional structure, principles
mentioned in ex Article 6 TEU (now renamed as ‘values’ in Article 2 TEU), fundamental
rights, the principle of integration as well as principles expressed in the policies; the basic
freedoms of the internal market being the most important part of the latter. See, Becker,
“EU-Enlargements and Limits to Amendments of the E.C. Treaty,“ 9.
642 Emphasis added. Bull. EC Supp. 2/78, “The transitional period and the institutional
implications of enlargement”, COM (78) 190, English version dated 24 April 1978, p. 9.
643 Smit and Herzog, “Article 237,“ 6-370. The fact that it was for the Council, upon Norway’s
failure to ratify the Treaty of Accession in 1972, to “decide immediately upon such resulting
adjustments as have become indispensable” to the Act of Accession illustrates the technical
nature of these adjustments, i.e. the fact that they are ‘mere adaptations’. Anything more
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sitates a Treaty modification on the basis of Article 48 TEU, since “the procedure
for admitting new Member States is designed to maintain the identity of the
admitting institution.”644
If we take the Court’s pronouncements on “adaptations” and apply it by
analogy to “adjustments”, it can be argued again that adjustments need to
be restricted to changes which cannot in any way affect the scope of one of
the provisions of the Treaties nor substantially alter their content.645 Thus,
they are merely amendments necessary to ensure the full applicability of the
Treaties to the new Member States. They are limited in principle to adjustments
intended to render the Treaties applicable in the new Member States to the
exclusion of all other amendments,646 which would need to be carried out
on the basis of Article 48 TEU.
5.2.3 “Adjustments” in previous Accession Treaties
It is possible to get a clearer idea of what “adjustments” mean by having a
brief overview of what the term entailed in past Acts of Accession. As men-
tioned above, under part two titled “Adjustments to the Treaties” of the various
Acts of Accession, one finds the “Institutional Provisions” and “Other Adjust-
ments” to the Treaties. Hence, the first and most important type of adjustments
to the Treaties are the institutional provisions, which are about the new re-
distribution of votes in the European Parliament, and the Council, and the
appointments of their nationals to the Commission, the Court of Justice and
various committees, i.e. adjustments that have to be made in every accession.
The title on “Other Adjustments” seems to be more interesting as it illustrates
what kind of other changes, other than the institutional ones, could be and
had to be made to the Treaties.
To begin with the 1972 Act of Accession, the few articles under the title
“Other Adjustments” are concerned with their territorial field of application.
Article 24(1) added the UK to the list of Member States specified in the first
sentence of Article 131 of the EEC Treaty. Article 24(2) added the list of coun-
tries and territories with which the UK had a special relationship to the list
in Annex IV to the EEC Treaty, that is the list of the countries and territories
with a special relationship to a Member State and which benefitted from special
association arrangements at the time. Articles 25, 26 and 27 made changes to
the articles determining the territorial field of application of the three founding
political would have required renegotiation among all the parties involved. See, Puissochet,
The Enlargement of the European Communities – A Commentary on the Treaty and the Acts
Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom: 125.
644 Becker, “EU-Enlargements and Limits to Amendments of the E.C. Treaty,“ 8-9.
645 Case C-273/04 Poland v Council, para. 48.
646 Case C-413/04 Parliament v Council, paras. 32 and 37.
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Treaties.647 The final article in this title, that is Article 28, defined the arrange-
ments applicable to the territory of Gibraltar.648
Subsequent Acts of Accession follow a similar pattern; they add the name
of the new Member State to the list in Article 227(1) of the EEC Treaty (now
Article 52 TEU) thereby extending the territorial application of the relevant
version of the Treaty to the new Member State, and specify the legal regime
that is to apply to the countries and territories with a special relationship to
that new Member State. Of course, the latter applies only to states in possession
of such territories. In the Spanish and Portuguese Act of Accession, the Treaties
and acts of the institutions applicable to the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla,
are made subject to the derogations referred to in the following paragraphs
of Article 25 and other provisions of the Act of Accession.649 Similarly, in
the 1994 Act of Accession, under the title “Other Adjustments”, it is stipulated
that “[t]his Treaty shall not apply to the Åland islands.” However, as in other
cases of special relationship, the Member State to which the country or territory
647 Article 25 determines the territorial field of application of the ECSC Treaty after accession.
The Treaty was not applicable to the Faroe Islands, unless Denmark submitted a declaration
to the French government; similarly, it was not applicable to the Sovereign Base Areas of
the UK in Cyprus; and it was partially applicable to the Channel Islands and the Isle of
Man. Article 26 determines the territorial field of application of the EEC Treaty after
accession. By Article 26 (2) which is to supplement Article 227(3) of the EEC Treaty, it was
reminded that the overseas countries and territories in Annex IV of the EEC Treaty enjoy
special arrangements of association. It was also clarified that countries and territories that
were not added to the list, were excluded from the general field of application of the Treaty,
even if constitutionally they were considered part of the Member States. (The only countries
with that status that were not included in the list at the time were Rhodesia, and the
territory of Hong Kong.) As far as the status of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man
is concerned, according to Puissochet, the treatment granted to them appeared to be like
“a general regime of exclusion, except in respect to the Community rules concerning the
exchange of products and the application of the agricultural policy, insofar as it affects
the movement of products.” See, Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities
– A Commentary on the Treaty and the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom: 186. Finally, Article 27 defined the territorial field of application of the
Euratom Treaty.
648 The regime established regarding Gibraltar is confusing. Article 28 excludes Gibraltar from
the field of application of the common agricultural policy. However, according to Puissochet,
due to the curious wording of the article, it seems to leave the Treaties applicable, while
at the same time excluding the application of the acts of the institutions. Overall, he
concludes that the Community rules will apply only to a minor extent in Gibraltar. See,
ibid., 187-89. See further the case concerning the voting rights for European Parliament
elections in Gibraltar, ECtHR, Matthews v the UK, Appl. No. 24833/94.
649 Regarding the application of EU law to the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, a special
regime is established again. While Article 25(2) of the Act refers to Protocol No. 2 which
establishes the conditions under which the EEC and ECSC Treaties concerning free move-
ment of goods, and acts of the institutions concerning customs legislation and commercial
policy are concerned, Article 25(3) excludes those territories from scope of application of
the common agricultural policy and common fisheries policy.
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is connected may by means of a declaration make the acquis applicable to that
territory.650
The only other novel provision in the 2003 Act of Accession stipulated that
the following sentence should be added to Article 57(1) of the EC Treaty: “In
respect of restrictions [in the area of free movement of capital to and from
third countries] existing under national law in Estonia and Hungary, the
relevant date shall be 31 December 1999.”651 Article 13 of the 2005 Act of
Accession also adds Bulgaria to that sentence. Article 12 of Croatia’s Act adds
Croatia, and specifies the relevant date as 31 December 2002. The final article
under the title “Other Adjustments” of the 2005 Act of Accession stipulates
the addition of a phrase to Article IV-448(1) of the Constitution, which makes
the Bulgarian and Romanian versions of the Accession Treaty also
authentic.652
Overall, it is possible to conclude that other than the institutional adjust-
ments made to the Treaties by the Acts of Accession, the main issue dealt with
under this title has been the special relationship between some Member States
and their former colonies or territories for which they are responsible. The
only other provision that was different made an adjustment to Article 57(1)
EC to allow Estonia, Hungary and Bulgaria to keep the restrictions they had
on 31 December 1999 in the area of free movement of capital to and from third
countries.
In short, this overview of past provisions of various Acts of Accession
demonstrates that the most important changes under the title “Adjustments
to the Treaties” are to be found under the title “Institutional Provisions”. Issues
regulated under the title “Other Adjustments” are very limited. The latter is
another indication of the substantively limited scope of the term “adjustments”
used in Article 49(2) TEU. It requires both a restrictive interpretation of the
term, as well as a tight causal link between the changes to the Treaties and
the accession of the new Member State.
650 If the Government of Finland makes such a declaration, the rules applicable to the Åland
islands will be those specified in Protocol No 2 to the 1994 Act of Accession.
651 Article 56 EC prohibited all restrictions on the movement of capital and payments between
the Member States, and between Member States and third countries. Article 57(1) EC
provided that “[t]he provisions of Article 56 shall be without prejudice to the application
to third countries of any restrictions which exist on 31 December 1993 under national or
Community law adopted in respect of the movement of capital to or from third countries
involving direct investment – including in real estate – establishment, the provision of
financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets.”
652 Although its main components and structure are the same, it is interesting to note that
what has so far been called an Act, for instance an “Act concerning the conditions of
accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and
the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union
is founded”, in the case of Bulgaria and Romania is called “Protocol Concerning the
conditions and arrangements for admission of the republic of Bulgaria and Romania to
the European Union”.
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5.2.4 Other measures facilitating the full integration of new Member States
The measures discussed in this section are not strictly speaking “adjustments”
within the meaning of Article 49(2) TEU; however, they can be considered as
instruments of adjustment/ adaptation in a much broader sense, as they all
share the same underlying rationale, which is the eventual full extension of
the acquis communautaire to the new Member States. While adjustments and
adaptations ensure the immediate extension of the Treaties and secondary law
to the new Member State after its accession, the aim of the measures in this
section is to provide the new and old Member States with some flexibility for
a pre-determined period of time to deal with difficulties and unforeseen
situations that might arise after the accession of the new Member State. In other
words, the measures dealt with in this section postpone the full implementation
of parts of the acquis under specified circumstances for a pre-determined period
after joining the EU.
The most important instruments dealt with in this section are transitional
measures, quasi-transitional measures, and safeguard clauses. While transitional
measures are negotiated prior to a country’s accession in line with the diffi-
culties it expects to experience in certain sectors and provides it with extra
time to prepare and adapt those sectors in view of the time the Union rules
in that sector will apply fully, safeguard clauses are put in place also for a
specified period, however as instruments aimed to enable the protection of
the interests of either the new or old Member States regarding unforeseen
problems in a given area. What differentiates the quasi-transitional measures
from these two instruments is that they are in place for an unspecified and
unforeseeable amount of time after a new Member State’s accession. Quasi-
transitional measures in a given area, which suspend the full application of
the acquis in that area, apply as long as the new Member State fails to fulfil
the conditions necessary to fully join that area. Unlike transitional measures
and safeguard clauses, they do not automatically and fully extend the acquis
to the new Member State after the expiry of a pre-determined period, but do
so only conditionally, upon the fulfilment of pre-determined criteria by the
new Member State.
An overview of types of measures used in past Acts of Accession might
prove useful since Turkey’s Negotiating Framework is not very precise as to
either the nature of the measures to be employed or as to the respective fields
in which they are to be employed. It simply mentions the possibility of includ-
ing “[l]ong transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or per-
manent safeguard clauses … in areas such as freedom of movement of persons,
structural policies or agriculture”.653 It is worth looking at different types
of measures used in past Acts of Accession, as that overview will help us
653 Negotiating Framework for Turkey, point 12, para. 4.
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establish their nature, functions and purpose. That in turn will provide us with
clues as to what was possible and what not in the past. In other words, the
latter overview will shed light on the constraints on Member States in drafting
Acts of Accession. Moreover, the Court’s comparative analysis of these
measures in past cases will enlighten us further as to the nature of these
measures as well as the substantive constraints flowing from the terms “adjust-
ments” and “adaptations”.
The following overview begins by an analysis of the most widely used
measures in past Acts of Accession that is transitional measures. It is followed
by a more novel variant of those measures, i.e. what here are called “quasi-
transitional measures”. Lastly, follows an overview of the past and present
of safeguard clauses with a view to establishing the repertoire of existing
clauses so as to establish the existence or the possibility of including a safe-
guard clause of a permanent nature in a future Act of Accession.
5.2.4.1 Transitional measures
Once the applicant States accepted the principle that they had to adopt the
acquis communautaire in full, the remaining task was the negotiation of the more
difficult areas the implementation of which would not be possible immediately
upon accession. As Avery succinctly puts it, “…the scope of the negotiations
is limited to the possibility of delays in applying the rules during ‘transitional
periods’”.654 In the majority of areas that Member States are able to adopt
and implement the acquis upon accession, there is no need for negotiations.
Only the necessary technical adjustments or adaptations need to be carried
out. Conversely, lengthy negotiations take place in areas where applicant States
think they need more time to implement the relevant acquis. Thus, the form
and method as well as the time-line of the transitional measures was one of
the main topics that had to be negotiated and agreed upon by the applicants
and the existing Member States.
The case law of the Court on the nature of transitional measures and the
way they need to be interpreted is quite illuminating. In Case C-413/04 Euro-
pean Parliament v Council, which was mentioned above to explain the meaning
of the term “adaptations”,655 what was at issue were temporary derogations
in favour of Estonia regarding the application of Directive 2003/54/EC provid-
ing for common rules for the internal market in electricity. The Council
adopted the contested directive (Directive 2004/85/EC) on 28 June 2004 on
the basis of Article 57 of the 2003 Act of Accession (AA). The problem was
firstly, that Article 57 AA allowed only for “adaptations” to be made to acts
of the institutions.656 It was Article 55 AA that provided for the possibility
654 Avery, “The Enlargement Negotiations,“ 40.
655 See section 5.2.2 above.
656 For the wording of Article 57 of the 2003 Act of Accession, see section 5.2.2.
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of adopting temporary derogations, but then only before 1 May 2004, and only
regarding acts of the institutions that were adopted between 1 November 2002
and the date of the signature of the Treaty of Accession, that is 16 April 2003.
Secondly, the European Parliament had no role to play under Article 57 AA.
The EP challenged the legal basis of the directive and the Court of Justice had
to rule on whether the “transitional measures” in the contested directive could
be considered “adaptations” under Article 57 AA.
AG Geelhoed in his Opinion explains eloquently the terminological differ-
ence between “temporary derogations” used in Article 55 AA and “adaptations”
used in Article 57 AA. His interpretation of these terms was also taken up by
the Court. The AG agreed with the arguments of the European Parliament and
the Commission, and suggested that the main difference between the terms
was as follows: “whereas ‘derogations’ are aimed at temporarily rendering
an element of the acquis communautaire inapplicable in a Member State in order
to grant it the sufficient time to take the necessary steps to permit it to comply
fully with its Community obligations, ‘adaptations’ are aimed at the opposite
effect of making the acquis applicable on accession.”657 In other words, the
temporary derogations delay the application of a given Community measure
in a new Member State, while adaptations enable the immediate application
of that measure upon accession.658
Based on the above observations and on the Court’s ruling in a previous
case concerning a parallel provision in the 1994 Act of Accession,659 the AG
suggested that:
‘the concept of ‘adaptations’ which at first sight appears to be more general in scope,
cannot, in the context of Article 57 AA, be construed as encompassing substantive
amendments to Community acts or measures permitting derogations to these acts. It
therefore only covers inescapable adaptations to a Community measure which are
incited by technical necessity rather than political opportunity.’660
According to the AG, the difference in meaning between the two concepts can
also be derived from the functions of Articles 55 AA and 57 AA, as well as from
the difference in procedure prescribed for the adoption of measures under
those provisions. The decision underlying the grant of temporary derogations
is of a political nature according to the AG, since temporary derogations are
granted at the request of an applicant State and since they amount to an
authorization of non-compliance with certain Community law obligations for
a limited period. Therefore, Article 55 AA provides, at the request of the
acceding State, for decision-making with unanimity. Whereas the adaptation
657 Opinion of AG Geelhoed, delivered on 1 June 2006, in Case C-413/04 Parliament v Council,
para. 55.
658 Ibid.
659 Case C-259/95 Parliament v Council.
660 Emphasis added. Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-413/04 Parliament v Council, para. 57.
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of Community acts in order to make them fully applicable in the new Member
State upon accession is a direct result of the principle that a new Member State
needs to adopt and implement the acquis in full and immediately upon acces-
sion. The AG argues that there is nothing political about such adaptations,
hence they can be adopted by the Council acting by qualified majority voting
on a proposal of the Commission or by the Commission on its own in respect
of acts adopted by it.661
The Court also reached the conclusion that “temporary derogations from
the application of the provisions of a Community act, whose sole object and
purpose is to delay the effective application of the Community act concerned
as regards a new Member State, cannot, in principle, be described as ‘adapta-
tions’, within the meaning of Article 57 of the 2003 Act of Accession.”662 The
adoption of those temporary derogations involved a political assessment
according to the Court. As such those derogations could not be adopted validly
on the basis of Article 57 AA.663
Another case that provides guidance as to how temporary derogations are
to be interpreted is an infringement action brought by the Commission against
the UK.664 The issue underlying the case was the national law in the UK, which
had the effect of restricting imports of potatoes even after the expiration of
the transitional period laid down in Article 9 of the Act of Accession. While
the Commission was relying on Article 9AA, the UK was relying on Article
60(2) AA for its claim on entitlement to maintain the existing restrictions. To
look at the wording of these provisions, Article 9 AA laid down the general
rule and it provided that:
‘1. In order to facilitate the adjustment of the new Member States to the rules in
force within the Communities, the application of the original Treaties and acts
adopted by the institutions shall, as a transitional measure, be subject to the de-
rogations provided for in this Act.
2. Subject to the dates, time limits and special provisions provided for in this Act,
the application of the transitional measures shall terminate at the end of 1977.’
Article 60(2) AA, which was an application of the general rule laid down in
Article 9 AA provided as follows:
‘In respect of products not covered, on the date of accession, by a common
organisation of the market, the provisions of Title I concerning the progressive
abolition of charges having equivalent effect to customs duties and of quantitative
restrictions and measures having equivalent effect shall not apply to those charges,
661 Ibid., paras. 57-58.
662 Case C-413/04 European Parliament v Council, para. 38.
663 Ibid., paras. 60-61.
664 Case 231/78 Commission v UK.
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restrictions and measures if they form part of a national market organisation on
the date of accession.
This provision shall apply only to the extent necessary to ensure the maintenance
of the national organisation until the common organisation of the market for these
products is implemented.’
Since potatoes were not covered by any common organization of the market
at the time, the UK argued that Article 60(2) AA constituted a special provision
within the meaning of Article 9(2) AA, which meant that it could maintain its
rules for the national organization for that sector. The Commission agreed
that Article 60(2) AA constituted derogation from the main rule in Article 42
AA,665 however it disagreed that it constituted a “special provision” within
the meaning of Article 9(2) AA.
The Court acknowledged that if considered in isolation, the wording of
Article 60(2) AA might appear to support the interpretation of the UK govern-
ment. However, it ruled that that interpretation could not be upheld in the
light of the general system of the Act of Accession and of its relationship with
the provisions of the EEC Treaty. According to the Court, such an interpretation
would “lead to unacceptable consequences as regards the equality of the Member
States in relation to certain rules essential for the proper functioning of the common
market.”666
Following its teleological approach to interpretation, the Court looked at
Article 2 AA,667 and established that the integration of the new Member States
into the Community is the fundamental objective of the Act of Accession.
Article 9(1) AA laid down that it is only “in order to facilitate the adjustment
of the new Member States to the rules in force within the Communities” that
“the application of the original Treaties and acts adopted by institutions shall,
as a transitional measure, be subject to the derogations provided for in this
Act.”668 Thus, the provisions of the Acts of Accession needed to be interpreted
with due regard “to the foundations and the system of the Community, as
established by the Treaty”.669 According to the Court, the provisions on
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect in the Act of
665 Article 42 AA reads as follows: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and exports shall,
from the date of accession, be abolished between the Community as originally constituted
and the new Member States and between the new Member States themselves. Measures
having equivalent effect to such restrictions shall be abolished by 1 January 1975 at the
latest.”
666 Emphasis added. Case 231/78 Commission v UK, para. 9.
667 Article 2 AA is the embodiment of the main principle of negotiation in the 1972 Act of
Accession. It reads as follows: “From the date of accession, the provisions of the original
Treaties and the acts adopted by the institutions of the Communities shall be binding on
the new Member States and shall apply in those States under the conditions laid down
in those Treaties and in this Act.”
668 Case 231/78 Commission v UK, para. 11.
669 Ibid., para. 12.
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Accession could not be interpreted in isolation from the related provisions
in the EEC Treaty. After examining the relevant provisions in the Treaty,
Articles 3(A) and Articles 30 et seq., the Court concluded that the importance
of the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and all measures having equi-
valent effect “for the achievement of freedom of trade between Member States
precludes any broad interpretation of the reservations or derogations in that
connexion provided for in the Act of Accession.”670
The Court ruled that Article 60(2) AA constituted derogation from the rule
laid down in Article 42 AA, however, it could not be regarded as a special
provision within the meaning of Article 9(2) AA. The reservation made in
Article 9(2) AA could not be given a broad interpretation. It needed to be
interpreted as relating only to special provisions, which were clearly defined
and delimited in time, and not to provisions such as Article 60(2) AA, which
referred to an uncertain event in the future.671
According to the Court, its conclusion is also confirmed by a consideration
of the consequences that would flow from the alternative interpretation ad-
vocated by the UK. Accordingly, “[i]n a matter as essential for the proper function-
ing of the common market as the elimination of quantitative restrictions, the Act
of Accession cannot be interpreted as having established for an indefinite period in
favour of the new Member States a legal position different from that laid down by
the Treaty for the original Member States.”672 If Article 60(2) AA were to be
regarded as a “special” provision, it would have the effect of establishing a
persisting inequality between the original and the new Member States, the
latter being able to prevent or restrict the importation of certain agricultural
products coming from the Community, while the old Member States would
be obliged under the Treaty to refrain from making such restrictions. In con-
clusion, even if “it was justified for the original Member States provisionally
to accept such inequalities, it would be contrary to the principle of equality of the
Member States before Community law to accept that such inequalities could
continue indefinitely.”673
The Court’s judgment rules out very clearly any permanent safeguard
clause or a permanent derogation from an area that is essential to the proper
functioning of the internal market. Free movement of goods and free movement
of persons674 are without doubt such areas.675 Such clauses would have
670 Ibid., para. 13.
671 Ibid., para. 16.
672 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 17.
673 Emphasis added. Ibid.
674 See, point 12, para. 4 of the Negotiating Framework for Turkey, and the second bullet point
of para. 23 of the European Council conclusions of 16-17 December 2004.
675 Becker argues clearly “transitional measures may not result in a permanent non-application
of law in areas which define the Community’s identity”. In his view, rules concerning the
four basic freedoms are among the rules that define that identity. Becker, “EU-Enlargements
and Limits to Amendments of the E.C. Treaty,“ 12.
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the effect of establishing “for an indefinite period in favour of the new Member
States a legal position different from that laid down by the Treaty for the
original Member States”, i.e. they are going to embed permanent inequality
into the Union system. As such they would clearly be in breach of the principle
of equality of the Member States before EU law.
The importance of the principle of equality of Member States cannot be
overemphasized. It is confirmed by its recent constitutionalisation in Article
4(2) TEU. Moreover, it has been argued in the past that the principle of equal
participation in the integration process as well as the principle of uniform
applicability of the provisions of the Treaty flow from the general principle
of rule of law and not from the prohibition on discrimination in Article 18
TFEU.676 From the role the principle of rule of law plays in the enlargement
process, Becker deduces that the new Member States have to have the same
rights and duties as the old Member States. Yet, this does not mean that the
principle of non-discrimination excludes any differentiation; it rather restricts
exceptions by imposing the requirement of a reasonable justification. Similarly,
for exceptions from the principle of uniformity of EU law in the context of
transitional measures objective reasons are required as justifications. As Becker
puts it, “deviations from the unity of law and the rule of non-discrimination
are to be tolerated if they serve, in the end, the purpose of a per se admissible
accession and aim at simplifying the mutual adaptation and securing unity
and equality in the whole Community area”.677
5.2.4.2 Quasi-transitional measures
A major novelty of the fifth and sixth enlargement waves was the plan to
gradually integrate the new Member States into the Eurozone and Schengen
area, as they were considered unfit to join at their time of accession. It should
be noted that not all old Member States are part of these two policy areas,
since some Member States have negotiated opt-outs.678 Opting-out was how-
ever, not an option for the new comers. They have formally committed them-
676 Ibid., 11.
677 Ibid.
678 The system of opt-outs is complicated. While Denmark has a full opt-out of Schengen (see
the Lisbon Treaty, Protocol No. 22 on the Position of Denmark, OJ C 83/299, 30.03.2010),
the UK and Ireland have an opt-out with a possibility of opting-in in some or all of the
provisions of the Schengen acquis (see Article 4 of Protocol No. 19, OJ C 83/291, 30.03.2010).
The UK and Denmark have opted-out of participating in the third stage of EMU. See,
Protocols No 15 and 16 to the Lisbon Treaty, OJ C 83/284, 30.03.2010. Sweden is considered
as a Member State with a derogation within the meaning of Article 139 TFEU. For more
information see, D. O’Keeffe and C. Turner, “The Status of Member States not Participating
in the Euro,“ Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 4(2001): 293-314. A. G. Toth, “The
Legal Effects of the Protocols Relating to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark,“ in
The European Unon after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis, ed. T. Heukels, N. Blokker, and M.
Brus (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 227-52.
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selves to adopting and implementing the acquis in these two areas, which they
will be included into gradually, as they fulfil the necessary conditions.679
Before looking briefly into the measures foreseen in these two policy areas,
it is worth thinking about the nature of this regime whereby the partial or
total non-participation of the new Member States in EMU and Schengen is
envisaged. Could these measures be considered under the title “transitional
measures” above? Interestingly, there are reasons to both include and exclude
these measures from the previous title. On the one hand, in its broadest sense,
the regime envisaged for the new comers in these areas is transitional, since
they are under the obligation to join these two areas. They will be able to join
as soon as they fulfil the requisite criteria applicable to each area. As men-
tioned above, they were not allowed to opt-out like some of the old Member
States. On the other hand, the legal regimes or arrangements created for EMU
and Schengen are very different from the “transitional measures” in that the
latter is supposed to be “limited in time and scope, and accompanied by a
plan with clearly defined stages for application of the acquis”.680 As soon
as the set period expires, the relevant acquis becomes fully applicable to the
new Member State, whereas there is no set deadline for the new Member States
to join the EMU and Schengen. While the application of the acquis as far as
transitional measures are concerned is automatic upon the expiration of the
pre-determined period, the application of the EMU or Schengen acquis is con-
ditional. The new Member States will be able to join these areas only if they
are able to meet the necessary entry criteria. One wonders whether the inability
of some new Member States to meet some of the criteria might eventually turn
out into a de facto opt-out.
Some of the new Member States have already joined the Eurozone or/and
Schengen.681 However, it is still worth briefly examining the “transitional”
regimes in force in these two areas, so as to see how far the new measures
go in terms of providing for differentiation. Hence, what follows is a very brief
description of the procedures envisaged in both areas.
679 For more detailed analysis on how the process of gradual integration into these areas is
to work see, Hillion, “The European Union is dead. Long live the European Union… A
commentary on the Treaty of Accession 2003,“ 593-96; K. Inglis, “The Union’s fifth Accession
Treaty: New means to make enlargement possible,“ Common Market Law Review 41(2004):
947-50; Inglis, Evolving Practice in EU Enlargement: 177-82.
680 Enlargement Strategy Paper 2000, cited in note 603 above, p. 26. See also the Negotiating
Frameworks for Turkey, Montenegro and Serbia.
681 The new Member States that already joined the Eurozone are Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta,
Slovakia and Estonia. See, S. Van den Bogaert and V. Borger, “Twenty Years After Maas-
tricht: The Coming of Age of the EMU?,“ in The Treaty on European Union 1993-2013:
Reflections from Maastricht, ed. M. de Visser and A. P. van der Mei (Intersentia, 2013), 451.
The new Member States that are not yet fully-fledged members of the Schengen area are




5.2.4.2.1 Economic and Monetary Union
While new Member States are obliged to be part of EMU from their date of
accession,682 from that date until their entry into the Eurozone they are con-
sidered as “Member States with a derogation” within the meaning of Article
139 TFEU. They need to fulfil the Maastricht convergence criteria before they
are able to adopt the single currency.683 At least once every two years, or
at the request of a Member State with a derogation, the Commission and the
European Central Bank prepare “Convergence Reports” examining whether
the new Member States fulfil the criteria.684 These reports form the basis of
the Council’s decision on whether a new Member State may join the Eurozone.
If the Council considers those conditions are fulfilled, acting on a proposal
from the Commission, and after consulting the European Parliament, it can
bring an end to the derogation enjoyed by a new comer.685
5.2.4.2.2 Schengen
As with the Eurozone, there is no specified target date for the full incorporation
of the new Member States into the Schengen area. The Schengen Protocol as
well as the secondary Schengen measures listed in the Annex I to the 2003
Act of Accession are binding on and applicable in the new Member States as
of their date of accession.686 All the other Schengen rules not mentioned
above (in the previous sentence) are binding but not applicable in the new
Member States. They become applicable only after the Council verifies “in
accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedures” that all
conditions are met.687 Then, the Council needs to issue a decision to that
effect after consulting the European Parliament.688
In short, the idea is that all the new Member States are supposed to sooner
or later join the Eurozone and Schengen. Yet, the recent economic crisis and
the repercussions of the “rescue plans” that had to be prepared for some old
Member States lead one to think that the existing Eurozone members will be
very cautious about letting in new comers, which will mean less pressure on
the newcomers to join and more time for adequate preparation.
It will not be wrong to say that the quasi-transitional measures were born
out of necessity. Some areas of integration, such as the Eurozone and Schengen,
are increasingly complex and very important and sensitive for Member States.
It is no surprise that new Member States are allowed to join only gradually,
as they fulfil the necessary requirements. That is how those areas developed
682 See Article 4 of the 2003 Treaty of Accession. See also, ibid.
683 The Maastricht convergence criteria are listed in Article 140(1) TFEU.
684 See Article 140(1) TFEU.
685 See Article 140(2) TFEU.
686 See Article 3(1) of the 2003 Acts of Accession, and Article 4(1) of the 2005 Act of Accession.
687 See Article 3(2) of the 2003 Acts of Accession, and Article 4(2) of the 2005 Act of Accession.
688 For the precise procedure, see Article 3(3) of the 2003 Acts of Accession, and Article 4(3)
of the 2005 Act of Accession.
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over the years. With the exception of the States opting-out, old Member States
joined those areas at different times as they fulfilled the requisite conditions.
For instance, Greece was able to join the Eurozone as of 1 January 2001, after
the Council decided it fulfilled the necessary criteria.689 Given the fact that
some old Member States had difficulty fulfilling the necessary requirements
for joining in these complex and sensitive areas of integration, it would have
been unfair (as well as unrealistic) to expect the new Member States’ immediate
fulfilment of the criteria upon accession.
The logical step was to let them prepare while they are inside the Union
with the full help and assistance of the Union institutions. Making them wait
outside until they fulfil all the criteria would be counterproductive, as the
process would lose its momentum and even their eventual integration might
be endangered. Overall, the logic behind the quasi-transitional measures is
not that different from that of transitional measures, as it aims to facilitate
the full integration of the new Member States in these complex and important
areas at a point in the future. The danger is that the inability (and/or un-
willingness) of a new Member State to fulfil the necessary criteria to join the
Eurozone or Schengen might turn out into a de facto opt-out; however, that
danger applies equally to old as well as new Member States which are not
part of the Eurozone (i.e. Sweden).690
Having examined the new type of measures applicable to new Member
States concerning their participation into Eurozone and Schengen, it is im-
portant to emphasize that these measures have been devised as “transitional”
measures. There is an obligation on the new Member States to participate in
these areas some time in the future, i.e. in principle as soon as they are able
to fulfil the requisite criteria. Accordingly, they are monitored for compliance
with the latter criteria on a regular basis. However, despite the obligation and
pressure to join those areas, given the de facto possibility of remaining out,
the “transitional” nature of these regimes could be questioned, hence their
qualification as “quasi-transitional”.
How come Member States were able to introduce these new types of
measures? Even though these two regimes carry theoretically the possibility
of being problematic, in case a Member State is not unable but rather unwilling
to join one of these areas, in practice, the incremental and conditional applica-
tion of these two regimes to the new Member States is not problematic, as
689 Council Decision 2000/427/EC, OJ L 167/19, 7.7.2000. That was two years after the intro-
duction of the euro as the Union’s currency on 1 January 1999. See, Van den Bogaert and
Borger, “Twenty Years After Maastricht: The Coming of Age of the EMU?,“ 451; O’Keeffe
and Turner, “The Status of Member States not Participating in the Euro,“ 299.
690 Officially, Sweden is also considered to be a Member State ‘with a derogation’ and is
required to adopt the euro. It is not yet part of the Eurozone, as it has not made the requisite
changes to its central bank legislation and does not meet some of the convergence criteria.
For further details on the adoption of the euro, see: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_en.htm
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it applied (and still applies) on the same terms and criteria to the old Member
States (except that opting-out is ruled out for the new Member States). As
described above, old Member States also joined these areas in groups, gradual-
ly, as they fulfilled the requisite conditions in each area. In other words, the
quasi-transitional measures respect the principle of equality of Member States.
Another reason that makes the application of these regimes possible is the
fact that the rules applicable in those regimes concern the latest and most
developed stage of economic integration: Economic and Monetary Union. As
illustrated by the States opting-out, though not entirely unproblematic, it is
economically possible not to take part in the Eurozone and/or Schengen while
still being a part of the European Union. While the initial steps of integration
were taken collectively by all Member States, such as establishing the Customs
Union, realizing the common market by ensuring the free circulation of all
factors of production, the final stage of integration, that of establishing an
economic and monetary union, proved more problematic than the former
stages.691 European integration witnessed an exponential increase in problems
experienced in every subsequent stage of integration. To complicate matters
further, when establishing the economic and monetary union was at stake,
the Union was no longer a homogenous economic block consisting of few
western developed economies. Hence, a practical and gradual approach was
taken regarding this last stage of integration, whereby only States that were
ready to join these policies were allowed to do so. That approach did not
change regarding the new Member States.
5.2.4.3 Safeguard clauses
Next, follows the examination of the safeguard clauses, especially those
included in the last two Acts of Accession. Safeguard clauses have always been
part of Accession Treaties. Yet, their actual use has not been that frequent,
which has sometimes led to confusion as to the nature and effect of these
clauses.692 Fortunately, there are a few cases shedding some light on the
application of safeguard clauses from earlier Acts of Accession. After examin-
ing those clauses, we will proceed to the examination of the new safeguard
clauses employed in the last two Acts of Accession. This overview will help
us understand the nature, purpose and past uses of those clauses based on
which conclusions will be drawn as to whether Member States would be
precluded (or constrained) from introducing a PSC on free movement of persons
in Turkey’s future Accession Agreement.
691 For the description of various stages of economic integration, see B. Balassa, The Theory
of Economic Integration (Routledge Revivals, 2013). 2; Foster, Foster on EU LAW: 14.
692 The use of the term in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey, point 12, para. 4, has also
been confusing. See the end of this section for the discussion on that point.
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To begin our examination with the first Act of Accession, which set the
precedent, the general safeguard clause in that Act was contained in Article
135. The wording of Article 135 AA was based on Article 226 of the EEC
Treaty,693 however, the provisions of that article in relation to a safeguard
clause ceased applying among the original Member States as of 31 December
1969, that is the end of the transitional period. According to Puissochet, the
effect of Article 135 AA was to ‘revive’ the safeguard clause contained in Article
226, though by limiting its effect only to relations among the new Member
States, and between the new and original Member States.694 To look at the
procedure that Article 135 AA provided for the adoption of protective measures,
it read as follows:
‘1. If, before 31 December 1977, difficulties arise which are serious and liable to
persist in any sector of the economy or which could bring about serious deteriora-
tion in the economic situation of a given area, a new Member State may apply for
authorisation to take protective measures in order to rectify the situation and adjust
the sector concerned to the economy of the Common Market.
2. On application by the State concerned, the Commission shall, by emergency
procedure, determine without delay the protective measures which it considers
necessary, specifying the circumstances and the manner in which they are to be
put into effect.
3. The measures authorised under paragraph 2 may involve derogations from the
rules of the EEC Treaty and of this Act to such an extent and for such periods as
are strictly necessary in order to attain the objective referred to in paragraph 1.
Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of
the Common Market.
4. In the same circumstances and according to the same procedure, any original
Member State may apply for authorisation to take protective measures in regard
to one or more new Member States.’
Safeguard clauses included in subsequent Acts of Accession followed largely
the wording and structure of Article 135 AA. There were some developments
though, such as the specification that “in the event of serious economic diffi-
culties, the Commission shall act within five working days”,695 or even “with-
in 24 hours of receiving such request” in certain sectors specified in the Acts
693 See note 120 above.
694 Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities – A Commentary on the Treaty and
the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom: 326-27.
695 See Article 130(2) of the 1979 Act of Accession, OJ L 291/47, 19.11.1979; Article 379(2) of
the 1985 Act of Accession, OJ L 302/135, 15.11.1985; Article 152(2) of the 1994 Act of
Accession, OJ C 241, 29.08.1994.
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of Accession.696 However, as illustrated by examples that will be briefly men-
tioned, just like with the ‘infringement proceedings’ the Commission has wide
discretion in deciding whether the conditions justifying the adoption of a
protective measure are present.697
As one can expect, the Commission has been sued in the past for both
granting and for refusing to grant authorizations for the adoption of protective
measures under the safeguard clauses. To begin with a case concerning an
instance whereby the Commission had authorized France to impose a quota
on imports of cotton yarn from Greece, based on Article 130 of the 1979 Act
of Accession, seven Greek undertakings brought an action pursuant to what
is now Article 263 TFEU for a declaration that the decision providing the
authorization was void.698 They argued that they were the main undertakings
in Greece that produce and export cotton yarn to France. Moreover, they were
distinguished form other exporters of cotton yarn of Greek origin into France
by virtue of a series of contracts of sales they had entered into with French
customers which were to be performed during the period of application of
the decision. They were not able to carry out those contracts because of the
quota system applied by the French authorities. Thus, they argued that the
Commission was both in a position to, and also under an obligation to, identify
the traders who would have been individually concerned by its decision. By
failing to do that, they argued that the Commission failed to comply with the
conditions of application of Article 130.699
To be able to come to a conclusion concerning the arguments of the
applicants, the Court needed to interpret Article 130 AA. The wording of Article
130(1) and (3) which the Court recites in the judgment is the same as that of
Article 135(1) and (3) of the 1972 Act of Accession mentioned above. According
to the Court, the requirement of Article 130 AA might be explained by the fact
that “a provision permitting the authorization of protective measures with regard
to a Member State which derogates, even temporarily and in respect of certain
products only, from the rules relating to the free movement of goods must,
like any provision of that nature, be interpreted strictly.”700 Moreover, according
to the Court, in order to determine whether the measure concerned met the
conditions laid down in Article 130(3), the Commission had to also take into
account “the situation in the Member State with regard to which the protective
measure is requested”,701 that is the situation in Greece. In other words, the
696 In the 1994 Act of Accession the sectors specified are agriculture and fisheries (Article
379(2)), while in the 1979 Act of Accession it is only the agricultural sector that is mentioned
(Article 130 (2)).
697 Case 11/82 SA Piraiki-Patraiki and others v Commission, para. 40.
698 Ibid., para. 1. See Commission Decision No 81/988/EEC of 30 October 1981, OJ L 362/33,
17.12.1981.
699 Ibid., paras. 12, and 15-16.
700 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 26.
701 Ibid., para. 28.
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Commission had to inquire into the negative effects of its decisions on the
economy of Greece as well as on the undertakings concerned. In that vein,
the Commission had to consider, as far as possible, the contracts which the
undertakings had already entered into and whose execution would be wholly
or partially prevented by the decision authorizing the protective measure.702
At the end, the Court ruled that the Commission had not complied with Article
130(3) as far as it had failed to take into account the contracts entered into
in good faith before the adoption of the protective measures. Thus, the con-
tested decision was declared partially void.
On another occasion, associations of French new potato producers brought
an action for damages against the Commission under Article 340(2) TFEU (ex
Article 215(2) of the EEC Treaty) arguing that they had suffered as a result of
the fact that the Commission refrained from taking the necessary measures
to stop the import of Greek new potatoes on the German, UK and French
markets.703 Even though the applicants claimed that the conditions needed
for the application of Article 130(2) AA for the adoption of protective measures
existed on three national markets, it was only France and the UK that requested
authorization for the adoption of protective measures. Interestingly, the French
application was not based on serious disturbances arising from the importation
of Greek potatoes into France, but rather on the sale of Greek potatoes into
the UK market, which allegedly kept French potatoes out of the UK market
thereby burdening the French market with the potatoes that had not been
exported.
Then, it was up to the Court to check whether the Commission’s assessment
was based on findings of fact that were correct. The Commission contended
that potatoes from Greece were not likely to disturb the UK market seriously
either by reason of their quantity or their price level. Its main argument was
that the true reasons for the fall in potato prices in the UK market were the
existence of very large stocks of ware potatoes and the simultaneous availabil-
ity of supplies from various other countries. The Commission also presented
the figures, which supported its arguments. The Court ruled that, in the light
of these figures the Commission was justified in concluding that the foreseeable
fall in potato prices would not be due to the Greek potatoes and that “by
refusing to authorize the application of a protective measure it did not exceed
702 Ibid.
703 See Case 114/83 Société d’Initiatives et de Coopération Agricole and Société Interprofessionnelle
des producteurs et Expéditeurs de Fruits, Légumes, Bulbes et Fleurs d’Ille-et-Vilaine v Commission,
[1984] ECR 2589; and Case 289/83 Groupement des Associations Agricoles pour l’Organisation
de la Production et de la Commercialisation des Pommes de Terre et Légumes de la Région Malouine
(GAARM) and others v Commission, [1984] ECR 4295.
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the limits of the margin of discretion accorded to it for the assessment of
economic data.”704
Both cases are useful examples, which delineate the margin of discretion
that the Commission has in authorizing Member States’ adoption of protective
measures on the basis of safeguard clauses in Accession Agreements. The
Commission’s job is in no way easy, as illustrated by the case Piraiki-Patraiki,
its margin of discretion is determined by the correctness of its analysis of the
economic situation and the consequences that flow from the adoption or non-
adoption of protective measures on the markets of the states requesting a
protective measure as well as the market of the state against which the protect-
ive measure is requested for.705 Incorrect analysis, or a hasty analysis based
on insufficient data on the part of the Commission might result in the Court
ruling that the Commission has exceeded its margin of discretion.
The last two waves of enlargement brought a novelty in respect of the
safeguard clauses as well. In addition to the traditional economic safeguard
clause present in all Accession Treaties, the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession
also contain new safeguard clauses covering specifically the internal market
and Justice and Home Affairs. Moreover, again for the first time ever, the 2005
Act of Accession contained a clause granting the Union the power to postpone
the membership of two countries who had already signed their Accession
Agreements.
5.2.4.3.1 “New” safeguard clauses
The first two new safeguard clauses were introduced into the 2003 and 2005
Accession Treaties with the objective to maintain the momentum of reform
in the new Member States with the acquis on the internal market and JHA. They
can be viewed as the spillover of pre-accession conditionality into the post-
accession phase. The main reason for this spillover according to many scholars
was the old Member States’ doubt as to the new Member States’ ability in
fulfilling their obligations in the areas of the internal market and JHA.706 The
704 Case 114/83 Société d’Initiatives et de Coopération Agricole and Société Interprofessionnelle des
producteurs et Expéditeurs de Fruits, Légumes, Bulbes et Fleurs d’Ille-et-Vilaine v Commission,
para. 20.
705 For other examples in which the Commission refused the grant of an authorization to take
protective measures see, Commission Decision 96/319/EC of 20 November 1995 refusing
Belgium’s application for protective measures with regard to pharmaceutical products
coming from Spain, OJ L 122/21, 22.05.1996; Commission Decision 96/320/EC of 20
December 1995 refusing Germany’s application for protective measures with regard to
pharmaceutical products coming from Spain, OJ L 122/22, 22.05.1996; and Commission
Decision 96/324/EC of 20 December 1995 refusing the United Kingdom’s application for
protective measures with regard to pharmaceutical products coming from Spain, OJ L 122/
26, 22.05.1996.
706 Hillion, “The European Union is dead. Long live the European Union… A commentary
on the Treaty of Accession 2003,“ 607. Inglis, “The Union’s fifth Accession Treaty: New
means to make enlargement possible,“ 954. A. Lazowski, “And then they were twenty-
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aim of the safeguard clauses is considered to be not only “the maintenance
of the achieved level of European integration”,707 i.e. to ensure the integrity
of the acquis, but also to protect the new Member States against unilateral
national measures that could be directed at them.708
Both safeguard clauses could be invoked during a three-year period.
However, safeguard measures can be maintained beyond this period if relevant
commitments by the new comers have not been fulfilled. To understand the
nature and effect of these clauses a closer look at them is required
a) Internal Market safeguard clause
Article 38(1) of the 2003 Act of Accession authorizes the Commission to take
appropriate measures,709 either on its own initiative or upon a request of
a Member State, where “a new Member State has failed to implement commit-
ments undertaken in the context of the accession negotiations, causing a serious
breach of the functioning of the internal market, including any commitments
in all sectoral policies which concern economic activities with cross-border
effect, or an imminent risk of such breach…”. The formulation of this provision
has been subject to criticism since it refers broadly to the commitments under-
taken in the negotiations rather than the specific commitments laid down in
the Act of Accession itself.710 Moreover, the form and nature of the measures
to be taken is entirely at the discretion of the Commission. Yet, failure to
implement a commitment is not sufficient to trigger the clause. The failure
needs to be the cause of “a serious breach of the functioning of the internal
market” or there needs to be “an imminent risk of such breach”, and even
then, the fact that “the Commission may…take appropriate measures” suggests
that the Commission has discretion in adopting the measure, as is the case
with its adoption of protective measures under the general economic safeguard
clause.
The Commission needs to take measures which are proportional and
“which disturb least the functioning of the internal market”. These measures
should be kept as long as they are “strictly necessary”. Safeguard measures
should not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States. The Commission may adapt the
measures as it sees appropriate in response to progress made by the concerned
Member State. Last but not least, the Commission needs to inform the Council
seven... A legal appraisal of the sixth Accession Treaty,“ Common Market Law Review 44
(2007): 410-19.
707 M. Spernbauer, “Benchmarking, safeguard clauses and verification mechanisms – What’s
in a name? Recent developments in pre- and post- accession conditionality and compliance
with EU law,“ Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 3 (2007): 286.
708 Inglis, Evolving Practice in EU Enlargement: 191.
709 Its equivalent in the 2005 Acts of Accession is Article 37.
710 Hillion, “The European Union is dead. Long live the European Union… A commentary
on the Treaty of Accession 2003,“ 603.
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before revoking the safeguard measures, and to take “duly into account any
observations of the Council in this respect”.711
The only case when the internal market safeguard clause was ever invoked
was in the case of the Bulgarian aviation sector,712 where it was established
that there was an imminent risk that Bulgaria’s failure to implement its com-
mitments to comply with the Community rules regulating this sector713 would
cause a serious breach of the internal market for air transport. Once the
Bulgarian authority for civil aviation (CAA) took the corrective measures to
remedy the safety shortcomings identified by previous visits of the European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Commission repealed the safeguard
measure.714
b) Justice and Home Affairs safeguard clause
According to Hillion, it was the absence of temporary derogations concerning
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, except the quasi-transitional arrange-
ments in relation to the Schengen acquis mentioned above, that led the current
Member States and the Commission to devise a sui generis safeguard clause
to address the potential serious breaches in the functioning of the area.715
This special clause, which is enshrined in Article 39 of the 2003 Act of Acces-
sion and Article 38 of the 2005 Act of Accession, is a bit more elaborate than
the safeguard clause on the internal market, however; overall it can also be
criticized for being quite broad and vague.
What triggers the clause could be “serious shortcomings or any imminent
risks of such shortcomings in the transposition, state of implementation, or
the application of the framework decisions or any other relevant commitments,
instruments of cooperation and decisions relating to mutual recognition in
the area of criminal law under Title VI of the EU Treaty and Directives and
Regulations relating to mutual recognition in civil matters under Title IV of
the EC Treaty in a new Member State”.716 The Commission is again the insti-
711 Article 38(2) of the 2003 Act of Accession.
712 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 1962/2006 of 21 December 2006 in application of
Article 37 of the Act of Accession of Bulgaria to the European Union, OJ L 408/8, 30.12.2006.
713 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 of 23 July 1992 on licensing of air carriers, OJ L 240/1,
24.8.1992; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community
air carriers to intra-Community air routes, OJ L 240/8, 24.8.1992; Council Regulation (EEC)
No 2409/92 of 23 July 1992 on fares and rates for air services, OJ L 240/15, 24.8.1992;
Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July
2002 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation
Safety Agency, OJ L 240/1, 7.9.2002; Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation
(EC) No 1701/2003, OJ L 243/5, 27.9.2003.
714 Commission Regulation 875/2008 of 8 September 2008 repealing Regulation (EC) No 1962/
2006, OJ L 240/3, 9.9.2008.
715 Hillion, “The European Union is dead. Long live the European Union… A commentary
on the Treaty of Accession 2003,“ 605.
716 Emphasis added. Article 39(1) of the 2003 Act of Accession.
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tution to take “appropriate measures” either on its own initiative or upon a
“motivated request” of a Member State. However, under this clause it needs
to “specify the conditions and modalities under which these measures are put
into effect” and it needs to consult the Member States before adopting the
appropriate measures.
The appropriate measures “may take the form of temporary suspension
of the application of relevant provisions and decisions in the relations between
a new Member State and any other Member State or Member States”.717 Just
like with the internal market safeguard clause, the measures are to be main-
tained as long as they are “strictly necessary” and need to be lifted when the
shortcomings are remedied. Similarly, the Commission might adapt the
measures in response to progress in rectifying the shortcomings, and finally,
can revoke the measures after having informed and duly having taken account
of the Council’s observations in this respect.
Even though the Accession Treaty provides for a one-stage procedure, in
the case of Bulgaria and Romania the Commission developed a scrutiny
mechanism, the so-called “Cooperation and Verification Mechanism”,718 that
adds a preliminary phase to the application of the JHA safeguard clause.719
Yet, if it proves necessary the immediate application of the safeguard clause
is also not precluded.720 The rationale behind this mechanism was again
bolstering post-accession conditionality by creating specific benchmarks with
a view to remedy the most important shortcomings identified by the Commis-
sion.721 Thus, the mechanism was to apply only regarding the commitments
concerning the areas to which these benchmarks were to apply. Bulgaria and
Romania had to report to the Commission by 31st of March each year, starting
by 31st of March 2007 for the first time, on the progress they make in address-
ing the benchmarks listed in the Annexes of their respective Decisions.722
The Commission could amend the Decisions and adjust the benchmarks if
need be. The Decisions were to be repealed upon the satisfactory fulfilment
of all the benchmarks.723
717 Article 39(2) of the 2003 Act of Accession.
718 Commission Decision 2006/928/EC, of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for
cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the
areas of judicial reform and fight against corruption, OJ L 354/56, 14.12.2006; Commission
Decision 2006/929/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and
verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial
reform and fight against corruption and organized crime, OJ L 354/58, 14.12.2006.
719 Lazowski, “And then they were twenty-seven... A legal appraisal of the sixth Accession
Treaty,“ 418.
720 See point 8 of the preambles of both Decisions.
721 See the Annexes to both Decisions for the benchmarks identified with regard to Bulgaria
and Romania.
722 Articles 1 of Decisions 2006/928/EC and 2006/929/EC.
723 See point 9 of the preambles of both Decisions.
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This mechanism was a new creation, something that has never been used
before in previous enlargements. However, it was not the only novelty in the
2005 Act of Accession. When it became clear that Bulgaria and Romania would
not be able to fulfil the obligations set forth in their pre-accession strategies,
the compromise found to not leave those two countries too far behind and
to keep the momentum of enlargement going was the insertion of an un-
precedented safeguard clause allowing the postponement of the membership
of both countries by twelve months (Article 39).724 What follows is a brief
account of what that clause provides for.
c) Membership postponement (safeguard) clause
The conditions for delaying the membership of Bulgaria and Romania are laid
down in Article 39(1) which provides that the Council could use the safeguard
clause if there is clear evidence that “there is serious risk of either of those
States being manifestly unprepared to meet the requirements of membership
by the date of accession of 1 January 2007 in a number of important areas”
[emphasis added]. The decision is to be taken unanimously by the Council.
However, regarding the specific commitments undertaken by Romania in the
Annex IX points I and II, the Council may take the postponement decision
acting by qualified majority on the basis of a Commission recommendation
“if serious shortcomings have been observed” (Article 39(2)&(3)).
It should be underlined that this clause is of a different kind,725 and the
most important difference distinguishing this clause from other safeguard
clauses is the central role played by the Commission in the latter safeguard
clauses, while it is the Council that takes the postponement decision on the
basis of a Commission recommendation under Article 39. The postponement
clause is a curious instrument that differentiates Bulgaria and Romania from
the other CEECs. It was not used, but the reason for not using it was probably
not the lack of serious shortcomings but rather the fact that a year was
regarded as an insufficient length of time to remedy those shortcomings. The
idea being that working with Romania and Bulgaria when they are inside
might prove to be more effective than trying to push for reforms when they
are outside the Union.726
d) Pre-accession closer monitoring (safeguard) clause
As the membership postponement safeguard clause proved to be an ineffective
instrument, it was not included in Croatia’s Act of Accession. However, it was
724 See, Lazowski, “And then they were twenty-seven... A legal appraisal of the sixth Accession
Treaty,“ 412-13.
725 Lazowski describes the membership postponement safeguard clause as “a political tool
with a legal touch”, while he describes the internal market and JHA safeguard clauses as
“legal tools with a political touch”. See, ibid., 415-19.
726 Editorial Comment, “The Sixth Enlargement,“ Common Market Law Review 43 (2006): 1499.
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replaced by another unique clause: Article 36 of Croatia’s Act of Accession.
It was included to emphasize the need for further work and preparations on
the part of Croatia until its actual date of accession, namely 1 July 2013. The
clause was included as reminder that Croatia had to complete the implementa-
tion of its commitments taken during the accession negotiations. After the
finalization of the accession negotiations, Member States gave the Commission
the mandate to closely monitor Croatia’s progress in all the areas covered by
the negotiations. Article 36(2) of empowered the Council, on a proposal from
the Commission, to “take appropriate measures if issues of concern are identi-
fied during the monitoring process” by qualified majority.
While this clause applied prior to the entry into force of Croatia’s Accession
Treaty, there are other clauses in place that can be triggered during the three
years following accession. Those are the general economic safeguard clause
(Article 37), the internal market safeguard clause (Article 38), and the Justice
and Home Affairs safeguard clause (Article 39), which were discussed above.
Overall, the last waves of accession witnessed an increase in the number,
variety and nature of safeguard clauses employed in the newcomers’ Acts of
Accession. As varied as they were, they were all clauses that applied for a
temporary and specified period of time, i.e. none of them was permanent. With
the exception of the membership postponement clause, the safeguard clauses
were intended as instruments of last resort to ensure compliance with the
relevant areas of the acquis.727 Most of them, the two exceptions being the
membership postponement clause and pre-accession closer monitoring clause,
were ex-ante tools aiming to prevent serious breaches of EU law by the new
Member States in their first three years after accession. They were at the
disposal of the Commission in addition to the infringement proceedings under
Article 258 TFEU. Obviously, it was the reactive, cumbersome and lengthy
nature of the latter procedure that created the need for the safeguard clauses.
However, as effective as they can be, the criticism goes that the very existence
of the safeguard clauses in respect to the incoming states only is prima facie
discriminatory. It underlies not only the mistrust of the old Member States
in the newcomers, but also the inability of the Union’s institutions in preparing
those countries for accession.728
Another important point worth noting is the increased role of the Council
regarding the new safeguard clauses, which makes them even more contro-
versial with respect to the principle of equality of Member States. The member-
ship postponement clause as well as the pre-accession closer monitoring clause
are unique, as the safeguard measure or the postponement decision is taken
by the Council before the Act of Accession enters into force; thus, arguably
they apply before the acceding States become full and equal Member States.
What is more controversial is the role that the Council plays in the “internal
727 See Comprehensive Monitoring Report of 5 November 2003, COM(2003) 676, p. 18.
728 Inglis, Evolving Practice in EU Enlargement: 191.
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market” and “Justice and Home Affairs” safeguard clauses. In the traditional
safeguard clause, the Commission was the only and main player. Under the
new safeguard clauses, before taking any decision to revoke such clauses, the
Commission was supposed to not only inform the Council but also duly take
account of the Council’s views in this regard. This probably does not amount
to an obligation to follow the Council’s view, however in practice, it would
be quite difficult for the Commission to ignore the Council’s view if they were
to disagree. This is another illustration of Member States’ attempts to increase
their power and control of all stages of the enlargement process, controversially
spilling over to the post-enlargement phase.
5.2.4.3.2 The proposed PSCs in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey
While the existence of temporary safeguard clauses, even if discriminatory,
could be explained by the practical need to give new Member States a period
of adaptation to the functioning of the Union and its internal market, as well
as allaying the fears of old Member States that any unexpected disruption
could be dealt with promptly and efficiently, the insertion of PSCs would go
against the grain of the very logic and principles of integration that have
applied so far. As was demonstrated in this part, the accession of new Member
States with different economic, political and cultural histories was an enormous
challenge, which necessitated new instruments and policies to make their
integration possible. While some strategies and instruments were new, the
purpose and principles underlying the process were the same, that is, to fully
integrate the newcomers into the existing policies and structures. To support
their preparation so that they are able to take on and apply in full the acquis
communautaire. If that goal was unrealistic in the short run, mechanisms were
put in place, such as the cooperation and verification mechanism for instance,
so that this goal is achieved in the long run.
It is true that some of the safeguard clauses created inequality between
the Member States, but the reason that inequality and discrimination were
condoned was because they were temporary, and because they prepared the
ground for full equality in the medium to long run. Moreover, it should not
be forgotten that recourse to safeguard clauses was also possible for the old
Member States during the transitional period, i.e. in the process of establishing
the internal market under Article 226 EEC. However, again that was a measure
of temporary nature, whereas inserting a PSC would mean engraving discrim-
ination on a permanent basis in the Treaty regarding not only that Member
State, but also its citizens, who will be Union citizens upon that State’s acces-
sion. That will contravene both past practice, case law and the current Treaties.
Perhaps there was a reason for never including a PSC in any past Accession
Treaty before.
The Court’s reasoning in interpreting some temporary derogation clauses
is illuminating and should be remembered once again. The Court ruled that
“it was justified for the original Member States provisionally to accept such
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inequalities, it would be contrary to the principle of equality of the Member States
before Community law to accept that such inequalities could continue
indefinitely.”729 According to the Court the provisions of the Act of Accession
needed to be interpreted with due regard “to the foundations and the system
of the Community, as established by the Treaty”.730 While the “foundations”
of the Community/ Union will be explored in the next Chapter, for the time
being suffice to refer to Article 4(2) TEU which clearly stipulates that “[t]he
Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties”. Ob-
viously, the availability of a PSC with regard to a single Member State will
blatantly violate that principle.
If we look again at the Negotiating Framework for Turkey, we see that
it is quite confusing because it mentions a few different instruments that could
be employed in the future Turkish Act of Accession in a few areas without
specifying which instrument would be appropriate for which area. As a
reminder of what exactly the Negotiating Framework envisaged regarding
the adoption of measures on free movement of persons, it read as follows:
‘Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard
clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures,
may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its
proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or
agriculture. Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establish-
ment of freedom of movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual
Member States. Transitional arrangements or safeguards should be reviewed regard-
ing their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal market.’731
What can be inferred from this paragraph is that “eventually” the freedom
of movement of persons will be established, however, by allowing “for a
maximum role of individual Member States”. Does this imply that there will
be a derogation clause on free movement of persons that some Member States
will be able to choose to apply until they see fit? Or that there will be free
movement of persons but with a safeguard clause that can be invoked by
Member States whenever they like? “The eventual establishment of freedom
of movement of persons” seems to suggest the former rather than the latter,
but obviously that might have been formulated ambiguously on purpose, so
that the Union and its Member States have the leeway to decide what is
appropriate when the time for decision-making comes. For the purposes of
this study, it is a fruitful exercise to check the legality of both types of measure,
that is an unprecedented PSC, as well as a derogation clause, which can be
729 Emphasis added. Case 231/78 Commission v UK, para. 11.
730 Ibid., para. 12.
731 Emphasis added. Negotiating Framework for Turkey, point 12, para. 4.
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changed on a future date by Member States, as Article 103 of the 1972 Act
of Accession concerning the fisheries regime examined below.732
Having examined the nature of transitional measures, “quasi-transitional”
measures, and safeguard clauses, it was demonstrated that the aim of all these
instruments was the eventual and successful integration of the new Member
States into the Union institutions and policies as full and equal Member States.
The fact that the shared aim was pursued relying on different methods does
not reduce the significance of this finding. What follows in the next section
is what was supposed to be ruled out,733 but was still exceptionally included
in some of the Acts of Accession, that is changes that arguably go beyond being
mere “adjustments” to the Treaties.
5.3 CHANGES TO THE TREATIES GOING BEYOND MERE “ADJUSTMENTS”
Even though the main principle of negotiation in every accession wave was
to adopt the acquis communautaire or the so-called “Community patrimony”
in full, there were occasionally some minor exceptions to this rule. However,
it will be argued that these exceptions were in no way of a scope or nature
to challenge the rule itself. The purpose of this part of the research is to lay
out these exceptions, as exhaustively as possible, in order to see in which areas
they existed and how far they could go; the underlying idea being that past
practice might also provide insight as to the limits of future practice and
constraints existing in this area.
It is very difficult to try to fit the different measures employed in Accession
Treaties into different categories. The difficulty lies in the fact that whenever
we create a category based on a particular criterion, a measure in that category
will sometimes also bear the characteristics of measures under other categories.
It would be much easier if we could just name the measures under this
category as “permanent derogations clauses”, as opposed to “transitional
derogation clauses”; however, as will be demonstrated, for instance in the case
of the arrangements agreed in the area of fisheries, the derogations were not
supposed to be necessarily permanent. They were to apply for ten years and
then it would be up to the Council to decide on the follow-up to those arrange-
ments.734 Moreover, while other “permanent derogation clauses” applied
only to the acceding Member State(s), the arrangement in the area of fisheries
732 The fisheries regime is analysed below in section 5.3.1.
733 European Commission, Communication, “Enlargement of the Community – Transitional
period and institutional implications”, Supp. 2/78, pp. 6-8; European Commission, “The
Challenge of Enlargement. Commission opinion on Norway’s application for membership”,
Supp. 2/93, pp. 5-6; Enlargement Strategy Paper 2000, cited note 603 above, p. 26.
734 They were not temporary either, since temporary derogations were introduced for a limited
time upon the expiration of which the acquis in that area would become automatically
applicable to the Member State concerned.
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changed the existing regime regarding all the Member States, old and new
alike. Hence, the more general subtitle “Changes to the Treaties going beyond
mere ‘adjustments’”.
As is elaborated below, the legal regime created by the first Act of Acces-
sion in the area of fisheries carries some characteristics that differentiate it from
other changes going beyond mere ‘adjustments’ in subsequent Acts of Acces-
sion. Therefore, a closer look at that regime is warranted. For the sake of
convenience and exhaustiveness, it is followed by a chronological examination
of the exceptional instances where changes in past Accession Treaties could
be argued to have gone beyond being mere ‘adjustments’.
5.3.1 Arrangement on fishing rights under the 1972 Act of Accession
The reason why the provisions on fishing rights constitute a separate category
under this title is because fishing rights were the only area in which problems
raised by accession were tried to be solved by transitional measures that
modified the system in force. It was “the only instance in which a temporary
retrograde change in relation to the status of the law before accession became
possible.”735 There are many issues that can be questioned related to this
statement though, starting from the point of the status of the law in this area
before accession to the ‘temporary’ and ‘retrograde’ nature of the change
provided for in the 1972 Act of Accession.
If one were to have a look at the system in force before the application
of the fish rich UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway in the area of fisheries, one
would be surprised to see that the area was not regulated. It was only the day
before the official negotiations of accession with the four applicant countries
began that the old Member States managed to agree on the acquis in this
area:736 the so-called 1970 ‘structural regulation’ and ‘market regulation’.737
The most important, and also most problematic, provision of Regulation 2141/
70 (the 1970 structural regulation) required Member States to open their
maritime waters to the access and use of all fishing vessels registered in
735 Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities – A Commentary on the Treaty and
the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom: 276.
736 The acquis on fisheries was agreed on 30 June 1970. See, R. J. Long and P. A. Curran,
Enforcing the Common Fisheries Policy (Oxford: Fishing News Books, 2000). 8; R. R. Churchill
and D. Owen, The EC Common Fisheries Policy (OUP, 2010). 5.
737 See respectively, Council Regulation No 2141/70 of 20 October 1970 laying down a common
structural policy for the fishing industry, OJ Eng. Spec. Ed. 1970 (III) 703; and Council
Regulation No 2142/70 of 20 October 1970 on the common organisation of the market in
fishery products, OJ Eng. Spec. Ed. 1970 (III) 707.
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Community territory and flying the flag of a Member State (Article 2).738
However, that provision was intended to apply only as of 1 November 1975
in the case of certain fishing grounds lying within three nautical miles of the
coast and which were to be designated by the Council (Article 4).739
The applicant states, especially Norway and the UK, expressed their con-
cerns with regard to the structural regulation, underlining the fact that it had
been adopted after the date on which they had in principle accepted the acquis
communautaire. According to them, the Regulation was detrimental to the
interests of their local populations depending on coastal fishing. At the end
of tough negotiations, they came up with the compromise laid down in Articles
100 to 103 in the 1972 Act of Accession.740
Article 100 established the main rules applicable with regard to fishing
as of their date of Accession, i.e. 1 January 1973. It provided the possibility
of derogation from the principle of non-discrimination established in Article
2 of Regulation No 2141/70 for a period of ten years. This derogation was
not limited only to the new Member State, but was extended to all Member
States. The waters in which Member States could restrict fishing were those
“situated within a limit of six nautical miles, calculated from the base lines
of the coastal Member State” (Article 100(1) AA). The six-mile limit could be
extended to 12 miles for the areas listed in Article 101 AA. These areas covered
very important sectors of the coastline of the new Member States and France.
The coastal states could reserve the right to fish in these areas to “vessels which
fish traditionally in those waters and which operate from ports in that geo-
graphical coastal area” (Article 100(1) AA). However, the derogation allowed
in Article 100 AA is subject to one restriction. If a Member State can claim
“special fishing rights” in the waters of another Member State, it can continue
to exercise those rights (Article 100(2) AA). Those “special rights” could have
been established either by treaty or by established practice.
Article 102 AA empowered the Council, acting on a proposal by the Com-
mission, to “determine the conditions for fishing with a view to ensure the
protection of the fishing grounds and conservation of the biological resources
of the sea” from the sixth year after accession at the latest. Last but not least,
Article 103 AA provided that the Commission was to prepare a report on the
738 To be more precise Article 2(1) of Regulation No. 2141/70 of the Council of 20 October
1970 laying down a common structural policy for the fishing industry, OJ Eng. Spec. Ed.
1970 (III) 703, provided as follows: “Rules applied by each Member State in respect of fishing
in the maritime waters coming under its sovereignty or within its jurisdiction shall not
lead to differences in treatment of other Member States.
Member States shall ensure in particular equal conditions of access to and use of the fishing
grounds situated in the waters referred to in the preceding subparagraph for all fishing
vessels flying the flag of a Member State and registered in Community territory.”
739 Puissochet, The Enlargement of the European Communities – A Commentary on the Treaty and
the Acts Concerning the Accesssion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom: 276.
740 Ibid., 274-83.
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economic and social development of the coastal areas of the Member States
and the state of fish stocks. Based on that report, and acting on a proposal
from the Commission, the Council was to “examine the provisions which could
follow the derogations in force until 31 December 1982.” According to Puis-
sochet, with these provisions the definition of the measures applicable in this
area is deferred to a future date, while leaving some flexibility as to whether
the new measures will be the extension of existing derogations or not, or
whether they will be temporary or permanent.741
At its meeting on 21 December 1982, the Council was not able to adopt
the measures mentioned in Article 103 AA. Yet, it managed to adopt a number
of regulations establishing a new Community fisheries regime at its meeting
on 25 January 1983. Article 6(1) of Regulation No. 170/83 establishing a Com-
munity system for the conservation and management of fishery resources,742
provided as follows: “As from 1 January 1983 and until 31 December 1992,
Member States shall be authorized to retain the arrangements defined in Article
100 of the 1972 Act of Accession and to generalize up to 12 nautical miles for
all waters under their sovereignty or jurisdiction the limit of six miles laid
down in that article.”
What happened with the new arrangement in Regulation No. 170/83 was
that the regime that seemed to be derogating from the main rule established
in Regulation No. 2141/70 was not only kept in place for another ten years,
but the geographical area that it covered was increased from six to twelve
nautical miles. This new arrangement was then extended few times,743 and
will remain in force until 31 December 2022.744 This means that the existing
arrangement cannot be viewed as derogation anymore or the extension of
derogation, but rather as constituting the main rule since it has been in force
for more than forty years.
Regulation No 2141/70 was put in force hastily without consulting the
candidate states with which accession negotiations had already begun. More-
over, the rule of equal access to maritime waters of other Member States laid
down in Article 2 of that Regulation was to apply subject to derogation for
the next five years. That derogation laid down in Article 4, stipulated that it
would apply to certain fishing areas situated within three nautical miles
741 Ibid., 281-82. See also, Churchill and Owen, The EC Common Fisheries Policy: 5-6; Long and
Curran, Enforcing the Common Fisheries Policy: 8-12.
742 OJ L 24/1, 27.01.1983.
743 The arrangement established by Regulation No 170/83 was extended for another ten years
by Regulation No 3760/92 establishing a Community system for fisheries and aquaculture,
OJ L 389/1, 31.12.1992; then for another ten years by Regulation No 2371/2002 on the
conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries
Policy, OJ L 358/59, 31.12.2002, para. 14 of the preamble; and lastly, by Regulation No 1380/
2013 of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, OJ L 354/22, 28.12.2013.
744 See, Article 5 of Regulation No 1380/2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, OJ L 354/32,
28.12.2013.
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calculated from the base lines of the Member States which were to be specified
by the Council. The 1972 accession took place before that five-year period
expired. In other words, the regime established by the Regulation applied only
for two years and then only subject to derogation. What happened with the
1972 Accession was that the derogation was extended to six nautical miles,
and with hindsight this became the main rule, which was subject to the re-
striction of “special fishing rights”, as well as to the exceptions listed in Article
101 AA. A decade later (in 1983), the main rule was extended to twelve nautical
miles and remained at twelve miles ever since. Yet, although it is not very
likely to change in practice, perhaps theoretically there is the possibility that
the regime in force might change as of December 2022.
In conclusion, fisheries was an area under the Common Agricultural Policy
at the time of the first accession (Article 3(d)). Under the combined provisions
of Article 38(3) and Annex II to the EEC Treaty, fishery products were subject
to the provisions of Articles 39 to 46 concerning agriculture.745 However,
fisheries was not yet an area with well-established rules and practices. Thus,
it is possible to argue both ways. Firstly, that the rules established by Regula-
tion No 2141/70 which were changed by the 1972 Act of Accession, do not
go beyond mere adjustments, since Regulation No 2141/70 was never applied
without derogation and was adopted only after the start of the negotiations
with the UK, Denmark, Ireland and Norway knowing that those rules will need
to be changed taking the interests of the newcomers into account when the
time for accession comes. Accordingly the arrangement on fisheries was needed
to be able to extend the acquis to a situation that did not exist in the Union
of six. Articles 100 to 103 of the 1972 Act of Accession lay down a regime for
fisheries, which was more adapted to the sea-faring nature of the then new
Member States than the existing regime put in place by continental states.746
Secondly, the argument to the contrary would be that it goes beyond a
mere adjustment since it creates a new regime with new rules that applies
to all Member States. Moreover, in addition to the more implicit competence
derived from Article 39, which specified objectives such as the rational develop-
ment of production and guarantee of regular supplies, objectives laid down
for CAP but which could be extended to fisheries as well, Article 102 of the
Act of Accession created a more explicit competence for the adoption of rules
“to determine conditions for fishing with a view to ensuring protection of the
fishing grounds and conservation of the biological resources of the sea”.
No matter which view one subscribes to, it is not difficult to see that the
arrangement on fisheries is eventually one with integrationist effects. Old
Member States wanted further integration in this area and the regulation they
had promulgated served as a good basis for the accession negotiations. With
some changes to the regime already applicable that enabled them to take into
745 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Kramer and Others, paras. 21-25.
746 See, Booss and Forman, “Enlargement: Legal and Procedural Issues,“ 102, footnote 19.
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account the interests of the newcomers as well, they found a middle ground
and set the main rules of the fisheries policy. With some further minor ‘adjust-
ments’, such as increasing the restriction on fishing in their waters from 6 to
12 nautical miles, the policy established in 1972 has survived and developed
until today.
5.3.2 Other measures in past Acts of Accession going beyond “adjustments”
To continue with another arrangement in the 1972 Act of Accession, which
seemed to go further than being a mere adjustmens, that is the case of butter
imported from New Zealand. As far as agricultural products are concerned,
most of the issues were resolved by transitional measures,747 whereas a
special transitional arrangement similar to that applying to fisheries was
adopted in the case of butter coming from New Zealand. Article 5(1) and (2)
of Protocol No 18 to the 1972 Act of Accession provided that in 1975 the
Council would examine the situation, taking into account inter alia:
‘progress towards an effective world agreement on milk products … [and] the
extent of New Zealand’s progress towards diversification of its economy and
exports, it being understood that the Community will strive to pursue a commercial
policy which does not run counter to this progress. Appropriate measures to ensure
the maintenance, after December 31, 1977, of exceptional arrangements in respect
of butter from New Zealand, including the details of such arrangements, shall be
determined by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commis-
sion, in the light of that review.’
When we come to the 1979 Act of Accession, the most important change, to
be more accurate an ‘addition’, to the existing rules was the inclusion of cotton
into the Common Agricultural Policy.748 As with other agricultural products,
a system of support for the production of cotton was to be introduced, so that
producers earn a fair income and the market in cotton is stabilized.749
Another interesting point regarding Greece was the joint declaration annexed
to the Final Act concerning the status of Mount Athos. It read as follows:
‘Recognizing that the special status granted to Mount Athos, as guaranteed by
Article 105 of the Hellenic Constitution, is justified exclusively on grounds of a
spiritual and religious nature, the Community will ensure that this status is taken
into account in the application and subsequent preparation of provisions of Com-
747 See, G. Olmi, “Agriculture and Fisheries in the Treaty of Brussels of January 22, 1972,“
Common Market Law Review 9, no. 3 (1972): 309-11.
748 See, Protocol No. 4 to the 1979 Act of Accession, OJ L 291, 19.11.1979.
749 B. Schloh, “The Accession of Greece to the European Communities,“ Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law 10 (1980): 4061.
200 Chapter 5
munity law, in particular in relation to custom franchise privileges, tax exemptions
and the right if establishment.’750
The arrangement on cotton is new but not something out of line with existing
practice under CAP. On the contrary, the rules applied in CAP are extended
to a product that was not covered by the policy simply because it was not
produced by the old Member States. Thus, it can be argued that this addition
to CAP does not go beyond being an “adjustment”. As to the declaration
regarding Mount Athos, it is merely a declaration, which aims to ensure that
the religious significance of Mount Athos is taken into account in the applica-
tion of EU law. Put differently, if need be, the ground for a future derogation
is laid down. However, that derogation is not a permanent one, but one that
would fit within the system of the Treaty. Derogations on the freedoms are
allowed on various grounds, public policy, public morality... within the system
of the Treaty, provided they are proporionate. The spiritual and religious
nature of a place could be assimilated to one of these grounds.
The 1994 Act of Accession also contains interesting arrangemenments and
novel additions to the existing acquis. To begin describing them in the order
they appear in the Act of Accession, the first novelty is Article 142 on Nordic
agriculture. That article stipulates as follows:
‘1. The Commission shall authorize Norway, Finland and Sweden to grant long-term
national aids with a view to ensuring that agricultural activity is maintained in
specific regions. These regions should cover the agricultural areas situated to the
north of the 62nd Parallel and some adjacent areas south of that parallel affected
by comparable climatic conditions rendering agricultural activity particularly
difficult.’
Article 142 specifies further the objectives of the aid and the considerations
that the Commission needs to take into account while determining the regions
referred to in paragraph 1. This article again was necessitated by a novel
situation. Prior to the accession of Finland and Sweden there was no Member
State whose mainland was subject to such harsh climatic conditions. Thus,
for the equitable application of CAP to all the Member States, the special
circumstances of the newcomers had to be taken into account. In other words,
this arrangement should also be seen as an attempt to extend the acquis to the
newcomers rather than a derogation or deviation from it.
The same goes for Protocol No. 3 of the 1994 Act of Accession on the Sami
people, which for the first time dealt with an indigenous population living
on the mainland territory of Member States.751 Norway, Sweden and Finland
750 Final Act, OJ L 291/186, 19.11.1979.
751 For arrangements on lands or territories with which Member States have a special relation-
ship, see section 5.2.3 of this chapter.
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had certain obligations and commitments with regard to Sami people flowing
from both national and international law. Thus, there was the need to accom-
modate those obligations and commitments within the EU legal order as well.
In the preamble of the Protocol, it was acknowledged that traditional Sami
culture and livelihood was dependent on primary economic activities such
as reindeer husbandry, following which Article 1 of the Protocol provided
that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of the EC Treaty, exclusive rights to
reindeer husbandry within traditional Sami areas may be granted to the Sami
people.” Article 2 of the Protocol provided the legal basis for the extension
of this Protocol so as to “take account of any further development of exclusive
Sami rights linked to their traditional means of livelihood”.
The third novelty introduced by the 1994 Act of Accession is contained
in Protocol No. 6, which created an additional objective to the existing five
referred to in Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88, as amended
by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93.752 The new objective, that is Object-
ive 6, under Article 1 of the Protocol aims “to promote the development and
structural adjustment of regions with an extremely low population density”.
The regions covered by Objective 6 are listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol, and
Annex 2 sets out the breakdown of resources by year and Member State. It
would probably be more accurate to qualify this new arrangement as a
measure going beyond mere technical adjustment, however, far from being
a permanent derogation clause. Since again the aim is extending the acquis
to a new situation arising in new Member States rather than derogating from
certain areas of the acquis. Furthermore, the arrangement is far from being
permanent, as in the fisheries regime, Article 5 of the Protocol refers to a future
date when the existing rules will be re-examined. It reads as follows:
‘The provisions of this Protocol, including the eligibility of the regions listed in
Annex 1 for assistance from the Structural Funds, shall be re-examined in 1999
simultaneously with the framework Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93 on structural
instruments and policies and in accordance with the procedures laid down in that
Regulation.’
The last clause in the 1994 Act of Accession to be examined is in Annex XV,
under point X Miscellaneous and concerns the prohibition of marketing of
tobacco products for oral use, the so-called “snus”, in Sweden and Norway.
The marketing of tobacco for oral use was prohibited by Article 8a of Directive
752 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93 of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2052/
88 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their
activities between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank
and the other existing financial instruments, OJ L 193/5, 31.7.1993.
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92/41/EEC,753 which defined “tobacco for oral use” in its Article 2(4) as “all
products for oral use, except those to be smoked or chewed, made wholly or
partly of tobacco, in powder or particulate form or in any combination of these
forms – particularly those presented in sachet portions or porous sachets –
or in a form resembling a food product”. The most widely used and marketed
types of “snus” in Sweden and Norway are either in a powder form (loose
snus) or in teabag-like sachets (portion snus), i.e. in forms described by Article
2(4) and prohibited by Article 8a. The derogation provides that “[t]he pro-
hibition in Article 8a … shall not apply in Sweden and Norway, with the
exception of the prohibition to place this product on the market in a form
resembling a food product”. Moreover, Sweden and Norway need to take all
the necessary measures to ensure that “snus” is not placed on the market in
other Member States, which will also be monitored by the Commission.
This is indeed a permanent derogation from secondary EU law that applies
to Sweden. It goes beyond being a “mere adjustment”, however, given the
fact that it concerns the marketing of a particular form of a product and then
only on the territory of one Member State, arguably, it is not a derogation that
is liable to have a serious effect on the functioning of the internal market or
on competition. The purpose of this derogation seems to be to provide some
flexibility as to the use of this product, whose effects on human health are
contentious, where there is habitual use of the product, i.e. Sweden and Nor-
way. Yet, the general prohibition is kept in place so as to prevent the habit
from spreading and thereby protect public health. This is another example
to the difficulties and tensions that can arise in the endeavour to extend the
acquis to new Member States with different geography, climate, cultures etc.
One of the most conspicuous derogations in the 2003 Act of Accession is
the Maltese derogation, providing for a permanent restriction to the purchase
of secondary reidences by non-residents of Malta. It is similar to the Danish
deorgation obtained by Protocol No. 1 to the Maastricht Treaty.754 The details
753 Council Directive 92/41/EEC of 15 May 1992 amending Directive 89/622/EEC on the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning the labelling of tobacco products, OJ L 158/30, 11.06.1991.
754 Protocol No. 1 to the Maastricht Treaty provided as follows: “Notwithstanding the Pro-
visions of this Treaty, Denmark may maintain the existing legislation on the acquisition
of second homes”. Hence, complaints on the ground that “only established residents are
entitled to acquire property in Denmark” have been dismissed. See European Parliament,
Committee on Petitions, 3 July 2006, Petition 866/2000 by Mr Rolf Dieter Rahn (German)
concerning equal treatment of Union citizens in Denmark, PE 311.501/REV II. It is argued
that the introduction of Protocol No. 1 was a response to two judgments delivered in in
1989: Cowan and Commission v Greece. In the latter case, the Court established that as far
as Greece had maintained legislation restricting the acquisition of immovable property by
nationals of other Member States, it had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 48,
52, and 59 of the EEC Treaty [now Articles 45, 49, 56 TFEU]. See, Case C-305/87 Commission
v Greece, [1989] ECR 1461, paras. 28-29; and Case 186/87 Cowan. G. Martinico, The Tangled
Complexity of the EU Constitutional Process: The Frustrating Knot of Europe (Routledge, 2013).
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of the derogation are to be found in Protocol 6 to the Act of Accession. It reads
as follows:
‘Bearing in mind the very limited number of residences in Malta and the very
limited land available for construction purposes, which can only cover the basic
needs created by the demographic development of the present residents, Malta
may on a non-discriminatory basis maintain in force the rules on the acquisition and
holding of immovable property for secondary residence purposes by nationals of
the Member States who have not legally resided in Malta for at least five years
laid down in the Immovable Property (Acquisition by Non-Residents) Act (Chapter
246).’
Malta shall apply authorisation procedures for the acquisition of immovable
property for secondary residence purposes in Malta, which shall be based on
published, objective, stable and transparent criteria. These criteria shall be applied
in a non-discriminatory manner and shall not differentiate between nationals of Malta
and of other Member States. Malta shall ensure that in no instance shall a national
of a Member State be treated in a more restrictive way than a national of a
third country.
In the event that the value of one such property bought by a national of
a Member State exceeds the thresholds provided for in Malta’s legislation,
namely 30000 Maltese lira for apartments and 50000 Maltese lira for any type
of property other than apartments and property of historical importance,
authorisation shall be granted. Malta may revise the thresholds established
by such legislation to reflect changes in prices in the property market in
Malta.755
If the authorization procedures as well as the criteria mentioned apply
equally to everone who is not a resident of Malta, including Maltese nationals,
this would make the Immovable Propert Act indirectly discriminatory, as more
Maltese nationals are likely to be resident in Malta. However, indirect discrim-
ination can be justified. In the case of Malta, the justification is the small size
of the island, and the limited number of residences and land available for
construction. It is difficult to envisage how the same result (making housing
available for residents of Malta) could be achieved by less restrictive means.
Moreover, given the tiny size of the island this derogation is not of such scope
or nature as to (negatively) affect the functioning of the internal market.
In addition, although technically speaking not a permanent derogation,
in Protocol 7 to the 2003 Act of Accession Malta has also tried to guarantee
79; D. Curtin, “The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces,“
Common Market Law Review 30, no. 1 (1993): 46-47.
755 Emphasis added. Protocol No 6 on the acquisition of secondary residences in Malta, OJ
L 236/947, 23.09.2003.
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that it would not be obliged to legalise abortion.756 According to Inglis, this
Protocol can be seen as a pre-emptive response to the legislative Resolution
of the European Parliament of July 2002,757 which was interpreted by Maltese
clergy as a call to legalise abortion.758
The last novel situation worth mentioning was introduced by Protocol No
10 to the 2003 Act of Accession. It deals with the special situation of Cyprus,
as the country acceded to the Union without settling the problem between
its Greek and Turkish communities. The arrangement found at EU level was
to suspend the application of the acquis to the areas of the island over which
the Cypriot government does not exercise effective control,759 namely the
northern Turkish part. The suspension can be withdrawn by “[t]he Council,
acting unanimously on the basis of a proposal from the Commission”.760
According to Article 2(1) of Protocol 10, following the same procedure, the
Council is to decide on the terms under which the provisions of EU law apply
between the areas that the Cypriot government exercises control (the southern
part) and those that it does not (the northern part).761 Since it is argued that
“the suspension of the acquis is not a derogation from the acquis”,762 this thesis
does not deal with the regime established in Cyprus in any depth. However,
it is worth noting that even if the regime created is not de jure one of a
permanent derogation, the development of the de facto situation in the long
run is difficult to foresee.763
756 The Protocol reads as follows: “Nothing in the Treaty on European Union, or in the Treaties
establishing the European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplement-
ing those Treaties, shall affect the application in the territory of Malta of national legislation
relating to abortion.”
757 European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a European Parliament and
Council regulation on aid for policies and actions on reproductive and sexual health and
rights in developing countries, (COM(2002) 120 – C5-0114/2002 – 2002/0052(COD)).
Regulation (EC) 1567/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on aid policies
and actions for reproductive and sexual health and rights in developing countries, OJ L
224/1, 6.9.2003.
758 Inglis, Evolving Practice in EU Enlargement: 52.
759 See Article 1(1) of Protocol No 10 on Cyprus, OJ L 236/955, 23.9.2003.
760 See ibid., Article 1(2). Similarly, in the event of a settlement it is the Council deciding by
unanimity on a proposal by the Commission “on the adaptations to the terms concerning
the accession of Cyprus to the European Union with regard to the Turkish Cypriot Com-
munity”. See ibid., Article 4.
761 Council Regulation 866/2004 on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol No 10 of the 2003
Act of Accession, OJ L 161/128, 30.4.2004; as amended by Regulation 1283/2005, OJ L 203/8,
4.8.2005; Regulation 587/2008, OJ L 163/1, 24.6.2008; and Regulation 685/2013, OJ L 196/1,
19.7.2013.
762 Inglis, Evolving Practice in EU Enlargement: 183.
763 On the possibility to accommodate a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation within the Union
legal order, see M. Cremona and N. Skoutaris, “Speaking of the de … rogations: accom-
modating a solution of the Cyprus issue within the Union legal order,“ Journal of Balkan
and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 4 (2009): 381-95.
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As illustrated by this overview, changes in past Accession Treaties going
beyond mere “adjustments” were rather exceptional and limited in scope. As
concluded, in most instances those changes were mere “adjustments” but of
a different kind. They were adjustments necessitated by inclusion of a novel
situation or condition that did not exist in the Union before. It is possible to
argue that some of them could still be considered as “adjustments” in the sense
used in Article 49(2) TEU, as there is a causal link between the “adjustment”
and the process of accession, as required by the latter provision. The solutions
found aimed at extending the application of existing policies to those products,
situations or conditions; thus had integrationist objectives and effects. For
instance, the application of CAP was extended so as to include a new product
“cotton”; a new objective (Objective 6) was added to existing objectives in
Regulation No 2052/88 so as to finance the development of regions with
extremely low population density; indigenous peoples were accommodated
so as to respect their right to enjoy their unique lifestyles.
At the end, arguably there are only two exceptional cases, in which changes
seem to have gone beyond being mere “adjustments”: those are the derogation
granted to the purchase of secondary residences in Malta and the derogation
on the prohibition of marketing of “snus”. Malta is very small and its second-
ary housing market quite attractive, which means that without any protection
and with increasing housing prices, its population could be deprived of the
opportunity to obtain housing in the long run. Since the Maltese rules do not
discriminate on the basis of nationality but residence, they are only indirectly
discriminatory and thus could arguably be justified, as they seem to be pro-
portionate to achieve their aim. As to the derogation on “snus”, it should be
noted that it concerns derogating from a single provision of secondary EU law,
i.e. Article 8a of Directive 92/41/EEC. In other words, the scope of that de-
rogation is very limited. It aims to accommodate Sweden’s cultural con-
sumption habits of tobacco, which is not shared by populations of other
Memberm States, while at the same time preventing those habits from spread-
ing to other parts of Europe.
Most important of all, none of these arrangements significantly affects the
proper functioning of the internal market, competition or one of the Union’s
well-established policies. All of them were introducing at the request of the
acceding States, none was imposed unilaterally on them. For the most part
these arrangements were created out of the necessity to accommodate the
particularities of each new comer usually with the aim to extend the acquis
to these novel conditions and situations.764 In the exceptional instances where
the aim was not the extension of the acquis, there was a reasonable justification
to derogate from the acquis so as to respect the particular needs or conditions
764 See, Booss and Forman, “Enlargement: Legal and Procedural Issues,“ 102, footnote 19.
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of a country. As such these derogations do not seriously call into question
the equality of Member States.
As far as the wording of the Negotiating Framework for Turkey is con-
cerned, it should be noted that a (temporary) derogation clause pointing to
a future date to establish “[t]he eventual establishment of freedom of move-
ment of persons” carries the danger of becoming a permanent derogation
clause. As illustrated by the fisheries regime, which was supposed to be
derogating from the main rule for ten years, the derogating regime became
the main rule rather than vice versa. The difference being of course that there
was no well-established regime in the area of fisheries when the regime in
the 1972 Act of Accession was devised and that the latter regime applied
equally to all Member States without differentiating between the old and new
Member States. Obviously, such a clause in the area of free movement of
persons will have a substantial impact both on the functioning of the internal
market and on competition, and it will discriminate directly on the basis of
nationality in respect of some of the fundamental freedoms with regard to
the nationals of one Member State only. No matter in what form, i.e. a perma-
nent derogation or a PSC, such a clause will fly in the face of important rules
and principles governing the enlargement process as well as on rules and
principles underlying the constitutional foundations of the Union, which is
examined in the next and final part.
5.4 CONCLUSION
This part contained an analysis of past and present versions of the Treaty
provision laying down the basis of both procedural and substantive constraints
in the framework of a candidate State’s accession process to the Union. The
various versions of this provision, now Article 49 TEU, have always constituted
the backbone of the enlargement procedure and have defined its general limits.
While the primary aim of this part was to identify the main legal (both pro-
cedural and substantive) constraints flowing from the latter provision, its
secondary aim was to demonstrate that the latter limits never provided a full
picture of what happened in practice. Hence, for a better understanding of
the full range of legal constraints that play a role in the process, the evolution
of past practice as well entrenched principles that have always underlain the
process have been identified and analysed.
Few examples of the limited view provided by Article 49 TEU, are as
follows: firstly, since the very beginning, that is the first accession process,
the Commission has played a role that went far beyond delivering an opinion
as indicated in in ex Article 237 EEC. Secondly, Member States have never acted
as such in the process but always via the Council machinery. Thirdly, with
the enlargement to the East and subsequent Treaty revisions, institutions of
the Union got even more involved in the process, to the extent that some
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commentators would argue that the Commission’s de facto role in the enlarge-
ment process came to resemble “the ‘Community method’: the Commission
proposes, the Council decides, and the Commission implements, controls and
evaluates”.765
Throughout Chapter 4, it has been argued that the Community/ Union
nature of the enlargement process has always been prominent. The fact that
recently Member States are trying to increase their control over the process
via the introduction of various mechanisms does not challenge this argument.
On the contrary, that development could be conceived of as an attempt to tip
the balance between the supranational and intergovernmental components
of the procedure back to where it was before the fifth enlargement. With the
increased role of the Commission, backing of the Parliament and the support
of the Presidencies, Member States felt the process gained its own life, which
was almost out of their control. With the “benchmarking” system they have
more control over the process. However, the fact that they still need to act
via the Council machinery remains unchanged. Moreover, the fact that the
main function of enlargement conferences is seen as registering the progress
of negotiations, which apparently take place between the chief negotiator of
the country and the Commission and/or the Presidency,766 demonstrates
the limited roles of Member States in the process.
In addition to the procedure provided in the Treaties and the enlargement
practice that developed over the years, the third component that defined the
nature of the process were the principles governing the negotiation process.
The first principle required the full adoption of the acquis communautaire and
the second one required the solution of all problems by transitional measures
of limited duration and not by changing the existing rules. The objective of
these principles was to ensure the continuity of the Community/ Union. The
examination of past Acts of Accession as well as of various measures employed
therein clearly illustrated that these principles were consistently applied in
each and every accession. The acquis communautaire was extended to all newly
acceding states in its entirety. When that was not possible immediately or
under traditional transitional measures, new measures were designed such
as the ‘quasi-transitional’ measures. Measures going beyond mere “adjust-
ments” were very exceptional and limited in scope, to the extent that we can
ignore their existence. This consistent application of the principles of nego-
tiation made the process foreseeable, credible and legitimate for the candidate
states.
As elaborated above, the PSC or permanent derogation clauses mentioned
in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey are unprecedented in the light of
both old and new mechanisms used in all the Acts of Accession. What differ-
entiates them most from the instruments employed so far is their underlying
765 Christoffersen, “Organization of the Process and Beginning of the Negotiations,“ 36.
766 See also, ibid., 42-43; Avery, “The Enlargement Negotiations,“ 40.
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rationale, which is to withhold the full extension of the acquis communautaire
to the acceding State, and/or suspending parts of the acquis, which are funda-
mental for the functioning of the internal market. Inclusion of such clauses
would mean amending some of the rules and policies of the Union, which
Member States are allowed to do on the basis of Article 48 TEU, but not on
the basis of Article 49 TEU. The limits to the changes Member States are allowed
to make under Article 49 TEU, as demonstrated in this Chapter, are delineated
by the notions of “adjustments” and “adaptations”.
In other words, Article 49 TEU has delimited the changes to be made under
its scope more clearly and more restrictively compared to Article 48 TEU, i.e.
it places firmer legal constraints on Member States as primary law makers
under Article 49 as compared to Article 48 TEU. The following part of this thesis
aims to establish that there are cases and Opinions delivered by the Court
of Justice, which imply the existence of a constitutional core, or constitutional
foundations of the Union, which could be argued to limit some of the changes
that affect that core even under Article 48 TEU.
As to the constraining effect of past practice and negotiation principles,
as demonstrated in Chapter 4, they flow from their consistent application and
their internalization by the Union institutions as well as Member States. The
chronological overview of past accession waves has demonstrated that the
main contours of the process as well as the main principles underlying it are
firmly entrenched by now. That entrenchment can be deduced not only from
Member States’ compliance with these principles and norms, i.e. by their
internalization, but also by their constitutionalisation, in other words, their
official incorporation into the Treaties. The partial incorporation of the
Copenhagen criteria as ex Article 6(1) TEU and now Article 2 TEU is a good
illustration of the latter point.
It should be noted that once incorporated into the Treaties, the constraining
force of these principles is further reinforced. The external threat of sanction
by the Court of Justice is added to the constraining force of internalization.
As argued above, the external threat of sanction by the Court of Justice is
always present in the framework of Article 49 TEU. Member States have to
comply with the procedural steps indicated in Article 49 TEU as well as pay
attention to the causal link between the “adjustments” they introduce and the
accession of the candidate State. Problems regarding procedure or substance,
if taken to the Court, might trigger a review of the Council Decision concluding
the accession negotiations, which could lead to its annulment.767
767 The relatively recent Pringle ruling has revealed that Member States cannot escape judicial
review when acting as primary law makers (though the review focuses mainly on checking
procedural requirements). See, Case C-370/12 Pringle. For a more elaborate discussion of
the possibility to challenge the PSC in front of the Court of Justice, see Hillion, “Negotiating
Turkey’s Membership to the European Union: Can the Member States Do As They Please?,“
279-82.
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As to the main substantive constraint imposed by Article 49 TEU, Chapter
5 identified the term “adjustment” and elaborated on its scope by analysing
other language versions of the term as well as examining changes included
under past Acts of Accession under that title “ Adjustments to the Treaties”.
It was demonstrated that the Dutch, French and German versions of the
Treaties all employed terms of more limited scope to refer to the changes
necessitated by accession under Article 49 TEU (‘aanpassingen’, ‘les adapta-
tions’, and ‘Anpassungen’) than the changes carried out under Article 48 TEU
(‘herziening’, ‘la révision’ and ‘Änderung’). Moreover, it was argued that the
fact that other language versions do not distinguish between changes to the
Treaties (‘adjustments’) and changes to secondary law (‘adaptations’), but use
a single term for both types of changes (‘aanpassingen’, ‘les adaptations’, and
‘Anpassungen’), suggests that the Court case law interpreting ‘adaptations’
could be used shed light on the term ‘adjustment’ as well. The conclusion
reached was that “adjustments” could be defined as the technical changes to
the Treaties necessitated directly by accession and the corresponding need
to ensure the full applicability of the Treaties to the acceding State to the
exclusion of other types of changes, which can be carried out under Article
48 TEU.
Since the Negotiating Franework is vague as to the precise type of measure
that would be employed regarding free movement of persons, Chapter 5
examines other types of measures used in past Accession Agreements, which
like ‘adjustments’ aim to facilitate the full integration of the new Member States
into the Union. Different types of measures are classified as ‘transitional
measures’, ‘quasi-transitional measures’ and ‘safeguard clauses’. It is argued
that a PSC on free movement of persons would be different from all the pre-
viously employed safeguard clauses, because it would be permanent, it would
single out one Member State and its nationals, and instead of aiming to extend
fully the application of the free movement provisions, it would provide for
their inapplication or suspension.
Lastly, Chapter 5 examined all new arrangements introduced by past Acts
of Accession so as to establish those that could be considered to be going
beyond the substantive constraint of ‘adjustment’ embedded in Article 49 TEU.
The examination revealed that there were many instances in which there was
need for new arrangements, however, the underlying rationale of almost all
of these was not derogating from the existing Treaty rules, but rather making
the necessary arrangements to incorporate them into the existing system of
rules. As to the two exceptions (restrictions on the purchase of secondary
rersidence by non-rresidents in Malta and the marketing of ‘snus’ in Sweden),
which were of a different nature, i.e. derogating from the existing rules, it was
established that they were of a very limited scope and not likely to effect the
functioning of the internal market in any siginificant way.
To recapitulate, this part established that enlargement takes place based
on a procedure enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union over which
210 Chapter 5
the Court has jurisdiction. As in other areas of EU law, under Article 49 TEU
Member States are subject to the general principles of law flowing from the
Treaties and case law of the Court. If Member States pledge to abide by those
principles and Treaties in intergovernmental agreements that they sign outside
the Treaty framework,768 those rules and principles should a fortiori apply
in the context of Article 49 TEU.
The following part demonstrates the existence of constitutional constraints
and their application to all acts and procedures that fall within the scope of
Union law. It shows the central role of fundamental rights and free movement
of persons and how their importance was further elevated by the introduction
of Union citizenship and the CFR. It is argued that all those developments place
strong constraints on Member States and are capable of precluding them from
introducing a directly discriminatory clause on the free movement rights of
nationals of a single Member State.
768 See Article 2 of (Draft) International Agreement on a Reinforced Union. Available online:
http://www.europeanvoice.com/GED/00020000/28000/28035.pdf.
PART III
Legal Constraints Flowing from the
Constitutional Foundations of the Union
INTRODUCTION
Having examined the legal constraints flowing from EU-Turkey Association
Law and EU enlargement law in the first two parts of this thesis, this final part
proceeds to examine the legal constraints on Member States when drafting
an Accession Agreement flowing from the constitutional foundations of the
Union legal order. The case law of the Court established that there are rules
in primary law that are more difficult to derogate from,769 implying those
rules are more important than others. This suggests that those rules, which
according to the Court constitute the “very foundations” of the legal order,770
could act as constraint on the primary law making function of Member States.
In addition to the case law of the Court, it is possible to identify those
foundations by examining the original Treaties, subsequent Treaty amend-
ments, as well as academic literature on the issue. To enable a full understand-
ing of Treaty provisions and recent case law, a brief account of the historical
evolution of certain aspects of the system is required. In other words, a mere
snapshot of recent case law and the current version of the Treaties might not
be enough to tell the full story on how the legal order gradually gained a life
(and a nucleus or core) of its own, managing to get out of the full grip of its
Masters, namely the Member States of the Union.
It should be emphasized from the very start that the purpose of this part
is not to identify those “very foundations” in their entirety, but simply to
identify parts of those foundations, which would be breached by the proposed
PSC on free movement of persons in Turkey’s Negotiating Framework. Identify-
ing those relevant parts would enable us to argue that they could act as
constraint on Member States when drafting Turkey’s Accession Agreement.
Hence, while Chapter 6 elaborates on the idea of constitutional foundations
of the Union that comprise a hard core that could even limit Member States’
power to revise the Treaties, which is extrapolated from the Court’s
Opinions771 and judgments,772 Chapter 7 focuses on the compatibility of
769 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, para. 304.
770 Opinion 1/91 EEA, para. 46; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi,
para. 304.
771 Opinion 1/91 EEA; Opinion 1/92 EEA; Opinion 1/09 of the Court of Justice. See Vilaça and
Piçarra, Are there material limits to the revision of the Treaties on the European Union?: 31-32.
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the PSC with a central element of those very foundations of the Union constitu-
tional order, namely the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nation-
ality, or in broader terms the principle of equality.
In short, Chapter 6 identifies the contours of the constitutional foundations
of the Union as recognized by the Court and later acknowledged by the
Member States. The substance of those “very foundations”, as far as they relate
to the PSC on free movement of persons, is arguably comprised of: the funda-
mental freedoms, Union citizenship and fundamental rights. Lastly, the Chapter
discusses the possible application of those areas as constitutional constraints
on Member States when drafting an Accession Agreement.
Chapter 7 focuses on the compatibility of the proposed PSC with, arguably
the most important principle forming part of those “very foundations”, which
it would breach, i.e. the principle of equality. To demonstrate how this prin-
ciple underpins and defines the edifice of the Union legal order, firstly, its
traditional role in the development of the internal market is briefly reviewed.
Secondly, it is demonstrated that equality is an inalienable part of the concept
of Union citizenship. Moreover, it is an integral part of the CFR as well as an
important general principle of EU law. As central as the equality of Member
State nationals is for the functioning of the EU legal order, another indispens-
able aspect of the principle that is analysed in Chapter 7 is the equality of
Member States, which has been constitutionalized recently in Article 4(2) TEU.
It is argued that a constitutional principle as central to the Union legal order
as the principle of equality would preclude Member States from including
a PSC on free movement of persons that would blatantly breach it.
772 See Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi; Kokott and Sobotta, “The
Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and International Law – Finding the Balance?.“
6 Constitutional Foundations of the Union as
a Constraint on Primary Law Making
6.1 INTRODUCTION
To demonstrate the existence of constitutional constraints in the Union legal
order, Chapter 6 begins by examining the areas identified as the foundations
of the Community in the original Treaties. Subsequently, it provides a detailed
analysis the first EEA Opinion, which inspired the literature on the existence
of a “core acquis”,773 an “untouchable hard core”,774 or a “fundamental patri-
mony”,775 which constitutes an “irreducible minimum”776 and thereby
constrains Member States as primary law makers. While the first EEA Opinion
laid down the basis of the thesis on the existence of implied material limits
to changing the Treaties, it has not remained an exception. Few recent pro-
nouncements and opinions of the Court have further confirmed the existence
of those “very foundations”. Their implications for the inclusion of a PSC on
free movement of persons in a future Accession Agreement are spelled out
in this section.
Once the judicial acknowledgment of the existence of the “very founda-
tions” of the Union is laid down, the next section tries to shed light on the
substance of those “very foundations”. Opinions and cases of the Court that
are examined in the above-mentioned section so as to establish the existence
of the “very foundations” of the legal order, are re-examined with a view to
establishing their substance. It is argued that the first component that con-
stitutes part of those very foundations is the four freedoms; free movement
of persons in particular. The second component is the concept of Union citizen-
ship, which the Court proclaimed as “destined to be the fundamental status of
nationals of the Member States”.777 It is argued that the concept has
entrenched the significance of the right to free movement of persons to such
an extent that now it constitutes a consolidated constitutional right. It has
773 S. Weatherill, “Safeguarding the Acquis Communautaire,“ in The European Union after
Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis, ed. T. Heukels, N. Blokker, and M. Brus (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 1998), 167.
774 C. C. Gialdino, “Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire,“ Common Market Law
Review 32, no. 5 (1995): 1119.
775 Vilaça and Piçarra, Are there material limits to the revision of the Treaties on the European Union?:
38.
776 Weatherill, “Safeguarding the Acquis Communautaire,“ 168.
777 Emphasis added. Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, para. 31.
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moved up in the hierarchy of norms and become stronger. For our purposes,
this translates into more constraining power on Member States.
The third component identified as part of the very foundations of the Union
in this study is fundamental rights. Fundamental rights were initially intro-
duced by the Court into the Union legal order as general principles of law.
Recent case law confirms that some of those principles belong to the “very
foundations” of the Union legal order.778 Arguably, these principles today
go beyond constituting “implicit” constraints or implicit material limits on
Member States as primary law makers, as they have not only been entrenched
by the case law of the Court over the years, but they have also been accorded
a prominent place in the Treaties for more than two decades. Now, they are
enshrined in Article 2 TEU, which follows the very first provision announcing
the establishment of the European Union (Article 1 TEU), and explicitly pro-
claims and enumerates the values on which the Union is founded. A brief
overview of the process of entrenchment of those principles and their rise in
the constitutional hierarchy of norms will shed light not only on the develop-
ment trajectory of those principles but also on the constitutionalisation or
“autonomization” of the EU legal order vis-à-vis its founders, i.e. the Member
States of the Union. It will demonstrate that they constitute another source
of constraint on introducing a PSC on free movement of persons in a future
Accession Treaty.
6.2 EXISTENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
OF THE “VERY FOUNDATIONS” OF THE UNION
While it is the Court’s first EEA Opinion that introduced the concept “very
foundations” of the Union, it is worth pointing out that the EEC Treaty also
allowed us to identify what it considered to constitute the “Foundations of
the Community”. Part II of the EEC Treaty carried that title,779 highlighting
the importance of the four freedoms in the construction of the common market.
Even though the EEC Treaty laid down quite clearly what the foundations of
the integration project were, it was Article 8a (later 14 EC) introduced by the
Single European Act780 that described best the relationship between the com-
778 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi.
779 Part II titled “Foundations of the Union” contained four Titles. Title I dealt with the
establishment of “Free Movement of Goods” with chapters on “The Customs Union” and
the “Elimination of Quantitative Restriction between Member States”. Title II was on
“Agriculture” and Title III on the “Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital”.
Chapter I of Title III was on “Workers”, Chapter 2 on the “Right of Establishment”, Chapter
3 on “Services”, and Chapter 4 on “Capital”. Lastly, followed “Transport” under Title IV,
another common policy essential for the establishment and proper functioning of the
common market.
780 OJ L 169/1, 29.06.1987.
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mon market781 and the four freedoms. It provided that “[t]he internal market
shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement
of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the
provisions of the Treaty.” Obviously, the internal market was not confined
to the four freedoms, yet they constituted the essence, the very core of the
project.
As important as the freedoms were, in the early years of the EEC, it was
not possible to deduce by looking at Treaty provisions alone the existence of
an area or principles of Community law of such paramount importance that
they could act as implicit material constraint on Treaty change. The idea
emerged only after the Court’s first EEA Opinion, which found the proposed
judicial supervision system envisaged under the EEA Agreement to be incom-
patible with “the very foundations of the Community”. Hence, Member States
had no choice but to make the necessary revisions to bring the EEA Agreement
in line with EU law.
For a clearer understanding of the Court’s Opinion, it is worth briefly
outlining the main characteristics of the EEA Agreement beforehand. The
purpose of the agreement was to create a European Economic Area covering
the territories of the Member States and those of the EFTA countries. Its Article 1
provided that its aim was “to promote a continuous and balanced strengthen-
ing of trade and economic relations between the Contracting Parties with equal
conditions of competition, and respect for the same rules, with a view to
creating a homogeneous European Economic Area”. The legal regime that were
to apply in relations between the EEA States would cover the free movement
of goods, persons, services, capital, and competition. The rules applicable in
those areas would be those laid down in corresponding provisions of the EEC
781 The common market was to be also called the single market or the internal market from
that time on. For our purposes there is no need to distinguish between these concepts.
However, it is worth noting that the term “internal market” is seen to be less extensive
than the term “common market”. See L. W. Gormley, “The internal market: history and
evolution,“ in Regulating the Internal Market, ed. N. Nic Shuibhne (Cheltenham, UK; North-
ampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2006), 14. Gormley notes that this distinction has not
always been understood by the Court. See, for example; Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament
and Council, [2000] ECR I-8419; for comments see, L. W. Gormley, “Competition and free
movement: Is the internal market the same as a common market?,“ European Business Law
Review 13, no. 6 (2002): 517-22; P. J. G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction
to the Law of the European Communities, ed. Laurence W. Gormley, 3 ed. (London: Kluwer
Law International, 1998); According to Barnard, since the realization of the single market
is dependent on policy action in ever-wider range of fields, including competition and social
policy, “it is likely that the terms common, single, and internal market are largely syn-
onymous“. C. Barnard, Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 3 ed. (Oxford: OUP,
2010). 12; K. Mortelmans, “The Common Market, the Internal Market and the Single Market,
What’s in a Market?,“ Common Market Law Review 35(1998): 107. D. Hanf, “Legal Concept
and Meaning of the Internal Market,“ in The EU Internal Market in Comparative Perspective:
Economic, Political and Legal Analyses, ed. J. Pelkmans, D. Hanf, and M. Chang (Brussels:
P.I.E Peter Lang, 2008), 78-81.
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and ECSC Treaties as well as secondary legislation. Moreover, the Contracting
Parties were to extend to the EEA future Community law in those fields.782
The aim of homogeneity was to be ensured through the use of provisions
identically worded with corresponding provisions in Community law and
through the establishment of an EEA Court, to which a Court of First Instance
would be attached. The EEA Court would have jurisdiction to settle disputes
between the Contracting Parties. Article 6 of the agreement provided that its
provisions and corresponding provisions of Community secondary law were
to be interpreted in conformity with the case law of the ECJ which were given
prior to the date of the signature of the agreement. Moreover, under Article
104(1) of the agreement all the Courts, EEA and EC/EU Courts were to pay due
account to the principles laid down in decisions delivered by the other courts
so as to ensure as uniform as possible an interpretation of the EEA agree-
ment.783
6.2.1 Opinions 1/91 and 1/92
In its first EEA Opinion, the Court of Justice identified several aspects of the
EEA Agreement that would create problems in terms of its compatibility with
the Union legal order. To mention the most important ones, firstly, it would
not be possible to achieve homogeneity of the rules of law throughout the EEA
because the aims and contexts of the agreements were different, which meant
that even identical provisions could be interpreted differently. The fact that
Article 6 of the EEA Agreement provided a duty of conform interpretation only
with the case law of the Court delivered prior to the signature of the agreement
was also problematic. As the case law evolved over time, the possibility of
divergent interpretation would emerge.784 Moreover, the interpretation of
the expression “Contracting Parties” by the EEA Court also raised issues,785
782 Opinion 1/91 EEA, paras. 3-4; See annotation by H. G. Schermers, “Opinion 1/91 of the Court
of Justice, 14 December 199; Opinion 1/92 of the Court of Justice, 10 April 1992,“ Common
Market Law Review (1992): 991-99; B. Brandtner, “The ’Drama’ of the EEA: Comments on
Opinions 1/91 and 1/92,“ European Journal of International Law 3(1992): 300-19.
783 Opinion 1/91 EEA, paras. 5-9.
784 Ibid., paras. 13-29.
785 The problem with the interpretation of the expression of “Contracting Parties” was that
as far as the Community and its Member States were concerned it could mean various
things depending on the issue and respective competences of the Community and Member
States. It could mean the Community and Member States; the Community; or Member
States. In other words, interpreting the term “Contracting Parties” would require the EEA
Court to rule on the respective competences of the Community and Member States. This
was likely to negatively affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties as
well as the autonomy of the Community legal order, which was to be ensured by the Court
of Justice. See, ibid., paras. 30-35.
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as well as the effect of the case law of the EEA Court on the interpretation of
Community law.
To examine the latter problem in more detail, the provisions of the EEA
Agreement as well as measures adopted by its institutions would become an
integral part of the Community legal order once it entered into force. The
decisions of the EEA Court would be binding on the Community institutions,
including the Court of Justice. According to the Court, an international agree-
ment providing for such a system of courts is in principle compatible with
Community law.786 “However, the agreement at issue takes over an essential
part of the rules – including the rules of secondary legislation – which govern
economic and trading relations within the Community and which constitute,
for the most part, fundamental provisions of the Community legal order.”787 The
problem with Article 6 of the agreement was mentioned above. In addition,
the agreement’s objective to ensure homogeneity of the law throughout the
EEA would not only determine the interpretation of the rules of the EEA Agree-
ment, but would also affect the interpretation of the corresponding rules of
Community law. Thus, the Court concluded: “in so far as it conditions the future
interpretation of the Community rules on free movement and competition [,] the
machinery of courts provided for in the agreement conflicts with Article 164
of the EEC Treaty [now Article 19(1) TEU] and, more generally with the very
foundations of the Community”.788
As to the question whether an amendment of Article 238 [now Article 217
TFEU] would permit the establishment of such a judicial system, the Court
unequivocally replied that “Article 238 of the EEC Treaty does not provide any
basis for setting up a system of courts which conflicts with Article 164 of the
EEC Treaty and, more generally, with the very foundations of the Community”.789
Consequently, an amendment of that article could not cure the incompatibility
with Community law of the judicial system envisaged by the EEA Agreement.
The judicial system envisaged by the EEA Agreement threatened the auto-
nomy of the legal order. Under Article 19(1) TEU (ex Article 164 of the EEC
Treaty) it has always been the Court of Justice that is to “ensure that in the
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed”. Thus,
conditioning the future interpretation of the Treaties by the Court to the
interpretation provided by another court in the context of another agreement
was incompatible with Article 19(1) TEU and endangered the autonomy of the
Union legal order. What increased the gravity of the incompatibility was the
fact that the area that would be affected or conditioned by the interpretation
of the EEA Court, that is the rules on free movement, constituted an “essential”
or “fundamental” part of the legal order, arguably part of its core or part of
786 Ibid., paras. 37-40.
787 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 41.
788 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 46.
789 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 71.
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its “very foundations”.790 Incompatibility of such gravity according to the
Court could not be cured by a simple amendment of the provision providing
a legal basis for the conclusion of association agreements with third countries
and international organizations.
The Court’s first Opinion resulted in the following changes: firstly, the idea
of creating an EEA Court was dropped. An EFTA court was to be set up in its
place with the competence to rule on the acts of the Surveillance Authority
as well as disputes between EFTA states. In other words, there would be no
common judicial organ but two separate courts: the EFTA court for EFTA coun-
tries, and the Court of Justice for the EEC. Secondly, a new Article 111 was
introduced to ensure that only the Court of Justice would be empowered to
interpret the provisions of the EEA Agreement that were identical in substance
to provisions existing under Community law. However, since EFTA countries
were far from being willing to subject themselves to future rulings of the Court
of Justice, a new mechanism was introduced via Article 105, whereby it would
be a political organ, the Joint Committee that would introduce the Court’s
new judgments into the EFTA legal order, keeping in mind the aim to preserve
the homogenous interpretation of the EEA Agreement. Similarly, in cases of
conflict between the rulings of the two courts, it was again the Joint Committee
that would be responsible to solve the conflict (Article 111). Moreover, an
“Agreed Minute” specified that the decisions of the Joint Committee would
not affect the rulings of the Court of Justice in any way.791
The revised version of the EEA Agreement was sent to the Court once again,
to check whether the new renegotiated provisions were compatible with the
EEC Treaty. The Court’s second Opinion was positive, however not un-
conditional. The Court’s interpretation of the new provisions clearly underlined
the paramount importance of one single principle, i.e. that of the autonomy
of the Community legal order. When asked to evaluate the mechanism intro-
duced under Article 105, the Court unequivocally declared that “ [i]f that
article were to be interpreted as empowering the Joint Committee to disregard
the binding nature of decisions of the Court of Justice within the Community
legal order, the vesting of such a power in the Joint Committee would adverse-
ly affect the autonomy of the Community legal order, respect for which must
be assured by the Court pursuant to Article 164 of the EEC Treaty”.792 Accord-
ing to the Court, the “Agreed Minute” stipulating that decisions of the Joint
Committee were not to affect the case law of the Court was an essential
safeguard, which was indispensable for preserving the autonomy of the Com-
munity legal order.793
790 Ibid., paras. 41 and 46.
791 See, Opinion 1/92 EEA; Schermers, “Opinion 1/91 of the Court of Justice, 14 December 199;
Opinion 1/92 of the Court of Justice, 10 April 1992,“ 999-1000.
792 Opinion 1/92 EEA, para. 22.
793 Ibid., 23-24.
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As to the newly introduced Article 111(3), which provided the possibility
to request the Court’s interpretation of provisions of the EEA Agreement
containing identical rules to the EEC Treaty, the Court ruled that “an inter-
national agreement concluded by the Community may confer new powers
on the Court, provided that in so doing it does not change the nature of the function
of the Court as conceived in the EEC Treaty”.794 The Court found that the function
concerned was not changed in the context of Article 111, since the wording
of the provision empowering the Court to “give a ruling” (“se prononcer” in
French) was clear on the point that the Court’s interpretation would be binding
on both the Contracting Parties and the Joint Committee. The fact that it was
the Joint Committee that had to settle the dispute at the end did not change
that fact.795 In short, if the revised version of the EEA Agreement were to be
interpreted in line with the Opinion of the Court, taking due account of pitfalls
that could endanger the autonomy of the Community legal order, it could
be considered as compatible with the EEC Treaty.
6.2.2 Opinion 1/09
A recent example confirming that some essential characteristics of the system
are untouchable or worthy of protection is the Court’s Opinion on the establish-
ment of a unified patent litigation system (called European and Community
Patents Court) situated outside the institutional and judicial framework of the
EU.796 As in its EEA Opinions, the Court found that such a system “would
alter the essential character of the powers which the Treaties confer on the institu-
tions of the European Union and on the Member States and which are indis-
pensable to the preservation of the very nature of European Union law.”797 The
system of courts established by the proposed agreement would have an exclus-
ive jurisdiction to hear actions brought in the field of Community patent and
would have to interpret and apply EU law in that field, which would deprive
national courts of their power to interpret and apply EU law as well as from
referring preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice. Moreover, to increase
the gravity of the problem, if the Patents Court were to breach EU law, there
794 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 32.
795 Ibid., paras. 33-35.
796 For a more detailed discussion of the Opinion, see C. Baudenbacher, “The EFTA Court
remains the only Non-EU-Member States Court – Observations on Opinion 1/09,“ European
Law Reporter, no. 7-8 (2011): 236-42; M. C. A. Kant, “A Specialized Patent Court for Europe?,“
Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, no. 2 (2012): 193-201; H. M. H. Speyart, “Is er nu
eindelijk een Unieoctrooi-pardon: “Europees octrooi met einheidswerking“,“ Nederlands
Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, no. 4 (2013): 135-44; F. Dehousse, “The Unified Court on
Patents: The New Oxymoron of European Law,“ in Egmont Papers 60 (Brussels: Academia
Press, October 2013).
797 Emphasis added. Opinion 1/09 of the Court of Justice, para. 89.
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would be no remedy against that breach. The Patents Court could not be
subject to infringement proceedings or sued for financial liability. All these
shortcomings led the Court to establish that draft agreement on a unified
patent litigations system would be incompatible with the Treaties.798
What was central in this Opinion as well as those on the EEA Agreement
is the principle of the autonomy of the legal order. The system of courts
envisaged under both international agreements would interfere with the
Court’s monopoly over interpreting EU law. Yet, the second system would
also damage the system of cooperation established between the national courts
and the Court of Justice. It would change the fundamental qualities of the
system, its essential dynamics, its “very nature” or “very foundations”, which
are inextricably linked and which rely on the cooperation between the national
courts and the Court of Justice. Accordingly, both agreements were found to
be incompatible with the Treaties.
6.2.3 Kadi I
To begin with providing a brief factual background to the Kadi case, which
also contained important statements regarding the “very foundations” of Union
law, it concerned Mr. Kadi, whose name appeared in Resolutions issued by
the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council. He was listed as one
of the persons associated with Usama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. The Resolu-
tions provided for the freezing of assets of organizations and people mentioned
in their lists. In order to implement the Security Council Resolutions, Member
States of the Union adopted few Common Positions, which were further
implemented by Council Regulations providing for the freezing of assets of
each entity or individual identified in the above-mentioned lists.799
As one of the individuals affected by the provisions of these Regulations,
Mr. Kadi applied to the General Court for the annulment of those Regulations
798 Ibid., paras. 88-89.
799 Mr. Kadi’s name was “added to the list in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001
of 6 March 2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan,
strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources
in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation No 337/2000 (OJ 2001
L 67, p. 1), by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2062/2001 of 19 October 2001 amending,
for the third time, Regulation No 467/2001 (OJ 2001 L 277, p. 25). He was subsequently
listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with
Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban, and repealing Regulation No
467/2001 (OJ 2002 L 139, p. 9).” See, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Kadi
II, judgment of 18 July 2013, n.y.r., para. 17.
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as far as they concerned him for infringing his fundamental rights.800 While
Mr. Kadi’s application in front of the General Court was not successful,801
his appeal to the Court of Justice was. The Court set aside the judgment of
the General Court, and annulled Regulation No 881/2002 in so far as it con-
cerned Mr. Kadi.
What is important for our purposes here is the fact that the Court reiterated
the existence of “the very foundations of the Community legal order” that
may not be challenged under any circumstances.802 While most of the com-
mentaries written on the case focus on the relationship it spells out between
the international and Union legal orders, for our purposes its significance is
twofold: firstly, the Court acknowledged the existence of the “very founda-
tions” of the Union in a ruling it delivered in a Grand Chamber formation,
and secondly, it revealed some clues as to what constitutes part of those “very
foundations”. The latter aspect of the judgment is dealt with in section 6.3.3.1
below.
To provide a full citation of the Court statement regarding the untouchable
core of Union law, it ruled that primary law provisions, here Article 307 EC
and 297 EC, could not be interpreted as authorizing “any derogation from the
principles of liberty, democracy, and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms enshrined in Article 6(1) EU as a foundation of the Union”.803 The
Court also categorically stated that Article 307 EC “may in no circumstances
permit any challenge to the principles that form part of the very foundations of
the Community legal order…”804 As to the content and principles which form
part of those “very foundations”, they are discussed in the following section
examining the “Substance of constitutional constraints”.
6.2.4 Implications
The most important pronouncement of the Court in its first EEA Opinion for
our purposes is to be found in the last two paragraphs (paragraphs 71-72),
in which the Court declared not only that Article 238 of the EEC Treaty [now
217 TFEU] did not provide any legal basis for setting up a system of courts
that would violate Article 164 of the EEC Treaty [now Article 19(1) TFEU] and
800 To be more specific, “[o]n 18 December 2001 Mr Kadi brought before the General Court
an action seeking the annulment, initially, of Regulations No 467/2001 and No 2062/2001,
then of Regulation No 881/2002, in so far as those regulations concerned him. The grounds
for annulment were, respectively, infringement of the right to be heard, the right to respect
for property and the principle of proportionality, and also of the right to effective judicial
review.” See, ibid., para. 18.
801 See T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission, [2005] ECR II-3649.
802 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, para. 304.
803 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 303.
804 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 304.
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the very foundations of the Community, but further added that even revising
Article 238 would not cure the incompatibility in question. This conclusion
was interpreted to imply the priority or hierarchical superiority of Article 164
EEC over Article 238 EEC, and more generally, the priority of provisions consti-
tuting “the very foundations of the Community” over those that did not.805
The three Opinions of the Court highlighted the paramount importance
of the principle of the autonomy of the Community legal order, which could
be maintained only and only if Article 164 EEC was fully respected.806 The
Opinions confirm Pescatore’s findings in his seminal essay of 1981, which
identified some parts of the acquis as “acquis fondamental”,807 that is a “funda-
mental patrimony”,808 “a “fundamental” acquis of constitutional rank”809
or “core acquis”.810 According to Pescatore, the fundamental acquis was an
acquis of a superior rank (“de rang supérieur”811), which contained the most
crucial elements of the Community legal order, that is “essential elements,
requirements effecting the very foundations of the Community, and rules
which guarantee the unity, identity and existence of the whole European
project”.812 This acquis, he argued, constituted “an untouchable hard core,
that is an absolute substantial restriction implicitly imposed on any substantial
revision”.813
After the EEA Opinions, other scholars followed in agreement that there
had to be aspects of the legal order, which were so central to its nature that
if removed, the legal order would be deprived of its essential characteristics.
Hence, those aspects had to be protected at all cost. Weatherill called the latter
the “core acquis”814 or “irreducible minimum of Community law”;815 Del-
court called it “a basic acquis, constituting what one might call the “genetic
inheritance” of the European Union”816 or “supra-constitutional acquis”;817
805 C. Delcourt, “The Acquis Communautaire: Has the Concept had its Day?,“ Common Market
Law Review 38, no. 4 (2001): 843.
806 Article 164 EEC provided as follows: “The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpreta-
tion and application of this Treaty the law is observed.”
807 P. Pescatore, “Aspects judiciaries de l’acquis communautaire,“ Revue Trimestrielle de Droit
Européen (1981): 620.
808 Vilaça and Piçarra, Are there material limits to the revision of the Treaties on the European Union?:
38.
809 Weatherill, “Safeguarding the Acquis Communautaire,“ 167.
810 Gialdino, “Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire,“ 1109.
811 Pescatore, “Aspects judiciaries de l’acquis communautaire,“ 620.
812 “des choses essentielles, des exigences qui touchent aux fondements même de la Commu-
nauté, des règles dont la méconnaissance mettrait en cause l’unité, l’identité et jusqu’à
l’existence même de l’entreprise européennee”, ibid.; cited in Delcourt, “The Acquis Commu-
nautaire: Has the Concept had its Day?,“ 841.
813 Gialdino, “Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire,“ 1109.
814 Weatherill, “Safeguarding the Acquis Communautaire,“ 167.
815 Ibid., 168.
816 Delcourt, “The Acquis Communautaire: Has the Concept had its Day?,“ 835.
817 Ibid., 844.
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Cruz Vilaça and Piçarra qualified it as a ““hard core” of the Treaty” or the
“foundations of the Community”, which in relation to the power of revision
posses a “supra-constitutional value”;818 for Gialdino “those are the principles
and values whose immutability constitutes the safeguard of the legality of the
order itself.”819
The most important implication of the existence of such an unamendable
core or fundamental acquis for our purposes is its function as a constraint on
Member States as primary law makers. If Member States are constrained by
that core or by the principles constituting part of that core within the Treaty
revision procedure, in which they arguably posses the widest room for
manoeuvre, they will be all the more constrained within Article 49 TEU pro-
cedure, which as illustrated in the previous part, empowers Member States
to make only the necessary “adjustments” linked directly to the accession of
a new Member State.
While many scholars820 agreed that in its EEA Opinions the Court con-
strued the existence of “unamendable principles in the Community legal
order”821 or “legal principles which even Treaty amendment cannot
violate”,822 it was more difficult to agree on which principles exactly these
were except for the principles, which could be derived from Article 164 EEC,
such as the principle of the rule of law, and the principle of the autonomy
of the legal order. Similarly, Vilaça and Piçarra acknowledge that the main
difficulties in identifying the material content of the implied limits to Treaty
revision suggested by the Court relate “to the absence of objective legal criteria
capable of defining such limits with certainty”.823 However, as difficult as
it might be to identify those limits precisely, by making use of clues contained
in the Treaties and above all in the case law of the Court, it is argued that
it is possible to approxiamtely draw those limits as far as they could have
implications for the inclusion of a PSC on free movement of persons in a future
Accession Agreement.
818 Vilaça and Piçarra, Are there material limits to the revision of the Treaties on the European Union?:
31-32.
819 Gialdino, “Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire,“ 1112-13.
820 T. C. Hartley, “The European Court and the EEA,“ International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 41, no. 4 (1992): 846-48; R. Bernhardt, “The Sources of Community Law: the
’constitution’ of the Community,“ in Thirty years of community law (Brussels-Luxembourg:
1981), 71.
821 Gialdino, “Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire,“ 1109.
822 J. H. H. Weiler, “Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective
of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration,“ Journal of Common
Market Studies 31, no. 4 (1993): 418, footnote 2.
823 Vilaça and Piçarra, Are there material limits to the revision of the Treaties on the European
Union?: 49.
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6.3 SUBSTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
The Treaties have never explicitly indicated the existence of hierarchy among
their provisions; had they done so, we would be talking about “explicit” and
not “implicit” limits to Treaty change. It is possible to talk about “implicit”
limits to Treaty change or implicit hierarchy among the provisions of a Treaty
or a constitution, when firstly, it is possible to infer that hierarchy from the
wording, function and place in the Treaty of some provisions compared to
others. Obviously, provisions that are placed at the very beginning of a Treaty
or a constitution under the title “Principles” or “Foundations of the Commun-
ity” will have priority or more weight compared to provisions that are placed
under the title “Transitional Provisions” placed towards the end of a Treaty
or a constitution. Logically, provisions that enshrine ends will also have
priority over those laying down means to achieve them, as the latter might
be changed or discarded in a subsequent revision if deemed inadequate or
inappropriate to achieve the desired ends. Hence while some provisions
constitute part of the “acquis fondamental” in a legal order, it would be possible
to qualify other provisions, as Pescatore did, as constituting “un droit plus
périphérique de caractère contingent et transitoire”.824
From the perspective of creating constraints, it makes a lot of a difference,
if it is merely legal scholars or a constitutional court (or the supreme court
of the land (or legal order)) that reads such a distinction into a constitution.
While the former might effect the latter in the long run, until that takes place,
as interesting or insightful as it might be, the academic discussion does not
bind anyone. However, once a constitutional court gives a particular interpreta-
tion of a certain provision or a concept, the latter becomes binding on all actors
operating within that legal system.825 Hence, the power of authoritative inter-
pretation vested in constitutional courts is of paramount importance.
As was briefly discussed in the introduction of this thesis, many constitu-
tional courts have developed doctrines to protect what they consider to be
the “core”, the “essence” or “spirit” of their legal orders, based on the object-
ives, structure as well as the underlying rationale of the constitutional orders
they had been created to uphold. They identify elements they believe imbue
the construct with particular values, purpose and meaning and thereby hold
it together. In their pursuit to safeguard the “core”, or the “spirit” of their legal
orders, each constitutional court has created its own terminology. While the
Indian Constitutional Court is after protecting the “basic structure” of the
Indian Constitution, the German Constitutional Court protects the “coherence”
824 P. Pescatore, “Commentaire de l’article 164 CEE,“ in Commentaire article par article du traité
instituant la CEE, ed. V. Constantinesco, et al. (Paris: Economica, 1992), 960; cited in Delcourt,
“The Acquis Communautaire: Has the Concept had its Day?,“ 843.
825 Fallon calls the latter phenomenon “mediated constitutional constraint”. See, Fallon,
“Constitutional Constraints,“ 1036.
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and “inner unity” of the Basic Law, while the Court of Justice protects the
“very foundations” of the Treaties as well as certain characteristics “which
are indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of European Union
law”.826
When it comes to identifying those “very foundations”, three clusters of
provisions are of interest to us, as they are capable of precluding Member
States from including a PSC on free movement of persons, which will violate
all those provisions. It should be noted that the concepts of “fundamental
acquis” and the “very foundations” of the Union are not used interchangeably
here, as the scope of the former concept seems to be broader. The former
concept also encompasses the latter. Or put differently, the “very foundations”
of the Union as defined by the Court could be seen as the hard core or nucleus
of the “fundamental acquis”. It constitutes the top layer in the hierarchy of
principles and norms, such as the principle of the autonomy of the Union legal
order.
The three clusters of provisions identified as belonging to the “very founda-
tions” of the Union, or at least to the “fundamental acquis” are: the funda-
mental freedoms, particularly those that concern free movement of persons;
Union citizenship, which constitutionalised the right to free movement; and
last but not least, fundamental rights. The leading authority in identifying those
clusters of provisions as constituting the substance of constitutional constraints
that are expected to play a role in precluding the inclusion of a PSC on free
movement of persons is the case law of the Court interpreting those provisions,
since in the Union legal order, it is the Court of Justice that is vested with the
power to provide an authoritative interpretation of Treaty and secondary
law.827 In addition to the Court’s case law, this section will make use of the
interpretation methods used by the Court, such as looking at the wording,
context, purpose of a provision, as well as relevant academic literature so as
to support and strengthen the evidence provided by the case law and Opinions
of the Court.
826 Opinion 1/09 of the Court of Justice, para. 89. See Jacobsohn, “An unconstitutional constitution?
A comparative perspective.“; Kommers, “German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon.“;
Goerlich, “Concept of Special Protection for Certain Elements and Principles of the Constitu-
tion Against Amendments and Article 79(3), Basic Law of Germany.“; Albert, “Nonconstitu-
tional Amendments.“
827 See Articles 19(1) TEU and 267 TFEU.
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6.3.1 Fundamental freedoms
Many consider the internal market as “the core of the EU’s constitutional
order”.828 A brief look at the EEC Treaty confirms this view, as the four
freedoms were listed under the title “Foundations of the Community”, and
almost all of the objectives listed under Article 3 were related to the establish-
ment of the common market and the four freedoms. What follows in this
section is a brief overview aiming to illustrate how important the freedoms
have been for the construction of the integration project, which for a long time
has had the establishment of a common market at its core. Illustrating how
significant the freedoms have been, and above all the free movement of per-
sons, will enable us to argue that they belong to the “very foundations” of
the Union, or are at least part of the “fundamental acquis”, thereby precluding
Member States from interfering with their functioning as they please.
For the purpose of illustrating their importance for the acquis, their place
in the Treaties and the provisions regulating their functioning are analysed
first. Next, follows a brief mention of secondary law promulgated to increase
their effectiveness. Thirdly, comes the case law of the Court that has blown
life into the freedoms by interpreting them in ever-broader terms, while
keeping under strict control the instances of derogation. Lastly, follows aca-
demic commentary that confirms how crucial the freedoms have been in
particular for the construction of the internal market and in general for Euro-
pean integration.
6.3.1.1 Fundamental freedoms in the Treaties
To achieve the objective of establishing a common market, the Treaty of Rome
contained provisions to ensure the free movement of factors of production.
In the current Treaty it is Articles 34-37 TFEU that prohibit quantitative re-
strictions on the free movement of goods. Articles 45-48 TFEU provide for the
free movement of workers, Articles 49-55 TFEU for freedom of establishment,
Articles 56-62 TFEU for free movement of services, and Articles 63-66 TFEU for
free movement of capital. These Treaty provisions provide the skeleton for
the functioning of the four freedoms, which are based on the principle of
828 D. Howarth and T. Sadeh, “The ever incomplete single market: differentiation and the
evolving frontier of integration,“ Journal of European Public Policy 17, no. 7 (October 2010):
923. See also, G. De Búrca, “Differentiation Within the “Core“? The Case of the Internal
Market,“ in Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity to Flexibility?, ed. G. de Búrca
and J. Scott (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2000), 133-71. N. Bernard,
“Flexibility in the European Single Market,“ in The Law of the Single European Market:
Unpacking the Premises, ed. C. Barnard and J. Scott (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart
Publishing, 2002), 101.
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negative integration that is removing obstacles and barriers to trade,829 where-
as the flesh was added by passing directives and regulations, which provide
for harmonization and creating a level-playing field.830
The importance of the freedoms has only increased in time, especially that
of free movement of persons after the introduction of Union citizenship into
the Treaties. Since the purpose of this study is to establish whether Member
States would be constrained from including a PSC on free movement of persons,
obviously, what is of primary concern to us is the development and place of
free movement rules for natural persons.831 The reason why they are exam-
ined together under the title “fundamental freedoms” with free movement
of goods and capital is the simple fact that in the pre-1993 period the Treaties,
case law of the Court, as well as scholarly work would often lump and study
those freedoms together. Hence, when reading case law, and literature on the
freedoms, it should be kept in mind that what is central to this study is the
free movement of persons.
The principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, which
is analysed in more detail in Chapter 7 of this study, is what underpins the
four freedoms at a minimum.832 This means that a migrant or a product has
to enjoy the same treatment as nationals or local products in a comparable
situation. In the early line of case law on the freedoms, Community law would
not interfere with national rules that were not directly or indirectly discrim-
inatory. However, since the early 1990s the Court has moved beyond that
discrimination model, fighting both discriminatory and non-discriminatory
“obstacles” or “restrictions” to free movement.833
The fact that the fundamental freedoms have been strengthened by the
Court’s interpretation as well as by legislation laying down the rules facilitating
the exercise of these freedoms should not lead one to think they are absolute.
They are not and they have never been. The Treaty itself provides for grounds
829 This approach can be illustrated by the Court’s ruling in Gaston Schul, according to which
the aim of the four freedoms is to eliminate “all obstacles to intra-Community trade in order
to merge the national markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as
possible to those of a genuine internal market“. See Case C 15/81 Gaston Schul, [1982] ECR
1409, para. 33.
830 Barnard, Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms: 10-11.
831 While free movement of workers is straightforward, freedom of establishment and freedom
to provide services are relevant as far as they relate to the free movement of natural persons.
The free movement rules for the “self-sufficient”, which were introduced via secondary
law in the 1990s, are also covered in this sub-section.
832 See the Opinion of AG Mayras in Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen, [1974] ECR 1299.
833 For an example see, Case C-49/89 Corsica Ferries, [1989] ECR I-4441, para. 8. It reads as
follows: “the articles of the EEC Treaty concerning the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital are fundamental Community provisions and any restriction, even minor,
of that freedom is prohibited“.; Barnard, Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms: 223-24;
A. P. Van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community: Cross-Border
Access to Public Benefits (Hart Publishing, 2003). 77.
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under which derogating from the freedoms is justified.834 As far as free move-
ment of persons is concerned, Article 45(3) TFEU allows Member States to
derogate from the free movement of workers on the grounds of public policy,
public security and public health. The same grounds of derogation from the
freedom of establishment and free movement of services are provided in
Articles 52 and 62 TFEU respectively. Moreover, Article 45(4) TFEU excludes
the application of the free movement of workers “to employment in the public
sector”. Similarly, Article 51(1) TFEU excludes the application of the freedom
of establishment and freedom to provide services “to activities, which in that
State are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority”.
The Court ensures that that all derogations from the freedoms are interpreted
restrictively.835
6.3.1.2 Development of free movement of persons in secondary law
While the Treaty provisions mentioned above sketched the skeleton of the
general derogations provided in the Treaty on free movement of persons,
Directive 64/221/EEC836 fleshed out those provisions. With the guidance of
the Directive it would be more difficult for Member States to abuse or extend
the scope of the derogation grounds provided in the Treaty. For instance,
Article 2(2) of the Directive prohibited Member States from invoking the Treaty
derogations to service economic ends. Article 3 specified that any measure
taken on the grounds of public policy or public security were to be based
exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. Moreover,
previous convictions were not supposed to constitute in themselves grounds
for taking such measures. Today Directive 64/221 has been replaced and the
case law interpreting its provisions has been codified in Directive 2004/38/
EC,837 which is analysed more closely together with the concept of “Union
citizenship”.838
While derogations from the freedoms were interpreted restrictively, the
free movement provisions were empowered by the case law of the Court,839
so as to enable them catch more obstacles and barriers to free movement.
Directives and regulations promulgated to that effect also helped to reach that
834 Articles 36, 45(3) and (4), 51 and 52 TFEU.
835 Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum, [1986] ECR 2121, paras. 26-28; Case 2/74 Reyners, [1974] ECR 631,
paras. 51-55.
836 Directive 64/221/EEC, note 450 above.
837 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation
(EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/
148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, OJ L 158/77,
30.04.2004.
838 See sub-section 6.3.2.2.
839 See sub-section 6.3.1.2.1.
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objective. As far as the development of free movement of persons is concerned,
it is noteworthy that in the 1990’s the Community adopted three directives
conferring a general right of movement and residence on the retired, students,
and those who are financially self-sufficient. This right was however subject
to the requirement of having sufficient finances and medical insurance.840
These three directives signalled the beginning of the erosion of the link
between economic activity and free movement. They instigated a shift in
perception of migrants from economic agents or factors of production to
individuals with rights. This shift was consolidated further and moved to a
whole new level with the introduction of Union citizenship for all nationals
of Member State by the Treaty of Maastricht. With the interpretation of the
Court, Union citizens acquired a more general, freestanding right of free
movement within the EU. Even though, as will be examined in more detail
below in the part on EU citizenship, that right is still to be exercised in accord-
ance with the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and second-
ary legislation.
6.3.1.2.1 Case law on the freedoms
The Court interpreted the free movement provisions broadly. It extended the
scope of Articles 34, 45 and 49 TFEU to cover indistinctly applicable measures
to free movement. To counterbalance the extension of scope of the free move-
ment provisions, it created additional grounds of derogation to the freedoms,
the so-called mandatory requirements or imperative requirements in the
general interest.841 To provide a concrete example, in Säger, the Court ruled
that Article 49 EC required “not only the elimination of all discrimination
against a person providing services on the ground of his nationality but also
the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national
providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is liable
to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of the provider of services estab-
lished in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar ser-
840 See Council Directive 90/364/EEC on the right of residence for persons of sufficient means,
OJ L 180/29, 13.07.1990; Council Directive 90/365/EEC on the rights of residence for
employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity, OJ L
180/28, 13.07.1990; and Council Directive 90/366/EEC on the rights of residence for
students, OJ L 180/30, 13.07.1990, repealed and replaced by Council Directive 93/96/EEC,
OJ L 317/59, 18.12.1993.
841 S. O’Leary, “Free Movement of Persons and Services,“ in Evolution of EU Law, ed. P. Craig
and G. De Búrca (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 508.
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vices”.842 Such “restrictions” could however, be justified by imperative
reasons relating to the public interest.843
In Gebhard, the Court provided one single test to be applied to national
measures that were “liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of
the fundamental freedoms”.844 Such measures had to fulfil four conditions
to be allowed by the Court: “they must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general
interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective
which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order
to attain it”.845 In addition to the principle of proportionality,846 derogations
were to be read subject to the general principles of law, fundamental human
rights847 in particular. Overall, the conclusion to be drawn from the Court’s
case law is that the freedoms are to be interpreted broadly,848 while de-
rogations are to be interpreted restrictively.849
As to specific cases in which the Court underlined the centrality of the
freedoms for the legal order, it is worth mentioning that in its early case law
the Court referred to the freedoms as “fundamental objectives” of the Com-
munity.850 Back in 1989 it stated that “the articles of the EEC Treaty concerning
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital are fundamental
Community provisions and any restriction, even minor, of that freedom is
prohibited”.851 In its later case law the Court qualified the four freedoms
as “fundamental freedoms” both collectively and individually. To cite the most
well-known cases, in Kraus and Gebhard the Court referred collectively to the
four freedoms as fundamental freedoms,852 whereas in Heinonen and Schmid-
berger it referred individually to the free movement of goods as a “fundamental
842 Emphasis added. Case C-76/90 Säger, [1991] ECR I-4221, para. 12; Subsequently, this test
was also applied to free movement of workers, e.g. Case C-464/02 Commission v Denmark,
[2005] ECR I-7929, para. 45; freedom of establishment, e.g. Case C-55/94 Gebhard, [1995] ECR
I-4165, para. 37; and free movement of capital, e.g. Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal,
[2002] ECR I-4731, paras. 44-45.
843 Case C-76/90 Säger, para. 15.
844 Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para. 37.
845 Ibid.
846 Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR I-4035, para. 15; Case C-108/96 Mac Quen, [2001]
ECR I-837, para. 31; Case C-100/01 Olazabal, [2002] ECR I-10981, para. 43.
847 Case C-260/89 ERT, [1991] ECR I-2925, para. 43.
848 Case 152/82 Forcheri, [1983] ECR 2323, para. 11.
849 Case 36/75 Rutili, [1975] ECR 1219, para. 27; Case 30/77 Bouchereau, [1977] ECR 1999, para.
33; Case C-114/97 Commission v Spain, [1998] ECR I-6717, para. 34; Case C-348/96 Donatella
Calfa, para. 23; Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain, [2006] ECR I-1097, para. 45.
850 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch, [1974] ECR 1405, para. 18.
851 Emphasis added. Case C-49/89 Corsica Ferries, para. 8.
852 Case C-19/92 Kraus, [1993] ECR I-1663, para. 32; and Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para. 37; see also
Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital v Spain, [2002] ECR I-607, para. 28.
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freedom”,853 and in Bosman and Angonese it referred to free movement of
workers as a “fundamental freedom”.854 The Court ruled that free movement
of goods constitutes “one of the foundations of the Community”.855 It even
referred to the free movement of workers as a “fundamental right” long before
the introduction of the concept of European Citizenship.856 The cases named
here are not exceptions but the rule that has been repeated in most of the cases
concerning the four freedoms.
The importance of the free movement rules can also be deduced from the
Court’s first EEA Opinion. While the most sacrosanct principle worthy of pro-
tection identified in the Opinion was the autonomy of the legal order, which
was to be ensured by safeguarding the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court over
the Treaties, the Opinion also highlighted that the proposed system of courts
was inconceivable because the EEA Agreement took over “an essential part of
the rules – including the rules of secondary legislation – which govern economic
and trading relations within the Community and which constitute, for the most
part, fundamental provisions of the Community legal order.”857 Moreover, the
agreement’s objective to ensure homogeneity of the law throughout the EEA
would inevitably affect the interpretation of the corresponding rules of Com-
munity law. Hence, concluded the Court: “in so far as it conditions the future
interpretation of the Community rules on free movement and competition [,] the
machinery of courts provided for in the agreement conflicts with Article 164
of the EEC Treaty [now Article 19(1) TEU] and, more generally with the very
foundations of the Community”.858 In short, the Court could not allow free
movement rules, which constitute an essential and fundamental part of Com-
munity rules, to be affected by the new legal regime created under the pro-
posed EEA Agreement.
6.3.1.3 Academic opinion
As to the academic literature emphasizing the importance of the four freedoms
in the context of European integration, it abounds with references underlining
their central role. The fact that “the four fundamental freedoms provided in
853 Cases C-394/97 Sami Heinonen, [1999] ECR I-3599, para. 38; and Case C-112/00 Schmidberger,
[2003] ECR I-5659, paras. 62 and 74.
854 Case C-415/93 Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4291, para. 7; and Case C-281/98 Angonese, [2000] ECR
I-4139, para. 35.
855 Emphasis added. Case C-194/94 CIA Security v Signalson [1996] ECR I-2201, para. 40; and
Case C-443/98 Unilever Italia v Central Food, [2000] ECR I-7535, para. 40.
856 Case 152/82 Forcheri, para. 11; Case 222/86 Heylens, [1987] ECR 4097, para. 14; and the Opinion
of AG Lenz in Case C-415/93 Bosman, para. 174; the Court also referred once to free move-
ment of goods as ’a fundamental right’. See Case C-228/98 Dounias, [2000] ECR I-577, para.
64.
857 Emphasis added. Opinion 1/91 EEA, para. 41.
858 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 46.
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the EC Treaty constitute the very essence of the Internal Market”859 is not dis-
puted, i.e. the two are seen as inextricably linked. Curzon describes their role
as follows:
‘The establishment of a common market … is one of the cornerstones of the European
Union (herein EU) and is based upon the protection of four fundamental economic
freedoms, i.e. the free movement of goods, persons, capital and the free provision
of services. Such free movement provisions have played a pivotal role in the
evolution of the EU and appear to have assumed what some consider to be of a
constitutional value in the EU legal order.’860
The four freedoms have been described as the “foundation stones of the
internal market”,861 and have been placed at the core of both the Community
legal system as well as that of the Union.862 They are seen as a prerequisite
for the establishment of the common market.863 What underpins those free-
doms at a minimum is the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of
nationality,864 which is analysed in detail in the last Chapter of this thesis.
Kingreen argues that the freedoms “were gradually transformed from general
principles of non-discrimination into rights of freedom”.865 According to Lane
they are “constitutional rights; they may be constitutional rights plus ultra”.866
Gekrath defines them as “economic constitutional rights” and as “the principle
elements of the economic Constitution of the Community”.867
859 Emphasis added. V. Skouris, “Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: The
Challenge of Striking a Delicate Balance,“ European Business Law Review 17, no. 2 (2006):
225.
860 Emphasis added. S. J. Curzon, “Internal Market Derogations in Light of the Newly Binding
Character of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,“ in The EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights: From Declaration to Binding Instrument, ed. Giacomo di Federico (Springer, 2011),
145.
861 Gormley, “Competition and free movement: Is the internal market the same as a common
market?,“ 520. Similarly, Schmidt and de Búrca describe them as the “core of the internal
market”, and as the “kernel of the EC’s common market”. See respectively, S. K. Schmidt,
“The Internal Market Seen from a Political Science Perspective,“ in The EU Internal Market
in Comparative Perspective: Economic, Political and Legal Analyses ed. J. Pelkmans, D. Hanf,
and M. Chang (Brussels: P.I.E Peter Lang, 2008), 101; De Búrca, “Differentiation Within
the “Core“? The Case of the Internal Market,“ 136.
862 See respectively, P. Oliver, “Competition and Free Movement: Their Place in the Treaty,“
in European Union Law for the Twebty-First Century, ed. Takis Tridimas and Paolisa Nebbia
(Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004), 175; G. Garrett, “The politics of legal
integration in the European Union,“ International Organization 49(1995): 178.
863 T. Kingreen, “Fundamental Freedoms,“ in Principles of European Constitutional Law, ed. A.
Von Bogdandy and J. Bast (Hart Publishing and Verlag CH Beck, 2010), 531.
864 See the Opinion of AG Mayras in Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen.
865 Kingreen, “Fundamental Freedoms,“ 523.
866 R. Lane, “The internal market and the individual,“ in Regulating the Internal Market, ed.
N. Nic Shuibhne (Edward Elgar, 2006), 258.
867 J. Gerkrath, L’émergence d’un droit constitutionnel pour l’Europe (Etudes Européennes, 1997).
315, cited in; Oliver, “Competition and Free Movement: Their Place in the Treaty,“ 166.
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No matter what exactly they are called, all discussions and studies point
to their pivotal role in the Union legal order. As Oliver puts it “the Court has
not wavered in its determination to keep the four freedoms … at the core of
the Community legal system”.868 Not only are the four freedoms at the core,
the free movement of persons, which is the freedom central to our research,
has been elevated somewhat higher than the other freedoms by virtue of the
introduction of the concept of Union citizenship.
Scholars argue that with the introduction of Union citizenship and the
Court’s subsequent case law interpreting it, movement related to an economic
activity was “relegated to constituting merely the ‘specific expression’ of a
more general and overarching right of free movement enshrined in Article
21 TFEU”.869 Since Union citizenship seems to have subsumed the economic
aspects of free movement of persons, and since the four freedoms have already
been studied thoroughly in the literature, this section will not deal in more
detail with the specifics of these freedoms, but will focus on the general free
movement right developed under the concept of Union citizenship. The follow-
ing section aims to demonstrate that following the introduction of Union
citizenship, the free movement right has arguably developed to an extent that
it would amount to a constitutional constraint on Member States, precluding
their arbitrary interference with the principles underlying it.
6.3.2 Union citizenship: The fundamental status
Another addition that is by now part of the fundamental acquis of the Union,
and has contributed to the approximation of the Union legal order to that of
States, is that of Union citizenship introduced by the Treaty on European Union
in 1993. Even though at the time of its introduction many were sceptical about
the more tangible and intangible870 benefits the new status could deliver,871
868 Oliver, “Competition and Free Movement: Their Place in the Treaty,“ 175.
869 J. Tomkin, “Citizenship in Motion: The Development of the Freedom of Movement for
Citizens in the Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union,“ in The First Decade
of EU Migration and Asylum Law, ed. E. Guild and P. Minderhoud (Leiden; Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 44-45; Tomkin refers to Case C-212/06 Government of the French
Community and Walloon Government, [2008] ECR I-1683, para. 59. For a similar argument,
see F. Wollenschläger, “A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union
Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration,“
European Law Journal 17, no. 1 (2011): 30.
870 Obviously, the most intangible benefit expected to flow from the introduction of the concept
was in the form of increased legitimacy for the integration project, by making the Union’s
benefits more visible to people, and by creating a genuine connection between the Union
and “the peoples of Europe”, thereby hoping to change the public perception of the EU
as elite-driven and distant from people. However, subsequent developments, such the
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, have arguably resulted in citizens’ further alienation
from Europe. See, S. Van den Bogaert, “The Treaty of Lisbon: The European Union’s Own
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today many agree that the gap between what the status promised and what
it seemed to provide initially, has been partially filled in by the judgments
of the Court of Justice.872
With the introduction of Union citizenship the umbilical cord between the
free movement of persons and the need to perform an economic activity was
cut,873 and nourished by the judgments of the Court, the new born concept
(‘citizenship’) developed quickly to become an independent source of rights
for all the nationals of Member States within the Union legal order. After the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union has also acquired its Bill of
Rights,874 namely the Charter of Fundamental Rights that clearly sets all the
bundles of rights to be enjoyed by citizens as well as some TCN residents in
the territory of the Member States of the Union.
This section provides a brief legal analysis of the status of Union citizen-
ship. The focus of this section is on the substance of the status of EU citizenship
as it stands, addressing the following questions: what are the core or inalien-
able rights that all Union citizens enjoy and what are the implications of those
rights for the PSC on free movement of persons? The aim of this section is to
establish whether it is possible to reconcile a PSC on free movement of persons
with the status of Union citizenship.
The analysis begins with a brief overview of the rights envisaged for Union
citizens in the Treaties and secondary law. While the provisions in the Treaties
are the starting point and source of inspiration for the Court, the real propell-
ing force behind the growth and development of the concept has been the case
law of the Court of Justice. Hence, the following sections examine the seminal
cases that shaped the concept, and briefly discuss case law that seems to have
Judgment of Solomon?,“ Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 15, no. 1 (2008):
19.
871 Scholars would often point out to the gap between the symbolism and grandeur of the
concept and what it actually delivered. See, F. G. Jacobs, “Citizenship of the European Union
– A Legal Analysis,“ European Law Journal 13, no. 5 (2007): 592. R. Bellamy and A. Warleigh,
“Introduction: The Puzzle of European Citizenship,“ in Citizenship and Governance in the
European Union, ed. R. Bellamy and A. Warleigh (London and New York: Continuum, 2001),
3.
872 See, S. O’Leary, “Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Citizenship,“ European Law Review
24(1999): 68-79; Jacobs, “Citizenship of the European Union – A Legal Analysis,“ 592. X.
Groussot, “’Principled Citizenship’ and the Process of European Constitutionalization –
From a Pie in the Sky to a Sky with Diamonds,“ in General Principles of EC Law in a Process
of Development, ed. U. Bernitz, et al. (Wolters Kluwer, 2008), 315; W. T. Eijsbouts, “Onze
Primaire Hoedanigheid,“ (Europa Instituut, Universiteit Leiden, 2011), 7-10.
873 That link between free movement and performing an economic activity was already
weekend by the introduction of the three directives conferring a general right of movement
and residence on the retired, students, and those who are financially self-sufficient. See,
Directives cited in note 840 above.
874 See, E. Guild, “The evolution of the concept of union citizenship after the Lisbon Treaty,“
in Integration for Third-Country Nationals in the European Union: The Equality Challenge, ed.
S. Morano-Foadi and M. Malena (Edward Elgar, 2012), 3-15.
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taken Union citizenship beyond what was initially envisaged in the Treaties.
The purpose behind this overview of case law is to reveal the core components
of Union citizenship, so as to establish the basic rights to be enjoyed by all
Union citizens. What is crucial for our purposes is to find out whether a PSC
on free movement of persons is going to affect those core components.
6.3.2.1 Union citizenship as defined in the Treaties
There are two main provisions in the Treaty that are interesting and that will
help us establish the crux of EU citizenship. These are Articles 20 and 21 TFEU
(ex Articles 17 and 18 EC). The first one, Article 20(1) TFEU solemnly proclaims
that:
‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality
of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall
be additional to and not replace national citizenship.’875
Article 20(2) TFEU lists the rights Union citizens are to enjoy: the right to move
and reside within the territory of the Member States; rights of political parti-
cipation, that is to vote and stand as candidate in elections to the EP, and in
the municipal elections in their Member State of residence;876 the right to
petition the EP, and apply to the Ombudsman;877 the right to enjoy diplomatic
and consular protection in the territory of a third country in which their
Member States is not represented.878 These rights are further elaborated in
the following articles (Articles 22-24 TFEU). Except for the right to diplomatic
and consular protection in the territory of a third state, there is not anything
new introduced by the concept of Union citizenship. It should also be noted
that not all of the rights just mentioned are exclusive to the Union citizens.
Some rights, such as voting in the municipal elections, petitioning the EP or
applying to the Ombudsman are also enjoyed by TCNs who are legally resident
on the territory of the Union.
The second important provision for our analysis, Article 21(1) TFEU, pro-
vides that “[e]very citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and
conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them
effect”. The fact that the main right granted to Union citizens was subject to
875 It should be noted that the Lisbon Treaty has changed the wording of this provision. Pre-
Lisbon citizenship was “complementary“ and not “additional“ to national citizenship. For
a commentary on the possible implications of this change, see J. Shaw, “Citizenship:
Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism,“ in The Evolution
of EU Law, ed. P. Craig and G. De Búrca (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 598-600.
876 See also Article 22 TFEU.
877 See also Article 24 TFEU.
878 See also Article 23 TFEU.
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the limitations and conditions that already existed in secondary law, in practice
meant that actually nothing new was granted. That was one of the main
criticisms and a source of disappointment with the concept at the time of its
introduction. However, as will be demonstrated below, the Court managed
to give meaning to the concept by linking it inextricably with the general non-
discrimination provision (Article 18 TFEU), which precedes the citizenship
provisions under the same title.
6.3.2.2 Citizenship Directive
The Citizenship Directive erodes entirely the remaining link between free
movement and economic activity for Union citizens and their families, who
wish to move and reside on the territory of another Member State for up to
three months, by introducing an unconditional right to free movement under
its Article 6.879 For residence exceeding three months the conditions of
possessing sufficient resources and medical insurance remain in place.880
However, the Court reinterpreted those conditions in light of Union citizenship
and ruled that those conditions are to apply subject to the principle of
proportionality.881
The Directive entered into force thirteen years after the introduction of
Union citizenship. Hence, to a large extent it is a codification of the Court’s
citizenship case law until that point. It repealed and replaced nine directives
and amended Regulation 1612/68.882 Another important novelty of the Direct-
ive was the right of permanent residence and corresponding strengthened
rights granted to those Union citizens who had resided for a continuous period
of five years in a host Member state.883 By now, the details of the Directive
are well established and well known. Since many of the decisions of the Court
codified in the Directive are briefly analysed below, there is no need to discuss
the Directive in more detail here. It is worth noting that this codification
implies the confirmation, or approval of the Court’s case law by the institutions
of the Union as well as by its Member States.
879 Article 6(1) of the Directive reads as follows: “Union citizens shall have the right of residence
on the territory of another Member State for a period of up to three months without any
conditions or formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid identity card or passport.”
Emphasis added.
880 See Article 7 of the Citizenship Directive.
881 Case C-413/99 Baumbast, [2002] ECR I-07091, paras. 90-91.
882 It repealed the following Directives: 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC,
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC.
883 See Chapter IV, Articles 16 to 21 of the Citizenship Directive.
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6.3.2.3 Union citizenship in the case law of the Court
The most important components of Union citizenship that the case law of the
Court brings forward are undoubtedly: free movement and equal treatment.
Coincidentally, those are the most important aspects of citizenship that would
be breached by the introduction of the proposed PSC. By suspending the free
movement rights of Turkish nationals, such a clause would be discriminating
on the basis of nationality, since no other Accession Agreement ever contained
such a clause. Thus, if we were able to demonstrate that free movement and
non-discrimination are at the very core of citizenship, i.e. they are the constitut-
ive or defining characteristics of the status of Union citizenship, it would be
possible to establish the incompatibility of the proposed PSC with the status
of Union citizenship. Moreover, the analysis of the citizenship case law aims
to argue and demonstrate that the status by now belongs to the “very founda-
tions” of the Union,884 and as such amounts to an important constitutional
constraint on Member States whenever they act within the scope of EU law.
To demonstrate how the concept of Union citizenship could amount to
a constraint on Member States as primary law makers, a brief reminder of
the case law on the economic free movement provisions would be helpful.
For individuals to successfully rely on the free movement provisions before
the introduction of Union citizenship, they had to fall both under the personal
and material scope of the Treaty and/or secondary legislation.885 In order
to fall under the personal scope of one of the freedoms in the Treaty, indi-
viduals had to be nationals of a Member State and fulfil two conditions. Firstly,
they had to demonstrate that they performed a genuine and effective economic
activity: that they provided (or received) a service for remuneration in an
employed or self employed capacity. Secondly, they had to demonstrate that
their situation contained a cross-border element. To be able to fall under the
material scope of the freedoms, individuals had to rely on the rights granted
by those provisions, such as the right to non-discrimination on the ground
of nationality, the right to accept offers of employment, the rights to move
within the territory of the host Member State etc.886
6.3.2.3.1 Union citizenship taking shape: First ‘ground breaking’ cases
The novelty brought by the first citizenship case, that of Maria Martinez Sala,
was that even though she did not perform any economic activity, she was
brought into the personal scope of the Treaty by virtue of the citizenship
884 The Court has never expressed itself in those terms, however, it will be demonstrated that
the overall development of the citizenship case law implicitly conveys that message.
885 The personal scope (ratione personae) of a Treaty provision or a piece of legislation defines
those to which it applies, whereas its material scope (ratione materiae) defines the rights
that it grants.
886 E. Spaventa, “Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and
its Constitutional Effects,“ Common Market Law Review 45(2008): 14-15.
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provisions. The Court ruled that “[a]s a national of a Member State lawfully
residing in the territory of another Member State, the appellant in the main
proceedings comes within the scope ratione personae of the provisions of the
Treaty on European citizenship”.887 It went on to rule that a citizen of the
Union, such as Ms Sala, “lawfully resident in the territory of the host Member
State, can rely on [Article 18 TFEU] in all situations which fall within the scope
ratione materiae of [Union] law”.
The second seminal judgment on the rights of Union citizens was that of
Grzelczyk,888 in which the Court declared its future projections of the status
of citizenship as follows: “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental
status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves
in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their
nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for”.889
Whereas citizenship in Martinez Sala was used to bring her within the personal
scope of the Treaty, in this case “the right to move and reside freely, as con-
ferred by [Article 21 TFEU]” was used to bring the case under the material scope
of the Treaty.890 In short, once a national of a Member State moves to another
Member State, he or she falls within the personal and material scope of the
Treaty, which enables him or her to rely on the principle of non-discrimination
laid down in Article 18 TFEU.
In Baumbast, the Court confirmed that Article 21 TFEU was directly effective
and created an independent right to free movement and residence for all Union
citizens.891 The Court acknowledged that the right was subject to limitations
and conditions contained in the Treaty and secondary law (to be financially
self-sufficient and to have a comprehensive health insurance), however, accord-
ing to the Court those limitations and conditions had to be interpreted with
regard to general principles of law, in particular with regard to the principle
of proportionality.892
The only condition that Mr Baumbast did not fulfil was to have compre-
hensive sickness insurance. His insurance did not cover emergency treatment
in the UK. According to the Court, it would be disproportionate to deny Mr
Baumbast the right of residence conferred on him by Article 20(1) TFEU just
on that ground. The implications of this ruling were huge. What this meant
in practice was that national authorities were under an obligation to take into
account the personal circumstances of every Union citizen relying on Article
20(1) TFEU. According to Spaventa, this “personalized” assessment of
proportionality “brings about a qualitative change in the expansion of judicial
887 Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala, [1998] ECRI-2691, para. 61.
888 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk.
889 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 31.
890 Ibid., para. 33.
891 Case C-413/99 Baumbast, para. 84.
892 Ibid., paras. 85-90.
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review of national rules”.893 She argues that such “indirect review” of Union
law limits the discretion of the legislature since all their actions or requirements
will need to be assessed on the basis of their proportionality.894 Hailbronner’s
criticism goes further, since he argues that the citizenship provisions and the
principle of proportionality are used to rewrite the rules laid down in second-
ary Union law.895
Baumbast was definitely “[a] further step in the advancement of citizens’
rights”896 instigated by the Court’s willingness to interpret relevant secondary
law in light of the Treaty’s citizenship provisions. Other cases followed where
this time the Court “softened” the “sufficient resources” requirements laid
down in the citizenship directive. According to the Court, recourse to social
benefits should not result automatically in losing residence rights.897 More-
over, those Union citizens who could demonstrate a sufficient degree of
integration in the host Member State would have access to social benefits that
are available to the nationals of that state.898
6.3.2.3.2 Further developments: Beyond discrimination, beyond material scope, beyond
internal situations?
Firstly, it is argued that the citizenship provisions in the Treaty go beyond
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality to prohibit non-
discriminatory restrictions as well under certain circumstances, in a way
following the Court’s approach on the four freedoms.899 It follows that any
measure that is liable to deter,900 dissuade,901 or discourage902 a Union
citizen from exercising his free movement right, or places him at a disad-
893 Spaventa, “Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and
its Constitutional Effects,“ 40.
894 Ibid., 41.
895 K. Hailbronner, “Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits,“ Common Market Law
Review 42(2005): 1251.
896 Tomkin, “Citizenship in Motion: The Development of the Freedom of Movement for Citizens
in the Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union,“ 43.
897 First established in Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, para. 43; afterwards, repeated in Case C-456/02
Trojani, [2004] ECR I-7573, para. 45. This statement of the Court was codified in Article
14(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC.
898 Case C-209/03 Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119, para. 59; Case C-158/07 Förster, [2008] ECR I-8507,
para. 49.
899 Jacobs, “Citizenship of the European Union – A Legal Analysis,“ 596-97; Groussot, “’Prin-
cipled Citizenship’ and the Process of European Constitutionalization – From a Pie in the
Sky to a Sky with Diamonds,“ 335; Tomkin, “Citizenship in Motion: The Development of
the Freedom of Movement for Citizens in the Case-law of the Court of Justice of the
European Union,“ 35; Wollenschläger, “A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market
Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of
European Integration,“ 25.
900 Case C-224/98 D’Hoop, [2002] ECR I-6191, para. 31.
901 Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas, [2006] ECR I-10451, para. 32.
902 Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan and Bucher, [2007] ECR I-9161, paras. 30-31.
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vantage for exercising those rights,903 is prohibited unless justified based
on objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons
concerned which are proportionate to the legitimate aim of the measure
concerned.904
Secondly, in Tas-Hagen and Tas the Court clearly used the language of
“restrictions” and ruled on access to a benefit, which at first sight fell outside
the material scope of the Treaty. The case concerned Dutch legislation on the
award of benefits to civilian war victims, which required the person concerned
to be resident in the Netherlands at the time when the application for the
benefit was submitted. Mr. Tas and Mrs. Hagen-Tas were Dutch nationals who
resided in Spain at the time of their application. Their applications were
rejected upon which they appealed. As to the analysis of the Court of Justice,
applicants clearly fell within the personal scope of the Treaty as Union citizens.
The benefit they were trying to obtain clearly fell within the competence of
Member States. However, according to the Court, that competence had to be
exercised in line with Union law, “in particular with the Treaty provisions
giving every citizen of the Union the right to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States”.905 Then, the Court repeated that Article
20 TFEU was not intended to extend the material scope of the Treaty to internal
situations.906 However, the situation of the applicants in this case was clearly
covered by the right to free movement and residence granted to every Union
citizen by Article 21(1) TFEU. Since the exercise of their right had an impact
on their right to receive a benefit under national law, their situation could not
be considered as purely internal.
According to the Court, “the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation
to freedom of movement cannot be fully effective if a national of a Member
State can be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles raised to his
residence in the host Member State by legislation of his State of origin
penalising the fact that he has used them”.907 The Court went on to establish
that national legislation that placed at a disadvantage nationals that had
“exercised their freedom to move and reside in another Member State is a
restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article [21(1) TFEU]”.908 The Court
admitted that such a restriction could be justified by objective considerations
of public interest, however it also had to satisfy the principle of proportionality.
The Court found that a residence criterion was not an appropriate or satis-
factory indicator for achieving the aim of the legislation, which was to ensure
903 Case C-224/98 D’Hoop, para. 34; Case C-224/02 Pusa, [2004] ECR I-6421, para. 20.
904 Case C-224/98 D’Hoop, para. 36; Case C-224/02 Pusa, para. 20; Case C-406/04 De Cuyper, [2006]
ECR I-6947, para. 40; Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas, para. 33.
905 Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas, para. 22.
906 Ibid., 23.
907 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 30. The Court referred to Case C-224/02 Pusa, para. 19.
908 Emphasis added. Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas, para. 31.
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the connection of applicants to the Member State granting the benefit. In short,
Article 21(1) TFEU precluded the contested Dutch law.
Spaventa suggests that this line of case law can be seen from two perspect-
ives. Firstly, it can be argued that what was at stake in these cases was dis-
crimination against movers. Both those who had moved or those who had
returned after having exercised their right to free movement were at a dis-
advantage compared to those who had not moved. Secondly, as proposed by
other scholars mentioned above, the right to move contained in Article 21(1)
TFEU could be seen as of broader application encompassing also non-dis-
criminatory obstacles to free movement.909
Similarly, in Schempp,910 the Court examined whether the national legis-
lation in question in the case “obstructed” applicant’s right to move and reside
in another Member State independently of any discrimination.911 According
to AG Kokott, “[s]uch a harmonised approach, which aligns the interpretation
of the right to freedom of movement or residence to the other fundamental
freedoms, corresponds to the “fundamental status” of Union citizenship
established by the Court and the new EU citizenship Directive.”912
Thirdly, as far as the effect of Union citizenship on “purely internal
situations” (one of the most criticized concepts of EU law913) is concerned,
the rule remains in place. In other words, the freedoms or the citizenship provi-
sions do not cover entirely internal situations that have no Union link (cross-
border element). However, the case law on citizenship has made some inroad
in that field as well, inciting comments as to the “arbitrariness to attaching
so much importance to crossing a national border”.914 As is often questioned,
what is indeed an ‘internal situation’ within an internal market which aims
to eliminate national frontiers and barriers to free movement?915
909 Spaventa, “Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and
its Constitutional Effects,“ 25.
910 Case C-403/03 Schempp, [2005] ECR I-6421, paras. 42-47.
911 J. Kokott, “EU citizenship – citoyens sans frontières?,“ (Durham Euroepan Law Institute
– European Law Lecture, 2005), 9.
912 Ibid.
913 N. Nic Shuibhne, “Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move
on?,“ Common Market Law Review 39(2002); A. Tryfonidou, “Reverse Discrimination in Purely
Internal Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe,“ Legal Issues of Economic Integration
35, no. 1 (2008); C. Dautricourt and S. Thomas, “Reverse discrimination and free movement
of persons under Community law: all for Ulysses, nothing for Penelope?,“ European Law
Review 34, no. 3 (2009).
914 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon
Government, para. 141.
915 Shaw, “Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitution-
alism,“ 596; Groussot, “’Principled Citizenship’ and the Process of European Constitutional-
ization – From a Pie in the Sky to a Sky with Diamonds,“ 338.
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For the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to emphasize the importance
of Zambrano,916 as it is the most important case that illustrates the erosion
of the outer boundaries of the concept of internal situations. The Zambrano
children were born in Belgium, to parents of Columbian nationality who
sought asylum, but did not succeed. Their applications to regularize their stay
and obtain unemployment benefits did not succeed either. Mr. Zambrano
challenged those refusals arguing that as a parent of minor children of Belgian
nationality, he was entitled to reside and work in Belgium on the basis of the
Union citizenship provisions. The problem was that the Zambrano children
had never moved outside their state of nationality (Belgium), which normally
meant that there was nothing to bring them within the scope of EU law. How-
ever, the Court disagreed, establishing that “Article 20 TFEU precludes national
measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens
of the Union.”917 According to the Court, refusing to grant Zambranos a right
to residence and a work permit would have such an effect, since it would lead
to a situation where the Zambrano children, who are citizens of the Union,
would have to leave the territory of the Union together with their parents.
As important as Zambrano is, perhaps it would be more correct to classify
it as an exception to the rule of internal situations, as the cases following it
(Dereci and McCarthy918) demonstrated the “purely internal situations” still
matter. Hence, Zambrano can be interpreted to exemplify an internal situation,
which is considered to have a link with EU law due to its drastic consequences.
Such a situation has the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine
enjoyment of the substance of their citizenship rights,919 as in the case of
Zambrano children, who would have to leave the territory of the Union. When
the genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights is threatened, “the
veil of internal situations may legitimately be pierced”.920
916 Case C-34/09 Zambrano, [2011] ECR I-1177. For a detailed analysis, see V. Borger, “Ruiz
Zambrano: Hoe Europees Burgerschap zijn Schaduw in de Tijd Vooruit Werpt,“ in Vrij
Verkeer van personen in 60 arresten: De zegeningen van het Europees burgerschap, ed. G. Essers,
A. P. van der Mei, and F. van Overmeiren (Den Haag: Kluwer, 2012).
917 Case C-34/09 Zambrano, para. 42.
918 Case C-256/11 Dereci, judgment of 15 November 2011, n.y.r; Case C-434/09 McCarthy, [2011]
ECR I-3375. For an in-depth discussion, see A. Tryfonidou, “Redefining the Outer Bound-
aries of EU Law: The Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci trilogy,“ European Public Law 18,
no. 3 (2012): 493-526; J. T. Nowak, “Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office National
de L’Emploi (ONEM) & Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department,“ Columbia Journal of European Law 17(2010-2011): 673; A. P. Van der Mei, S.
Van den Bogaert, and G. R. De Groot, “De arresten Ruiz Zambrano en McCarthy,“ Neder-
lands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 6(August 2011): 188-99.
919 Case C-34/09 Zambrano, para. 42.
920 N. Nic Shuibhne, “(Some of) The Kids Are All Right,“ Common Market Law Review 49(2012):
365.
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Zambrano is a step in the right direction, since it enables the Court to deal
with an extremely problematic example of reverse discrimination,921 by using
and sharpening further one of the most precious weapons in its arsenal of
provisions of EU law, that of Union citizenship. In the light of Zambrano it could
be concluded that anything that would deprive Union citizens of “the genuine
enjoyment of the substance of their citizenship rights” would constitute a
constraint on Member States. The following section tries to establish the
contents of that substance.
6.3.2.3.3 Core of Union citizenship
What these cases reveal as to the substance or the core of Union citizenship
is that first and foremost Union citizenship is about movement and residence
on the territory of the Member States. That conclusion is confirmed by Ad-
vocate Generals and scholars alike. AG Sharpston calls the right to movement
and residence the “core” right of Union citizenship,922 while AG Colomer
calls it the “central right of citizenship”.923 Nic Shuibhne calls them the “the
undoubted “core” rights of citizenship”.924
Yet, that is not the only right attached to citizenship. As the case law clearly
demonstrated, the right to free movement and residence come with the bonus
of the right to equal treatment. Once a Union citizen exercises his right to free
movement and residence, by virtue of his citizenship status he is automatically
entitled to equal treatment in the host Member State. According to Wollen-
schläger, the right to move and reside in the host Member State, the far-reach-
ing claim to national treatment,925 as well as the prohibitions on restriction
to freedom of movement constitute the “core guarantees” of Union citizen-
ship.926
Scholars argue that with the introduction of Union citizenship and the
Court’s subsequent case law interpreting it, movement related to an economic
activity was “relegated to constituting merely the ‘specific expression’ of a
more general and overarching right of free movement enshrined in Article
921 P. van Elsuwege, “Shifting the Boundaries? European Union Citizenship and the Scope
of Application of EU Law,“ Legal Issues of Economic Integration 38, no. 3 (2011): 276.
922 See the AG’s Opinion in Case C-34/09 Zambrano, para. 80.
923 See the AG’s Opinion in Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan and Bucher, para. 67.
924 Nic Shuibhne, “(Some of) The Kids Are All Right,“ 365; Kochenov also calls the rght to
free movement “a core element of European citizenship“, see D. Kochenov, “European
Integration and the Gift of the Second Class Citizenship,“ Murdoch University Electronic
Journal of Law 13, no. 1 (2006): 212.
925 The equality aspect of citizenship is analysed further in the following chapter.
926 Wollenschläger, “A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizen-
ship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration,“ 30.
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21 TFEU”.927 According to Tomkin, this is a paradigm shift. Member State
nationals are no longer granted rights as economic means serving economic
ends, but by virtue of their status as Union citizens.928
As to the implication of these developments for the inclusion of a PSC on
free movement persons, it is evident that such a clause would go against the
grain of the status of Union citizenship. It will undermine the work of the
Court in this field, as it will create second-class citizens on a permanent basis.
Citizens whose right to free movement and residence within the territory of
Member States can possibly be suspended at the whim of individual Member
State governments. In addition to violating the substance of the Union citizen-
ship concept, such a clause will also be discriminatory. It will discriminate
directly on the basis of nationality, providing the possibility to single out and
suspend the free movement rights of nationals belonging to one Member State
only. It will be quite a challenge to legitimize such a clause when the Court’s
case law already moved beyond non-discrimination on the basis of nationality
to tackle all kinds of restriction affecting free movement. If Member States
are to respect the existing Treaties and their provisions as interpreted by the
Court, the Union citizenship provisions at their current stage of development
will preclude Member States from including such a controversial clause into
the Turkish Accession Agreement.
6.3.3 Fundamental rights
The third cluster of cases demonstrating that some provisions of EU law belong
to the “very foundations” of the Union or implying they are hierarchically
superior to other provisions of the Treaties, are those dealing with fundamental
rights.929 This section begins by examining the most recent and important
cases of the Court revealing the place of fundamental rights in the current
hierarchy of norms. This demonstration begins with the case, in which the
Court was most explicit and compelling in its statements regarding the import-
ance and status of fundamental rights, i.e. the first Kadi judgment.930 It is
927 Tomkin, “Citizenship in Motion: The Development of the Freedom of Movement for Citizens
in the Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union,“ 44-45; Tomkin refers to
Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government, para. 59; For
a similar argument, see Wollenschläger, “A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market
Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of
European Integration,“ 30.
928 Tomkin, “Citizenship in Motion: The Development of the Freedom of Movement for Citizens
in the Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union,“ 45.
929 See Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, para. 303; Case C-229/05
P PKK and KNK v Council, [2007] ECR I-439; and Case C-432/04 Cresson, [2006] ECR I-6387.
930 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi.
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followed by two other cases, Cresson and PKK,931 in which the Court’s exam-
ination of the compatibility of primary law provisions with relevant provisions
of the ECHR, implicitly confirmed that provisions protecting fundamental rights
are hierarchically superior to other provisions of the Treaties, i.e. to provisions
which are not considered to be part of the “very foundations” of the Union.
After providing a snapshot of the most important cases revealing the status
of fundamental rights in today’s legal order, a more historical approach is
taken in order to illustrate and explain the emergence and the rise of funda-
mental rights to their current position. Next, the inclusion of fundamental
rights in the Treaties and their rise from being mentioned in the preamble to
the SEA to constituting Article 2 TEU after Lisbon is put under the spotlight.
Lastly, it is argued that the case law of the Court, starting from the first cases,
in which it declared protection of fundamental rights constituted general
principles of Community law, to drafting of the Charter, which eventually
became part of primary law after Lisbon, contributed to the constitionlisation,
i.e. autonomisation of the EU legal order over the decades. Today Member
States respect fundamental rights and freedoms not only because they have
deeply internalized them, but also because their violations are backed up by
sanctions provided by the Court of Justice.
6.3.3.1 Snapshot of recent case law
To begin with the Kadi case,932 the gist of the Court’s ruling is in the state-
ment that “the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have
the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include
the principle that all European Union acts must respect fundamental rights, that
respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court
to review in the framework of the complete system of legal remedies estab-
lished by that treaty”.933 The Court held that the General Court had to review
the lawfulness of the contested Regulations in light of fundamental rights, even
if they had been adopted in order to implement Security Council resolutions.
Since it failed to do so, its reasoning was vitiated by an error of law.934 More-
over, the fact that the Council had failed to communicate to Mr. Kadi the
evidence relied on against him to justify the inclusion of his name in the
contested Regulations, deprived him of the right to defend himself, as well
as from the right to effective judicial review.935 On the same grounds, the
Court found that his right to property was also infringed.936
931 Case C-432/04 Cresson; Case C-229/05 P PKK and KNK v Council.
932 For the factual background of the case, see section 6.2.3 above.
933 Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Kadi II, para. 22.
934 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, paras. 326-27.
935 Ibid., paras. 345-49.
936 Ibid., paras. 369-71.
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As to the Court’s statements regarding the position of fundamental rights
in the EU legal order, which is the most important aspect of the judgment for
the purposes of this thesis, they were clear and unequivocal. Referring to two
primary law provisions, Articles 307 and 297 EC, the Court ruled that they
could not be interpreted as authorizing “any derogation from the principles
of liberty, democracy, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
enshrined in Article 6(1) EU as a foundation of the Union”.937 The Court also
categorically stated that Article 307 EC “may in no circumstances permit any
challenge to the principles that form part of the very foundations of the Community
legal order, one of which is the protection of fundamental rights”.938
The Court’s statements in Kadi place fundamental rights at the top of the
hierarchy of norms in the Union legal order. Just like the principle of the
autonomy of the legal order, which was protected by the Court in its first EEA
Opinion, fundamental rights have been declared sacrosanct by the Court, by
virtue of their “form[ing] part of the very foundations of the Community legal
order”.939 Fundamental rights in general, and the principles enshrined in
Article 6(1) TEU (now renamed as values under Article 2 TEU) in particular,
are hierarchically superior principles that constitute part of the core, of the
“very foundations” of the legal order. As such they constrain Member States
whenever they act within the scope of EU law, including when they perform
their functions as primary law makers in the context of drafting an Accession
Agreement.
In Cresson, the second example, the Commission brought action against
former Commissioner Mrs. Cresson on the basis of the third subparagraph
of Article 213(2) EC [now Article 245(2) TFEU] for breaching her obligations
as a Commissioner. She was accused of “conduct amounting to favouritism
or, at least, and gross negligence”.940 In her defence, she raised procedural
issues concerning the way her case was handled and argued that her rights
of defence had not been not respected. More specifically, she complained of
a lack of legal remedy, in case the Court decided to impose a penalty on her,
since there would be no possibility to appeal that decision. To check whether
that would indeed breach her right to effective judicial protection, the Court
tested Article 213(2) EC against Article 2(1) of Protocol No. 7 of the ECHR.941
937 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 303.
938 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 304.
939 Ibid.
940 Case C-432/04 Cresson, para. 1. For details, see R. Mastroianni and A. Arena, “Case C-432/04,
Commission of the European Communities v. Édith Cresson, Judgment of the Court (Full
Court) of 11 July 2006, [2006] ECR I-6387.,“ Common Market Law Review 45(2008): 1207-32.
941 Article 2(1) of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR provides that “everyone convicted of a criminal
offence by a court or tribunal has the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed
by a higher court or tribunal. Even if it be accepted that that provision applies to pro-
ceedings based on Article 213(2) EC, it is sufficient to point out that Article 2(2) of that
Protocol states that that right may be subject to exceptions in cases, inter alia, where the
Constitutional Foundations of the Union as a Constraint on Primary Law Making 247
The Court found that Article 213(2) EC complied with the rules established
under the Convention. The fact that the Court found it necessary to check
whether a provision of the Treaties was fundamental rights-compliant clearly
implies the hierarchical superiority of fundamental rights. Moreover, these
cases illustrate that the Court needs fundamental rights not only to legitimize
various provisions of secondary law, but also of primary law.
The third and last example, which confirms and illustrates the ‘precedence’
of fundamental rights over provisions of primary law, is the PKK case.942 The
facts of the PKK case are similar to Kadi. The PKK’s funds and financial assets
were frozen since it was added as a terrorist organization to the list envisaged
in Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2580/2001, which was adopted to implement
UN Security Council Resolution (Res. 1373 (2001)).943 The PKK brought an
action for annulment and damages to the General Court, but its action was
declared inadmissible, upon which it appealed to the Court of Justice. The
relevant part of the Court’s judgment for our purposes is the part where KNK,
an umbrella organization to which the PKK was related, argued that the admiss-
ibility requirement under Article 230(4) EC [now Article 263(4) TFEU], the
requirement to be “directly and individually concerned”, was so restrictive
that it conflicted with the ECHR, and more specifically with Article 13 of the
Convention which provides for the right to an effective remedy. Instead of
dismissing that argument, the Court went on to check whether that was indeed
the case.
After repeating the importance of fundamental rights in the EU legal order,
the Court examined the issue of admissibility under Article 34 of the Conven-
tion. The Court established that to be considered a victim, the case law of the
Strasbourg court and Article 13 ECHR require an applicant to have been affected
by a violation that had already taken place. Moreover, the case law of the
Strasbourg court had already established that “persons who claim to be linked
to an entity included in the list annexed to Common Position 2001/931, but
who are not included in the list themselves, do not have the status of victims
of a violation of the ECHR within the meaning of Article 34 thereof and that,
consequently, their applications are inadmissible”.944 The KNK was linked
to the PKK, but it was not included in the disputed list, which meant that it
person concerned was tried in the first instance by the highest court or tribunal.” Hence,
the fact that Mrs. Cresson would not be able to appeal the Court’s decision did not violate
her right to effective judicial protection. See, ibid., paras. 112-113.
942 Case C-229/05 P PKK and KNK v Council.
943 The PPK sought the annulment of Council Decision 2002/460/EC of 17 June 2002 imple-
menting Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures
directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and
repealing Decision 2002/334/EC, OJ L 160/26, 18.6.2002.
944 Case C-229/05 P PKK and KNK v Council, para. 80. The Court refers to the following Stras-
bourg case: ECtHR, Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistia and Others v 15 States of the Euroepan Union,
Appl. Nos. 6422/02 and 9916/02.
248 Chapter 6
would not be able to establish the status of a victim under Article 34 ECHR.
Thus, it would not be able to bring an action before the Court of Human
Rights, which illustrated that Article 230(4) EC (now Article 263(4) TFEU) was
in line with the ECHR.945
As briefly described below, even though fundamental rights initially had
no place either in the Treaties or the case law of the Court, once they were
introduced into the legal order as general principles of EU law, their rise was
steady and consistent over the decades. The few cases analysed above, as well
as the central place of fundamental rights in the Treaties,946 clearly illustrate
how deeply entrenched they are today into the Union legal order. By now
they have reached the pinnacle of norms and values in the Union legal order
and constitute part of the core or of the “very foundations” of the legal order.
The vast array of case law on fundamental rights as well as the never diminish-
ing judicial and academic interest on this topic in the last half a century, have
contributed to the deep internalization of protection of fundamental rights
firstly in the national and then also in the Union legal orders.947 However,
the most decisive factor in the internalization of fundamental rights in various
legal orders was undoubtedly, the mechanisms of external sanctions built-in
within various legal orders in the aftermath of the Second World War.
At national level, it was the national constitutional courts that guaranteed
the protection of fundamental rights. To provide the most prominent example,
in the case of Germany it was the Bundesverfassungsgericht that ensured
compliance regarding the protection of fundamental rights enumerated in the
Grundgesetz. At international, or more precisely regional level, it was the
European Court of Human Rights that ensured that its Contracting Parties
abide by the rights enumerated in the Convention, for the protection of which
it was established. Given the rise and centrality of the protection of funda-
mental rights of the individual at all levels and almost all jurisdictions in the
last century, it was unthinkable, at least in Europe, that there would be a legal
order, or a level of governance (however one names it), that would not take
account of those rights.
While the Union legal order started taking account of fundamental rights
as early as the 1970s, they soon became so central to it that compliance with
them became a pre-condition for the validity and lawfulness of any Union
act. In other words, acts disrespecting a fundamental right could be sanctioned
by annulment (nullity) by the Courts of the Union. The Court’s pronouncement
in Kadi II is quite clear, it provided that “the Courts of the European Union
945 Case C-229/05 P PKK and KNK v Council, paras. 80-83.
946 See the introduction, as well as section 6.3.3.3 following below.
947 It should be noted that all Member States of the Union are also parties to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all
European acts in the light of fundamental rights”.948
What can be inferred from the Court’s pronouncement in Kadi II is that
fundamental rights are capable of constraining Member States in their roles
as primary as well as secondary law makers. While their constraining role
regarding the latter is clear and uncontested, it is their constraining role when
Member States act as primary law makers that is more controversial. However,
the analysis of the Pringle case following below,949 illustrates clearly the con-
straining force of general principles on Member States when they act as
primary law makers too. The constraining force flows from the threat of a
sanction (here in the form of a declaration of incompatibility) since there is
the possibility to refer a Council Decision approving the conclusion of an
Accession Agreement or the adoption of a Treaty revision to the Court before
its ratification for a check of its legality and/or compliance with the require-
ments of the procedure under which the contested Decision was adopted.950
While the four freedoms were indigenous to the legal order, fundamental
rights were not. They were incorporated later into the Union legal order;
however, they climbed up the stairs in the hierarchy of norms in Union law.
Today, just like the four freedoms, they form part of the “very foundations”
of the Union. What follows is a brief overview of the emergence and develop-
ment of fundamental rights in the EU legal order, and a discussion of their
constraining, legitimizing as well as constitutionalizing functions in EU law.
This overview sheds light on their central place in the EU legal and demon-
strates that those principles are capable of constraining Member States even
when they act as primary law makers.
6.3.3.2 Inception and rise of fundamental rights
The silence of the founding Treaties on fundamental rights and their sub-
sequent incorporation into the case law of the Court as general principles of
law in response to the challenge of the German and Italian constitutional courts
is well known. Thus, the discussion on this process is brief, as comprehensive
studies on the topic already exist,951 and since what is relevant here is their
948 Emphasis added. Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Kadi II, para. 23.
949 Case C-370/12 Pringle.
950 R. Plender, “The European Court’s Pre-emptive Jurisdiction: Opinions under Article 300(6)
EC,“ in Judicial Review in European Union Law, ed. D. O’Keeffe (Kluwer Law International,
2000), 203-20.
951 See Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law; X. Groussot, General Principles of Community
Law (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2006); J. A. Usher, General Principles of EC Law,
European Law Series (London and New York: Longman, 1998); A. Arnull, The General
Principles of EEC Law and the Individual (St. Martin’s Press, 1990). For an alternative account
see, G. De Búrca, “The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights
Actor,“ The American Journal of International Law 105(2011): 649-93.
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current status and possible function as constraint on Member States when
drafting an Accession Agreement.
As to the Court’s approach in its endeavour to extrapolate general prin-
ciples of EU law, it had to “weigh up and evaluate the particular problem and
search for the best and most appropriate solution”.952 The common constitu-
tional traditions of the Member States as well as international human rights
agreements would be the main sources of inspiration. What is “best and most
appropriate” would depend on the objectives of the Community. Thus, the
standard of protection would change from one case to another,953 igniting
criticism and academic debate on the issue.954
Starting with Stauder,955 and later rulings on more and more cases in-
volving issues of fundamental rights,956 the Court established a comprehens-
ive “unwritten” catalogue of rights, which was eventually adopted as the
Charter of Fundamental Rights. From the first case until the adoption of the
Charter (and even afterwards), the Court was criticised for various reasons.
At the beginning, it was criticised for the fact that the its initial motivation
was not the protection of fundamental rights per se, but the protection of the
supremacy of Community law as well as the autonomy of the legal order.957
After Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and Nold,958 it was criticised for protect-
ing fundamental rights only to the extent this was necessitated by the goal
952 Opinion of AG Slynn in Case 155/79 AM&S, [1982] ECR 1575, 1649.
953 According to Groussot, the Court’s approach is neither minimalist nor maximalist, but
“evaluative”. For details see, Groussot, General Principles of Community Law: 48-50. See also,
M. Lindfelt, Fundamental Rights in the European Union – Towards Higher Law of the Land?
(Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2007). 67-70.
954 For an example, see L. Besselink, “Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On Fundamental
Rights, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the European Union,“ Common Market Law Review
35(1998).
955 Stauder was the first case in which the Court recognized that fundamental human rights
were enshrined in the general principles of Community law and were protected by the
Court. See, Case 29/69 Stauder, [1969] ECR 419, para. 7.
956 For a comprehensive survey of the rights protected and recognized as general principles
of EU law see, K. Lenaerts et al., European Union Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell; Thomson
Reuters, 2011). 845-48.
957 Lindfelt, Fundamental Rights in the European Union – Towards Higher Law of the Land?: 65.
958 In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the Court identified “the constitutional traditions common
to the Member States” as the source of inspiration for such rights, and ruled that those
rights had to be “ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the
Community”. See, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125, para. 4. In
Nold, it identified international treaties for the protection of human rights as an additional
source of inspiration. However, according to the Court, fundamental rights were not
“unfettered prerogatives”. They had to be viewed in the light of the social function of that
right and the activities it protected, i.e. they were “subject always to limitations laid down
in accordance with the public interest”. Hence, those rights could be subject to certain limits
justified by the overall objectives of the Community, as long as the substance of those rights
was left intact. See, Case 4/73 Nold, [1974] ECR 491, para. 14.
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of economic integration.959 Others argued that the Court’s use of fundamental
rights was ‘instrumental’, the underlying motive being the extension of its
jurisdiction to matters reserved to Member States.960 The main critique regard-
ing the state of affairs before the adoption of the Charter was that the case
law developed by the Court lacked legal certainty and predictability.961 Des-
pite all the criticisms and discussions the prominence of fundamental rights
in the EU legal order increased slowly but surely.962
6.3.3.3 Constitutionalisation of fundamental rights by inclusion in primary law
Late judge Mancini claimed that the acquis of fundamental rights developed
by the Court was “one of the greatest contributions that the court has made
to democratic legitimacy in the Community”.963 Similarly, Member States
declared that “[p]rotection of fundamental rights is a founding principle of
the Union and an indispensable prerequisite for her legitimacy”.964 In other
words, the judges’ contribution was acknowledged and matched by the Mem-
ber States: first, by recognizing and enshrining the protection of fundamental
rights in the Treaties, and secondly, by crystallizing the case law of the Court
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.965 What follows is a brief overview
of the inclusion and rise of fundamental rights in the Treaties, i.e. from appear-
ing in the preamble to becoming Article 6 TEU and rising up to constitute
Article 2 TEU with the Lisbon Treaty revision.
Fundamental rights were first mentioned in the preamble to the Single
European Act.966 It was only with the Treaty on European Union adopted
959 Lindfelt, Fundamental Rights in the European Union – Towards Higher Law of the Land?: 2-3.
960 J. Coppel and A. O’Neill, “The European Court of Justice: taking rights seriously?,“ Legal
Studies 12, no. 2 (1992): 227. For another critical account of the fundamental rights juris-
prudence of the Court, see P. R. Beaumont, “Human Rights: Some Recent Developments
and Their Impact on Convergence and Divergence of Law in Europe,“ in Convergence and
divergence in European Public Law, ed. Paul R. Beaumont, Carole Lyons, and Neil Walker
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002).
961 Lindfelt, Fundamental Rights in the European Union – Towards Higher Law of the Land?: 3.
962 P. (ed.) Alston, The EU and Human Rights (OUP, 1999); R. Lawson, “Confusion and Conflict?
Diverging Interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights in Strasbourg
and Luxembourg,“ in The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe: Essays in
Honour of Henry G. Schermers, ed. R. Lawson and M. De Blois (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1994).
963 G. F. Mancini, Democracy and Constitutionalism in the EU (Oxford and Portalnd, Oregon:
Hart Publishing, 2000). 45.
964 See Presidency Conlcusions to the Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, Annex IV.
965 The Charter was first proclaimed as a non-binding instrument in December 2000, OJ C
364/1, 18.12.2000. By virtue of the reference to the Charter that was included in Article
6(1) TEU with the Lisbon Treaty revision, it has a primary law status, OJ C 306/1, 17.12.2007.
966 The Single European Act made the following reference in its preamble: “the findamental
rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention
for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Social Charter, notably
freedom, equality and social justice“.
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in Maastricht that they found their place in the main text of the Treaties as
Article F(2). The latter article stipulated that “[t]he Union shall respect funda-
mental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November
1950 and as they result from constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, as general principles of Community law”.967 As important as this
development was, Von Bogdandy argues that the latter article, which is now
Article 6(3) TFEU, was formulated entirely from a limiting perspective. It
commits “the Union to general principles of law which have no constitutive
function but only a restrictive one”.968
Von Bogdandy’s argument does not diminish the importance of Article
6(3) TFEU. It rather serves to highlight a subsequent development that took
the protection of fundamental rights to a new level. That development was
the inclusion of Article 6(1) TEU by the Amsterdam Treaty revision. Article
6(1) TEU provided that “[t]he Union is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule
of law, principles which are common to the Member States”. According to
Von Bogdandy, this provision laid down the normative core content on which
the EU is established, and as such, the argument goes, the constitutional content
of Article 6(1) TEU by far surpasses the constitutional dimension of Article 6(2)
TEU (ex Article F(2)). He concludes that “[n]ow not only restrictive, but also
a constitutive European constitutionalism has found its recognition in positive
law”.969 As discussed above, the Court’s statements on protection of funda-
mental rights, democracy and the rule of law in the Kadi ruling, support this
view.970
With the Lisbon Treaty revision, the Member States renamed the “prin-
ciples” on which the Union is founded as “values”, and extended further the
list. The significance and effect of the renaming remain to be seen. Article 2
TEU now reads as follows:
‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidar-
ity and equality between women and men prevail.’
967 Article F(2), became Article 6(2) TEU with the Amsterdam Treaty revision, and it is now
Article 6(3) TEU after the Lisbon Treaty revision.
968 A. von Bogdandy, “Founding Principles,“ in Principles of European Constitutional Law, ed.
A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (Oxford, München: Hart Publishing, Verlag C.H. Beck, 2011),
22.
969 Ibid.
970 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, paras. 303-04.
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Undoubtedly, one of the most significant developments was the Charter’s
assuming primary law status with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
on 1 December 2009.971 Its text was not reproduced in the Treaties, but Article
6(1) TEU stipulates that the Charter “shall have the same legal value as the
Treaties”. This was not an easy decision for the Member States, which were
wary of conferring greater powers to the Union via the Charter. The US
experience illustrated how a Bill of Rights of very limited scope could have
centralizing effects engendered by the creative interpretation of a Supreme
Court.972 Thus, Member States wanted to prevent that from happening by
making absolutely clear that the Charter would have a limited personal and
material scope.973 Hence, the Charter was addressed to “the institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard to the principle of
subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union
law”.974
Another important development illustrating the importance given to
fundamental rights was the inclusion of Articles 7 TEU and 309 EC (now Article
354 TFEU) with the Amsterdam Treaty. The aim was to provide a legal basis
for the Union to react against a Member State that would seriously and persist-
ently breach the principles (now values) recognized in Article 6(1) TEU (now
Article 2 TEU). The drawback of this provision was that it provided a post hoc
tool, i.e. it could not be used preventively. The Nice Treaty amendment
corrected this drawback by also adding a mechanism enabling preventive
action in the event of “a clear risk of a serious breach” (Article 7(1) TEU). When
the European Council determines the existence of such a risk under Article
7(2) TEU, the Council under Article 7(3) TEU “may decide to suspend certain
of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State
in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government
of that Member State in the Council”.
971 OJ C 306/1, 17.12.2007.
972 It is interesting to note the US experience in this respect. Similarly, the framers of the US
constitution were afraid that a Bill of Rights would widen federal legislative powers. It
was introduced only later in 1791, to appease those opposing the Constitution on the ground
that it did not contain a Bill of Rights. So when adopted, it had a limited scope ratione
personae. It would only apply to the federal government and would not in any way affect
the legislative powers of the states. However, over the years, the Supreme Court extended
the application of almost all the rights contained in the Bill of Rights to the states as well,
thereby limiting their legislative competence. This extension was based on the theory of
incorporation, according to which the Fourteenth Amendment, which was addressed to
the states, “incorporates” the Bill of Rights. For more details see, A. Knook, “The Court,
the Charter, and the Vertical Division of Powers in the European Union,“ Common Market
Law Review 42(2005): 374-79. T. M. Fine, An Introduction to the Anglo-American Legal System
(Navarra: Thomson-Aranzadi, 2007). 28-36.
973 Knook, “The Court, the Charter, and the Vertical Division of Powers in the European
Union,“ 373-74.
974 Emphasis added. Article 51(1) CFR. See also, Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, judgment
of 26 February 2013, n.y.r.
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Article 7 TEU is mainly a political tool. Yet, its mere existence is quite
significant as it very clearly illustrates the underlying values of the Union,
the breach of which might trigger sanctions. It is not only the possibility of
sanctions that demonstrates the importance and constraining force of funda-
mental rights, but also the fact that in terms of scope Article 7 TEU is all
encompassing, i.e. all Member State action falls within its scope. The fact that
it is a provision that makes no distinction as to whether Member States act
within or outside the scope of EU law, illustrates how central fundamental
rights are to the EU legal order.
6.3.3.4 Role of fundamental rights in the constitutionalisation of the legal order
While the previous section covered how fundamental rights slowly but surely
obtained primary law status, and how they rose to become Article 2 TEU, it
should be emphasized that fundamental rights played a constitutionalizing
role also as unwritten general principles of EU law. This sub-section firstly,
looks briefly into how fundamental rights, as general principles, were used
by the Court to increase the autonomy of the Union legal order. Secondly,
it examines the significance of adopting a binding Charter of Fundamental
Rights that has primary law status.
6.3.3.4.1 As general principles of Union law
“General principles” is a broad category that is a moving target as it evolves
by every case delivered by the Court. Some of the functions and legal effects
of the term are more controversial than others.975 To begin by mentioning
briefly the most important functions of those principles in the Union legal
order: they serve to fill gaps, as aid to interpretation and as grounds for
review.976 The fact that every scholar creates different sub-categories of
general principles of EU law is an indication of the relative character of the
975 Editorial Comments, “Horizontal Direct Effect – A Law of Diminishing Coherence,“ Common
Market Law Review 43, no. 1 (2006); A. Masson and C. Micheau, “The Werner Mangold Case:
An Example of Legal Militancy,“ European Public Law 13, no. 4 (2007); P. Cabral and R.
Neves, “General Principles of EU Law and Horizontal Direct Effect,“ European Public Law
17, no. 3 (2011).
976 Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law: 29-35; See, S. Peers, “The ’Opt-out’ that Fell to
Earth: The British and Polish Protocol Concerning the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,“
Human Rights Law Review 12, no. 2 (2012); V. Belling, “Supranational Fundamental Rights
or Primacy of Sovereignty? Legal Effects of the So-Called Opt-Out from the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights,“ European Law Journal 18, no. 2 (2012); D. Anderson and C. C.
Murphy, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights,“ in EU Law After Lisbon, ed. A. Biondi, P.
Eeckhout, and S. Ripley (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 166-69. A. Dashwood et al., Wyatt and Dash-
wood’s European Union Law (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2011). 321.
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term.977 As rightly noted by Tridimas, those classifications usually raise more
questions than they answer.978 While it is useful to keep in mind the breadth
of the term as well as the existence of different sub-categories of general
principles, our focus here is on the sub-category of fundamental rights as
defined in Article 6(3) TFEU.979
As far as they encapsulate fundamental rights, general principles also have
a legitimising function, as they reflect the norms and values on which the legal
order is built.980 Their legitimising function goes hand in hand with their
function as constraint. Tridimas elaborates on how in the aftermath of the
Second World War distrust of executive power led to the search of constitu-
tional principles to constrain administrative discretion in Germany. The devel-
opment of general principles of EU law can be seen as a parallel development.
More specifically, it was “an effort to assert the legitimacy and supremacy
of Community law over conflicting national traditions”,981 by subjecting the
977 Every author uses a different classification of general principles of EU law. Some general
principles find themselves under more than one category, while others are not categorized
as “general principles” at all by some scholars. To begin with Tridimas, he identifies two
main types of general principles: “(a) Principles which derive from the rule of law. In this
category belong, for example, the protection of fundamental rights, equality, proportionality,
legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations, and the rights of defence. … (b)
Systemic principles which underlie the constitutional structure of the Community and define
the Community legal edifice. These refer to the relationship between the Community and
Member States, and include primacy, attribution of competences, subsidiarity, and the duty
of cooperation provided for in Article 10 EC.” Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law:
4. Schermers and Waelbroeck identify three types of general principles of law: (a) Compell-
ing (or constitutional) legal principles; (b) Regulatory principles common to the laws of
the Member States; (c) General principles native to the Community legal order. For the
definition and distinction of each group see, H. G. Schermers and D. F. Waelbroeck, Judicial
Protection in the European Union, 6th ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law Internation, 2001). 28-30.
Groussot divides general principles of law into three groups: administrative principles (e.g.
proportionality, non-discrimination and legitimate expectations), the procedural principles
(e.g. rights of defense), and fundamental rights (e.g. right to property). He also traces back
the origins of those principles to the national jurisdictions from which they were derived.
See, Groussot, General Principles of Community Law: 4 and 17-43.
978 Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law: 3.
979 Article 6(3) TEU reads as follows: “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute
general principles of the Union’s law.“
980 Lindfelt, Fundamental Rights in the European Union – Towards Higher Law of the Land?: 12.
981 Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law: 24. Similarly, Von Bogdandy claims that “the
phenomenon of one-sided public power“ is at the centre of every constitutional order. This
one-sidedness clashes with “the central tenet of modern Europe“, that is with individual
freedom, turning this clash into the central problem of modern constitutional law. Both
national as well as EU constitutional law are preoccupied with “the constitution, organiza-
tion and limitation of this problematic one-sidedness“. He argues that most, if not all
constitutional principles are concerned with this problem. See, Bogdandy, “Founding
Principles,“ 24.
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exercise of public power to substantive and procedural limitations,982 without
getting into conflict with national constitutional courts.
As mentioned before, the founding Treaties are framework treaties i.e.
traités cadres. They did not and still do not contain “a complete set of rules
and principles which is necessary to redeem the promise of reining in the
exercise of political power by the ‘rule of law’”.983 It was the Court of Justice
that developed those principles based on its mandate to “ensure that in the
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed”.984 According
to AG Mázak, by formulating general principles of EU law, the Court has
“added flesh to the bones of Community law, which otherwise … would have
remained a mere skeleton of rules, not quite constituting a proper legal
‘order’”.985 For others, general principles constitute the ‘spirit’ of the Treaties,
or of any constitution, by imbuing it with meaning going beyond the black
letter of its provisions.986 The Supreme Court of Canada has expressed this
view eloquently in the following paragraph:
‘The constitution is more than a written text. It embraces the entire global system
of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional authority. A
superficial reading of selected provisions of the written constitutional enactment,
without more, may be misleading. It is necessary to make a more profound investi-
gation of the underlying principles animating the whole of the Constitution…Those
principles must inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional rights and
obligations.’987
Similarly, Tridimas is of the opinion that general principles are an expression
of the constitutional standards underlying the EU legal order; hence recourse
to them constitutes an integral part of the methodology employed by the Court
of Justice. Since general principles embody constitutional values, they are
capable of influencing the interpretation of written rules even in the absence
of gaps.988 As illustrated above, the most significant of those principles have
been codified by the Member States in the Treaties. In the pre-Lisbon Treaty
on the European Union they were called the principles on which the Union
982 M. Herdegen, “General Principles of EU Law – the Methodological Challenge,“ in General
Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development, ed. U. Bernitz, J. Nergelius, and C. Cardner
(Great Britain: Kluwer Law International, 2008), 3.
983 Ibid., 344.
984 Emphasis added. Now Article 19(1) TEU.
985 Opinion of AG Mázak in Case C-411/05 Félix Palacios de la Villa, [2007] ECR I-08531, para.
85.
986 Von Bogdandy argues that Article F in the Maastricht Treaty, as well as Article 6(2) TEU
in the Amsterdam version were formulated from a limiting perspective. Therefore, they
had only a ’restrictive’ function, as opposed to the ’constitutive’ function of Article 6(1)
TEU (now Article 2 TEU). Bogdandy, “Founding Principles,“ 15.
987 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Can) to question 1, cited in ibid.
988 Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law: 19.
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is founded, while under current Article 2 TEU they are the values on which
the Union is founded. No matter what their official designation is, scholars,
and the Court of Justice,989 agree on the fact that they constitute “the top
tier of the hierarchy of norms of EU law”.990 They express the normative core
content on which the EU is built, and are seen as the recognition in positive
law of “a constitutive European constitutionalism”.991
To sum up, general principles have contributed to the constitutionalisation
of the legal order in many senses of the term. First of all, as just mentioned
above, some of those principles have become constitutional by virtue of being
codified in the Treaties, i.e. “the constitutional charter” of the Union. Secondly,
they have contributed to the constitutionalisation of the legal order by incorpor-
ating the protection of fundamental rights,992 by establishing the rule of law,
and overall by laying down substantial and procedural constraints on the
exercise of law making power in the EU. Thirdly, they have contributed to the
process whereby the Treaties have asserted their normative independence vis-à-
vis the Member States, and have evolved into “the founding charter of a
supranational system of government.”993 As to how the latter happened, Von
Bogdandy explains the role of principles in formulating an autonomous legal
discourse, which strengthens the autonomy of courts vis-à-vis politics and
allows for an internal development of the law that circumvents Article 48
EU.994
6.3.3.4.2 As part of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
Lastly, the codification of fundamental rights in the Charter has led many to
view it as “the centrepiece of the current EU constitutionalization process”.995
With its clear constitutional overtones, the Charter, as the EU’s ‘Bill of
Rights’,996 contributes further to this shift away from the international legal
order where the Member States are the ‘Masters of the Treaties’, towards “a
989 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, para. 304.
990 Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law: 16. C. Eckes, “Protecting Supremacy from External
Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order,“ European Law Journal
18, no. 2 (2012): 241.
991 Bogdandy, “Founding Principles,“ 22.
992 Von Bogdandy argues that individual rights were essential for the constitutionalisation
of the Union, however he acknowledges that those rights were rarely qualified as funda-
mental rights. He claims that “integration has followed the functionalist, not the constitution-
alist path“. ibid., 45.
993 This definition of ’constitutionalisation’ has been provided by Tridimas, The General Principles
of EU Law: 5.
994 Bogdandy, “Founding Principles,“ 18.
995 P. Eeckhout, “The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question,“ Common
Market Law Review 39(2002): 945.
996 G. De Búrca and J. B. Aschenbrenner, “The Development of European Constitutionalism
and the Role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,“ Columbia Journal of European Law
9(2002-2003): 372.
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genuinely autonomous legal order” with “a self-sustaining constitution”.997
It reinforces the democratic legitimacy of the legal order,998 by providing
for a constitutionalized system of protection of fundamental rights as well as
by constraining the scope of action of Union institutions and Member States.
6.4 APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
The entrenchment and inviolability of certain fundamental rights is the hall-
mark of modern constitutionalism as far as it means “nothing more than a
system of legally entrenched rights that can override, where necessary, the
ordinary political process”.999 The latter understanding of constitutionalism
is criticised regarding its legitimacy, or “the ‘undemocratic nature’ of judge-
made higher law”.1000 It is accused of positing democracy versus rights.1001
However, as far as one talks about the Treaty amendment process, which is
“characterized by a singular lack of transparency and real ‘democratic’ choice,
then it is suggested that the guarantee of judicial control by a Court concerned
to protect the rights of individuals and their fundamental freedoms may be
essential to fulfil the characterization of the EC Treaty as ‘a constitutional
997 Ibid., 364.
998 Ibid., 368; O. Zetterquist, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Res
Publica,“ in The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding Instrument,
ed. G. Di Federico (Springer, 2011), 8.
999 Bellamy, “The Political Form of the Constitution: the Separation of Powers, Rights and
Representative Democracy,“ 436. Similarly, Dworkin points out that constitutionalism
is increasingly understood as “a system that established legal rights that the dominant
legislature does not have the power to override or compromise”. See, Dworkin, “Constitu-
tionalism and democracy,“ 2.
1000 Curtin, “The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces,“ 65.
1001 According to Dworkin the conflict between democracy and rights “is illusory, because
it is based on an inaccurate understanding of what democracy is”. He clarifies that
democracy does not merely mean majority rule, i.e. “mere majoritarianism does not
constitute democracy unless further conditions are met”. Even though there is no
agreement as to exactly what those conditions are “some kind of constitutional structure
that a majority cannot change is certainly a prerequisite to democracy”. For example,
argues Dworkin, there must be rules to ensure that a majority cannot disenfranchise a
minority, or abolish future elections. See, Dworkin, “Constitutionalism and democracy,“ 2;
building on Dworkin’s arguments, Schauer adds that “[j]ust as we might expect anyone
– including judges, lawyers, members of Congress, the President, and ordinary citizens –
to be systematically deficient at the task of acting against self-interest, so, too, might we
expect majorities to have the same systematic deficiencies. … [Hence], the same arguments
for being reluctant to let police officers, presidents, attorneys general, and lawyers police
themselves would also apply to the policing of majorities and the policing of the people,
for this is a large part of what rights against majorities do”. See, F. Schauer, “Judicial
Supremacy and the Modest Constitution,“ California Law Review 92(2004): 1064; on the
conflict between democracy and rights see also, Katz, “On Amending Constitutions: The
Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment,“ 252-53.
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charter based on the rule of law’.”1002 As mentioned in the introduction,
it was mainly the historical experience of the Second World War, which
demonstrated that democracy is a necessary but not sufficient guarantee for
the protection of individual rights and freedoms. That was for instance, the
rationale behind entrenching those rights in an “eternity clause” in the German
Constitution.1003
In the same vein, Vilaça and Piçarra argue that the idea that Member States
are free to revise the Treaties as they want, “disregards the obvious fact that
the Treat[ies] not only create[s] rights and obligations on the part of the Mem-
ber States but also create[s] fundamental rights on the part of their nationals,
such as those relating to free movement of persons”.1004 Hence, goes the
argument, the Treaties “[are] not and could not be at the entire disposal of
the Member States anymore than the fundamental rights embodied in their
respective constitutions as States based on the rule of law could ever be”.1005
As illustrated by the incorporation of general principles of law based on
the common constitutional traditions of Member States, as well as ECHR to
which all Member States are parties, the Union legal order is not insulated
from that of its Member States. The interaction between the two has been
studied widely, and is considered “entirely normal and healthy”.1006 In this
respect, it is perhaps inevitable that the Court takes up the limits to revision
drawn by national constitutions and constitutional courts as an example in
this respect.1007 After decades of interaction, harmonization and approxima-
tion between legal orders, it is argued that “a substantial part of the consti-
1002 Curtin, “The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces,“ 65.
1003 See, Goerlich, “Concept of Special Protection for Certain Elements and Principles of the
Constitution Against Amendments and Article 79(3), Basic Law of Germany,“ 397-412;
Herzog, “The Hierarchy of Constitutional Norms and Its Functions in the Protection of
Basic Rights,“ 90-93. More recently, the Czech Constitutional Court performed review
around a non-amendable Article 9(2) of the Czech Constitution, which was included to
protect the constitution against changes to essential requirements of a democratic state
governed by the rule of law. For more details, see I. Šlosarèík, “Czech Republic 2009-2012:
On Unconstitutional Amendment of the Constitution, Limits of EU Law and Direct
Presidential Elections,“ European Public Law 3(2013): 435.




1007 The Court’s approach in Kadi, also reminded many scholars of the approach taken up
by the national constitutional courts, especially that of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in
early 1970s, when it declared that “so long as” there were no mechanisms for the
protection of fundamental rights at Union level, it would not hesitate to review the
judgments of the Court of Justice. (The case triggering the so-called “ Solange” approach
or cases was Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 11 25.) For the
similarity between the approaches of national constitutional courts of 1970s and that of
the Court of Justice in Kadi, see A. von Bogdandy et al., “Reverse Solange – Protecting
the Essence of Fundamental Rights Against EU Member States,“ Common Market Law
Review 49(2012): 489-520.
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tutional core of the [Union] ultimately coincides with the fundamental prin-
ciples shared, to a greater or lesser degree, by the various national constitu-
tional orders, and that therefore, to that extent, the material limits to be pre-
served in the [Union] legal order derive, quite simply, from the transposition
to the [Union] level of those which, identical or similar in nature, are laid down
by the national constitutions”.1008
6.4.1 Are the “very foundations” impossible to amend?
As illustrated by history, no regime, no legal order is cast in stone. Rarely are
States able to prevent revolutions, which is a clear illustration of the fact that
their constitutions are not capable of preventing their own violation, they “can
only deny any semblance of legality to such violation”.1009 The Union legal
order is not much different from those of States in this respect as well.
Weatherill agrees that the Union legal order has “inalienable elements in
its “very foundations””,1010 as suggested by the Court in its Opinion 1/91.
He adds that “[t]here is and should be an irreducible minimum to [Union] law
– as seen from within”.1011 However, as a matter of public international law,
he argues that it is difficult to envisage how Member States could be prevented
from amending the Treaties as they wish, provided they all agree on the
desired changes. He warns that if those changes are of a fundamental nature,
this might mean the existing legal order has been brought to an end. Member
States are capable of doing that “acting ‘from outside’”.1012 A similar warning
comes from Ehlermann, who argues that constraining the freedom of amending
the Treaties by setting unwritten material limits might induce Member States
to rely on conventional public international law so as to bypass those limits
by arriving at a consensus outside Union law,1013 as illustrated by the fiscal
compact.
In other words, what is argued here is not that the substantive limits to
amendment set by the Court will protect the legal order and its essential
characteristics forever, but simply that the essential characteristics of the legal
order or its “very foundations” are a sine qua non (essential pre-requisite) for
the continuation of the legal order as it is. The fact that the nature of the legal
1008 Vilaça and Piçarra, Are there material limits to the revision of the Treaties on the European
Union?: 56-57.
1009 Ibid., 52.
1010 Weatherill, “Safeguarding the Acquis Communautaire,“ 168.
1011 Emphasis added. Ibid.
1012 Ibid.
1013 C.-D. Ehlermann, “Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft – Rechtsprobleme
der Erweiterung, der Mitgliedschaft und der der Verkleinerung,“ Europarecht 19(1984):
123; cited in Vilaça and Piçarra, Are there material limits to the revision of the Treaties on
the European Union?: footnote 51.
Constitutional Foundations of the Union as a Constraint on Primary Law Making 261
order can be changed or be brought to an end by the Member States is not
disputed. It is worth noting that changing the essential characteristic of the
legal order will mean the end of the Union legal order, as we know it, and
the birth of a new, different legal order. In short, the latter will no longer be
the legal order of Van Gend en Loos.1014 It will be of a legal order of a differ-
ent character that rests on new foundations. Hence, the argument put forward
here is that there are constraints on Member States as primary law makers
assuming that they want to maintain the essence of the existing legal order.
6.4.2 Are the “very foundations” able to constrain Member States as primary
law makers?
To repeat the gist of the argument, Member States are constrained by the
essential characteristics of the Union legal order, its constitutional foundations,
or as put by the Court, by its “very foundations”, as long as they want to
maintain it and continue to act within its framework. As described in the
introduction, there are two types of constraints: internal (normative) and
external constraints. They can function independently as well as jointly by
reinforcing each other. The section above demonstrated how the protection
of fundamental rights spilled over from the national constitutional traditions
into the case law of the Court of Justice, by the initial push of few national
constitutional courts. After that, slowly but surely their protection was deeply
ingrained in the Union legal order, firstly, as general principles of EU law, and
then enshrined in the Treaties initially as principles (ex Article 6 TEU) and now
as values (Article 2 TEU) on which the legal order is established. Their inclusion
into the Treaties, as well as the case law of the Court is another illustration
of firstly, how deeply entrenched or internalized those principles are; and
secondly, of how both types of constraints reinforced each other over time.
After having examined the process of internalization of fundamental rights
in the Union legal order, it is also worth looking more closely at the source
of external constraints, that is the threat of sanctions flowing from the Court
of Justice when Member States do not comply with some of the principles
constituting part of the “very foundations”, especially in their role as primary
law makers. In this respect, the recent Pringle case points towards the possibil-
ity of judicial review, as well as the obligation on Member States to act in line
with general principles whenever they act in the scope of Union law, irrespect-
ive of whether they act as primary or secondary law makers.
The Pringle judgment illustrates that primary law making procedures are
amenable to judicial review. The case arose after the adoption of European
Council Decision 2011/199/EU, which concerned the amendment of Article
1014 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos.
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136 TFEU by insertion of a new paragraph 3.1015 The amendment was to be
carried out on the basis of Article 48(6) TEU, the newly introduced “simplified
revision procedure”. Mr. Pringle claimed that the amendment of Article 136
TFEU by Decision 2011/199 was unlawful. Hence, the first question referred
to the Court concerned the validity of Decision 2011/199 in so far as it
amended Article 136 TFEU on the basis of Article 48(6) TFEU.
In addition to the Council and the Commission, ten Member States inter-
vened in the case arguing that the Court’s jurisdiction to examine the first
question was limited, if not excluded. They argued that the Court had no
power to assess the validity of Treaty provisions under Article 267 TFEU. The
Court’s response was that it was the validity of Decision 2011/199, an act of
a EU institution that was at stake and not that of Article 136 TFEU. Since the
European Council was one of the Union’s institutions under Article 13(1) TEU,
the Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to examine the validity of the contested
decision under Article 267(1)(b) TFEU.1016
As to its analysis of the matter, the Court began by admitting that the
examination of the validity of primary law does not fall within its jurisdiction
under Article 267(1)(a) TFEU. However, it added that after the introduction
of the simplified revision procedure, it was up to the Court to ensure that
Member States comply with the conditions laid down by the simplified pro-
cedure. For that purpose, the Court had to check, first, whether the procedural
rules laid down in Article 48(6) TEU were met;1017 second, whether the
amendments concern only Part Three of the TFEU as required by the first
subparagraph of Article 48(6) TEU; and lastly, whether there is no increase in
the competences of the Union as required by the third subparagraph of Article
48(6) TEU.
According to the Court, compliance with the conditions provided for in
Article 48(6) TEU had to be monitored in order to establish whether the sim-
plified revision procedure was applicable. As the institution responsible to
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is
observed under Article 19(1) TEU, it fell to the Court to examine the validity
of the contested decision. In other words, the Court had jurisdiction to examine
1015 OJ L 91/1, 6.4.2011. The following paragraph was to be added to Article 136 TFEU: “3.
The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to
be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The
granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject
to strict conditionality“.
1016 Case C-370/12 Pringle, paras. 30-31.
1017 The Court did not list the procedural requirements of Article 48(6) TEU, probably because
they were all met in this case. One of those requirements is provided in the second
sentence of subparagraph 2 of Article 48(6) TEU and reads as follows: “The European
Council shall act by unanimity after consulting the European Parliament and the
Commission, and the European Central Bank in the case of institutional changes in the
monetary area“.
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the validity of Decision 2011/199 in the light of the conditions of Article 48(6)
TEU.1018
At the end of a comprehensive review, the Court found that there was
nothing capable of affecting the validity of the contested decision. However,
it should be noted that in addition to checking whether the procedural con-
ditions of Article 48(6) TEU were met, the Court also had to go into the sub-
stance of the matter. It was not enough to establish formally that Article 136
TEU is a provision in the Part Three of TFEU. The Court also had to check
whether the proposed amendment affected provisions in Part One of the
Treaty, that is whether the amendment would encroach on the competences
of the Union in the areas of monetary policy and coordination of Member
States’ economic policies.1019 After establishing that the proposed revision
concerned only provisions of Part Three of TFEU, the Court went on to check
the content, that is the substance of the proposed amendment, which was laid
down in Article 1 of the contested decision, to ensure that the amendment
would not entail the conferral of new competences on the Union.1020
It should be noted that the Court’s approval was not the end of the sim-
plified revision procedure. In order to attain primary law status, Decision 2011/
199 had to be approved by the Member States in accordance with their consti-
tutional requirements as stipulated by the last sentence of subparagraph two
of Article 48(6) TEU. That is actually how every procedure entailing amend-
ment, or changes to the Treaties ends, be it the ordinary revision procedure
(Article 48(4) TEU) or the enlargement procedure (Article 49(2) TEU). The fact
that those procedures have intergovernmental components, however, does
not exclude them from the Court’s jurisdiction, as suggested by Pringle.
The second question referred to the Court is also of relevance for the
arguments put forward in this thesis, more specifically, for establishing that
general principles of EU law are also capable of constraining Member States
when acting as primary law makers under Article 49 TEU. The second question
concerned the interpretation of various Treaty provisions,1021 as well as of
the general principle of effective judicial protection.1022 The referring court
wanted to establish “whether those articles and principles preclude a Member
State whose currency is the euro from concluding and ratifying an agreement
1018 Case C-370/12 Pringle, para. 35.
1019 Ibid., paras. 45-70.
1020 Ibid., paras. 71-76.
1021 Articles 4(3), and 13 TEU; and Articles 2(3), 3(1)(c) & (2), 119 to 123, and 125 to 127 TFEU.
1022 The second question also concerned the interpretation of Article 2 and 3 TEU, as well
as the prinicple of legal certainty. However, the Court found the second question
inadmissible as far as it concerned those two provisions and the prinipcle of legal
certainty, on the ground that the order of reference failed to explain the relevance of those
provisions and that prinicple to the outcome of the dispute.
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such as the ESM Treaty”.1023 In other words, could those articles and general
principles act as constraint on Member States in ratifying the ESM Treaty?
After analysing every provision individually, the Court ruled that none
of those provisions precluded a Member State whose currency is the euro from
concluding the ESM Treaty. As to the application and interpretation of the
general principle of effective judicial protection, the applicant argued that the
establishment of the ESM outside the Treaty framework would remove it from
the scope of the Charter, which would breach the guarantee to effective judicial
protection laid down in Article 47 CFR.
The Court responded by pointing out that Article 51(1) CFR is addressed
to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. According
to Article 51(2) CFR, the Charter does not extend the field of application of
Union law, establish new powers and tasks or modify those defined in the
Treaties. Thus, the Court interprets EU law within the limits of powers con-
ferred on it. The Court went on to explain that, “the Member States are not
implementing Union law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter,
when they establish a stability mechanism such as the ESM where … the EU
and FEU Treaties do not confer any specific competence on the Union to establish
such a mechanism.”1024 Thus, the Court concluded that the general principle
of effective judicial protection did not preclude either the conclusion or the
ratification of the ESM Treaty.
The explanation provided by the Court is pretty clear. The general principle
of effective judicial protection and Article 47 CFR, which the Court seems to
use interchangeably, will not apply to a Treaty (the ESM), which will be born
entirely outside the structures of the Treaties. The Treaties do not confer any
competence on the Union to establish the ESM; whereas, they contain a pro-
cedure to admit new Member States under the conditions stipulated by Article
49 TEU as well as to amend the Treaties under the conditions stipulated by
Article 48 TEU. Thus, general principles do apply and constrain Member States
when they are acting within procedures embedded in the Treaties.
The Court of Justice has jurisdiction to review whether the conditions laid
down in those provisions are met, and whether the proposed amendments
comply with general principles of EU law. It should be noted that the most
straightforward way for the Court to review the validity of a European Council
decision would be before its entry into force, that is before the act it adopts
is ratified by all Member States. Even though the same decision could be
challenged after ratification, the latter process would be trickier in terms of
its consequences.1025
1023 Case C-370/12 Pringle, para. 77.
1024 Emphasis added. Ibid., para. 180.
1025 Hillion notes that the Court could interpret and check the application of the provisions
of a future Turkish Accession Treaty via the preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267
TFEU). He argues that the more radical option would be the use of the plea of illegality
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Pringle seems to be in line with AG Lenz’ Opinion in LAISA where he argued
that “the possibility cannot be excluded that the Member States themselves
might enact primary law contrary to the Treaty which would then necessarily
be subject to review by the Court, not only by means of an interpretation of
the kind constantly undertaken by the Court in proceedings under Article 177
of the EEC Treaty (4) [now Article 267 TFEU] but also in a direct action, be it
eventually essentially on the basis of Article 164 of the EEC Treaty [now Article
263 TFEU]”.1026 It should be noted that previously, the European Council
was not one of the institutions listed in the Treaties consequently its acts were
not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Whereas after Lisbon, the
validity of its acts can be challenged, both via Article 267 TFEU as in Pringle,
as well as via Article 263 TFEU.1027
As Von Bogdandy underlines, it is the Member States that compose the
European Council and Council and as such they are “in the centre of the public
authority constitutionalised by the Treaties, while being strictly subjected to
primary law”.1028 In other words, Member States act as Member States of
the Union whenever they act within the scope of EU law, i.e. whenever they
act within the procedures, structures of the Union or whenever their actions
affect areas or competences in which their actions have been pre-empted by
the Treaties or secondary EU law. Thus, whenever they act within the scope
of EU law,1029 they are bound by the Treaties, the Charter, as well as by
general principles of law, which together constitute primary law.
In conclusion, if a Member State or an institution of the Union applies to
obtain the Court’s Opinion on the compatibility of the PSC with Union law
included in Turkey’s Accession Agreement after the Council’s approval of the
agreement,1030 or challenge its validity under Article 263 or 267 TFEU, just
(Article 277 TFEU) whereby a Turkish national asks the Court to hold inapplicable a
safeguard measure claiming that the basis on which it is adopted (that is the PSC in the
Accession Treaty) is itself invalid for not being compatible with fundamental principles
of Union law. For a more detailed discussion, see Hillion, “Negotiating Turkey’s
Membership to the European Union: Can the Member States Do As They Please?,“ 281-82.
1026 See, Opinion of AG Lenz delivered on 1 December 1987 in Joined Cases 31 and 35/86
LAISA and CPC España v Council of the European Communities [1988] ECR 2285, part
B -I- (a) of the Opinion.
1027 Article 263(1) TFEU provides as follows: “The Court of Justice of the European Union
shall review the legality of legislative acts … of the European Council intended to produce
legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.”
1028 Emphasis added. Bogdandy, “Founding Principles,“ 35.
1029 In the explanations to the Charter, OJ C 303/32, 14.12.2007, the cases referred to explain
the statement “Member States when they act in the scope of Union law” are the following:
Case 5/88 Wachauf, [1989] ECR 2609; Case C-260/89 ERT; Case C-309/96 Annibaldi, [1997]
ECR I-7493. While the first case seems to exemplify the most straightforward situation,
that is Member States acting as agents of the Union in implementing EU law, the Court
has interpreted it recently in boarder terms, that is not only when Member States are
directly implementing an EU Directive for instance, but also when a national law, which
was not put in place to implement a Union obligation, is connected to or has an effect
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like it did in Pringle, the Court would be able to review the legality of the
Council Decision approving the Agreement. The Court could review the
contested Council Decision on procedural grounds as it already stated that
Article 49 TEU is “a precise procedure encompassed within well-defined limits for
the admission of new Member States”,1031 which can be interpreted to mean
that it is up to the Court to rule on whether the procedural requirements of
Article 49 TEU have been met. Moreover, like in Pringle, the Court could carry
a limited substantive review to check whether there’s anything in the Accession
Agreement that goes beyond being a mere “adjustment” that aims to integrate
the new Member State into the structures of the Union.
The Court should not be expected to uphold an Accession Agreement that
contains elements which are incompatible with the “the very foundations”
of the EU legal order as defined in Article 2 TEU. The fact that this could be
the case is demonstrated more clearly in the following Chapter, by providing
a specific example of how the PSC would violate one of the founding principles
of the Union legal order, that is the principle of non-discrimination on the
basis of nationality.
6.5 CONCLUSION
This Chapter discussed the existence of the “very foundations” of the Union
as an untouchable core, which acts as a constraint on Member States even when
they act as primary law makers. The Court’s EEA Opinions, Opinion 1/09 and
its pronouncements in Kadi I confirm the existence of fundamental principles
that constitute “the very foundations of the [Union]” that have to be respected
at all times. It was noted that a concept similar to that used by the Court, but
not identical, the concept of “fundamental acquis” was coined first by Pescatore
to indicate the existence of an acquis of superior rank, before the Court’s EEA
to an issue regulated by EU law. See, Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, paras. 19-26. The
ERT case exemplifies situations in which Member States derogate from Union law and
the Court reminds them that they need to comply with fundamental rights even in cases
of derogation. The obligation to comply with fundamental rights even in “derogation
cases” was recently confirmed in Case C-390/12 Pfleger, judgment of 30 April 2014, n.y.r.,
paras 35-36. As to the Annibaldi case, it refers to a situation that is covered entirely by
national law and has no link to EU law. The latter situations has been recently confirmed
in Case C-483/12 Pelckmans Turnhout NV, judgment of 8 May 2014, n.y.r., paras 18-23. For
a more detailed discussion of these three situations, see K. Lenaerts, “Exploring the Limits
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,“ European Constitutional Law Review 8, no. 3
(2012): 376-87.
1030 The legal basis for obtaining the Court’s Opinion is Article 218(11) TFEU [ex Article 300(6)
EC]. For more information on the procedure, see Plender, “The European Court’s Pre-
emptive Jurisdiction: Opinions under Article 300(6) EC,“ 203-20.
1031 Emphasis added. Joined Cases 31 and 35/86 LAISA and CPC España v Council of the European
Communities, para. 7.
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Opinion. The implication of the existence of such a core of Union law for the
inclusion of a PSC on free movement of persons is clear, as principles belonging
to that core would arguably be able to constrain Member States from including
such a clause if it were to violate any of those principles.
While the existence of “the very foundations” is not disputed very much,
what is controversial is identifying the content of the notion defined by the
Court. To be able to determine the content of the notion, firstly the original
Treaties, case law and Opinions of the Court were examined for clues. In
addition to the principles of the rule of law (now embedded in Article 19(1)
TEU, ex Article 164 EEC), the autonomy of the legal order (EEA Opinions and
Opinion 1/09) and protection of fundamental rights (Kadi I), it was argued that
the fundamental freedoms and the core of Union citizenship also constitute
part of those “very foundations”.
The analysis on the substance of constitutional constraints begins with the
four freedoms. They are identified as part of the “very foundations” due to
several factors. Firstly, their central place in the original EEC Treaty, under
the title “Foundations of the Community”, as well as their vital role in the
establishment of the internal market, which has been traditionally seen as the
essence of the integration project. Secondly, The Court’s case law and academic
writing also confirm how crucial they have been and still are to the project
of European integration. The analysis in this part focused on the development
of the free movement of persons, since that is one of the areas in which the
introduction of a PSC is considered. As they developed over time, the Court
acknowledged that it considered the freedoms as part of the foundations of
the [Union], and even as “fundamental rights”. Similarly academics defined
them as “economic constitutional rights”.
The development that removed the adjective “economic” and turned free
movement into almost (as it is still subject to some limitations) a fully-fledged
constitutional right was the introduction of Union citizenship. While the
concept is arguably the latest addition to the “very foundations” of the Union
legal order, in our demonstration of the substance of constitutional constraints,
it follows immediately the freedoms, mainly because it provides a clear illustra-
tion of the relationship between what is “destined to be the fundamental status
of nationals of Member States” and the right to free movement of persons.
While Union citizenship as provided in the Treaties initially was seen as a
disappointment or an empty promise, the overview of the Court’s case law
illustrated how the Court managed to make something out of it, i.e. as put
by O’Leary, how it fleshed out the bare bones of the citizenship concept.
As demonstrated above, the Court’s case law on Union citizenship cut the
existing connection between the right to free movement and its economic
objective, i.e. the pursuit of an economic activity. Now the right to free move-
ment, and the corollary right of equal treatment, which is analysed in more
detail in the following Chapter, are directly linked to the status of Union
citizenship. Free movement and equal treatment constitute the very core of
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the citizenship status. Since a PSC on free movement of persons is bound to
breach both aspects of the latter status, as (it will suspend the free movement
rights of Union citizens of only Turkish nationality) it would be breaching
the essence or the entire core of the citizenship concept. Hence, it is argued
that Member States would be precluded from including such a clause that
is liable to violate Union citizenship, “the” status of nationals of Member States,
which is arguably part of the “very foundations” of the Union.
The third and final substantive constitutional constraint identified in this
Chapter, which the Court already identified explicitly as one of “the principles
that form part of the very foundations of the Union”1032 is the protection
of fundamental rights. Unlike the fundamental freedoms, fundamental rights
were initially not even mentioned in the Treaties. Hence, the inception and
rise of fundamental rights in the hierarchy of norms within the Union was
briefly reviewed by examining the Court’s case law in this area. The Court
was the engine propelling the upward movement of those rights. Reaching
the pinnacle in the hierarchy of norms in the Union legal order would how-
ever, not have been possible if it had not been for the approval of the Member
States. That approval was manifested by the inclusion of protection of funda-
mental rights in the Treaties, and by giving them a more prominent place in
each subsequent Treaty revision. The latter development, combined with the
case law of the Court, created a virtuous circle that led to stronger protection
and genuine internalization of fundamental rights at both Member State and
Union levels.
Next, it was argued that fundamental rights played an important role in
the constitutionalisation of the Union legal order in at least two senses of the
word. Firstly, the development of fundamental rights and their inclusion in
a binding Charter brought the Union legal order closer to those of nation states.
Secondly, they contributed to the autonomisation of the Union legal order vis-à-
vis the Member States, by helping the Court develop an autonomous legal
discourse. Hence, the Court of Justice was identified as the main authority
in the Union legal order competent to ensure respect for the substantive
constitutional constraints and the “very foundations” of the legal order. It was
noted however, that as constitutionalized as a legal order could be, that would
not mean it could not be brought to an end. Just like revolutions terminate
national legal orders, theoretically Member States are also, in principle, able
to bring the Union legal order to an end. Hence, the argument forming the
basis of this thesis was fine-tuned to claim that the “very foundations” of the
Union constitute an untouchable core assuming that Member States want to
maintain the fundamental structure of the existing legal order in place. Chang-
ing the fundamentals of the legal order would mean the end of the existing
one and the creation of a new legal order.
1032 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, para. 304.
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While the entrenchment and internalization of fundamental rights illustrated
their constraining power as normative or internal constraints, the recent Pringle
judgment illustrated clearly how they could also be used as external constraints
matched with the threat of sanction in the hands of the Court of Justice. In
other words, Pringle was an example of the application of constitutional
constraints. It showed that any Council Decision adopting a Treaty of
Accession, before its ratification and transformation into primary law, could
be challenged to check if it respects, firstly, the conditions stipulated by the
procedure on the basis of which it was adopted, and secondly, principles that
constitute part of the “very foundations” of the Union.
As for our test case, in the framework of Article 49 TEU, the Council De-
cision approving an Accession Agreement could be reviewed firstly, on pro-
cedural grounds, and secondly, on substantive grounds, so as to check whether
what Article 49 TEU provides for has been respected. Regarding the former,
the Court already established that Article 237 EEC (now Article 49 TEU) is “a
precise procedure encompassed within well-defined limits for the admission of
new Member States”.1033 The Court could check if those limits had been
respected. Regarding the latter, the Court could check whether the “very
foundations” of the Union were respected, and if there were anything in the
Accession Treaty that went beyond being a mere adjustment carried out to
facilitate the accession of the new Member State. Obviously, a PSC on free
movement of persons that breaches few elements that constitute part of the
“very foundations” of the Union will not be able to pass the test set by the
Court. Hence, the next step (Chapter 7) is to establish that the proposed PSC
would breach one of the fundamental principles of the Union legal order,
which belongs to those “very foundations”, namely the principle of non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality or the principle of equality.
1033 Emphasis added. Case 93/78 Mattheus v Doego, para. 7.

7 The Principle of Equality as Part of the
Constitutional Foundations of the Union:
A Case Study
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter is going to demonstrate that equality is one of the most important
values on which the Union is founded, and as such capable of constraining
Member States and Union institutions alike, whenever they act within the scope
of Union law. In other words, it is part of the constitutional foundations of
the Union, or part of its “very foundations”, which Member States need to
respect at all times, including when they act as primary law makers under
Article 49 TEU. The reason why the case study in this Chapter is based on the
principle of equality rather than other principles, such as that of legal certainty,
loyal cooperation or proportionality, is quite obvious, yet worth repeating.
The proposed PSC in Turkey’s Negotiating Framework would be directly
discriminating on the basis of nationality. As important as other principles
are, the most obvious and egregious breach in the case of the inclusion of a
PSC on free movement of persons in the future Turkish Accession Agreement
would be first and foremost that of the principle of non-discrimination. Hence,
since there is an overlap between the potential future breach caused by the
PSC and arguably, the most important value or principle on which the Union
is founded, it is only logical to have a look at the area that would be most
affected by the adoption of the contested clause. Moreover, the stronger and
more entrenched a principle is, the greater constraining power it has on
Member States whenever they act within the scope of the Treaties, i.e. another
reason to focus on the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of national-
ity.
The principle of equality is a multi-faceted and complex legal concept,1034
which has been a source of inspiration since ancient times. “Nothing is more
fascinating and more deceptive than equality” according to Advocate General
Lagrange.1035 As interesting and inspiring the concept might be, the focus
in this study is on the general principle of equality as manifested in EU
1034 J. Wouters, “Constitutional Limits of Differentiation: The Principle of Equality,“ in The
Many Faces of Differentiation, ed. B. de Witte, D. Hanf, and E. Vos (Intersentia, 2001), 302.
1035 Opinion of AG Lagrange in Case 13/63 Italy v Commission, [1963] ECR 190.
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law,1036 and more specifically on the principle of non-discrimination on the
basis of nationality. Since the Court ruled that the non-discrimination rules
of the Treaty constitute “merely a specific enunciation of the general principle
of equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of Community
law”,1037 and that the ‘principle of equal treatment’ and the ‘principle of
non-discrimination’ “are simply two labels for a single general principle of
Community law”,1038 those two ‘labels’ are used interchangeably throughout
this study.1039 As to the content of the principle of equality, the Court estab-
lished that it “prohibits both treating similar situations differently and treating
different situations in the same way unless there are objective reasons for such
treatment”.1040 This is also known as the Aristotelian notion of equality which
dictates that likes be treated alike, while unalikes be treated unalike in pro-
portion to their unalikeness, i.e. also know as formal equality.1041
The aim of the following section is to demonstrate the central and defining
role the principle of non-discrimination played in establishing the internal
market, the historical core of the integration project. It argues that equality
constitutes part of its “very foundations” and the latest Treaty revisions are
merely an illustration of the further entrenchment of this central position.
Moreover, equality is a principle that has been identified as “superior rule
1036 Davies explains the centrality of the term “advantage” to the definition of discrimination
in EU law as follows: “Whereas Aristotle regarded discrimination simply as different
treatment of similar situations, EU law has narrowed the concept slightly and, in most
of its written definitions, finds discrimination only to exist where there is an advantage
created for one group or another.” Hence, he argues that treatment that is different, but
not advantageous does not constitute discrimination in EU law. See, G. Davies,
“Discrimination and Beyond in European Economic and Social Law,“ Maastricht Journal
of European and Comparative Law 11, no. 1-2 (2011): 15.
1037 Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel, [1977] ECR 1753, para. 7; Case C-122/95 Commission
v Germany, [1998] ECR I-973, para. 62; Joined Cases C-364/95 and C-365/95 T. Port GmbH
& Co. , [1998] ECR I-1023, para. 81.
1038 Case C-422/02 P Europe Chemi-Con (Deutschland) GmbH, [2005] ECR I-791, para. 33.
1039 For comments on the relationship between the concepts of equality and discrimination
see, C. Tobler, Indirect Discrimination: A Case Study into the Development of the Legal Concept
of Indirect Discrimination under EC Law (Antwerpen – Oxford: Intersentia, 2005). 40; G.
Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (Kluwer Law International,
2003). 10.
1040 Case C-422/02 P Europe Chemi-Con (Deutschland) GmbH, para. 33. The Court refers to, inter
alia, Case C-442/00 Rodríguez Caballero [2002] ECR I-11915, para. 32 and the cases cited
therein.
1041 C. Tobler, “The Prohibition of Discrimination in the Union’s Layered System of Equality
Law: From Early Staff Cases to the Mangold Approach,“ in The Court of Justice and the
Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law, ed. A. Rosas,
E. Levits, and Y. Bot (Asser Press and Springer, 2012), 459; A. Numhauser-Henning, “EU
Equality Law – Comprehensive and Truly Transformative?,“ in Labour law, fundamental
rights and social Europe, ed. M. Rönnmar (Hart Publishing, 2011), 114; Davies,
“Discrimination and Beyond in European Economic and Social Law,“ 10. For a critical
analysis of the principle as defined above, see P. Westen, “The Empty Idea of Equality,“
Harvard Law Review 95, no. 3 (1982): 537-96.
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of law” by the Court,1042 which means that it would not only act as a con-
straint on Member States in negotiating the Accession Agreement, but would
also influence the interpretation of the PSC in case of its adoption. The latter
aspect concerning the interpretation of the PSC is not dealt with here, as it
remains outside the scope delineated for this study.1043
This Chapter starts by discussing the market origins of the principle of non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality. It describes how indispensable and
how instrumental the principle has been, and still is, in the construction as
well as regulation of the internal market. Its significance is discussed with
reference to Treaty provisions containing the principle, as well as with refer-
ence to its use by the Court of Justice in deciding cases in which it was
invoked.
The brief discussion of the origins and role of the principle is followed by
a discussion demonstrating how the principle was embedded deeply into
Union law. By now, it constitutes one of the most firmly entrenched principles
in the constitutional foundations of the Union. The following sections describe
the process of entrenchment, which was instigated by the Court and reinforced
by Member States’ approval. It is discussed with reference to Treaty provisions,
which according to the Court are merely specific expressions of the general
principle of equality.1044 An overview of the Court’s case law is provided
from past to present with a view to demonstrating how the principle has
evolved over time to acquire many additional roles to play, the role as a
fundamental right being one among the most significant.
The role of the principle of non-discrimination as a fundamental right was
further strengthened by the introduction of Union citizenship. Section 7.3.2
studies the relationship between the principle and the concept of Union citizen-
ship as developed by the case law of the Court of Justice. Next, follows an
examination of its entrenchment in the Treaties as well a discussion illustrating
its importance and ever-wider scope of application. Subsequently, the place
of the principle in the CFR is discussed, in addition to some other relevant
provisions with implications for the PSC. Last but not least, to complete the
picture on equality, after examining its relevance and importance for indi-
viduals, the final section focuses on its significance for Member States of the
Union.
1042 See, Case 156/78 Frederick H. Newth, [1979] ECR 989, para. 13; Case T-489/93 Unifruit Hellas,
[1994] ECR II-1201, para. 42.
1043 It is worth mentioning again that the purpose of this thesis is to identify the constraints
on Member States at the point when they act as primary law makers drafting an Accession
Agreement. The issues a PSC would raise in the post-ratification stage of the latter
Agreement and the way the Court of Justice could deal with them are of different nature
(though interrelated, the issue of constraints is more theoretical as opposed to the issue
of how the Court deals with an existing PSC, which is more practical), and hence not
covered here. They will be the topic of a future study.
1044 Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel, para. 7.
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7.2 INTERNAL MARKET ORIGIN OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION
The aim of this section is to illustrate the centrality of the principle of non-
discrimination to the Union legal order in general and to the free movement
of persons in particular. The analysis begins by examining the function and
role of the principle in the Community legal order, as well as its evolution
over the decades to establish how fundamental and indispensable the principle
has been and still is for what has now become the European Union. Its import-
ance has only increased over time.
It should be noted that the analysis and discussion contained in this section
is in no way novel or original. This should come as no surprise, as briefly
discussed above, the four freedoms constitute the core of the internal market,
and as such they have been always at the centre of scholarly attention. That
has only increased with the introduction of the concept of Union citizen-
ship.1045 Given the inextricable link between the free movement of persons
and the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, that link
has been extensively studied.1046 What is provided here is a fresh look on
that relationship from a new lens: that of the PSC. This new lens provides an
additional insight as to the nature of that relationship. It is hoped that the new
1045 See W. Maas, “Equality and the Free Movement of People: Citizenship and Internal
Migration,“ in Democratic Citizenship and Free Movement of People, ed. W. Maas (Koninklijke
Brill, 2013), 9-30; Guild, “The evolution of the concept of union citizenship after the Lisbon
Treaty,“ 3-15; Jacobs, “Citizenship of the European Union – A Legal Analysis,“ 591-610;
D. Kochenov, “A Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A Novel Chapter
in the Development of the Union in Europe,“ Columbia Journal of European Law 18(2011):
55-109; S. Kaldenbach, “Union Citizenship,“ in Principles of European Constitutional Law,
ed. A. Von Bogdandy and J. Bast (Hart Publishing and Verlag CH Beck, 2010); S. O’Leary,
“Developing an Ever Closer Union between the Peoples of Europe? A Reappraisal of
the Case Law of the Court of Justice on the Free Movement of Persons and EU
Citizenship,“ Yearbook of European Law 27, no. 1 (2008): 167-93; M. Condinanzi, A. Lang,
and B. Nascimbene, Citizenship of the Union and Free Movement of Persons, Immigration
and Asylum Law and Policy in Europe (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008);
R. C. A. White, “Free Movement, Equal Treatment, and Citizenship of the Union,“
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 54(2005): 885-906; S. O’Leary, The Evolving
Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free Movement of Persons to Union Citizenship
(Kluwer Law International, 1996).
1046 For few examples, see C. Hilson, “Discrimination in Community free movement law,“
European Law Review 24(1999): 445-62; N. Bernard, “Discrimination and Free Movement
in EC Law,“ International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45, no. 1 (1996): 82-108; E. Johnson
and D. O’Keeffe, “From Discrimination to Obstacles to Free Movement: Recent
Developments Concerning the Free Movement of Workers 1989-1994,“ Common Market
Law Review 31, no. 6 (1994): 1313-46; Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European
Internal Market; Barnard, Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms; B. Wilkinson,
“Towards European CItizenship? Nationality, Discrimination and Free Movement of
Workers in the European Union,“ European Public Law 1, no. 3 (1995): 417-37; Tobler, “The
Prohibition of Discrimination in the Union’s Layered System of Equality Law: From Early
Staff Cases to the Mangold Approach.“
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lens reveals whether the principle of non-discrimination is part of the “very
foundations” of the Union. If so, the implication would be that Member States
could not act as they wish in their role as primary law makers in the context
of enlargement. Accordingly, they would be precluded from introducing a
PSC on free movement of persons in the future Turkish Accession Agreement,
or any other Accession Agreement for that matter.
In short, this section of the thesis tells the same story from a different angle
and recapitulates some of our previous findings, this time with the spotlight
placed on the principle of non-discrimination. The length and depth of the
following analysis has been determined in the light of what has already been
discussed in previous Chapters, as well as taking account of the relevance of
various aspects of the principle in assessing its compatibility with the contro-
versial PSC on free movement of persons.
There is no way to overemphasize the importance of the role played by
the principle of non-discrimination in eradicating obstacles standing in the
way of establishing the internal market. Equality is said to be “one of the
foundations on which the primary pillars of Community law are built.”1047
Tridimas speaks of the principle as “the keystone of economic inte-
gration”.1048 According to Tobler, it could be said “to form a normative core
in Community law”.1049 Scholars agree on “the instrumental” or “market-
unifying” role of the principle,1050 which is examined below.
7.2.1 Its place in the Treaties
The principle of non-discrimination has permeated many areas of EU law, but
our main concern here is its relationship with the rules on the four freedoms
and more specifically the free movement of persons. To begin with the general
prohibition of discrimination on the ground of nationality in the EEC Treaty,
Article 7 EEC (now Article 18 TFEU) provided that “[w]ithin the scope of appli-
1047 L. Waddington, “The Expanding Role of the Equality Principle in European Union Law,“
in Policy Paper Series on Constitutional Reform in the EU 2003/04 (Italy: European University
Institute, Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies, 2003), 2.
1048 T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (OUP, 1999). 45; cited in Tobler, Indirect
Discrimination: A Case Study into the Development of the Legal Concept of Indirect Discrimination
under EC Law: 35.
1049 A. Numahuser-Henning, “Introduction: Equal Treatment – A Normative Challenge,“ in
Legal Perspectives on Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination Law, ed. A. Numahuser-
Henning (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 21.
1050 For the former role see, G. De Búrca, “The Role of Equality in European Community Law,“
in The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law, ed. A. Dashwood and S. O’Leary (Sweet
& Maxwell, 1997), 14 and 30; for the latter see, G. More, “The Principle of Equal Treatment:
From Market Unifier to Fundamental Right?,“ in The Evolution of EU Law, ed. P. Craig
and G. de Búrca (OUP, 1999); see also, Waddington, “The Expanding Role of the Equality
Principle in European Union Law,“ 2.
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cation of the this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions
contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited.” It was further specified in what is now Article 45 (2) TFEU, which
provided that freedom of movement for workers “shall entail the abolition
of any discrimination based on nationality between the workers of the Member
States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work
and employment.” The principle is implicit in the other free movement pro-
visions, as they have been formulated differently.1051 The provisions on the
freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU), freedom to provide services (Article
56 TFEU) and free movement of capital (Article 56 TFEU) prohibit any “re-
strictions” on those freedoms. The concept of “restrictions” is wider than non-
discrimination and catches also non-discriminatory measures that constitute
obstacles in front of establishing a unified market.1052
The most basic and most important weapon in identifying as well as
fighting the obstacles in front of the free movement of the four factors of
production has been the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality.
According to Van den Bogaert the principle “lies at the heart of the application
of [Union] provisions on the free movement of workers, the freedom of estab-
lishment and the freedom to provide services”.1053 The fact that the Treaty
provisions on the four freedoms have been formulated differently seems to
obscure this fact.1054 However, once we look at the Court’s analysis of cases
dealing with the freedoms, the importance of the principle becomes more
obvious.
1051 According to Davies, one explanation for that might be the fact that the concept of
discrimination “seems to sit more comfortably with situations involving people than those
involving goods and services“. See, Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European
Internal Market: 56.
1052 Van den Bogaert confirms the latter argument by pointing out to the definition of the
concept “restrictions” laid down in the General Programmes for the abolition of restrictions
on the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services of 18 December 1961,
OJ Eng. Spec. Ed. Second Series IX, 7 and 32, as well as to early case law of the Court
(see, Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen, [1974] ECR 1299, para. 25; and Case 2/74 Reyners, [1974]
ECR 631). Restrictions are defined as “any measure which, pursuant to any provision
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in a Member State, or as a result
of the application of such a provision, or of administrative practices, prohibits or hinders
the person providing services in his pursuit of an activity as a self-employed person by
treating him differently from nationals of the State concerned. Moreover, “any
requirements imposed, pursuant to any provision laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action or in consequence of any administrative practice, where, although
applicable irrespective of nationality, their effect is exclusively or principally to hinder
the provision of services by foreign nationals” are also to be regarded as restrictions (Title
III). See, S. Van den Bogaert, Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the EU Post
Bosman (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005). 122-23.
1053 Ibid., 124.
1054 Hilson, “Discrimination in Community free movement law,“ 445-46.
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Before looking into the role of the principle in the Court’s case law, it
should be noted from the outset that as important as the four freedoms are,
they have never been absolute. The drafters of the Treaty have specified
grounds on which Member States are able to derogate from them. In the area
of free movement of persons, these grounds are “public policy, public security
or public health”,1055 and in the area of free movement of goods there is
a longer list of grounds laid down in Article 36 TFEU.1056 However, the fact
that Member States take measures on one of these grounds do not give them
free hand in doing whatever they like. The Court interprets these grounds
very restrictively.1057 Moreover, against the possibility of abusing those
grounds,1058 there is precaution in the Treaties themselves. The last sentence
of Article 36 TFEU demonstrates that clearly by providing that the prohibitions
or restrictions on one of the grounds provided by the article itself shall not
“constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States”. The Court has made the test even stricter by
adding a proportionality test whereby it checks whether the objective of the
measure tested could be attained in a less restrictive way.
7.2.2 Its development in the case law of the Court
It soon became clear that as important as it was to fight discriminatory
measures, this was only a modest first step in dismantling the barriers frag-
menting the internal market. Thus, the Court in its case law moved to fight
also non-discriminatory measures, also called indistinctly applicable or equally
applicable measures, under the broader label of “restrictions”.1059 However,
it soon became equally clear that the list of grounds enumerated in the Treaties
1055 See, Article 45(3) TFEU for free movement of workers, and Article 52(1) TFEU for freedom
of establishment and freedom to provide services. For further details see also, “Chapter
VI – Restrictions on the right to entry and the right to residence on grounds of public
policy, public security or public health” of Directive 2004/38/EC.
1056 The grounds listed in Article 36 TFEU are “public morality, public policy or public
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection
of national reassures possessing artistic, historic or archeological value; or the protection
of industrial or commercial property”.
1057 Case 41/74 Van Duyn, [1974] ECR 1337, para. 18; Case C-348/96 Donatella Calfa, para. 23;
Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, [2004] ECR I-5257, para. 65.
1058 There is secondary law in the area of free movement of persons clarifying how exactly
those grounds are to be interpreted and applied by Member States. See, Chapter VI of
Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004, OJ L 158/77, 30.04.2004, which replaced Council
Directive 64/221/EEC. See respectively, notes 837 and 450 above.
1059 The first case on free movement of workers in which “a genuinely non-discriminatory
measure was involved” was Case C-415/93 Bosman. For an in-depth discussion see, Van
den Bogaert, Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the EU Post Bosman: 130.
For a general discussion on “restrictions“, see Tobler, Indirect Discrimination: A Case Study
into the Development of the Legal Concept of Indirect Discrimination under EC Law: 75-77.
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on which Member States could derogate from the freedoms was far from
meeting their needs. There were many more legitimate interests, which the
States would wish to protect, such as the environment, the consumers’ interests,
culture, fundamental rights etc., but were not able to under the limited number
of grounds listed in the Treaties. Acknowledging the need for additional
grounds of derogation first in the area of free movement of goods, in its
ground breaking Cassis de Dijon ruling,1060 the Court created new exceptions,
initially called “mandatory requirements”, to the free movement provisions.
However, these exceptions would apply only if the measure concerned was
not discriminatory, pursued a legitimate aim in the public interest and was
proportionate.
What the creation of the additional grounds of derogation meant for the
Court’s analysis in identifying and classifying different types of measures,
was that it was mainly the fact whether the measure concerned was discrim-
inatory or not which determined whether or not and how it could be jus-
tified.1061 Thus, after asking the very first question, which is whether a
measure is a quantitative restriction or measure having an equivalent effect
in the area of free movement of goods, or whether it constitutes a “restriction”
regarding the other freedoms, next, the Court asks whether the measure is
discriminatory or put differently “distinctly applicable”. It is the answer given
to that question that determines whether the measure can be justified under
the Court created exceptions mentioned above or not.1062 While non-discrim-
inatory measures can be justified under both Treaty provided and Court
created exception grounds, discriminatory measures can be justified only under
the limited grounds provided in the Treaty.
In other words, the fact whether there is discrimination on the grounds
of nationality between products, workers, services, or capital is essential in
how the Court resolves each and every case. It was in Gebhard that the Court
unified its approach to the Court created exceptions regarding all the freedoms,
and the fact that non-discrimination is the very first condition that needs be
fulfilled clearly demonstrates how important the principle is in the functioning
of the freedoms. To look at the whole test, the Court in Gebhard provided that:
‘…national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of funda-
mental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must
be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative
1060 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon.
1061 Hilson, “Discrimination in Community free movement law,“ 451.
1062 Unfortunately, the Court’s case law has not always been consistent in this respect. There
are cases in which the Court evades discussing whether the restrictive measure is
discriminatory or not. For such an example, see Case C-28/09 Commission v Austria, [2011]
ECR I-13525. For the relevance of discrimination in the Court’s analysis and a critique
of the Court’s inconsistent approach, see S. Weatherill, “Free Movement of Goods,“
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2012): 543-45.
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requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attain-
ment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is
necessary in order to attain it.’1063
The Court’s analysis illustrates the crucial role played by the principle of non-
discrimination in the proper functioning of the freedoms, as the internal market
needs to be equally accessible to goods, services, and persons originating from
different parts of the market. As Waddington puts it, equality “lies at the heart
of the four fundamental freedoms of movement”.1064 The principle was so
central to the functioning of the internal market that to increase its effective-
ness, the Court had to broaden the prohibition to cover also “indirect discrim-
ination” or what has also been called “covert discrimination”.1065
The concept of indirect discrimination is well established and well known.
It suffices to briefly mention here that it was intended to catch “seemingly
neutral differentiation criteria with a disproportionate impact or effect upon a group
(or object) that is protected by an explicit prohibition of discrimination”.1066
It takes place, for instance, when a measure does not formally discriminate
on the basis of nationality, but on other seemingly neutral ground such as place
of residence or possession of a particular qualification available only domestic-
ally, and as a result “is liable to have such [discriminatory] an effect”.1067
The fact that the Court does not require proof of discrimination, but accepts
the mere likelihood of such effect,1068 demonstrates both the importance of
the principle as well as the Court’s efforts to increase the effectiveness of the
prohibition of non-discrimination via its case law.
7.3 EMBEDDING EQUALITY DEEPER INTO UNION LAW
The following sections aim to demonstrate that the importance of the principle
of equal treatment has continuously increased and evolved over time, as has
its power of constraint on Member States. As mentioned above, the Court
recognized equal treatment as one of its general principles of law. It con-
tributed further to pushing the principle up in the hierarchy of norms, by
1063 Emphasis added. Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para. 37. The Court refers to Case C-19/92 Kraus,
para. 32.
1064 Waddington, “The Expanding Role of the Equality Principle in European Union Law,“ 2.
1065 See, Case 152/73 Sotgiu, [1974] ECR 153, para. 11; Case C-111/91 Commission v Luxembourg,
[1993] ECR I-817, para. 9; Case C-419/92 Scholz, [1994] ECR I-505, para. 7.
1066 Tobler, Indirect Discrimination: A Case Study into the Development of the Legal Concept of
Indirect Discrimination under EC Law: 57. For the definition of the concept of “indirect
discrimination“, see also Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market:
15-16.
1067 Case C-237/94 O’Flynn, [1996] ECR I-2617, para. 21.
1068 See Case C-175/88 Biehl, [1990] ECR I-1779, para. 14; Case C-204/90 Bachmann, [1992] ECR
I-249, para. 9; Case C-237/94 O’Flynn, para. 18.
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naming it “superior rule of law”,1069 acknowledging it constitutes part of
the “fundamental personal human rights” which it protects,1070 and by
making it an integral part of the concept of Union citizenship.1071
The first two sections discuss the Court’s role in the constitutionalisation
of the general principle by embellishing it with new important roles, and by
making it an integral component of the concept of Union citizenship. The
following two sections demonstrate the formal constitutionalisation of the
principle by its inclusion into Treaties and the Charter by consecutive Treaty
reforms. Both processes have created a virtuous circle reinforcing the import-
ance as well as the constraining force of the principle. Moreover, it is argued
that the principle has been constitutionalised not only formally, by being
acknowledged as part of primary law, but also in other two senses of the term.
To begin with the first sense of the term, constitutionalisation can be
summarized as “a process where the norm is entrenched and accorded higher
legal status”.1072 This implies that its position in the system is consolidated
in the sense that it is less vulnerable to change or repeal. Moreover, it also
means that where conflicts between legal norms arise, those that are constitu-
tionalized will be given greater weight.1073 Even if the process might not
be complete, it is widely acknowledged that the principle of equal treatment
has been undergoing a process of constitutionalisation in this first sense of
the term.1074
Constitutionalisation in its second sense is borrowed from the German legal
order. It is not about hierarchy or superiority, but about the penetration or
permeation of the principle of equal treatment in our case (or fundamental
rights in the case of Germany) into the entire legal order.1075
Constitutionalisation of the principle in this latter sense of the term in the
Union legal order became especially visible after the inclusion of the horizontal
provisions or “Provisions Having General Application” under Title II of the
TFEU. Accordingly, Articles 8 and 10 TFEU require all Union activities to be
informed by and be in line with the principle of non-discrimination.
It should be noted that this process(es) of constitutionalisation of the
principle of equal treatment should not be seen as its complete transformation,
1069 Case 156/78 Frederick H. Newth, para. 13; Joined Cases 83/76 and 94/76, 4/77, 15/77 and 40/77
HNL and Others, [1978] ECR 1209, paras. 4-5; Case T-489/93 Unifruit Hellas, para. 42.
1070 Case 149/77 Defrenne III, [1978] ECR 1365, paras. 25-26.
1071 See section 7.3.2 above.
1072 M. Bell, “The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening,“ in The Evolution
of EU Law, ed. Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (OUP, 2011), 625.
1073 Ibid., 625-26.
1074 Ibid., 629-31; More, “The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to Funda-
mental Right?,“ 535-40; Waddington, “The Expanding Role of the Equality Principle in
European Union Law,“ 11-24; Wouters, “Constitutional Limits of Differentiation: The
Principle of Equality,“ 306.
1075 A. von Bogdandy, “The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights
and the Core of the European Union,“ Common Market Law Review 37(2000): 1333-34.
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but rather as a process whereby it acquires roles additional to the ones already
mentioned above.1076 To use Reich’s Russian doll analogy,1077 these roles
are the different dresses the principle puts on depending on the occasion and
the general climate determined by Treaty changes, legislative action as well
the Court’s interpretation. However, unlike the dresses of a Russian doll these
roles/dresses are not cut in wood or stone. They evolve in order to adjust to
the vagaries of the legal climate. As such, the constitutional dress is the latest
addition to the expanding wardrobe of the principle of equality.
In short, the following sections highlight some of the important develop-
ments contributing to the process of constitutionalisation of the principle of
equality and demonstrate how deeply embedded it is into the Treaty structures.
This demonstration aims to bolster the argument that the inclusion of a PSC,
breaching such a fundamental principle or core value of the EU legal order
into an Accession Agreement, would be precluded.
7.3.1 Equality as an established general principle of EU law
The principle of non-discrimination in EU law derives directly from the
Treaties. It was initially enshrined in Article 7 EEC, (ex Article 6 EC, ex Article
12 EC, now Article 18 TFEU), and has always had its more specific manifesta-
tions in other provisions of the Treaties.1078 However, according to the Court,
those latter provisions are “only a specific expression of the general principle
of equality which is one of the fundamental principles of [Union] law and
which requires that comparable situations are not treated in a different manner
unless the difference in treatment is objectively justified”.1079 The Court estab-
lished further that the general principle of non-discrimination embodied in
Article 18 TFEU applies only in the absence of more specific provisions in a
1076 Waddington, “The Expanding Role of the Equality Principle in European Union Law,“
29.
1077 For a more detailed description, see N. Reich, “A European Constitution for Citizens:
Reflections on the Rethinking of Union and Community Law,“ European Law Journal 3,
no. 2 (1997): 133.
1078 In the area of free movement of goods, see Articles 36-37 TFEU; in the area of agriculture,
see Article 40(2) TFEU; in the area of free movement of workers, see Article 45(2) TFEU;
in the area of free movement of capital, see Article 65(3) TFEU; in the area of transport,
see Article 95(1) TFEU; in the area of competition, see Article 107(2)(a) TFEU; in the area
of social policy, see Article 157(2) TFEU; in the area of external relations (humanitarian
aid), see Article 214(2) TFEU. This list merely provides examples of the specific
manifestations of the principle of non-discrimination in various parts of the Treaties. It
is not exhaustive.
1079 Case C-280/93 Germany v Council, [1994] ECR I-4973, para. 67. See also, Joined Cases 117/76
and 16/77 Ruckdeschel, para. 7; Case 281/82 Unifrex, [1984] ECR 1969, para. 30. For a more
extensive list of cases and discussion, see Schermers and Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection
in the European Union: 88; and Lenaerts et al., European Union Law: 156-57.
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relevant field.1080 Non-discrimination is “one of the fundamental principles
of the Treaty which must be observed by any court”.1081 Due to its prevalent
appearance in the Treaties and its foundational character, Usher has defined
the principle of non-discrimination as “an underlying general principle of
[Union] law”.1082
General principles of EU law refer to “unwritten, judicially driven
norms”1083 that may be codified at one point. They are not precise or well-
defined and have an overarching scope, i.e. their application goes beyond a
specific field of law.1084 According to Usher “the express prohibition of
discrimination on the grounds of nationality set out in Article 6 [now Article
18 TFEU] is so wide as to preclude the development of any wider general prin-
ciple”.1085 In the same vain, Tobler confirms that it is “[o]nly the prohibition
of discrimination on grounds of nationality under Article 18(1) TFEU and the
specific provisions reserved by it [that] applies in all fields of Union law”,
while almost all other non-discrimination provisions have a more limited
scope.1086 In line with our analogy above, the principle of non-discrimination
based on nationality is the “black dress” that can be worn everywhere, it is
deemed appropriate for all occasions, i.e. the joker, while the other dresses
(other specific manifestations of the principle of non-discrimination), are
suitable only on an number of limited occasions.
As already mentioned, the Court established that the general principle of
equality is “one of the fundamental principles of Community law”.1087 It
often used the concepts of non-discrimination and equality interchangeably,
and sometimes together. It laid down that “[f]undamental rights include the
general principle of equality and non-discrimination”.1088 Similarly, it ruled
that the principle of equal treatment “constitutes a fundamental right”.1089
It also referred to it as “the general principle of equal treatment”.1090 Accord-
ing to the Court, ‘the principle of equal treatment’ and the ‘principle of non-
discrimination’ “are simply two labels for a single general principle of Com-
munity law, which prohibits both treating similar situations differently and
treating different situations in the same way unless there are objective reasons
1080 Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia, [1994] ECR I-1783, para. 19; Case C-22/98 Becu, [1999]
ECR I-5665, para. 32; Case C-55/98 Vestergaard, [1999] ECR I-7641, para. 16.
1081 Case 8/78 Milac, [1978] ECR I-1721, para. 18.
1082 Usher, General Principles of EC Law: 12.
1083 C. Semmelmann, “General Principles in EU Law between a Compensatory Role and an
Intrinsic Value,“ European Law Journal 19, no. 4 (2013): 461.
1084 Ibid.
1085 Usher, General Principles of EC Law: 20.
1086 Tobler, “The Prohibition of Discrimination in the Union’s Layered System of Equality
Law: From Early Staff Cases to the Mangold Approach,“ 447.
1087 Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel, para. 7.
1088 Case C-442/00 Rodríguez Caballero para. 32.
1089 Case C-37/89 Weiser, [1990] ECR I-2395, para. 13.
1090 Case C-144/04 Mangold, [2005] ECR I-9981, para. 76.
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for such treatment”.1091 In other words, in addition to its ‘instrumental’ and
‘market-unifying role’, in time, the principle has also acquired an additional
role or status as a fundamental right.
To provide an example of the process in which the principle of non-dis-
crimination acquired new roles over time, one notices that in the early case
law the Court established that the abolition of discrimination was needed “in
order to ensure the free movement of workers which is essential to the common
market”.1092 Next, the Court moved to a phase, in which it confirmed the
economic rationale underlying the principle, however, it also acknowledged
its social role. Defrenne II is a good example, as the Court recognized that
Article 157 TFEU pursued a double aim: economic and social. In addition to
the economic aim,1093 the Court established that the “provision forms part
of the social objectives of the Community, which is not merely an economic
Union, but is at the same time intended, by common action, to ensure social
progress and seek the constant improvement of the living and working condi-
tions of their peoples”.1094
The following important stage in the development of the principle of non-
discrimination was the Court’s recognition in Defrenne III that the prohibition
of non-discrimination based on sex forms part of the “fundamental personal
human rights”, the observance of which it ensures.1095 With the transfer of
new competences to the Union and the creation of the status of Union citizen-
ship, the situation had changed to such an extent by the beginning of the new
millennium that the Court concluded that “the economic aim pursued by
[Article 157 TFEU], namely the elimination of distortions of competition between
undertakings established in different Member States, is secondary to the social
aim pursued by the same provision, which constitutes the expression of a
fundamental human right”.1096
The cases cited above illustrate clearly the emergence and rise of the
additional roles of the principle of non-discrimination over its original role
linked to the establishment of an internal market. The social role of the prin-
ciple, and above all that of a fundamental individual right is now clearly the
robe in fashion. The ‘instrumental’ and ‘market unifying’ dress is still in use
and part of the wardrobe, however, not as popular as before.
1091 Case C-422/02 P Europe Chemi-Con (Deutschland) GmbH, para. 33.
1092 Emphasis added. Case 15/69 Ugliola, [1969] ECR 363, para. 3.
1093 See, Case 43/75 Defrenne II, para. 9.
1094 Ibid., para. 10.
1095 Case 149/77 Defrenne III, paras. 26-27.
1096 Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom AG, [2000] ECR I-743, para. 57.
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7.3.2 Equality as part of citizenship
The most important development that increased the prominence of the prin-
ciple of equal treatment even further was the introduction of the concept of
Union citizenship into the Treaties, and at least as important was the Court’s
interpretation of it. As discussed in detail in sub-section 6.3.2.3 above, the Court
broadened the scope of the prohibition of non-discrimination based on nation-
ality laid down in Article 18 TFEU, by extending its application to all Union
citizens resident lawfully in the territory of a host Member State.1097 The
result was the decoupling of the principle from the economic activity require-
ment, which was previously necessary for its application. Being a Union citizen
lawfully resident in a host Member State became sufficient to bring a person
within the personal scope of the Treaty and claim a right to equal treatment
with nationals of that State. While initially the Court would extend the right
to equal treatment to situations and benefits that fall within the material scope
of EU law,1098 in its later case law it extended the right also to benefits that
fell within the competence of Member States, when it was of the opinion that
Member States had not exercised their competence in line with EU rules.1099
There is no need to repeat the case law on citizenship discussed above,
however, it is worth emphasising the central role of the principle of equality
that has become an integral part of the citizenship concept. As argued by AG
Jacobs, “[f]reedom from discrimination on grounds of nationality is the most
fundamental right conferred by the Treaty and must be seen as a basic ingre-
dient of Union citizenship.”1100 In the same vain, a decade later, AG Maduro
reiterated that “[t]he prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality
is no longer merely an instrument at the service of freedom of movement; it
is at the heart of the concept of European citizenship”.1101 Scholars confirm that
after the introduction of citizenship there has been “a reconceptualization of,
or a qualitative change in, the relationship between the right to free movement
and the right to non-discrimination”.1102 The umbilical cord between the
two has been cut. Now they are no longer linked to one another, “[r]ather,
1097 Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala, para. 63.
1098 Ibid.
1099 The benefits at stake in this case were benefits for civilian war victims. See, Case C-192/05
Tas-Hagen and Tas, paras. 21-22.
1100 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz, para. 24.
1101 See Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-524/06 Huber, [2008] ECR I-9705, para. 18.
1102 A. P. Van der Mei, “The Outer Limits of the Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds
of Nationality: A Look through the Lens of Union Citizenship,“ Maastricht Journal of
European and Comparative Law 11, no. 1-2 (2011): 72. See also, H. De Waele, “The ever-
evolving conccept of EU citizenship: Of paradigm shifts, quantum leaps and Copernican
revolutions,“ in Globalisation, Migration, and the Future of Europe: Insiders and Outsiders,
ed. L. S. Talani (Routledge, 2012), 101-207.
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they are separately and directly linked to the fundamental status of Union
citizenship”.1103
The decoupling of the application of the non-discrimination principle from
the performance of an economic activity in the Court’s citizenship case law
was indeed revolutionary.1104 Now, the principle applies not because one
is a worker, entrepreneur, service provider or recipient, but simply by virtue
of being a Union citizen legally resident in another Member State. Thus, it
is argued that the principle of equality between EU citizens has assumed “a
constitutional character subject to strict judicial scrutiny”.1105 The inclusion
and further elaboration of the principle in the Treaties and the Charter, which
is briefly discussed below, contributed further to the constitutionalisation of
the principle. What is especially notable in the Lisbon Treaty revision, and
which could also be interpreted as a tacit approval of the Court’s case law
by the Member States, is the placement of the Treaty provisions on non-dis-
crimination and citizenship in Part Two of the TFEU, under one title, namely
“Non-Discrimination and Citizenship”.
If one is to go back to the two manifestations of constitutionalisation
mentioned above, that is hierarchical superiority and ubiquity (presence/
penetration in various fields of law), the hierarchical superiority of the principle
of equality was never in doubt, as the Court consistently repeated over the
years that it constitutes “a superior rule of law”.1106 That position has been
consolidated further with the added boost of Union citizenship. As to the
gradual expansion of the scope of the principle, as well as its proliferation
into wider areas of Union law, which is also discussed in the following section,
those were developments enabled by the creation of the Union citizenship
status as well as continued transfer of new competences to the Union. As
argued by Van der Mei, citizenship and non-discrimination have fuelled each
other. Not only has the gradual expansion of the prohibition of non-discrimina-
tion provided substance to Union citizenship, but the latter status has also
served “as a source to strengthen the right to equal treatment of national-
ity”.1107 In other words, the central place of the principle in the Union legal
order was consolidated further over time.
1103 Van der Mei, “The Outer Limits of the Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of
Nationality: A Look through the Lens of Union Citizenship,“ 72.
1104 For a more detailed account of the development of the Court’s case law on Union
citizenship, see De Waele, “The ever-evolving conccept of EU citizenship: Of paradigm
shifts, quantum leaps and Copernican revolutions,“ 191-207; S. Currie, “The Transforma-
tion of Union Citizenship,“ in 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Back and Thinking
Forward, ed. Michael Dougan and Samantha Currie (Hart Publishing, 2009), 365-90.
1105 Bell, “The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening,“ 614.
1106 Case 156/78 Frederick H. Newth, para. 13; Case 50/86 Les Grands Moulins de Paris, [1987]
ECR 4833, para. 10; Case T-489/93 Unifruit Hellas, para. 42; T-93/94 Becker, [1996] ECR II-141,
para. 26.
1107 Van der Mei, “The Outer Limits of the Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of
Nationality: A Look through the Lens of Union Citizenship,“ 85.
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Many scholars argue that the transformation of the principle or the comple-
tion of its constitutionalisation process could not be considered over as long
as the concepts of “internal situations” and “reverse discrimination” continue
to exist.1108 As far as it relates to citizenship, the constitutional dress of the
principle of equality is still seen as “work in progress”, and perhaps it is so.
However, as suggested by Van der Mei, and his interpretation of the Court’s
ruling in Zambrano, the Court does not view “reverse discrimination” as a
problem of discrimination, “but rather as one of disrespecting substantive EU
rights involved”.1109 Hence, going back to our wardrobe of rights, it might
be perhaps useful to specify that the constitutional garment in our wardrobe
is not strictly speaking a “dress”, but rather a coat. A coat is a protective
garment worn on top of others. It is a garment that normally one does not
need (or wear) at home, i.e. in their Member State of origin. One needs it once
he or she steps outside the confines of the known and familiar, i.e. in our
context once a national frontier is crossed.
Hence, the argument that the process of constitutionalisation of the principle
of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality would be complete once
it applies to all Union citizens irrespective of what they do and in which part
of the Union they reside, might be erroneous. As Europeans possess a rich
wardrobe of rights, they are already protected at many levels: national (local
level), constitutional (Member State level), and European (at regional level
by the EU and the ECHR). As argued by Weiler, in this case the problem is not
a shortage of rights, but rather their abundance.1110 In short, in the European
context, what to wear, or which specific principle of equality one should be
protected by, is more a problem of luxury rather than dire need.
Moreover, for our purposes the principle is as strong and authoritative
as it can be in its new “constitutional garment”. Since the proposed PSC would
infringe both the right to free movement as well as the principle of non-dis-
crimination based on nationality, there is not much that the further decoupling
of the two will add to our discussion. AG Colomer’s Opinion in Petersen also
demonstrates clearly how inextricably linked citizenship and free movement
are at the moment. According to the AG General:
1108 Shaw, “Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitu-
tionalism,“ 596-97; Nic Shuibhne, “Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal
Rule: Time to Move on?,“ 769-70. It should be noted however, that there are those who
think, “the internal situation doctrine is a suitable instrument to meet the constitutional
necessity of respecting the division of powers between the Union and its Member States”.
See, D. Hanf, “’Reverse Discrimination’ in EU Law: Constitutional Aberration,
Constitutional Necessity, or Judicial Choice?,“ Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative
Law 11, no. 1-2 (2011): 57.
1109 Van der Mei, “The Outer Limits of the Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of
Nationality: A Look through the Lens of Union Citizenship,“ 81.
1110 J. H. H. Weiler, “Editorial: Individuals and Rights – The Sour Grapes,“ European Journal
of International Law 21, no. 2 (2010).
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‘Cases such as Carpenter, Baumbast and R, Bidar, Tas-Hagen and Tas and Morgan and
Bucher demonstrate a tendency towards protecting individuals, a concern with the
personal situation of those who exercise a right under the Treaties which in the
past was much less evident. Thus, the free movement of persons acquires its own
identity, imbued with an essential nature that is more constitutional than statutory,
transforming it into a freedom akin to the dynamics of the fundamental rights.’1111
It should be emphasised again that it was the addition of citizenship provisions
and the case law of the Court that enabled free movement of persons to acquire
its own identity. That would not have been possible if it had not been coupled
with the principle of equal treatment. In other words, “the coat” (the constitu-
tional protection against discrimination in cross-border situations) is arguably
the EU’s most significant contribution to the wardrobe of Union citizens. It
is so fundamental and defining, that a wardrobe without it would not qualify
as one belonging to a Union citizen. Hence, it can be argued that Member
States should be precluded from withholding it from Union citizens, who will
acquire that status in the future.
7.3.3 Expanding scope of equality in the Treaties
The fact that “general principles of Community law have constitutional
status”,1112 as well as the fact that the principle of equality constitutes a
general principle, which is one of the fundamental principles of the EU legal
order,1113 were already emphasised above. This means that the principle
of equality or non-discrimination played a constitutional role, long before
scholars had acknowledged it. What made that role more prominent or visible
in recent years, were the Treaty changes that mirrored and confirmed the
Court’s case law.
As to the expansion of the scope of the prohibition of non-discrimination
beyond nationality, the most important development to that effect was the
inclusion of Article 13 EC by the Amsterdam Treaty. It has now been replaced
and extended by Article 19 TFEU as a legal basis for the adoption of measures
covering discrimination on the following grounds: “sex, racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”. Even though the
provision did not impose any specific obligation on Member States to take
action, and as such did not have direct effect, it increased the visibility of the
principle and widened the Union’s power in the field of anti-discrimination
law.1114 A series of Directives were enacted based on Article 13 EC;1115
1111 See Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-228/07 Petersen, [2008] ECR I-6989, para. 17.
1112 Case C-101/08 Audiolux, [2009] ECR I-9823, para. 63.
1113 Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel, para. 7.
1114 Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law: 64.
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however, since they do not deal with discrimination based on nationality, and
have no implications for the PSC, they will not be discussed in any detail here.
The most significant developments came with the Lisbon Treaty revision.
Not only was equality embedded more deeply in the Union’s “basic constitu-
tional charter, the Treaty”,1116 but the document devoting it an entire chapter
(Chapter III), namely the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, was
elevated to acquire the same legal value as the Treaties.1117 To begin with
the additions to the Treaties, both “equality” and “non-discrimination” were
explicitly named in the respective two paragraphs of Article 2 TEU, as constitu-
ting foundational values of the Union as well as of its Member States. Article
3(3) TEU instructs the Union to “combat social exclusion and discrimination”.
Moreover, Article 9 TEU dictates the Union to “observe the principle of equality
of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies”.
While one cannot help but wonder how the Union is to ensure its institu-
tions give equal attention to all Union citizens, and whether that will be in
line with the premises of the principle itself, Bell argues that the precise
interpretation of rights conferred by constitutional texts is of lesser significance.
What counts is the presence or absence of principles such as equality.1118
Similarly, Shaw underlines the “undoubtedly foundational character of consti-
tutional law and discourse for any polity”.1119 She claims constitutional texts
offer “a privileged frame of reference for questioning the boundaries, nature
and purpose of any given polity”.1120 As such, it can be argued that they
have both normative power, and perhaps also transformative potential, as an
entity that claims to be bound by certain principles will also need to abide
by those principles, or at least provide convincing justifications for not being
able to do so. In other words, the more visible and constitutionalized the
principle of equality in the EU legal order is, the more difficult it becomes for
the Union and Member States to deviate from it.
1115 See, Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180/22, 19.07.2000; Directive 2000/78/EC
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation,
OJ L 303/16, 2.12.2000; Directive 2002/73/EC amending Directive 76/207/EEC on the
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access
to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, OJ L 269/15,
5.10.2002; Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between
men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373/37,
21.12.2004.
1116 Case 294/83 Les Verts, para. 23.
1117 See Article 6(1) TEU.
1118 Bell, “The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening,“ 626.
1119 J. Shaw, “The European Union and Gender Mainstreaming: Constitutionally Embedded
or Comprehensively Marginalized?,“ Feminist Legal Studies 10(2002): 215.
1120 Ibid.
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While the inclusion of “equality” and “non-discrimination” in Article 2
TEU symbolises their place at the top of hierarchy of constitutional norms, their
inclusion in Article 8 TFEU (ex Article 3(2) EC)1121 and especially the newly
introduced Article 10 TFEU is a clear illustration of the effort to deeply entrench
those principles in all the activities of the Union, i.e. constitutionalisation in
the second sense of the term as defined in this Chapter. It provides as follows:
“In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim
to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation.” Article 8 and 10 TFEU are to be found
under Title II “Provisions having general application”. They are among the
so-called horizontal or mainstreaming provisions, which require the Union
and its institutions to systematically scrutinise its measures and policies by
taking into account their possible effects on the grounds identified under the
provisions of Title II.1122
Last, but not least follows the examination of the principle of equality as
it appears in the Charter. Article 6(1) TEU proclaims that “[t]he Union
recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the
Treaties.”1123
7.3.4 Equality as enshrined in the Charter
As to the Charter, its entire Chapter III is devoted to “Equality”. It contains
seven articles. Our focus will be on the first two general articles, which have
“a traditional justiciable and constitutional form”,1124 while the other five
are more specific and aspirational.1125 To begin with Article 20, which
provides that “[e]veryone is equal before the law”, the Explanations on the
Charter clarify that the provision “corresponds to a general principle of law
which is included in all European constitutions and has also been recognized
by the Court of Justice as a basic principle of Community Law”.1126 The
1121 It reads as follows: “In all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and
to promote equality, between men and women.”
1122 For “gender mainstreaming“, see S. Fredman, “Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental
Rights in the EU Social Space,“ European Law Journal 12, no. 1 (2006): 53-55.
1123 Emphasis added.
1124 Waddington, “The Expanding Role of the Equality Principle in European Union Law,“
23.
1125 The more specific articles deal with: cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity (Article
22); equality between men and women (Article 23); the rights of the child (Article 24);
the rights of the elderly (Article 25); the integration of persons with disabilities (Article
26).
1126 See, Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/24, 14.12.2007.
290 Chapter 7
Court interpreted Article 20 CFR in line with its Explanations and confirmed
that it enshrines the general principle of equal treatment, which “requires that
comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different
situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is object-
ively justified”.1127 This definition leads Tobler to convincingly argue that
“Article 20 is not about ‘equality before the law’ understood in a traditional
sense (i.e. equal application of the law to all, whatever the content of the law)
but indeed the broad principle as previously recognized in its case-law”.1128
Article 21(1) CFR contains an open-ended list of prohibited discrimination
grounds, which include “sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, member-
ship of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orienta-
tion”. It draws on Article 13 EC (now 19 TFEU), Article 14 ECHR and Article
11 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.1129 According to
Tobler, it corresponds to the general principles of equality with respect to
particular discrimination grounds.1130 Its more relevant part for our purposes
is its second paragraph, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of national-
ity. The Explanations provide that it corresponds to Article 18 TFEU and that
it should be applied in compliance with it.1131 Waddington notes that Article
21 CFR reveals a hierarchy, with the prohibition of discrimination on the ground
of nationality being primus inter pares, as it applies in all fields of EU law.1132
Second come the grounds covered by Article 19 TFEU and the non-discrimina-
tion Directives, which have their own internal hierarchy.1133 Lastly, come
the remaining grounds in which the Union is not entitled to adopt any legis-
lation.
1127 Case C-149/10 Chatzi, [2010] ECR I-8489, paras. 63-64. See also, Case C-208/09 Sayn-
Wittgenstein, [2010] ECR I-13693, para. 89.
1128 Tobler, “The Prohibition of Discrimination in the Union’s Layered System of Equality
Law: From Early Staff Cases to the Mangold Approach,“ 455.
1129 See, Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/24, 14.12.2007.
1130 Tobler, “The Prohibition of Discrimination in the Union’s Layered System of Equality
Law: From Early Staff Cases to the Mangold Approach,“ 456. To that effect, see the
references to the general principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age and Article
21 CFR, Case C-447/09 Prigge and Others, [2011] ECR I-8003, para. 38; Joined Cases C-297/10
and C-298/10 Hennings and Mai, [2011] ECR I-7965, para. 47.
1131 See, Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/24, 14.12.2007.
1132 Waddington, “The Expanding Role of the Equality Principle in European Union Law,“
24. Tobler also notes the limited field of application of almost all non-discrimination
provisions. She notes that only the prohibition of non-discrimination based on nationality
as laid down under Article 18 TFEU applies in all fields of Union law. See, Tobler, “The
Prohibition of Discrimination in the Union’s Layered System of Equality Law: From Early
Staff Cases to the Mangold Approach,“ 446.
1133 See, E. Howard, “The case for a considered hierarchy of discrimination grounds in EU
law,“ Maastrict Journal of European and Comparative Law 13, no. 4 (2007): 445-70; E. Howard,
“Equality: A Fundamental Right in the European Union?,“ International Journal of
Discrimination and Law 10(2009): 29-32.
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Although, strictly speaking, it does not fall under the title “Equality and
the Charter”, another obvious provision in the Charter capable of constraining
Member States as primary law makers, which is worth mentioning here, is
Article 45(1) CFR. It is situated under Chapter V of the Charter titled “Citizens’
Rights”, and it provides as follows: “Every citizen of the Union has the right
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States”; whereas
paragraph 2 provides that “[f]reedom of movement and residence may be
granted, in accordance with the Treaties, to nationals of third countries legally
resident in the territory of a Member State”. What is striking when one com-
pares those two paragraphs is the absolute formulation of the right to move
and reside freely for Union citizens. Unlike the corresponding formulation
of this right in the Treaties, there is no qualification attached to the effect that
the right concerned “shall be exercised in accordance with the conditions and
limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted thereunder”.1134
As soon as one checks the explanations relating to Article 45(1) of the
Charter one is informed that the right guaranteed by paragraph 1 is the right
guaranteed by Article 20(2)(a) TFEU, which means “that “[i]n accordance with
Article 52(2) of the Charter, those rights are to be applied under the conditions
and within the limits defined by the Treaties”. Undoubtedly, Charters and
Declarations of Rights contain more ambitious goals and pompous language.
However, that should not be a reason to brush them aside. The ideals they
set and the discourse they establish are more important than their precise
interpretation, as argued above. They have transformative potential, as the
ideals they set are usually perceived as something to strive for, something
to achieve in the long run. Hence, it makes perfect sense to establish an ideal
of an unconditional right to free movement for Union citizens in a Charter
of Fundamental Rights, which leads one to the expectation of the creation of
an ever stronger and more absolute right to free movement of persons over
the years. That expectation is undoubtedly strengthened by the Union’s pros-
pect (and above all, obligation under Article 6(2) TEU) to accede to the ECHR.
7.4 PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF MEMBER STATES
What was discussed so far, was how important and foundational the principle
of equality was for the nationals of Member States and the integration project,
as well as how it evolved over time to acquire a broader scope and penetrate
deeper into all fields of Union law. This section deals with the same principle,
however this time as far as it relates to the Member States themselves. Equality
1134 Article 20(2) TFEU.
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of Member States has always been a constitutional principle of Union law,1135
which has also been acknowledged by the Court.1136
Member States of the EU have committed themselves to treat both each
other as well as their citizens equally. While previously the principle of equal-
ity of States was an unwritten principle of EU law, after the Lisbon Treaty
revisions one finds it expressly laid down in Article 4(2) TEU, which provides
that “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties
as well as their national identities …” [emphasis added]. Including clauses
that have not existed in any other Accession Agreement allowing other Mem-
ber States to suspend the free movement rights of the nationals of an acceding
State, and of that State only, will put a serious question mark on both the
“equality” of that State vis-à-vis other Member States, as well as on the equality
of its citizens with other nationals of Member States. The possible inclusion
of “specific arrangements” or additional PSCs concerning agriculture or struc-
tural policies would obviously also not serve promoting the equality of a new
Member State with old ones.1137
The case Commission v. UK discussed in Part II above, provides a good
illustration of how the Court could deal with a contentious PSC. Given the
tenets laid down in the judgment, which could easily be transposed from goods
to people, one could argue that Member States would be constrained from
including the PSC, as the existing case constitutes a basis for a prospective
sanction by the Court. Since Commission v. UK concerned free movement of
goods and more specifically “the elimination of quantitative restrictions”, and
our primary concern throughout this study was the inclusion PSC on “free
movement of persons”, the Court could easily replace the crossed out phrases
with those in brackets and establish that “[i]n a matter as essential for the proper
functioning of the common market as [free movement of persons], the Act of
Accession cannot be interpreted as having established for an indefinite period [at the
expense of] the new Member States a legal position different from that laid down
by the Treaty for the original Member States.”1138 Thus, even if “it was justified
for the [acceding] Member States provisionally to accept such inequalities, it would
1135 Wouters, “Constitutional Limits of Differentiation: The Principle of Equality,“ 315-16;
De Witte, “The Impact of Enlargement on the Constitution of the European Union,“ 247.
1136 Case 231/78 Commission v UK, para. 17; Case 39/72 Commission v Italy, [1973] ECR 101, para.
24.
1137 It is worth reminding that point 12, para. 4 of Turkey’s Negotiating Framework reads
as follows: “Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent
safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard
measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its
proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or
agriculture.”
1138 Emphasis added. Case 231/78 Commission v UK, para. 17.
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be contrary to the principle of equality of the Member States before Community law
to accept that such inequalities could continue indefinitely.”1139
In short, equality of Member States is a constitutional principle of EU law,
which has also been recently codified in the Treaty. It is a principle derived
from the principle of the sovereign equality of States,1140 one the fundamental
principles of public international law.1141 Even though what is of primary
importance for our purposes is the principle of equality of Member States,
since drafting of an Accession Treaty takes place within the scope of Article
49 TEU, which is within the scope of EU law, it is also worth mentioning the
relevance of the public international law principle, since the end product (the
Accession Treaty) after its ratification, is also an international agreement.
7.5 CONCLUSION
To recap, the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality is perhaps
the most deeply embedded principle into the Union legal order. It has been
cemented into its “very foundations” both by the Treaties as well as the case
law of the Court of Justice. It has played a crucial role in integrating the
various national markets into what was to be re-named as the “internal mar-
ket”. Scholars confirm that “[t]he very genesis of an internal Community trade
law is firmly based on the principle of non-discrimination which is one of the
cornerstones of the whole quasi-constitutional structure of the Union”.1142
The Court established it is a superior rule of law, a fundamental right and
a general principle of EU law of constitutional status. It is a right linked to
“the fundamental status” of every Union citizen, though still to be mainly
enjoyed in the existence of cross-border elements bringing the situation within
the scope of Union law. The “fundamental and inalienable value which is
equality”1143 is perhaps even more fundamental and more inalienable after
its inclusion into the core aims and values on which the Union claims to be
1139 Emphasis added. Ibid.
1140 The principle has been explicitly acknowledged in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, which
provides that “The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members.” See also the elaboration of the principle in the Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Annex to Resolution 2625 (XXV) of
the UN General Assembly of 24 October 1970. For the contents of ‘sovereign equality’
see point 2. under, ‘VI. The principle of sovereign equality of States.
1141 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1998). 289.
1142 D. O’Keeffe and A. F. Bavasso, “Four Freedoms, One Market and National Competence:
In Search of a Dividing Line,“ in Judicial Review in European Union Law: Liber Amicorum
in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, ed. D. O’Keeffe (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
2000), 542.
1143 See the Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-13/94 P v S, [1996] ECR I-2143, para. 20.
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founded.1144 The Treaty of Lisbon acknowledges the principle at both Mem-
ber State and individual levels. The Charter, which is elevated to primary law
status, further consolidates the cardinal position of the principle in the EU legal
order. As argued by Bell, the principle has been both widening and deepening
over the years.1145
A PSC enabling Member States to suspend the free movement rights of
Turkish nationals, as Union citizens in the future would be in violation of the
principle of equality on many different levels. It would violate the principle
of equality of Member States, of individuals as Union citizens, as workers,
service providers, service recipients, self-employed or self-sufficient. It would
trample on one of the core values on which the Union is founded. Given the
fact that many of the developments mentioned in this Chapter were part of
a grand legitimacy-building exercise, such as the Court’s case law on funda-
mental rights, the introduction of the concept of Union citizenship and drafting
of the CFR, it is not difficult to see how the inclusion of the PSC concerned
would put a question mark on these achievements as well as on the credibility
of the Union.
Moreover, as discussed in the previous Chapter, free movement of persons
occupies a special place in the Court’s case law, “as it straddles both the
general principle of equal treatment and that of respect for fundamental
rights”.1146 Both free movement and equality have been strengthened by
the introduction of Union citizenship, its interpretation by the Court, and last
but not least by their unequivocal codification in the CFR, which is now part
of primary law.
In short, the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality is
of “functional and foundational or existential value”1147 for the Union legal
order. Without it, “the EU would probably not even exist or survive”.1148
Hence, it is argued that as the most powerful and entrenched principle of the
Union legal order, the principles of non-discrimination in combination with
the right to free movement linked to the status of Union citizenship, would
constrain Member States from including a PSC directly discriminating against
Turkish nationals and restricting their freedom of movement as EU citizens
in the future.
1144 See Articles 2 and 3(3) TEU.
1145 See Bell, “The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening.“
1146 Ibid., 626.
1147 Van der Mei, “The Outer Limits of the Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of
Nationality: A Look through the Lens of Union Citizenship,“ 63.
1148 Ibid.
8 General Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to establish whether there may be EU law based
constraints on Member States as primary law makers in the context of drafting
an Accession Agreement, and if so, to identify them. This identification was
carried out with referencece to the proposed PSC clause on free movement of
persons in Turkey’s Negotiating Framework. It was argued that in the context
of preparing an Accession Agreement there are legal constraints on Member
States flowing from three sources: the pre-existing relations between the
associate and the EU, in this specific case Association Law built around the
Ankara Agreement; the rules of the enlargement process; and finally, the
constitutional foundations of the Union.
Chapter 2 in Part I analysed the past and present of the concept “associ-
ation”. It looked into what type of relationship it entailed so as to be able to
place the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement in its proper context. While it
was demonstrated that association proved to be a flexible relationship that
could fit the particular needs of the associate and the EU, it was also illustrated
that originally it was intended as a temporary relationship between the EEC
and less developed countries wishing to become full members. The association
agreements with Greece and Turkey were “undoubtedly the purest form of
application of Article 238 [now Article 217 TFEU]”.1149
In time, in addition to the association based on a Customs Union signed
with Greece and Turkey, which copied the development path of the EEC, other
types of associations emerged. The association with Malta and Cyprus was
based on a “potential” Customs Union, while the EAs with the CEECs, and SAAs
signed with the countries of the Western Balkans were based on a free trade
area. All these agreements were flexible enough to accommodate the changing
needs of the associates and served as stepping-stones to the membership of
those state, which were ready to join the Union. Even some of the EFTA states,
with which an alternative deal to membership was struck, i.e. the EEA,
managed to reorient their relationship to become full EU Member States.
1149 Given how similar both agreements were, what was said regarding the Association
Agreement with Greece, could by analogy, also be applied to the Ankara Agreement.
P. A. Blaisse, “Report prepared on behalf of the Committee on External Trade on the
common trade policy of the EEC towards third countries and on the applications by
European countries for membership or association”, European Parliament Working Papers,
No 134, 26 January 1963, p. 36.
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In short, when the political will was there, the precise type of the associ-
ation was of little concern for the associates as well as the Union. As far as
the Ankara Agreement is concerned, which is the centrepiece of Chapter 3,
nobody questions the fact that it was designed as a genuine pre-accession
agreement. The agreement was ambitious, and it aimed to achieve its objectives
by gradually integrating Turkey into the common market by gradually en-
suring the free movement of goods, workers, services and establishment. What
was important for our purposes was to establish whether the free movement
of persons regime under the association developed far enough to be able to
constrain Member States from including a PSC on free movement of persons
in a future Accession Agreement. The analysis of association law, especially
recent case law on the standstill clauses, demonstrated that it did.
The development of the association was envisaged in three stages: pre-
paratory, transitional, and final. As Turkey strengthened its economy, in 1973
an Additional Protocol laying down the detailed rules and timetables for the
establishment of free movement of goods and free movement of persons
entered into force. While the parties abided by the timetable set for the estab-
lishment of the Customs Union, they did not do so regarding the one set for
free movement of workers. There was no timetable in the Additional Protocol
for the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services. There
was only a standstill clause regarding those two freedoms, which prohibited
Member States from introducing new restrictions in these areas. It was the
Association Council that was supposed to breathe life into those freedoms
by adopting specific decisions aimed to implement them, which it never did.
It only adopted three decisions concerning the rights of Turkish workers who
were already legally resident and employed in the Member States. Those
decisions proved crucial, as they contained directly effective provisions which
Turkish workers were able to invoke in the national courts of Member States.
The rights embedded in these decisions, as well as in other instruments of
the Ankara acquis, could be regarded as a source of constraints on Member
States when negotiating an Accession Treaty with Turkey.
What surprisingly proved more important in terms of realizing free move-
ment of persons than the provisions conferring specific rights on workers and
their family members in those decisions, were the standstill clauses on free
movement of workers (Article 13 of Decision 1/80), freedom of establishment
and freedom to provide services (Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol).
Those clauses did not confer any rights on individuals. They would simply
freeze the legal situation in Member States regarding those freedoms as of
the date of entry into force of the legal instruments containing those clauses.
The reason why they make a difference today is the simple fact that the rules
on free movement of persons in the 1970s were much more liberal than today.
Since Member States did not respect the standstill clauses and introduced
stricter rules on free movement of workers, freedom of establishment and
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freedom to provide servcies, the recent cases result in the partial reinstatement
of free movement.
The case law on the standstill clauses was not however, merely a matter
of removing new obstacles, it had its twists and turns. The most important
one being the Demirkan ruling, which established that the freedom to provide
services under the Ankara Agreement could not be interpreted in line with
EU law. Hence, Member States, which had introduced new restrictions regard-
ing Turkish service recipients, were able to keep those in place, as receipt of
services under the Ankara Agreement was not considered to be an activity
of a sufficiently “economic” nature, remaining therefore, outside the scope
of the Agreement. According to the Court, “irrespective of whether freedom
of establishment or freedom to provide services is invoked, it is only where
the activity in question is the corollary of the exercise of an economic activity that
the ‘standstill’ clause may relate to the conditions of entry and residence of
Turkish nationals within the territory of the Member States”.1150 Tum and
Dari established that this was the case regarding freedom of establishment,
and Soysal established that regarding the freedom to provide services.
The fact that the standstill clause in Decision 1/80 covered the first entry
of Turkish workers into the territories of some Member States was mentioned
first in Commission v Netherlands,1151 and later confirmed in Demir.1152 More-
over, recently in Dogan, the Court ruled further that legislation that makes
family reunification more difficult also constitutes a “new restriction” within
the meaning of Article 41(1) AP.1153 Except for the Soysal case, the Commis-
sion put no effort into establishing the laws applicable regarding different
Member States, which means that implementation is late and patchy. Many
Member States fail to adjust their immigration policies until there is a judgment
referred to the Court directly from their own national courts.
As slow as the implementation of those judgments might be, this does not
change the fact that a PSC on free movement of persons, would be a step back
even from the existing regime on free movement of persons. As argued above,
membership is supposed to complement and increase the rights of nationals
of candidate countries upon their accession by equating them to those of
existing Union citizens, not by curtailing their existing rights. In other words,
the existing legal regime is a bare minimum, which would need to be comple-
mented with further rights, and as such it would arguably constitute a con-
straint on Member States when drafting an Accession Agreement.
Having identified constraints flowing from the pre-existing relations
between the EU and the candidate, Part II aimed to establish possible con-
straints that flow from the accession process itself, the backbone of which is
1150 Emphasis added. Case C-221/11 Demirkan, para. 55.
1151 Case C-92/07 Commission v Netherlands, para. 49.
1152 Case C-225/12 Demir, para. 34.
1153 Case C-138/13 Dogan, para. 36.
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Article 49 TEU. It is the one and only provision in the Treaties governing
specifically enlargement. It helped us identify both the procedural as well as
substantive constraints on Member States that flow from the Treaties. As
important as it is, it is quite cryptic, and fails to provide the full picture of
what is a long and complex process. For instance, as demonstrated in Chapter
4, it does not fully reflect the roles of Union institutions in the process. While
institutions can and often do play additional roles, it is important to note that
they have to stick to the basics identified in Article 49 TEU, as any deviation
might trigger external sanctions, i.e. the Court could annul the Council Decision
approving the Accession Agreement for not fulfilling an “essential procedural
requirement”.1154
Since there is no other primary law provision, or secondary law for that
matter, that could shed light on the accession process, Chapter 4 turned to
analysing past practices of enlargement. That analysis revealed that the basics
of the process were laid down during the first enlargement and were further
consolidated in each subsequent wave. While some fine-tuning was done when
deemed necessary, the basic contours of the process remained unchanged.
Similarly, the main negotiation principles that were articulated prior to the
first enlargement were consistently applied in each and every enlargement.
The first of these principles mandated the full adoption of the acquis communau-
taire, while the second one allowed for some derogations to the first, though
only for limited pre-specified transitional periods and in limited fields. Rather
than derogation, the second principle should be seen as a reinforcement of
the first, as its underlying rationale was to give the newly acceding Member
State additional time to adjust so that at the end of the pre-specified transitional
period they are able to adopt and apply the acquis communautaire in its entirety.
The overall aim of both principles was obviously the continuity of the Com-
munity/Union legal order.
Chapter 5 identified the substantive constraints that flow from Article 49
TEU and examined past Accession Agreements with a view to finding out
whether those constraints had been respected. The main substantive constraint
specified in Article 49 TEU is the term “adjustment”. What could be be inferred
from Article 49 TEU is that it allows only for “adjustments”, which can be
defined as technical changes or adaptations that are strictly necessitated by
accession, that extend the application of Union acquis to the new Member State.
The term “adjustment” is more restrictive than the term “amendment” or
“revision” used in Article 48 TEU, which implies less room for manoeuvre
under Article 49 TEU. The fact that the Dutch, French and German versions
of the Treaty similarly use more restrictive terms to indicate the limited scope
of change allowed in the context of Article 49 TEU in comparison to the terms
used under Article 48 TEU also proves this point.
1154 Case C-65/90 European Parliament v Council.
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To be able to find whether the substantive constraint imposed by Article
49 TEU was respected in the past, the rest of Chapter 5 distinguished between
measures used in past Accession Agreements which share the broad underlying
rationale of the term “adjustment”, i.e. the eventual full extension of the acquis
to the newcomer, and those that do not. It should be noted that while “adjust-
ments” and “adaptations” ensure the immediate extension of, respectively,
the Treaties and secondary law to the new Member State upon its accession,
the other measures identified as sharing the same broad rationale postpone
the full implementation of specific parts of the acquis for limited amount of
time after the newcomer’s accession. Transitional measures, quasi-transitional
measures and safeguard clauses, which are examined together as measures
facilitating the full integration of a Member State, allow the newcomer an
additional period to prepare itself to be able to fully undertake its obligations
under Union law. While transitional measures can be taken only for a pre-
determined period of time, quasi-transitional measures differ in that they are
supposed to be in place for a limited time, which is however not pre-deter-
mined. Regarding the latter measures, the newcomers have the obligation to
join those areas, such as the Eurozone and Schengen; however, they are
allowed to do so once they fulfil certain conditions.
As far as safeguard clauses are concerned, they have always applied for
a pre-specified period of time and have served as safety valves in case of
unforeseen problems in given areas. Unlike transitional and quasi-transitional
measures they are not clauses that apply automatically upon a newcomer’s
accession: they are dormant clauses. They could be triggered by either the old
or the new Member States so that they are able to take protective measures
against an unforeseen situation. There are no uniform terms or conditions for
triggering safeguard clauses. Each clause can be different. What is common
to transitional measures and safeguard clauses is that they apply for a pre-
specified period of time, which usually is the end of the so-called transitional
period, by the end of which the newcomer is expected to be ready to operate
on the same terms as the other Member States.
Lastly, Chapter 5 examined the most problematic aspect of past Accession
Agreements: measures that go beyond being mere “adjustments”. As past
Accession Agreements are the concrete examples of past practice, the aim was
to establish whether the substantive constraint that those agreements should
contain only “adjustments” necessitated by accession was respected. The idea
behind that exercise was that our findings on past practice would shed light
on both the existence of substantive constraints as well as on future practice
in this area.
While some of the measures analysed under this title could be clearly
categorised as permanent derogations such as the Maltese restriction on buying
secondary residences by non-residents, and the exception obtained by Sweden
for the marketing and use of “snus”, most of the other measures identified
as prima facie falling under that category (as measures going beyond being
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mere “adjustments”) on a closer look turn out to be “adjustments” in the broad
sense of the term. To provide a few examples, the inclusion of “cotton” as a
product under CAP, the exception created for granting national aid to Nordic
agriculture (more specifically areas to the north of the 62nd Parallel), special
rights granted to the indigenous Sami people, were all necessitated by the need
to accommodate the particularities of the newly acceding States. In those cases
the aim was to extend the acquis to the newcomers by taking their special
situations into account, i.e. there was no country that produced cotton prior
to Greece’s accession; there were no countries with harsh climatic conditions;
and neither were there indigenous people, whose special lifestyles had to be
accommodated prior to Sweden’s accession. In any event, those were per-
manenet arrangements negotiated and adopted at the request of the acceding
States. They were in no way unilaterally imposed arrangements by the existing
Member States.
Overall, it is argued that despite the existence of a few permanent deroga-
tions that go beyond being mere “adjustments”, those derogations are ex-
ceptions, which are not of such scope and nature as to seriously challenge the
existence of the rule itself. They did not affect the proper functioning of the
internal market, competition or one of its well-established policies. Moreover,
past experience also cautions us against another danger that can be inferred
from Turkey’s Negotiating Framework, i.e. the statement that “the decision-
taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of movement
of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual Member
States”.1155 The fisheries regime is a clear illustration of how a transitional
arrangement intended for a certain period of time might turn into a permanent
one, if the fate of that measure is left to the hands of the Member States in
at a future point in time.
The last part turned to the constitutional foundations of the Union, with
a view to establishing whether and how they could also operate as a constraint
on Member States qua primary law makers. Just like various national constitu-
tional courts have come up with doctrines to protect what they see as the
essence of their legal orders, such as the “basic structure” doctrine of the Indian
Constitutional Court or the “inner unity” or “coherence” doctrine of the
German Constitutional Court, Opinions and case law of the Court of Justice
demonstrate that similarly, it safeguards what it sees as the “very foundations”
of the Union legal order.
Chapter 6 firstly, established the existence of the “very foundations” of
the Union as a constitutional constraint on Member States. Then, it tried to
identify the substance of those “very foundations” as far as they would have
the effect of precluding Member States from introducing a PSC on free move-
ment of persons. Based on the Treaties, case law and Opinions of the Court,
1155 Point 12, para. 4 of the Negotiating Framework for Turkey.
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it identified three areas that could have that effect: fundamental freedoms,
in particular free movement of persons, the Union citizenship status, and
fundamental rights.
To begin with the freedoms, the EEC Treaty placed them under the title
“Foundations of the Community” from the very start. Empowered by the case
law of the Court their importance only increased over time. The Court called
them “fundamental freedoms”,1156 and it even labelled free movement of
workers as a “fundamental right”.1157 Scholars unanimously agreed that
they constituted the crux of the internal market as well as the integration
project. The introduction of Union citizenship, which was seen by the Court
as “destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of Member States”1158
pushed free movement of persons further up in the hierarchy of norms.
While initially criticised for being devoid of any substance, the case law
of the Court changed the opinion of many when it linked free movement and
equality directly to Union citizenship. Both became inalienable components
of citizenship. The Court even slightly modified the terms of application of
Union law so as ensure that Union citizens are not deprived of the enjoyment
of the substance of their citizenship rights.1159 Today many regard free move-
ment linked to citizenship as the general rule, and the economic freedoms as
its specific expressions.
The last area of relevance for our purposes that constitutes part of the “very
foundations” of the Union is that of fundamental rights. In Kadi I the Court
made that statement explicitly. It identified “respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article 6(1) TEU (now Article 2 TEU) as
a foundation of the Union”.1160 In Cresson and PKK,1161 by checking
whether primary law provisions were ECHR-compliant, the Court implicitly
acknowledged the “precedence” of fundamental rights over other Treaty
provisions.
It was the Court that developed the acquis on fundamental rights over the
years. Member States acknowledged the foundational role of those rights in
the Treaties, and eventually enshrined them in a Charter of Fundamental
Rights. Interestingly, in their process of constitutionalisation, i.e. achieving
primary law status, they also constitutionalised the legal order by making it
more autonomous. While for a long time, they were enforced as general
principles of EU law; they now have a central place in the Treaties and the
Charter. Their increasing importance has prompted the Member States to insert
an obligation in the Lisbon Treaty, under Article 6(2) TEU, to accede to the
1156 Case C-19/92 Kraus, para. 32; Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para. 37.
1157 Case 152/82 Forcheri, para. 11; Case 222/86 Heylens, para. 14.
1158 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, para. 31.
1159 Case C-34/09 Zambrano.
1160 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, para. 303.
1161 Case C-432/04 Cresson; Case C-229/05 P PKK and KNK v Council.
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ECHR. The Union’s accession will add another source and layer of constraints
on Member States and Union institutions.
As to the application of those constraints on Member States, Chapter 6
clarified that the argument laid down here is not that Member States cannot
ever bring the existing legal order to an end. They can do so. The argument
was rather that they have to respect the “very foundations”, or genetic code
of the legal order, so as to preserve its essence. Changing those very founda-
tions is not impossible, but as argued above, would mean bringing to an end
the existing legal order as we know it, and replacing it with a new one. Like
constitutional courts of states, the Court of Justice as the guardian of the Union
legal order could in certain circumstance act to protect its raison d’être. The
Pringle case1162 demonstrated it is not inconceivable for the Court to review
a Council Decision approving an Accession Agreement. It could carry out a
procedural review as well as a substantive review and check whether the
agreement contains anything that goes beyond what the terms of Article 49
TEU allow Member States to undertake, i.e. anything that goes beyond being
an “adjustment” necessitated by the accession of a new Member State. If the
Court detects such an element, especially something that would be contrary
to the “very foundations” of the Union legal order, such as a PSC on free
movement of persons, it could annul that Decision.
To prove that a PSC on free movement of persons would be contrary to
the “very foundations” of the Union, Chapter 7 provided a case study of the
principle of non-discrimination based on nationality. Non-discrimination or
equality would be without doubt the most gravely violated principle, if a PSC
on free movement of persons were to be included in Turkey’s future Accession
Agreement, as it would directly discriminate against Turkish nationals only.
A PSC regarding “agricultural policy or structural funds” would similarly
discriminate directly against Turkey. Hence, the aim of Chapter 7 was to
demonstrate that the principle of non-discrimination is part of the “very
foundations” of the Union legal order. The implication of that demonstration
was that a principle of such importance would preclude the inclusion of a
PSC clause that would breach it.
To demonstrate how deeply embedded the principle is in the constitutional
foundations of the Union, Chapter 7 begins its analysis by looking into the
very origins of the principle. That analysis clearly shows how instrumental
and indispensible the principle has been in the construction and regulation
of the internal market. In addition to the general prohibition of non-discrimina-
tion based on nationality, which always had a central place in the Treaties
(initially, as Article 7 EEC, Article 12 EC and now Article 18 TFEU), the Treaties
also contained many “specific expressions” of the principle. For our purposes
1162 Case C-370/12 Pringle.
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the principle’s most crucial and noteworthy role was as an integral part of
the freedoms, and free movement of persons in particular.
The Court also played an important role in pushing the principle up in
the hierarchy of norms. It ruled not only that the general principle of equality
was “one of the fundamental principles of Community law”,1163 but also
that it was a “superior rule of law”,1164 as well as an important part of the
“fundamental personal human rights”1165 which it protects. Chapter 7 dem-
onstrated that the Court and Member States contributed to the constitutional-
isation of the principle not only by placing it at the pinnacle of the hierarchy
of norms, but also by spreading it throughout the legal order; more specifically,
by making it part of the horizontal provisions of the Treaties, which require
all Union activities to be in compliance with it.1166 Moreover, its scope was
expanded by the inclusion of “sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation” as discrimination grounds on which
further measures could be taken.1167
Equality is also considered as one of the core components of Union citizen-
ship,1168 the destiny of which is on the way to becoming the fundamental
status of Member State nationals1169 as predicted and partially fulfilled by
the Court. Moreover, the Charter, which now has primary law status,1170
contains an entire chapter devoted to “Equality”.1171 One could expect that
its role might be even further consolidated by the Union’s future accession
to the ECHR.1172
While most of Chapter 7 was devoted to establishing that the principle
of the equality of Member State nationals constituted part of the “very founda-
tions” of the legal order, its last section briefly examined the principle of
equality of Member States, which would similarly be breached by the inclusion
of a PSC clause, be it in the area of free movement of persons, agriculture or
structural funds. While it was an unwritten principle of EU constitutional law
for a long time,1173 now the equality of Member States has its solid place
in the Treaties as Article 4(2) TEU.
To sum up, the principle of non-discrimination or equality is an inalienable
part of all three areas identified as part of the “very foundations” of the Union:
the fundamental freedoms, Union citizenship as well as fundamental rights.
1163 Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel, para. 7.
1164 Case 156/78 Frederick H. Newth, para. 13; Case T-489/93 Unifruit Hellas, para. 42.
1165 Case 149/77 Defrenne III, paras. 25-26.
1166 See Articles 8 and 10 TFEU.
1167 See Article 19 TFEU.
1168 See section 7.3.2 above.
1169 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk.
1170 See Article 6(1) TEU.
1171 See Chapter III of CFR.
1172 See Article 6(2) TEU.
1173 See Case 231/78 Commission v UK.
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Chapter 7 illustrated that in addition to violating those “very foundations”,
a PSC on free movement of persons would also breach the principle of equality
of Member States. This thesis tried to demonstrate that such a clause would
be a strong stab at the very heart of the existing Union legal order, which it
might not be able to survive.
In short, what the story of the mountain revealed is how it gained its own
life and existence partly independent from that of the will of its creator-Gods.
However, our mystical mountain was to learn that having its own will, spirit,
flesh and bones does not mean a carefree life devoid of constraints and limita-
tions. On the contrary, it was to experience that it is in the nature of every
“being” to be constrained by what it “is”, i.e. what we can call “the terms of
its existence”. Its own free will, flesh and spirit were to limit it first before
anything else did.
It exercised its free will and made promises. It gave its word for something
it did not know whether it would still desire in the future. The time came when
that promise (the promise of accession laid down in the Ankara Agreement)
haunted and constrained it. Its growing body, flesh and bones were another
constraint for the mountain (the Treaties, and in the context of this thesis
specifically Article 49 TEU). It was a mountain; it could not be a bird and fly.
As much as it loved its spirit for its beauty and uniqueness, the mountain was
constrained by it as well. Yet, it still loved it above everything else. While its
body grew and became large and clumsy, its unique spirit (the “very founda-
tions”) never changed. It was its essence, without which it would not be. It
knew that something so precious had to be cherished and protected.
Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
GRENZEN AAN DE BEVOEGDHEDEN VAN EU-LIDSTATEN TOT VASTSTELLING VAN
PRIMAIR RECHT
Een gevalstudie van de voorgestelde permanente vrijwaringsclausule op het gebied
van het vrij verkeer van personen zoals opgenomen in het Onderhandelingskader voor
de toetreding van Turkije tot de Europese Unie
Staat het lidstaten van de Europese Unie vrij om toetredingsverdragen auto-
noom op te stellen of legt het recht van de EU hen daarbij beperkingen op?
Dat is de centrale onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift. De auteur verdedigt
de stelling dat beginselen en bepalingen van EU-recht inderdaad zulke beper-
kingen omvatten en identificeert vervolgens de mate waarin de lidstaten als
gevolg hiervan beperkt worden in hun verdragsluitende bevoegdheden. Meer
specifiek wordt het voorstel tot een permanente vrijwaringsclausule op het
gebied van het vrij verkeer van personen zoals opgenomen in het Onder-
handelingskader voor de toetreding van Turkije als gevalstudie aangewend
voor een meer fundamenteel onderzoek naar de aard van de EU-rechtsorde.
Het proefschrift onderzoekt meer bepaald drie deeldomeinen van het EU-
recht waaruit beperkingen op de bevoegdheid van lidstaten tot het vaststellen
van toetredingsverdragen voortvloeien. Ten eerste, de bestaande rechtsregels
voorafgaand aan eigenlijke toetredingsverdragen, in dit geval het juridische
kader van de Associatieovereenkomst EEG-Turkije (Deel I); ten tweede, de
regels, gebruiken en gewoonten inzake toetreding van nieuwe lidstaten tot
de Europese Unie (Deel II); en ten derde, de constitutionele grondslagen en
rechtsbeginselen van de EU als eigen rechtsorde (Deel III).
Het eerste hoofdstuk schetst een algemeen kader en licht de belangrijkste
juridische concepten, de methodologie en de opbouw van het proefschrift toe.
Hoofdstuk twee analyseert vervolgens de achtergrond en ontwikkeling van
het rechtsbegrip ‘associatie’.. Daarbij stelt de auteur dat een associatieovereen-
komst beschouwd kan worden als een volwaardig pre-toetredingsakkoord.
zeker in het geval van de Associatieovereenkomst EEG-Turkije (Ankaraverdrag).
Het derde hoofdstuk omvat een uitvoerige bespreking van het Ankaraverdrag
en het daarop voortbouwende associatierecht, meer bepaald de regelgeving
inzake het vrije verkeer van personen en de permanente vrijwaringsclausule
in dat verband. Na een grondige analyse van recente rechtspraak van het Hof
van Justitie van de EU hieromtrent, besluit de auteur dat de permanente
vrijwaringsclausule niet alleen een stap terug zou zijn ten opzichte van het
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EU acquis inzake het vrije verkeer van personen, maar ook een achteruitgang
ten opzichte van bestaand associatierecht.
Hoofdstukken vier en vijf behandelen vervolgens beperkingen die voort-
vloeien uit de toetredingsprocedure zelf, opgenomen in artikel 49 van het
Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie (VEU). Het vierde hoofdstuk richt zich
meer bepaald op de procedurele vereisten van die bepaling. Het behandelt
hoe uitbreiding zich heeft ontwikkeld in de praktijk sinds de eerste toetreding
van nieuwe lidstaten en definieert daarbij de rol van de EU-instellingen. Gaan-
deweg worden op die manier de belangrijkste beginselen van toetredings-
onderhandelingen die zich in de praktijk ontwikkeld hebben en die inmiddels
tot vaste gebruiken en gewoontes verheven werden, uiteengezet. Hoofdstuk
vijf analyseert vervolgens de inhoudelijke beperkingen. Aandacht wordt vooral
besteed aan het begrip ‘aanpassing’ vermeld in artikel 49 VEU. De auteur stelt
dat de term ‘aanpassing’ beperkter moet worden opgevat dan het begrip
‘wijziging’ uit artikel 48 VEU (procedure tot wijziging van de verdragen). Als
gevolg daarvan hebben lidstaten minder bewegingsvrijheid in de procedure
van artikel 49 VEU. De rest van het hoofdstuk toetst vervolgens of eerdere
toetredingsverdragen deze striktere lezing van artikel 49 VEU in acht nemen,
of dat ze maatregelen bevatten die verder gaan dan slechts ‘aanpassingen’.
De auteur identificeert een aantal bepalingen die voorbij het begrip ‘aanpas-
sing’ gaan, maar komt tot de vaststelling dat de gevolgen hiervan eerder
beperkt zijn. Verdergaande bepalingen hebben immers geen betekenisvol effect
gehad op het functioneren van de interne markt, het mededingingsrecht, of
andere gevestigde EU-beleidsdomeinen.
In het zesde en zevende hoofdstuk wordt nagegaan in welke mate de
constitutionele grondslagen van de EU zelf een beperking vormen voor de
lidstaten in hun hoedanigheid als verdragsluitende partijen bij toetreding. Zoals
veel nationale grondwettelijke hoven leerstukken hebben ontwikkeld om de
essentie van hun rechtsorde te beschermen, heeft ook het Hof van Justitie van
de EU zich in verschillende arresten en adviezen uitgelaten over wat het als
de fundamenten van de Europese rechtsorde beschouwt. Tot deze fundamen-
ten, zoals vastgelegd in de Verdragen en de rechtspraak, behoren in elk geval
de fundamentele vrijheden, met name het vrij verkeer van personen, het EU-
burgerschap, en de grondrechten. Hoofdstuk zes onderzoekt in hoeverre die
fundamenten de lidstaten zouden kunnen verhinderen om een permanente
vrijwaringsclausule in te voeren in het toetredingsverdrag met Turkije. In het
zevende hoofdstuk toont de auteur aan dat het verbod op discriminatie op
basis van nationaliteit tevens deel uitmaakt van diezelfde fundamenten. Daar-
door zouden lidstaten hier niet zomaar van kunnen afwijken in de context
van toetredingsprocedures met derde landen.
Concluderend kan dus worden vastgesteld dat verschillende soorten van
juridische beperkingen aan de lidstaten worden opgelegd in de context van
toetreding. Het resultaat hiervan is dat lidstaten bijzonder weinig speelruimte
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